find it given place in discussion of these problems by Westerners after Japan herself has abandoned it. I was surprised to notice that Mr. J. O. P. Bland, in his article in the CENTURY MAGAZINE for January, treats that pretense seriously. It is the one point where I would differ from Mr. Bland's reasoning, although I can perceive between the lines of it the restraints which his position as British subject impose at this juncture. The idea of Korea and Manchuria providing a satisfactory field for Japan's excess population is an exploded fallacy that no longer is widely entertained in Japan, and which no longer, if it ever did, has a place in Japan's genuine, as distinguished from her pretended, foreign policy.

While on this topic I may state that some false assumptions about it are widely accepted. First, it is incorrect to say that Japan is overpopulated in a territorial sense, for a large area of the territory of Japan proper is sparsely populated, and nearly half of the arable land of Japan proper is uncultivated. It therefore is not lack of land that impels Japanese to emigrate; it is a desire for economic betterment. There is a good deal of room, expressed in land, in Korea and Manchuria. Manchuria has long been a part of China, and large parts of China are even more densely populated than Japan. Yet Chinese have not gone to Manchuria in large numbers for various reasons, among which are climate and lack of communications and security. These conditions are passing, and China now would herself like to use Manchuria for her surplus population; but when she sought a few years ago to make practical effort in that way, she was blocked by Japan. That being so, I cannot accept Mr. Bland's assumption of a sort of right for Japan to take Korea and Manchuria on those grounds. If it comes to right, then China's right should supersede Japan's, for China's need for her own undeveloped territory is fully as great. If the legality and ethics of the question are to be considered at all, then China has a prior and better claim.

cal, outcome of Japan's efforts to colonize in Korea and Manchuria and in other parts of China is that, notwithstanding their Government has maintained many unjust preferential conditions for them in comparison with Koreans and Chinese, Japanese immigration to the continent of Asia is a failure. The reason is simple. In going to Korea and China, Japanese find that they have transplanted themselves to an even lower standard of living than obtains in Japan; that is, to a more cramped economic field, not a wider one. Japanese cannot, even with preferential facilities, compete in large numbers with their neighbor Orientals. Chinese and Koreans are able to, and do, undercut Japanese in business economies and standards of living. Preferential exactions in their behalf by their Government enables some Japanese, perhaps a few tens of thousands, to improve their state slightly by pursuing commercial and other occupations in China; but to the millions of Japan's peasantry China offers no lure and little opportunity for betterment.

The application of this situation to Japan's contacts with America is obvious. It is not toward the East, with its lower economic level, that Japan's millions yearn; but toward the West, with its higher economic standards, under which Japanese of all classes can cut and still find room for an immense improvement of their condition. This explains the Japanese effort to retain their position in California, Japan's tentative approaches in Mexico and other American countries; in fact, it provides the key to one phase of Japan's attitude toward the United States. In the last few years two points have taken clear shape in Japanese minds: Korea and China do not provide a satisfactory outlet for them, and the only really desirable field for emigration (North and South America) is barred to them by the United States.

I am surprised at the seeming indifference of our citizens to this supremely grave issue that confronts our nation, at their apparent failure to realize that it

own point of view and their comparative indifference to the Japanese point of view. Americans know that they have no thought of aggressing upon or attacking Japan, and they take for granted that Japanese have no thought of attacking them. Americans feel no reason why they should attack or aggress on Japan, and they jump to the conclusion that therefore Japan has no reason to attack us. Yes, I know the stock arguments and formulas of Japan's publicity propaganda in this country. They run like this: Japanese friendship for America is traditional; trade between Japan and the United States is large, and therefore precludes a conflict; Japan is too poor to make war even if she wanted to; Japan is bound by treaties to respect the "open door" and the integrity of China; Japan intends to assure those conditions by formulating a "Monroe Doctrine" for the Orient; in respect to the question of status of Japanese in the United States, Japan seeks only recognition of the principle of equality of treatment for Japanese already in this country, and is abiding by the so-called "gentlemen's agreement"; Japan desires. only to cooperate with America in protecting and developing China; and any who argue or show facts to the contrary are "irresponsible" persons trying to "make trouble."

