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must have one head, and all the departments, if we are to have system and organization, must be under the control of one chief executive. Each superior must have the appointment and removal of his subordinates, and each subordinate must be under the control of his immediate superior. This is just as true of national and State administration as it is of the administration of cities or private enterprises. It is true as to all work to be done by men. We must be able to centralize public opinion. There must be, as to each piece of work, one single official, who may get the honor of good work, and on whom we may heap the odium of bad work. Men say that it is unsafe to trust power in one hand: it is much more unsafe to divide it. Our greatest security with all officials under any proper system is in the power of public opinion. But public opinion must be able to find its object quickly, if it is to strike.

7. Each man in the service should be selected for fitness-for his one work.

But under our Constitution, and under what is called parliamentary government, the chief officers of the people are in fact selected for their fitness for election work. The chief places in the executive administration are put up as a prize, to be fought for in an election contest, to be won by the most skillful election workers. With us the contest comes at regular periods. We have a great national campaign once in four years between two national armies, with smaller local battles each year, which serve to keep the troops always under arms, and in a high state of discipline. Under the English system, the contest is carried on in the House of Commons, between two champions, the decision as to who is the winner being given by vote of the House, with an occasional appeal "to the country." And on the European Continent it is a never-ending scramble for place, between small factions. With us in the United States it is government by campaign, in England it is government by prize fight, on the Continent it is government by mêlée -and, with all of us, government by election machine. The science of war by election has, with us, reached the highest stage of development yet recorded. The civilized nations of Europe are slowly toiling onward in our path of progress. M. Gambetta in France and Mr. Chamberlain in England are, consciously or unconsciously, helping to establish great national election machines, under which fitness for election work will

be the test by which public officials will be selected, for local as well as national administration.

8. Every man in the service should be removable at once-for his own failure to do well his one work.

What we must secure is the responsibility of individuals for the work of individuals. But under our system of short terms, with a large number of elective offices, many of which become vacant at the same time, we lose sight of individuals, and see only the great organizations, to which the individuals profess allegiance. It is always a question of "platforms," almost never a question of whether this man or that man has given good administration. But this attempt to mass responsibility destroys it.

What we must have is a system which will, in city affairs, secure at the head of one department responsibility for that one department, and at the head of the whole city administration responsibility for the whole administration. When we come to State affairs, we wish responsibility for the management of our prisons, canals, and our State finances. And when we come to national affairs, we wish at the head of each department responsibility for that one department; and with the President of the United States, we wish responsibility, not for opinions, or platforms, or "grand old principles," before election, but for administrative results after election. We wish, not a "policy," but performance-a thorough supervision and efficient management of our executive administration.

This responsibility for working results, as the experience of many centuries has shown, can be secured in only one way, and that is, by the summary removal of all inefficient men. Removing men at the end of four years, or of one year, does not serve our needs. The removal must be immediate, if it is to have any good effect on the other men in the service. And if we wait till the next general election, there is a great possibility that the man will not be removed at all.

We must, too, in order to enforce responsibility, remove the right man, the one who makes the failure, and not remove one man for the failure of another, or the heads of twenty departments for the failure of one, or a constitutional adviser because his chief will not take his advice.

We must, too, make the removal for the right thing. We must not remove the head of the War Office for a blunder in the House

of Commons, nor for a failure to do good election work.

And this power of removal must exist as to the chief executive, as well as subordinates the mayor of a city, the governor of a State, and the President of the United States. The chief is the man we must deal with. And he should be removed for the right reason for a failure to give good administration-by a two-thirds vote of the supreme legislative body. Members of the supreme body would be removable, as they now are, by vote of the body itself.

9. The process of election should be used only to fill vacancies, when there are vacancies. It should not be used constantly, at fixed periods, in the fruitless attempt to thereby enforce responsibility.

