Is there anything more in this than was apprehended and expressed by Mencius? Butler says in the conclusion of his first discourse that 'Men follow their nature to a certain degree but not entirely; their actions do not come up to the whole of what their nature leads them to; and they often violate their nature.' This also Mencius declares in his own forceful manner :-'When men having these four principles, yet say of themselves that they cannot develop them, they play the thief with themselves, and he who says of his prince that he cannot develop them, plays the thief with his prince'.' 'Men differ from one another in regard to the principles of their nature;—some as much again as others, some five times as much, and some to an incalculable amount:-it is because they cannot carry out fully their natural powers"."

Second proof that

human nature is

-that it is a con

stitution, where the higher princi

ples should serve

the lower.

So much for the first or preliminary view of human nature insisted on by Mencius, that it contains principles which are disinterested and virtuous. But there wants something more to make good the position that virtue ought to formed for virtue: be supreme, and that it is for it, in opposition to vice, that our nature is formed. To use some of the 'licentious talk' which Butler puts into the mouth of an opponent:-'Virtue and religion require not only that we do good to others, when we are led this way, by benevolence and reflection happening to be stronger than other principles, passions, or appetites; but likewise that the whole character be formed upon thought and reflection; that every action be directed by some determinate rule, some other rule than the strength or prevalence of any principle or passion. What sign is there in our nature (for the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from thence) that this was intended by its Author? Or how does so various and fickle a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? . . . As brutes have various instincts, by which they are carried on to the end the Author of their nature intended them for, is not man in the same condition, with this difference

really as though it were in a higher degree and more extensive.' 'It is sufficient that the seeds of it be implanted in our nature.' The illustration from a child falling into a well must be pronounced a happy one. How much lower Mencius could go may be seen from his conversation with king Hsüan, Bk. I. Pt. I. vii, whom he leads to a consciousness of his commiserating mind from the fact that he had not been able to bear the frightened appearance of an ox which was being led by to be killed, and ordered it to be spared. The kindly heart that was moved by the suffering of an animal had only to be carried out, to suffice for the love and protection of all within the four seas.

only, that to his instincts (i.e. appetites and passions) is added the principle of reflection or conscience? And as brutes act agreeably to their nature in following that principle or particular instinct which for the present is strongest in them; does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey the law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion or conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him? . . . Let every one then quietly follow his nature; as passion, reflection, appetite, the several parts of it, happen to be the strongest; but let not the man of virtue take it upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute; since these, equally with him, obey and follow their nature 1.'

To all this Butler replies by showing that the principle of reflection or conscience is 'not to be considered merely as a principle in the heart, which is to have some influence as well as others, but as a faculty, in kind and in nature, supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority of being so;' that the difference between this and the other constituents of human nature is not 'a difference in strength or degree,' but 'a difference in nature and in kind;' that it was placed within to be our proper governor; to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and motives of action:-this is its right and office; thus sacred is its authority.' It follows from the view of human nature thus established, that 'the inward frame of man is a system or constitution; whose several parts are united, not by a physical principle of individuation, but by the respects they have to each other, the chief of which is the subjection which the appetites, passions, and particular affections have to the one supreme principle of reflection or conscience.'

Now, the substance of this reasoning is to be found in Mencius. Human nature-the inward frame of man-is with him a system or constitution as much as with Butler. He says, for instance :"There is no part of himself which a man does not love; and as he loves all, so he must nourish all. There is not an inch of skin which he does not love, and so there is not an inch of skin which he will not nourish. FOR EXAMINING WHETHER HIS WAY OF NOURISHING BE GOOD OR NOT, WHAT OTHER RULE IS THERE BUT THIS, THAT HE DETERMINE BY REFLECTING ON HIMSELF WHERE IT SHOULD BE APPLIED ?

'Some parts of the body are noble and some ignoble; some great

and some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, and he who nourishes the great is a great man '.'

Again:-Those who follow that part of themselves which is great are great men; those who follow that part which is little are little men 2.'

The great part of ourselves is the moral elements of our constitution; the lower part is the appetites and passions that centre in self. He says finely:- There is a nobility of Heaven, and there is a nobility of man. Benevolence, righteousness, self-consecration, and fidelity, with unwearied joy in what is good;--these constitute the nobility of Heaven. To be a duke, a noble, or a great officer;— this constitutes the nobility of man 3.'

There is one passage very striking:- For the mouth to desire sweet tastes, the eye to desire beautiful colours, the ear to desire pleasant sounds, the nose to desire fragrant odours, and the four limbs to desire ease and rest;-these things are natural. But there is the appointment of Heaven in connexion with them; and the superior man does not say of his pursuit of them, "It is my nature.” The exercise of love between father and son, the observance of righteousness between sovereign and minister, the rules of ceremony between host and guest, the display of knowledge in recognising the worthy, and the fulfilling the heavenly course by the sage ;these are the appointment of Heaven. But there is an adaptation of our nature for them; and the superior man does not say, in reference to them, "It is the appointment of Heaven 1."'

