question. Whether all this would be good or bad, fortunate or unfortunate, for the future of our country, it is well nigh beside the point to consider. The primary consideration is that unless our Government acts in the directions we have been outlining, the workers here and now will not be doing their full share toward the conclusion of a successful peace. And they will most assuredly defend their indifference to the war's outcome by asserting in phrases that may be inarticulate and confused, that democracy in international affairs is, as far as they are concerned, bought at too high a price if it is paid for by the constriction or postponement of democracy at home, a sentiment with which the rest of the country may be in absolute disagreement, but which stands as a truth to hard-pressed laborers.

The fact is, however, that after the war a new temper must almost inevitably register itself in our industrial life, and the war will assuredly have left us demoralized if it does not reveal something of what this new temper is to be. Two characteristics of it may already be discerned. We shall first grapple with problems on a new scale, and in a country of a hundred million people this is no small achievement. To abandon a parochial, restricted, class-blinded conception

of neighborliness and justice is the beginning of wisdom. And, secondly, we shall recognize that our economic readjustments are no longer simply problems of the terms under which we work, but problems of status. The workers will increasingly be less concerned for five dollars a day than for a measure of control in the formulation of factory policies, a motive which will come to dominate the industrial struggle in no distant future.

We should, in fact, set ourselves even before the war ends to consider our industrial problems on an adequately comprehensive scale, and to realize that thoroughgoing readjustment must look toward a more equalized status among our several classes. We shall then find that the industrial aspects of the war are being administered with new precision and success. We shall find also that we are in possession of a criterion by which palliatives may be estimated and the alarms of reactionaries quieted; and that weakness in our body politic which is to be attributed to the acuteness of the labor problem will, as our point of view changes, be found to be gradually disappearing. In its stead will be growing up in our national life a strength and high courage which will be born of the unequivocal promise of our fundamental institutions.

IN

N this tremendous armed conflict, which has drawn into it the greater part of the nations of the civilized world, Spain, by the desire of almost all her citizens, has been and continues to be neutral. What does this attitude mean? That Spaniards look with indifference upon this catastrophe or feel an equal degree of sympathy for each of the belligerent alliances? Not at all. Spaniards desire to remain neutral because the majority of them are Germanophiles, or, rather, because they are thorough enemies of England and France as well as of the United States. As it is impossible for them to take an active and open part on the side of the Central empires, they wish to preserve their neutrality at any cost, because, should they abandon it, their only field of action would be to range themselves upon the side of the nations that they detest.

The Spanish people, generally speaking, are thoroughly conservative, traditionbound, reverent of its past, determined to continue living within the confines of its own mentality, which it calls "the Spanish soul"; hostile to every change, firmly convinced that it can progress without imitating what is thought or done abroad, and that it is sufficiently endowed morally and intellectually to be genuinely national. In the eyes of those who think thus the mistake made by Spain consists in not having always and everywhere followed the policy of the most Spanish of its sovereigns and the most Spanish of Spaniards, King Philip II.

It is from the time of this monarch that the deep hatred against the Englishman dates a hatred founded primarily on religious, and later on political, motives. While Philip II was proclaiming himself the champion of the Roman Catholic Church, and while in America, Flanders, and wherever else opportunity

offered he was exterminating heretics, England was becoming the bulwark of Protestantism and the most formidable foe of the papacy. Politically, the discovery of America and the Strait of Magellan caused Spain to conceive the idea of making herself the ruler of the seas. There, too, England went forth to meet the Spaniards, and from that moment the dominion over the sea, of which Philip II had dreamed, passed without difficulty tothat nation which thenceforth was called "perfidious and proud Albion."

Spanish hatred of England has continued ever since, though nowadays new reasons are given to explain it. As time passed, other events happened, especially the occupation of Gibraltar, which the Anglophobes invoke to-day as a justification of their attitude.

In the eyes of this majority of Spaniards, satisfied with its religion and with the monarchy, living under that form of civilization known as the military and religious, France also is a detested nation. These Spaniards do not forget the Napoleonic invasion, though, to be sure, they do not even remember the name of Wellington, who freed Spain from the French yoke. The so-called War of Independence left a deep impression on the Spanish soul

-an impression which in the course of time has been revived by the recent expulsion from France of the religious orders. These communities have settled in Spain, and neither they nor the inhabitants of Spain can forgive the neighboring republic for taking such a step, especially as this democracy, by setting such an example, overturns the traditional policy of the monarchists.