But that is what we have really been trying to do under our system as it now stands. We have been acting on the belief that by electing men frequently we secured their responsibility to the people. It secures only responsibility to the election machine. Aggregate removal by aggregate election is not a sound political process. Removal of individuals for individual faults is the only way in which responsibility can be enforced. To talk of the responsibility of a "party' is like talking of the responsibility of the whole collective human race.

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10. For supreme supervision and control, there should be the one common judgment and will of the whole people.

This common judgment and will of the whole people must be uttered, as to the local affairs of the small districts, where citizens can meet and act as one body, by the citizens themselves; as to city, county, State, and national affairs, by their assemblies of their chosen delegates. This is the only way, as has been shown, in which such a thing as a common judgment of the whole people can be had. If we try, as to the affairs of a city, a State, or of the whole nation, to have that common judgment uttered at the polls, by the citizens themselves, nine millions of them, through periodical elections, we get, not the people's voice, only a collection of paper ballots. The hand may be the hand of the people, but the voice is the voice of the election machine.

11. Every political act should be open. Above all, let the vote of the individual be open. No man should be allowed to vote who has not the courage to have his vote known. Secret voting by ballot is the pet device of the professional corruptionist.

| Here, as everywhere, publicity is the essential to honest action. We say we wish "responsible government." Let responsibility begin here, with the responsibility of the individual citizen for his individual action. We shall then soon make the purchase of votes impossible.

12. Time and quiet must be had to secure a healthy political growth.

Our present political system, taking it at its theoretical best, is a system of government, by revolution, at regular periods. Parliamentary government, taking it also at its theoretical best, is a system of government, by revolution, at irregular periods. The theory of each system is that one group of men is to control public affairs for a time, and that then, if the people are dissatisfied with their control, there shall be a clearing out of the men who are at the heads of all the executive departments. ments. Changing a large number of subordinates would be comparatively harmless; but we are continually changing the men at the head. We might as well keep changing a man's brain, and hope for vigorous and healthy life. Mere automatic action of the extremities is not enough in political organisms. We must have a brain and a will.

What we want is, not a series of revolu tions, but a system which allows steady growth, a gradual renewal of single organs, as they die or become useless-a system where single men can be weeded out, and new men can be brought in, as the needs of the service require, instead of having these annual and quadrennial earthquakes and avalanches. We must have government by evolution, not government by revolution. Men must have time-to find their places, to learn what their work is and how to do it, to do their work after they learn it, to find new work to be done, and new ways of doing it. Men must have time-to become adjusted one to another, to grow into a living and working organization. The organization must have timefor its leaders to be found, for them to grow. The organizers at the head must have time-to find the worth of the men under them, and to train their successors. Abuses, even, must have time-to localize themselves, and develop their true remedies.

This perpetual turmoil of elections, where year after year we go through the empty form of placing in a box a list of names of men we do not know, put in our hands by men whom we do not respect, may have for some men in the community certain


pecuniary advantages. But it is not gov- | imperfections or abuses. The aim here is to find some remedy for those abuses that we now see. Others will, no doubt, arise under any system which we may adopt. But these we already know. These we must deal with as well as we can.

The conclusion of this branch of the argument, then, is this:

In order to secure a people's government, in order to have the people's common work done according to the people's common will, we must have a system with these main features:

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11. Every political act should be open. 12. Time and quiet must be had to secure a healthy political growth.

III. And what would be the results which such a system would give us?

Let two points be understood.

It is not intended that the system here set forth is the one which we must adopt. It has already been said that this problem of the people is too large a one for any one man to deal with. What is here submitted is given only by way of suggestion-to draw out other schemes and discussion, so that in the end we can work out a true solution of the problem before us.

Nor is it expected that, under any system that can be devised, there will be no

So much being premised, let us, as far as we can, forecast the probable working of the scheme here proposed.