All of these arguments are fallacious in hypothesis, and most of them are untrue as to fact. As to the oft-repeated idea that Japan's trade with the United States precludes thought of war on her part, it is sufficient to recall that, a few weeks before the great war in Europe started, a prominent German statesman cited the vast commerce between Germany and England as a reason why those nations never could become enemies, while the truth was that the very magnitude and complexity of those relations, with their incidental competitive features, were among the chief causes of this war. And such conditions will be among the chief causes of future wars. Japan's "traditional" friendship for America is worth as much as is her traditional friendship for China or as any

international traditional friendship is; while the fact is that just now the Japanese feel a very lively antipathy and contempt for this country, its institutions and its citizens, and by a calculated process have been educated to regard our nation as Japan's next antagonist in the series of wars required to establish the hegemony of the far East and the mastery of the Pacific in Japan's keeping. Japan's poverty and near-bankruptcy, instead of being a conclusive restraint, is one of her chief reasons for going to war; for she is grinding her people with taxation to maintain large military and naval establishments with the expectation of recouping at the expense of rich and helpless nations. Japan professes to adhere to the "open door" policy, but she strangles it in every way she can. Japan, for effect in America, likens her policy toward China to the Monroe Doctrine, whereas it is the absolute antithesis of the Monroe Doctrine both in hypothesis and working method. Japan pretends that the "point of honor" is her sole concern in the California issue; but in reality the Japanese are resolved to force their way into the Western Hemisphere by arms, if they can, provided they cannot accomplish it by diplomacy.

To repeat, there are two grave issues between Japan and the United States, the fate of China and Japanese immigration to the Americas. This latter issue does not touch the United States exclusively, but also all our neighbor republics to the south. This brings in both the old Monroe Doctrine and the new Pan-Americanism, for a Japanese colonization of countries on this hemisphere, in its political and economic reactions, would affect the United States scarcely less than a Japanese colonization of our own States. To Americans this issue probably will seem more important than the fate of China, although it is not really so. It is nearer, anyhow, and therefore looms larger.

Let us strip the immigration issue to the bone, and see what it amounts to. There are two distinct points of view, Japan's and ours. Americans pretty well understand their own. It is briefly: Ori

entals have lower economic standards than ours, and therefore disturb our earning and living conditions; they have different political and religious ideas, which cannot easily be adjusted to ours; they have different racial and social characteristics, and therefore cannot be assimilated into our social body. So we cannot endure their presence here in large numbers.

Japan's point of view is merely that her people want to come to Western countries and to have the same rights and opportunities here that others have. The real pressure behind this desire I have already indicated, and it is a condition that cannot be ameliorated by arguments, or satisfied by concessions to "honor." In support of her point of view, Japan advances certain arguments, some of which seem plausible at first blush, but all of which are inconsistent in some degree, and almost wholly irreconcilable with what our nation can possibly concede. Japan insists that her subjects shall have the same position and rights in the United States as, let us say, Englishmen or Dutch or French or Germans. That seems fair enough, but consider. With whom does it rest to say who shall and who shall not join in our nationality, share our political and social life? With this nation, of course. Το submit that decision in any part to a foreign nation would mean to qualify our sovereignty. I am not arguing that Japanese should be excluded. I only contend that Americans have the exclusive right to decide the conditions of citizenship and residence in their own country. A good deal can be said in favor of the Japanese even as residents of this nation. That is not the question between the two nations. We reserve to ourselves the right to exclude or admit whom we will, according to standards of citizenship which we make for ourselves. From this position, I am sure, Americans cannot be budged except by superior force of arms.

