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commemorate his death. They will not their shooting. And now they were go without it. If the Sacramentobe not making use of Christ's instrument of provided, they ask for it. At home redemption as an instrument for men's there was never such a demand for it destruction. as exists at the front. There is a mystic But our young officers resolved to sympathy between the trench and the restore the cross to its work of saving Cross, between the soldier and his men. They waited till night fell, then Saviour.
removed the cross to a point a hundred And yet, to those who willed the war or two yards to the left. When in the and drank to the day of its coming morning the German gunners fired even the Cross has no sacredness. It their shells, their observers found that is to them but a tool of war. An officer the shells fell too far wide of the cross told me that during the German retreat and they could make nothing of the from the Somme they noticed a pecu- mystery. It looked as if some one had liar accuracy in the enemy's firing. been tampering with their guns in the The shells followed an easily distin- night. To put matters right they alguishable course. So many casualties tered the position of their guns, so that occurred from this accurate shelling once more the shells made a circle that the officers set themselves to dis- round the cross, and henceforth our solcover the cause. They found that the diers were safe, for the shells fell harmcircle of shells had for its centre the lessly into the outlying fields. Nor cross-roads, and that at the cross-roads was this the only time during their rewas a crucifix that stood up clearly as treat when the Germans put the cross a landmark. Evidently the cross was
to this base use and were foiled in their being used to guide the gunners, and knavery. was causing the death of our men. When a nation scraps the Cross of
But a more remarkable thing came Christ and turns it into a tool to gain to light. The cross stood close to the an advantage over its opponents, it road, and when the Germans retired becomes superfluous to ask who began they had sprung a mine at the cross- the war, and folly to close our eyes to roads to delay our advance. Every- the horrors and depravities which are thing near had been blown to bits by being reached in the waging of it. the explosion except the crucifix, but There is a new judgment of the nathat had not a mark upon it. And yet tions now proceeding, and who shall it could not have escaped, except by predict what shall be? The Cross of a miracle. They therefore set them- Christ is the arbiter, and our attitude selves to examine the seeming miracle toward it decides our fate. I have seen and came across one of the most as- the attitude of our soldiers toward the tounding cases of fiendish cunning. Cross at Neuve Chapelle and toward They found that the Germans had that for which it stands; and I find made a concrete socket for the crucifix more comfort in their reverence for so that they could take it out or put it Christ and Christianity than in all in at pleasure. Before blowing up the their guns and impediments of war. cross-roads they had taken the cross The Cross of Christ towers above out of its socket and removed it to a the wrecks of time, and those nations safe distance; then, when the mine had will survive which stand beneath its exploded, they put the cross back so protecting arms in the trenches of that it might be a landmark to direct righteousness, liberty, and truth.
BY AMORY HARE
It is so still here in the dusky wood;
Once at this hour I saw you pass
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE SITUATION
BY ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME
I HOPE that I have shown, in my last ables them to derive from the four funarticle, what the real, deep-seated. rea- damental political sciences — geograson is of the successes that the Germans phy, ethnography, political economy, have achieved over the Allies. We and national psychology — important have seen that, while the Germans are practical results. Now, the Allies, havpast masters in burglary and murder, ing even at this moment no comprewho, in committing these thefts and hension of the extraordinary potency other crimes, employ the most highly of these invisible forces, are making no perfected material resources, the most use of them. The result is that, notwiththorough study of chemistry, and the standing their vast resources, they are most ingenious mechanical inventions, still in a much less advantageous conthey are equally far advanced in the dition to contend with the Boches. purely intellectual domain, which en- Our deductions have led us also to VOL. 121 - N0. 4