Besides these causes for antagonism against England and France, there exist in Spain a feeling of admiration for Germany and a fervid sympathy and venera

tion for the autocratic and military form of her institutions. The Spanish nation, to put it in a nutshell, wishes, like every nation, to be well governed, but its political conception of good government is that of genuine paternalism, by means of which a tutelary government makes the nation strong, contented, rich, and powerful.

Moreover, the clergy and the monastic orders hope that, if the Central empires are victorious, the pope will again become, largely by the will of Austria, sovereign lord over Rome.

In general the Spanish army is Germanophile, and the same is probably true of the

navy.

A minority, led by intellectual elements of high worth, is resolutely pro-Ally, and these men are the ones who dare by word and by writing to struggle against Germanophile public opinion, which is merely "public sentiment," stimulated by the thousands of Germans who do everything possible in Spain to keep alive the prejudices and hatred against their enemies.

Representative government in Spain is a fiction. In order to form a ministry, the king summons a politician at the head of a party which possesses the majority in the Spanish Parliament, or which is at least capable of forming a cabinet made up of men who enjoy its confidence. If the Parliament responds to the policy of the ministry, all goes well; but if the Parliament shows hostility, it is dissolved, and another is elected, which always has a satisfactory ministerial majority! This fictitious method of procedure has brought the system into discredit, the result being that Spaniards do not live under a government of laws, but under one of politicians.

From the beginning of the war the governments have shown a tendency to range themselves upon the side of the Allies, though they have been forced to maintain a certain attitude of reserve in view of the fact that the Spanish army is openly Germanophile. Some think that the army's sentiments are not of such intensity as to make it lose the sense of

military discipline and cause it, for example, to refuse to fight against the Central powers. Recently, an event of the greatest seriousness has proved that the army is determined to impose its will upon the Government rather than to obey it. An organization of officers has been formed, called the Council of Defense, including officers from the rank of second lieutenant to that of colonel, confined originally to the artillery and cavalry, but spreading later to the infantry. Two months ago the Government, alarmed by the attitude of these councils, ordered the Captain-General of Catalonia to dissolve the council of the infantry. When the heads of this organization refused to obey, the captain-general, following instructions from Madrid, had the colonel-president arrested. Thereupon a conflict of the most serious kind broke out; the subordinate officers and colonels of all the regiments told the captain-general that they would proceed to free the arrested men unless the latter were immediately set at liberty. This incident caused the downfall of the ministry of the Marquis of Alhucemas, and the triumphant military men saw their commanders freed, and proved that the Government could not manage the army as it pleased.

These councils have officially published their aims. They have declared that the army is completely disorganized, and it lacks munitions and rifles and machineguns; that it would not be able to resist an European enemy, no matter what nation, it might be, and that the officers found themselves compelled to make these statements. public in order that, in case of a catastrophe, the nation might know that the army was not to blame, but rather the governments which one after the other have ruled in Spain. Although constitutionally the king is not responsible, naturally public opinion realized what a tremendous blow had been dealt to the king by this deplorable occurrence. In order not to be branded as selfish, the councils declared that they would not limit themselves to procure reforms for the army, but would concern themselves with all that was neces

sary for the public welfare. In this way the proceedings of the officers achieved popularity.

A few months before this happened the liberal cabinet, presided over by Count de Romanones, fell. On the very day after his resignation, before another ministry was formed, he did not scruple to publish a document explaining that he retired from the Government because, as the moment had arrived when Spain should abandon neutrality and range herself on the side of the Allies against the Central empires, he was unable to bring this about because he was not permitted to adopt such an attitude. The reference was clearly leveled at the king, although, of course, he was not named.

On

Señor Maura is the leader of the Conservative party; he is considered the strongest of Spanish politicians. various occasions after he ceased to head the Government there have arisen crises in which, to judge from public opinion, he should have been reinstated in power. But the king has always passed over Señor Maura. Lately, in a sensational speech, this eminent politician made two statements of immense importance. He said that in his opinion Spain should not abandon her neutrality not only because she should not favor England or France, but because there was not the slightest reason for her declaring war upon Germany. By his second statement he made the king appear guilty of the ill-advised appointment of those whom he called upon to head the Government.

After this speech, and on the occasion of another crisis owing to the fall of Alhucemas, the king, contrary to the forecast of the friends and even of the enemies of Señor Maura, did not call upon him to form a government, but summoned instead the present premier, Señor Dato, a seceder from the party of Señor Maura.

It is said publicly that the crown is slipping from the head of the king, though the monarchists are confident that the army will always support the throne. The officers of the Councils of Defense have adopted an ambiguous form for expressing

their sentiments on this point, so that, according to the interpretation made of it, they will be willing to support the throne ---or a republic, should this be the form of government chosen by the Spaniards..