The small group of intelligent statesmen who control the Japanese Government understand this perfectly, yet they keep the question alive. It is inconsistent for any nation to try to force its subjects

or citizens upon other nations, thus to expatriate them. Are Japanese immigrants to America so undesirable that their own Government should want to get rid of them by converting them into American citizens? Take it another way. From remarks recently made in this country by Baron Shibusawa, Japan does not care about her subjects becoming naturalized in this country, for thereby they would be lost to Japan, if their change was genuine, but only wants them to be treated like other foreigners. Here, again, America's answer necessarily is that she herself must reserve and exercise the right to discriminate among foreigners, according to circumstances. Our general immigration laws are a long list of discriminations; furthermore, Japan herself imposes, in that country, nearly the same disabilities on foreigners to which she objects here.

Does not this brief analysis suggest that behind Japan's outward position there is a deeper motive? It is clear that no concession that it is possible for the United States to make, without qualifying its internal sovereign powers, can meet what Japanese really want to obtain. So here we have a dead-lock, which can be loosened only by one side receding or by a fight.

It would seem, I grant, that no nation in Japan's position would be mad enough to try to force this legally untenable issue with another great nation; yet the present tone of the Japanese press and recent utterances of Japanese leaders and statesmen show plainly that the thought is seriously entertained, and furthermore that they think the hour has come to force it. With Japanese the feeling is now or never.

To comprehend Japan's point of view, it is necessary to understand her true relation to the great war, in which she is nominally a participant on the side of the Allies. To Japan the great war spelled opportunity, as predicted by Count Hayashi when he wrote, "She will be able to reap advantage for herself." And she has been a diligent reaper, too; but she has not yet got all her reapings safely housed, nor

is she yet convinced that the opportunity is exhausted.

I was in China when the war began and until recently, and I was a close observer of events. It was well understood that the British in China were opposed to Japan's participation at that time and tried to prevent it; but when Japan showed determination to enter, Great Britain was constrained outwardly to welcome her as an ally, and sent a detachment of British troops to take part in the operations against Tsingtau. That was intensely irritating to Japan, whose statesmen and publicists well understood the distrust that prompted Great Britain's action, and the feeling was so strong that the position of the small British force with the expedition was very unpleasant. However, Britain saved her point by technically joining in the Tsingtau venture, and thereby taking title to have a say in the eventual disposal of the place and the settlement of questions that inevitably would arise. Japan's subsequent course in China further strained British susceptibilities, but the exigencies of the European War imposed outward harmony. As time passed, the possibility of Japan sending troops to aid. the Allies in Europe was broached, and as far back as a year ago means of compensating Japan were discussed, one proposal being to cede her a piece of territory in French Indo-China. Great Britain, which power has special reasons for not caring to enhance an Oriental nation's military. prowess with her own Oriental subjects, has opposed the use of Japanese troops in Europe, India, and Egypt. The allied powers have few delusions about Japan's motives and attitude. They know that if Japan sends troops to Europe, she will want large compensation, and they also know that there is only one form of compensation that will satisfy Japan and which the allied powers can possibly deliver.

Japan's price for sending troops to Europe is a free hand in China and the northern Pacific. There you have it. Put another way, that means that the Allies, having no assets of their own to give Japan

that would be worth anything to her, might in extremity allow Japan to take her chief pay from China. Such a course would mean a considerable sacrifice of British and French interests and prestige in the far East, a price that will not be paid except as a last resort. It would mean, also, that the interests and prospects of the United States, under the Hay Doctrine, would also be part of the compensation to Japan. If such a deal is made, the United States will not be consulted, but will be left to discover it, as it discovers most lessons of the war, in the "logic of events." I take it that few people in America caught the real significance of a news despatch out of Washington, published recently in the newspapers, of a plan to have China join the allied combination. This suggestion caused a furor in Japan, where the press violently assailed it as a blow at Japan, which it really was, being a device to protect British and French interests in China against the insidious machinations of Japan during the course of the war. Of course China's participation would not be felt either way in the military and naval operations, and the scheme. did not contemplate her active participation.