define the strategy of the political nomenon which I set down, but which sciences' and the integral strategic I cannot explain. equation which makes its application The Pangermanist scheme dates from possible. This equation contains six 1895. Since then it has been elaborated unknown quantities: military, naval, in Germany in thousands of lectures geographical, ethnographical, politico- Innumerable pamphlets, spread broadeconomic, and national-psychologic. cast, have made it familiar to an imThe facts established by three and a mense majority of the sixty millions of half years of war prove that it is abso- Germans. Moreover, it was for the realutely indispensable to find these six son that this scheme was carefully deunknown quantities before undertak- vised a long while beforehand that the ing any operation capable of exerting Germans became earnestly desirous for an appreciable influence on the general its execution, and, generally speaking, development of the war. Indeed, the went cheerfully forth to war, believing, present amazing and perilous state of doubtless, that it would be short, but affairs is susceptible of this explana- firmly convinced that it would bring tion which summarizes all others: the them enormous booty — a bait which general operations of the Staff at Berlin has always set the Germans in motion have been planned and carried out in from the beginnings of history. accordance with the strategy of the po- Now, in spite of the extraordinary litical sciences. On the other hand, the publicity of the Pangermanist scheme operations of the Entente have been throughout Germany for twenty-two conducted in such utter ignorance of years, the guiding spirits of the Entente this strategy, that none of them could did not believe in its existence during reasonably be expected to succeed. the first two years of the war. I agree
It is of supreme importance for that this seems incredible, but I reAmericans to understand quite clearly ceive constantly so many new proofs of the fundamental cause of the strategic its truth that to doubt it is impossible
. errors of the Entente. Indeed, such a This ignorance has had this result; clear understanding is the only means that the Allies have failed to realize by which the United States can avoid that Germany made war, before all sacrifices in men and money infinitely else, to make the Hamburg-Persian greater than are necessary. I shall, Gulf plan an accomplished fact, and therefore, treat this part of my subject that that achievement, by reason of its by appealing to the unmitigated truth, inevitable consequences, would suffice without regard for other considerations. to assure Germany of the dominion of
the world. It is this failure to grasp
the real war-aim pursued by Germany, THE THEORY THAT THE WESTERN FRONT
which explains why the supreme imIS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE
portance of the Danube front - which I propose to show that, as a matter was the key of the war, which the Allies of fact, all the strategic errors of the had in their possession, and which it Entente are derived from this: that the was relatively easy for them to retain Western front has been regarded as the did not receive serious attention while most important front. The first source it was time. At the opening of hostiliof this idea is the incredible but un- ties, and even for a very long time doubted ignorance of the Pan-German- thereafter, the leaders of the Allies ist scheme on the part of the leaders of were convinced that Germany was the Entente. This ignorance is a phe- fighting to rid herself of France, and
especially of England. France and But it is evident that the Western England therefore undertook simply to front could not be the principal one fight Germany and Austria-Hungary, from the Allies' standpoint — the one, very little importance being attributed that is to say, on which to bring about to the action of the latter. Practically a final decision. For, ever since the day then, notwithstanding the important when it was demonstrated that fortipart assigned to Russia, the war was fied fronts, which can be very rapidly regarded, at Paris and London, as a increased in depth by trenches, deep sort of prize-fight, in which one of the shelters, and barbed-wire entangletwo chief adversaries - either the ments, cannot be quickly pierced, French and British or Germany and a demonstration which was almost abAustria — would fall within the ropes. solute in October, 1914, - it has been
This quasi--sportive' idea of the war contrary to common sense for the Allies was particularly prevalent among the to hope that they could obtain on the British. Having in reality no military Western front a victory so overwhelmtraditions, they regarded the conflicting as to compel Germany to abandon as a gigantic boxing-match, in which the Hamburg-Persian Gulf idea. But the best 'slugger' would necessarily be this controlling point of view was unthe victor. So it came about that to heeded -a perfectly natural consethe British the war was, and perhaps quence of the Allied ignorance of the still is, solely a matter of endurance. Pangermanist scheme. On the other hand, once the war was However that may be, the theory begun by Germany, the question of that the Western front is all importAlsace-Lorraine inevitably came to the ant has been repeatedly laid down by front for the French. Must she not Colonel Repington, the military critic be set free first of all?
