Puslapio vaizdai

of the English Press. At last the fat man germinated an idea exquisitely Andalucian.

"Will you accept thirty-seven pesetas and fifty centimos?"

"That's it!" exclaimed the judge, thumping the table.


Will you accept thirty-seven pesetas and fifty centimos! You cannot write to the British Consul, nor can you arouse the English Press for two pesetas fifty."

In a part they were right. Had they but known it, I wouldn't have dared to write to the British Consul for five pesetas, nor yet maybe for the whole forty. Still, old boy, don't you think that the British Press may yet be roused for two pesetas fifty? However, the solution was 80 perfect that I could not disturb it. I stood up, and made the judge my best bow.

"In deference to your exertions, Señor Juez," I said, I said, "I will accept thirty-seven pesetas fifty centimos. But I will still give five pesetas, nay, ten pesetas, to the poor."

The judge rubbed his hands. He was very pleased with his sharpness. He had out-manœuvred the British Press. He sent his clerk running to find Miguel.

The carrier came in, looking as bad-tempered as his dried-up face would exhibit; his son followed him in a sullen mood. As soon as Miguel came into the room he began to talk.

"There has been no need for all this, Señor Juez," he cried. "I was about to pay this

fellow when he called me a thief. After that, of course, honour being compromised, I was forced-____”

The judge stilled him with a wave of the hand.

"You will pay the Englishman thirty-seven pesetas fifty centimos," he ordered.

Miguel consulted with his son in undertones.

"Very well," he agreed at last.

With an evident reluctance, from various pockets they produced a heap of silver coins, which with some care, fingering the cash lovingly, they counted out under my nose. There were four large silver five- peseta pieces, the rest being made up of two-peseta, one-peseta, and fifty centimo coins. Spain has not suffered as has most European countries by a withdrawal of her silver currency. I thanked the carters, handed over two of the douros to the judge, shovelled the rest of the money into my pocket, where it made a weighty bulge, bowed to the judicial committee, and took my leave exultant. I, a mere Englishman, had beaten the Spaniard at his own game.

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"Es falsa," she said. It was. A thought troubled me. I paid her with another peseta, drank my wine without relish, and hurried back to my posada bedroom. Here I poured Miguel's money on to the bed. Fool that I was! I should have remembered that Spain is rotten with snide coin. The general effect of legality, the judge, his committee, had flurried me. Slowly I sorted out the false silver which Miguel had palmed off amongst the rest. Miguel proved to be a man of humour: there was ex

actly seven pesetas fifty centimos worth of counterfeit money.

He had paid me, under the very eyes of the judge-but how much did the latter suspect?-the very thirty pesetas first offered. And I had given ten pesetas of them to the poor.

All that afternoon I was packing my bags. I left Caldoz with the dawn of next day. Too well did I know what Caldoz would be talking about. Viva Espana, no obstante!



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THE purpose of this study is to bring to notice two military leaders whose claims to inclusion in the rôle of the Great Captains have been almost entirely overlooked. It deals with two amazing, if almost unknown, figures. First, Jenghiz Khan, the founder of the Mongol Empire, the greatest land power the world has known, the bounds of which made the empires of Rome and Alexander appear almost insignificant in comparison. Second, his great general, Subutai, who,

after his death, carried the Mongol menace into the heart of Europe, and shook the fabric of mediæval civilisation in the West. The study may serve to show that the strategical ability of these two leaders is matched in history only by that of Napoleon; that the tactical methods of the Mongol Army hold lessons of importance for present-day students; and finally, it may convince us that we do wrong to dismiss lightly the military potentialities of the Orient.

If we study a physical map of Asia and Europe, we can trace a vast belt of open and level territory, though of varying altitudes, which stretches from the Yellow Sea in the Far East to the Baltic Sea and the Danube in the West. This chain of plains and plateaux is practically unwooded, and only broken by a few well-defined mountain ranges. It is the trough of the world's migrations, the path by which the great racial invasions have come to Europe and to China. Along it have passed the trans-continental routes of commerce from the early caravans to the Siberian Railway. But in even greater volume has it been the


channel for armies, for it offers few obstacles to movement, and there uniquely the all-essential principle of mobility has full rein.