This glance at the inner motives, the "wheels within wheels" of present-day far Eastern diplomacy, may illuminate Japan's actual international position. It is precarious, to say the least. Opportunity looms large for her, but it may pass before she can completely seize it, and there is a possibility that even what she has gained may be taken away when the war ends unless she can better secure it. The period from the present to the end of the war marks, perhaps, the crisis of Japan's national existence as a world power, when she must either firmly grasp her opportunity and fortify her position or see her vaulting ambitions fade forever. By the same tokens, this period must also be a critical one in relations between Japan and the United States.

The determining factors can be recounted succinctly. For years Japan, anticipating this crisis, has strained every

resource to be prepared for it, has feverishly and as secretly as was possible pushed her naval and military expansion, while using devices to restrain similar development by the United States. The margin of proportion in America's favor was narrowing rapidly when the great war came, and a few years more would probably have seen it closed, and swung to Japan's side. Because of the war, much has happened to upset previous calculations, and of these new developments none is more important to Japan than what is called the "preparedness" movement in this country. If any adequate defensive program goes through, based on recognition of existing conditions. among nations, then Japan's hope of slipping by America in armed power without this nation knowing or thinking about it is disappointed. Certain conditions and proportions now existing never may occur in combination again.

To put it flatly, Japan has betrayed Great Britain in China, and the only thing that will prevent collapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance after this war is because Great Britain cannot then find the necessary equivalent of support elsewhere. The true interest and equity of all the Western powers in China is to sustain the "open door" and the national stability of China. Japan has recently made some kind of secret trade with Russia to offset the expected defection of Great Britain; but well she knows that is an unstable and insecure dependency. After the war, Japan faces the (to her) terror of international isolation, with the consequences of her diplomatic obliquity reacting upon her, and extinguishing forever her dream of super-greatness. Furthermore, the United States, shaken awake, will not at once go to sleep again.

In following her chosen course, Japan has adopted the old Russian theory of diplomacy, the guiding principle of which is duplicity behind a mask of amiability, while her working formula is based on German militaristic efficiency pounded by the Bernhardi school. To-day Germany, of Western nations, represents. Japan's real ideal. Although technically

ex

at war with Germany, the Japanese press teems with flattering references to that power; while in the same columns the United States, a friendly nation, is continuously and opprobriously criticized.

There is one feature of the anti-American movement in Japan that is unique, I believe. It dates from the Portsmouth treaty, when, as is popularly reckoned, President Roosevelt took a prominent part in securing peace. Behind the scenes it is well understood that the Japanese Government was anxious for peace at that time, although assuming the attitude of victors, and that Mr. Roosevelt's activity was in the nature of coming to Japan's assistance diplomatically. But the peace terms were very disappointing to the Japanese people, who had been led by their Government to expect something different; and a consequence was that the meddling of the United States was blamed for robbing Japan of substantial fruits of victory. Of course the Japanese Government knew the truth, yet, with ample means to do so, it did nothing to counteract this popular impression, which obtains to this day, nourished among other sources for the prevailing dislike of America among Japanese. It is doubtful if a parallel exists in modern times for this instance of a friendly and beneficial act by one nation for another nation being deliberately used or allowed to create antagonism against the nation doing the favor.

At present, and during the remainder of the great war, the United States is exposed more than usual to an attack by Japan. Japan, because of the war, is herself freed from immediate complications; she can turn her back on Russia without alarm, and deterring influences of Great Britain and France are for the time ineffective. The United States probably is now at the minimum of its comparative armed power, and totally lacking in supports, moral and practical, from other powers, a condition not likely ever to occur again. China is helplessly weak. The Panama Canal is temporarily obstructed. The defenses of American possessions and strategical positions in the Pacific are in