Toward the middle of last August the leaders, for the space of four days, succeeded in organizing a general strike, which I myself witnessed in Barcelona. This strike was not started by workmen to assert the rights of their class; on the contrary, its object was to unite its efforts to those of all Spaniards who desire a remedy for the political and economic ills under which they suffer, and to oblige the Government to give its attention to the interests of the country rather than to the personnel of officialdom.

All the factories were closed, no workmen went to work, the street-cars ceased running, not a single carriage, private or for hire, was to be seen in Barcelona, the attendants at the stations disappeared, and travelers were compelled to carry their baggage themselves. The shops closed one after another, only a few trains continued to run, and it was said that the gas and electric-light plants would not be in operation that night. The civil governor, when he saw the extent of the trouble, gave up the government to the captain-general, and shortly after noon a squad of engineers passed along the street with an officer, who proclaimed martial law. At the same moment forces of engineers, cavalry, civil guards, and artillery occupied strategic thoroughfares of the city, placing no fewer than six light cannon in the Plaza de Cataluña, the very heart of Barcelona.

The infantry was rigorously confined to its barracks. The people trusted it, and the Government distrusted it. In view of the attitude of the Councils of Defense, the Government feared that the infantry would take advantage of the strike to assume a threatening demeanor. In order to be able to repress any movement of this kind, the Government had located the above-mentioned cannon to preserve the supremacy of force. It was known that the workmen hoped that the infantry would espouse the side of the people.

The Government had no fewer than twelve thousand men in Barcelona, and it was lucky that, in carrying out their acts of violence, the workmen had nothing but little pocket-revolvers; for had they had a few hundred rifles, the trouble would have reached very serious proportions. With these pocket-weapons some workmen and many ill-intentioned persons fired at the troops, mostly from the tops of houses or from hiding-places behind trees, at very long range. The fire was vigorously answered everywhere, and the houses from which the firing of revolvers did not cease were bombarded by the artillery, which thus did not remain idle. It was said that most of the soldiers killed or wounded were struck by Mauser-bullets, the weapon used by the army, which is not to be wondered at in view of the frequency of their volleys in every direction.

The conflict lasted four days in Barcelona. In Madrid, Valencia, Bilbao, and Santander especially, and also in other towns of more or less importance, there were troubles of the same character. Public opinion accused the Allied governments of having provoked these disorders with their money; it was said that England and France paid the republican, socialist, and liberal leaders of all sorts to foment revolution and overthrow the monarchy. This was the opinion of the Germanophile majority.

Yet neither France nor England have any reason for seeking a change of government in Spain-a change that would bring in its wake the usual disorders, from which those nations could not profit in the least. On the other hand, it was easy to believe that German agents had provoked the disorders, as they had done in Greece, Argentine, Brazil, and the United States, for the purpose of diverting the attention of the Government to matters of internal policy and order, thus driving from its mind the idea and possibility of intervening in the international domain.

The Spanish Government knows full well who fomented these disorders; it is also aware that the German submarines take on supplies along the coast of Spain

and in the Balearic and Canary Islands, that vessels from Spanish ports help in every way possible the aforementioned submarines. But how is this to be avoided? The Government has not the means of effectively policing its coasts.

In the meantime the situation of the Spaniards becomes worse. The cost of food-stuffs rises; there is lack of coal, a dearth of wheat. Wages, say the employers, cannot be raised; there are not enough workmen. Postmen first, and later the municipal guards, have formed their Councils of Defense, imitating the officers; but the Government laughs at them, because they do not threaten with rifles and cannon, and the fear of losing their employment keeps them from taking more decisive steps.

The army thinks itself ill prepared to meet a foreign foe, but in the meantime it is strong enough to impose its will at home upon its fellow-citizens and even to continue the war in Morocco. Its officers are perfectly right when they demand. efficient organization of the army and remind the Government that public needs are neglected, yet its attitude is not that of an army which obeys, but rather of one that wishes to direct, and to exact obedience. Moreover, it is probable that Councils of Defense may be organized among the soldiery, as in Russia. Should this occur, the officers may possibly wish to rally round the throne; but it would not be at all strange if the councils of soldiers should form the nucleus for the forces which the republic needs in order to be victorious in Spain.

Apparently things in Spain are going very badly, and the consensus of opinion among upholders of the monarchy and among its foes is that the monarchy is in grave peril, which means that a royal crisis is imminent in Spain.

In Spain the present war is looked upon as a great struggle between Germany on one side and England on the other; France and Austria are considered secondary figures. With the exception of a few men, few believe that there is in the balance nothing less than the free and