In the centre of the continent lies the Mongolian Plateau, barred by lofty and inaccessible Tibet from the fertile plains of India, but with comparatively easy access to the rich fields of China to the East, and of Western Turkestan and Russia to the West. Here, in this bare bleak enclosure, is the birthplace of the TurcoMongol race, and the conditions of their environment have given the race their special characteristics. The European peoples have become seafarers



by reason of their lengthy rated, these off-shoots retain coast-lines and close touch with the sea. The Mongolian peoples are horsemen because constant and far-reaching land movement was necessary to obtain pasturage, and a warlike race because the barrenness of the land and the resulting migrations have brought them into repeated conflict with other tribes and peoples. Long before the days of Jenghiz Khan, this lateral expansion of the Turco-Mongol race, and their pressure on the peoples who lay to the West, had produced barbarian invasions which overran Europe and overthrew the Roman Empire, culminating in the invasions of the Huns. The Bulgars, and the Magyars of Hungary, are of the Turco-Mongol race, as are the Cossacks of Southern Russia. Yet though long sepa

the instincts and characteristics
of the race. They settle only
in open level country - the
plains of Hungary, the steppes
of Russia-which recalls their
ancestral pastures.
ancestral pastures. Their very
tribal names are often
reminder of the essential
unity of the race-" Cossack
is but a corruption of Kasak,
which means separated from
the tribe," and Kirghiz
implies "errants." They share
many of the same physical
and social characteristics.
They are essentially a war-
like and not an industrial
race; they do not take kindly
to the arts of peace. "Man is
born in the house, and dies on
the field" is one of their pro-
verbs, and the ties of family
and dwelling-place are as noth-
ing to those of military com-

The father of Jenghiz Khan, Yesukai, had attained the overlordship of a congery of Mongolian tribes. His son, Temuchin, to give him his true name, was born in a tent on the bank of the river Onon in 1162 A.D., and succeeded his father at the age of thirteen. A number of the tribes seized the occasion to break away, and the early years of his reign were occupied with the successful endeavour to re-establish his sway. This done, he gradually extended his rule over the whole of the Mongolian steppes. It was

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the rich and fertile empire of with Jenghiz Khan's] desire the Shah of Khwarizm (Karis- for expansion, brought about mian Empire), which embraced a conflict, the signal for what is to day Turkestan, which was the Shah's folly Persia, and Northern India. in putting to death the envoys The latter's intrigues, combined of Jenghiz.

Fuller knowledge has dispelled the excuse of medieval historians that the Mongol victories were due to an overwhelming superiority of numbers. Quality rather than quantity was the secret of their amazingly rapid sequence of successes. Alone of all the armies of their time had they grasped the essentials of strategy, while their tactical mechanism was so perfect that the higher conceptions of tactics were unnecessary.

To a unique degree had they attained the "intellectual discipline" preached by Marshal Foch. The supreme command was in the hands of the Emperor; but once the plan was decided upon, the subordinate generals executed the actual operations without interference, and with but the rarest communication with the supreme command. The nominal command of the various armies was held by royal princes, but the actual control was exercised by generals of experience, of whom the most famous were Chépé and Subutai in Subutai in the Western campaigns, and Mukhuli in China. Merit and not seniority was the key to advancement: thus both Chépé


and Subutai rose to high command before they were twentyfive, over the heads of far senior generals.

The organisation of the army was on a decimal basis. The strongest unit was the touman, a division of 10,000 troops, which could act as an independent force. The army was made up by a temporary grouping of toumans, generally three. Each touman was composed of 10 regiments of 1000 men, and each regiment of 10 squadrons, and that again into 10 troops of 10 men apiece.

In addition there was a touman d'élite, the guard, which usually formed a general reserve in the hands of the commander-in-chief. There were also various formations of auxiliary troops.

For their protective equipment ment the Mongols had an armour of tanned hide in four pieces, composed of overlapping plates, which were lacquered to prevent humidity. The shield was only used when on sentry duty.

Their weapons comprised a lance, a curved sabre with sharpened point, suitable either for cutting or thrusting, and

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