of the London Times. 1 For these diverse reasons, the French Finding myself compelled, in order and British were inclined to argue that to make more clear my indispensable the chief theatre of operations was demonstration, to show how far Colonecessarily where the chief adversaries nel Repington has gone astray, and were, and, at the same time, to all ap- what infinite harm his errors have done pearance, their principal and mutual to the cause of the Entente by reason interests — that is to say, in the West. of the mighty influence of the Times, This conviction once formed, this con- which is almost a national organ, I sequence was deduced from it in Lon
conceive that no sinister motive can don and Paris, namely, that the Bal- be attributed to me if I make, by way kans and Turkey could have no serious of preamble, this statement. I was one effect on the result of the war; that it of the first Frenchmen who favored the was not only useless, therefore, but Franco-British rapprochement, at a positively dangerous, to send a con- time when public opinion in my counsiderable force to the East, because the try was opposed to that policy. To the principal front – that in the West, powerful Times, which has many a where everything was destined to be time assisted me in propagating my decided — would thus be deprived of ideas, I am most grateful. To me per
, the benefit of armies which the En- sonally, therefore, it is really distressing tente, taken by surprise by the war, to take issue with one of its chief colhad been obliged to raise and equip in laborators. But according to my honhaste, and had no right to send a long est belief, Colonel Repington, because way from home.
1 Now of the Morning Post.
of the extraordinary influence of the quent and accordant intelligence from organ in which he writes, has been in Italy and Russia. But Colonel Repingstrumental in leading the Allies to ton has been so hypnotized by the commit errors in strategy which have Western front that he has consistently cost millions of men and endangered refused to give any weight to what was the issue of the war. I feel, therefore, going on in the rest of Europe. We proin duty bound to call the attention of ceed to trace the chronological developthe Allies to the immense amount of ment and the influence of his theory. harm done by Colonel Repington. His At the end of August, 1914, Colonel constantly repeated forecasts have this Repington set forth his own conception characteristic in common, that for of the most important front when he three years and a half they have been described the part to be played by the most strikingly falsified by events. Russian armies on the one hand and by
But the Repington peril still exists. the Franco-British armies on the other, In fact, even to-day a large number of disclosing at the same time his idea of Allied newspapers continue to repro- German strategy. I quote from L duce his forecasts because they appear Temps of September 1, 1914: —
in the Times as coming from one hav
We must fight, even if we have to fal ing authority, although any sort of back to the Atlantic, without allowing Ger. credit should long ago have been de- many to overwhelm us. It is absolutely in nied to him. But his failure to reason dispensable for her to have her Metz and from indubitable indications and the her Sedan, and a long war would be disas most notorious facts seems to be com
trous for her with her largely industrial popplete, if we may judge from certain
ulation, her business paralyzed, her coast
blockaded. Her entire strategy is based on passages in an interview on the general
these considerations, and it should be our condition of affairs given by the colonel
aim to bring this plan to naught and to fight to Le Temps, October 10, 1917.
with all our strength, without endangering The situation (declared the military critic
the welfare of our people by brilliant coup of the Times at that late date) is that the
which would expose us to attack.
It is fear that is behind the present GerBoches are getting the worst of it except in Boche communiqués, and that they know it.
man tactics, — the vandalism and the policy Moreover, every time that we go into battle
of terrorizing the civil population; it is fear they are beaten. ... Our losses are slight
- not physical fear, but fear of the consenow because we are proceeding according to
quences to her if France and England were the plan of an offensive with a limited ob
not quickly and completely crushed.
Russia, for her part, is performing the jective. ... Our victories are almost automatic. . . . Italy and Russia still have very
function of a “steam-roller.' Her rôle in the strong effective forces. . . . Russia? Yes,
war is most important, and final triumph she is passing through a serious crisis, but
depends in large measure on the way in
which she carries it out. The Franco-Britwe must not lose confidence in her. Russia
ish armies have diverted the main hold of is a jack-in-the-box, and the winter is working on her side.
the German armies from Russia, and while
the Allies operating in France keep their Less nan a month after these state
claws in that bulk, Russia must take adments the Italians suffered a serious
vantage of the opportunity.
The results obtained by her thus far indidisaster, Russia went to pieces, and
cate that such is her purpose. Roumania was reduced to impotence.
Taking into account the season of the Now, these disastrous events might
year and its natural concomitants, Russis very easily have been forecast several should reach Berlin within two months; if, months before, with the help of the fre- at the end of that time our claws are still