1. This system would make things free. It will make the people free to choose the men who are to have the chief control of their public affairs. It meets directly the disturbing causes in our present system. It does away with the large election districts, restores the old town-meeting, as the basis of all national and State as well as local government-makes the town-meeting, as it were, the single cell of political organization. The system also lessens greatly the amount of election work to be done, and leaves no official dependent on the carrying of the next election for his present support or future advancement. Moreover, as far as any system can, it makes it impossible for any band of men, by any possible completeness of combination, to arrange beforehand the result of an election. Any combination for that purpose would have to capture the whole people. And there is only one thing that can capture the whole people, and that is a great reputation.

2. It would specialize, instead of centralize, the different powers in the government.

Under our present system of frequent elections, by direct popular vote, through large districts, these vast national election machines get the control of everything, of local as well as national affairs. If, on the contrary, as is here proposed, we decrease the number of elections and elective offices, decrease the size of election districts, and make the national, State, and local elections distinct, by having distinct electoral conventions, we shall separate the administration of national, State, and local affairs, one from the others, as far as they can be, and as far as they should be.

3. The system would enforce the responsibility of public servants.

That is, it would provide the means for removing single individuals for their single failures to do their single work, as soon as the failure took place. And it would place the power to make this removal, as to each executive official, in the hands of the one man who would be best fitted to use it, and who would have a stronger motive than any other man or body of men to use the power


wisely—that is, the official's immediate supe-
rior. Under a system where power is trusted
in the hands of single men, when affairs go
wrongly, then public opinion is at once
centered on the man who has the power.
He is driven to use his power of removal
of his subordinate in self-defense. He gets
all the odium which comes from the bad
work, and all the praise for the good work,
which is done by the men under him.
might, no doubt, misuse his power. But
all the inducements would be in favor of his
using his power wisely. But now the in-
ducements are, in the main, in favor of his
using his power unwisely and corruptly.


4. It would promote the efficiency of the public service.

Again, it is the tendencies of the system with which we are dealing.

tainly be a man who has already shown administrative talent. Very probably he would be a man who had already distinguished himself in the public service. Above him would be a body of men who would have the power to remove him, at any time, in case his administration of affairs were not satisfactory. It would be very certain that they would not agree to remove him, by a two-thirds vote, if his administration were able and honest. So long as he gave good administration, he would be certain of holding his position, and of gaining a great reputation among a great people. All his influences and surroundings would be in favor of his giving us the best management of affairs that he could. If he should try to appoint favorites to office, he would at once injure the working of the force under him. He would arouse opposition everywhere. He would concentrate on himself alone the combined hostility, of the people, who wish their affairs well managed; of the men above him, who would feel the effects of his misconduct; of the men under him, who would be angry at having the places, which should be used to reward them for honest service, used for his selfish purposes. Moreover, he would have time to become known. If he were a man who should try to use his power for his own gain, he would not do so in single instances only; the abuses would be many; the hatred of the people would have time to grow and concentrate. The country would soon be too hot to hold him. But now, we simply wait till the next election. We have no time to work out the real remedy. We leave it to time to bring the remedy for us, which time never does.

5. This system would purify the public service.

With us, and with every free people, a very great number of our best men have a strong wish to go into public life. It was so in the early days of the country, and it is so still. The people, too, wish their best men in public life. The best men for the public service will be drawn into it, if they are not kept out by some abnormal condition of things, such as we now have. And men once in the service will find their right places in due time, if the operation of natural laws is not checked by some foreign force, like that of the election machine. And the men in the service will learn how to do their work, and will do it from mere pride, which is for most men a sufficient motive, if they are not compelled, by some foreign pressure, to give their main efforts to other things. Even the men that we now have in our public offices-selected, as they are, on a false test-in the main serve us as well as they can, under all the disadvantages of the system under which they labor. If they were only as fairly placed as the men in any of our great private business establishments, if they were only sure of permanent employ-bly ment and promotion for showing zeal and efficiency at their work,-they would soon become an efficient organization of working-men. But all the prizes go to the men who manage caucuses and conventions. Instead of being sure of their places, our public officials may at any moment be removed, to make way for some man who has counted ballots at a disputed election.