From these paragraphs it is quite clear that what Mencius considered as deserving properly to be called the nature of man, was not that by which he is a creature of appetites and passions, but that by which he is lifted up into the higher circle of intelligence and virtue. By the phrase, 'the appointment of Heaven,' most Chinese scholars understand the will of Heaven, limiting in the first case the gratification of the appetites, and in the second the exercise of the virtues. To such limitation Mencius teaches there ought to be a cheerful submission so far as the appetites are concerned, but where the virtues are in question, we are to be striving after them notwithstanding adverse and opposing circumstances. THEY ARE

1 Bk. VI. Pt. I. xiv. Pt. II. xxiv.

2 Bk. VI. Pt. I. xv.

3 Bk. VI. Pt. I. xvi.

4

* Bk. VII.

OUR NATURE, what we were made for, what we have to do. I will refer but to one other specimen of his teaching on this subject. 'The will,' he said, using that term for the higher moral nature in activity, the will is the leader of the passion-nature. The passionnature pervades and animates the body. The will is first and chief, and the passion-nature is subordinate to it '.'

My readers can now judge for themselves whether I exaggerated at all in saying that Mencius's doctrine of human nature was, as nearly as possible, identical with that of Bishop Butler. Sir James Mackintosh has said of the sermons to which I have made reference, and his other cognate discourses, that in them Butler 'taught truths more capable of being exactly distinguished from the doctrines of his predecessors, more satisfactorily established by him, more comprehensively applied to particulars, more rationally connected with each other, and therefore more worthy of the name of discovery, than any with which we are acquainted; if we ought not, with some hesitation, to except the first steps of the Grecian philosophers towards a Theory of Morals. It is to be wished that the attention of this great scholar had been called to the writings of our philosopher. Mencius was senior to Zeno, though a portion of their lives synchronised. Butler certainly was not indebted to him for the views which he advocated; but it seems to me that Mencius had left him nothing to discover.

The proper use of Mencius's views thus far considered.

But the question now arises-'Is the view of human nature propounded by Mencius correct?' So far as yet appears, I see not how the question can be answered otherwise than in the affirmative. Man was formed for virtue. Be it that his conduct is very far from being conformed to virtue, that simply fastens on him the shame of guilt. Fallen as he may be,-fallen as I believe and know he is, his nature still bears its testimony, when properly interrogated, against all unrighteousness. Man, heathen man, a Gentile without the law, is still a law to himself. So the apostle Paul affirms; and to no moral teacher of Greece or Rome can we appeal for so grand an illustration of the averment as we find in Mencius. I would ask those whom his sayings offend, whether it would have been better for his countrymen if he had taught a contrary doctrine, and told them that man's nature is bad, and that the more they obeyed all its

1 Bk. II. Pt. I. ii. 9. Dissertation; on Butler.

2 Encyclopædia Britannica (8th edition), Second Preliminary

lusts and passions, the more would they be in accordance with it, and the more pursuing the right path? Such a question does not need a reply. The proper use of Mencius's principles is to reprove the Chinese-and ourselves as well-of the thousand acts of sin of which they and we are guilty, that come within their sweep and under their condemnation,

for it.

From the ideal of man to his actualism there is a vast descent. Between what he ought to be and what he is, the contrast is How Mencius melancholy. 'Benevolence,' said our philosopher, 'is admitted much the characteristic of man'.' It is 'the wide house in actual evil, and how he accounted which the world should dwell,' while propriety is 'the correct position in which the world should ever be found,' and righteousness is 'the great path which men should ever be pursuing.' In opposition to this, however, hatred, improprieties, unrighteousness are constant phenomena of human life. We find men hateful and hating one another, quenching the light that is in them, and walking in darkness to perform all deeds of shame. 'There is none that doeth good; no, not one.' Mencius would have denied this last sentence, claiming that the sages should be excepted from it; but he is ready enough to admit the fact that men in general do evil and violate the law of their nature. They sacrifice the noble portion of themselves for the gratification of the ignoble; they follow that part which is little, and not that which is great. He can say nothing further in explanation of the fact. He points out indeed the effect of injurious circumstances, and the power of evil example; and he has said several things on these subjects worthy of notice:-'It is not to be wondered at that the king is not wise! Suppose the case of the most easily growing thing in the world;-if you let it have one day's genial heat, and then expose it for ten days to cold, it will not be able to grow. It is but seldom that I have an audience of the king, and when I retire, there come all those who act upon him like the cold. Though I succeed in bringing out some buds of goodness, of what avail is it'?' 'In good years the children of the people are most of them good, while in bad years the most of them abandon themselves to evil. It is not owing to their natural powers conferred on them by Heaven that they are thus different: the abandonment is owing to the circumstances through which they allow their minds to be

1 Bk. VII. Pt. II. xvi. VOL. II.

Bk. III. Pt. II. ii. 3.
F

3 Bk. VI. Pt. L. ix.