Under this system here proposed, the pressure begins at the top, where it must begin to have an efficient service. The chief executive will be a man chosen by the whole people, on a free vote. He will very cer

Under this system, we should begin to purify the public service at the top. We should have in our supreme body an assem

of men who would, as far as men could, be free from any inducement to use their power wrongly. They would be men in very high station, with slight possibility of any further political advancement. The chief executive would be under every possible influence to act honestly and wisely. He would be in the highest position he could reach. There would be, with them and him, the possibility of lasting disgrace if they were dishonest, and the certainty of great fame if they did what was right. To make men honest, or as honest as they can be, the great need is that there should be thorough supervision and a certainty of de

tection in case of any wrong-doing. Under our present system we have no thorough supervision. For we keep changing the men at the head. They have neither the time nor the motive to learn thoroughly what is done by the men under them. But this thorough supervision and certainty of detection exists in all large, well-ordered private establishments. For, in every large business, work must be so subdivided that each man has his work brought into contact at many points with other men. He cannot be dishonest or inefficient without making a disturbance in other departments. The larger the business, the more sure is this result; and our public business is the largest in the land.

6. The system would embody and enforce the people's will.

Many thoughtful men would have the fear that the system proposed would give us a bureaucracy,-what is sometimes called an aristocracy of permanent office-holders, who would lose their sympathy with the best thought and feeling of the time, would stagnate and become corrupt.

Under the system proposed, it is true that most of the men who once entered our public service would probably be there for the whole of their lives. But they would not all stay in the same places. Seventeen of Napoleon's marshals rose from the ranks. So it would be in a well-ordered civil service. It would be a body full of life and energy, where the strong men would rise to the highest places, where there would be a perpetual struggle for advancement. In every well-ordered industry we have what is, in one sense, a life tenure—that is, most men who are good workers follow the calling which they have chosen through their lives. But the faithful workers do not stay in one position; they rise.

As to such a system giving us a bureaucracy: The thing which is really meant by this word is an irresponsible bureaucracy an army of officials appointed by an irresponsible ruler, who uses the places in his service to pension his personal adherents. In such a state of things, stagnation is certain. But no such state of things could exist under a responsible government.

As to such a system giving us a permanent aristocracy of office-holders: If our public service is to be efficient, we always shall have, under any system, a permanent class of office-holders. We have it now. The question with us is, whether these permanent office-holders shall be our best

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men, or those who gain and keep their places by the manipulation of an election machine.

As to such a system causing our public officials to lose their sympathy with the popular thought and feeling: How much sympathy with popular thought and feeling do we find in our public men now? The system under which they are placed in power, and are kept there, makes it impossible for them to regard the people's real wishes.


On the contrary, under the simple, natural system here proposed, what would be the situation? The men who would be sent to our State and national legislatures would generally be men well advanced in life. Their periods of service would probably be, on an average, about twelve years. The members would be continually changing. New blood would be always coming in. There would always be a large number of experienced men to give character and stability to the policy pursued. The new men, as they were elected, would be in harmony with the prevailing tone of thought of the day in the districts from which they came. All the members, new and old, would be always learning and thinking. Instead of being behind the thought of the age, they would lead it. These men would very certainly be men of commanding ability, men like Webster, Calhoun, and Clay -the great men of the day, who have the confidence of the people. Would an assembly so made up be one of intellectual stagnation? Or would such men embark in wild schemes of political piracy, and endeavor to subvert the people's liberties? Such men would have their own ideas. It might even be, that some of them would try to use their public places to forward their private interests. But if any men can be trusted, those men could be. And some one we must trust, otherwise government cannot exist. We cannot, by any machinery we may devise, secure that any body of public men shall continually trim to every shifting current of popular feeling. Nor do we wish that. We wish men, and not weather-cocks, in our public assemblies; men who will use in our service their superior knowledge and abilities. We wish their judgment, and not our They cannot fail to change their opinions with the times, being open to the same influences with other men.


7. This system would give us a healthy national life and growth.

We should be free. Now we are bound

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