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A SILVER DENARIUS OF THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE The portrait at the right (obverse) is of Cæsar Octavianus (Augustus), with a slight beard to indicate mourning, and at the left (reverse), of Mark Antony. The date is 41 B.C.

spirit of the times. And with it Julia soon began to abuse the fortune, the popularity, the prestige, and the power which came to her from being the daughter of Augustus and the wife of Agrippa. Little by little she became possessed by the mania of being in Rome the antithesis of Livia, of conducting herself in every case in a manner contrary to that followed by her stepmother. If the latter, like Augustus, wore garments of wool woven at home, Julia affected silks purchased at great price from the oriental merchants. These the ladies of the older type considered a ruinous luxury because of the expense, and an indecency because of the prominence which they gave to the figure. Where Livia was sparing, Julia was prodigal. If Livia preferred to go to the theater surrounded by elderly and dignified men, Julia always showed herself in public with a retinue of brilliant and elegant youths. If Livia set an example of reserve, Julia dared appear in the provinces in public at the side of her husband and receive public homage. In spite of the law which forbade the wives of Roman governors to accompany their husbands into the provinces, Julia prevailed upon Agrippa to make her his

companion when in the year 16 B.C. he made his long journey through the East. Everywhere she appeared at his side, at the great receptions, at the courts, in the cities; and she was the first of the Latin women to be apotheosized in the Orient. Paphos called her "divine" and set up statues to her; Mitylene called her the New Aphrodite, Eressus, Aphrodite Genetrix. These were bold innovations in a state in which tradition was still so powerful; but they could scarcely have been of serious danger to Julia, if her passionate temperament had not led her to commit a much more serious imprudence. Agrippa, compared to her, was old, a simple, unpolished man of obscure origin who was frequently absent on affairs of state. In the circle which had formed about Julia there were a number of handsome, elegant, pleasing young men; among others one Sempronius Gracchus, a descendant of the famous

Enlarged from the original owned by Professor G. N. Olcott


This coin, a denarius, worth about seventeen cents, repre-
sents Cæsar as Pontifex Maximus. Together with all the
other Roman coins bearing Caesar's image it was struck in
the year before his death-44-45 B.C. The fact that Cæsar
placed his image on these coins may have strengthened the
suspicion of his enemies that he wished to make himself king.

tribunes. Julia seems toward the close to have had for him, even in the lifetime of Agrippa, certain failings which the Lex de adulteriis visited with terrible punishments.

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if from this time on there should have been fostered between Julia and


Livia a half-suppressed rivalry. The fact is, in itself, very probable and several indications of it have remained in tradition and in history. We know also that two parties were already beginning to gather about the two women. One of these might be called the party of the Claudii and of the old conservative nobility, the other the party of the Julii and of that youthful nobility which was following the modern trend. As long as Agrippa lived, Augustus, by holding the balance between the two factions, succeeded in maintaining a certain equilibrium. With the death of Agrippa, which occurred in 12 B.C., the situation was changed.

Julia was now for the second time a widow, and by the provisions of the Lex de maritandis ordinibus should remarry. Augustus in the traditional manner sought a husband for her, and, seeking him only with the idea of furthering a political purpose, he found for her Tiberius, the elder son of Livia. Tiberius was the step-brother of Julia and was married to a lady whom he tenderly loved; but these were considerations which could hardly give pause to a Roman senator. In the marriage of Tiberius and Julia, Augustus saw a way of snuffing out the incipient discord. between the Julii and the Claudii, between Julia and Livia, between the parties of the new and of the old nobility. He thereHe there fore ordered Tiberius to repudiate the young, beautiful, and noble Agrippina in order to marry Julia. For Tiberius the sacrifice was hard; we are told that one day after the divorce, having met Agrippina at some house, he began to weep so bitterly that Augustus ordered that the former husband and wife should never meet again. But Tiberius, on the other hand, had been educated by his mother in the ancient ideas, and therefore knew that a Roman nobleman must sacrifice his feelings to the public interest. As for Julia, she celebrated her third wedding joyfully; for Tiberius, after the deaths of Agrippa and of his own brother Drusus, was the rising man, the hope and the second personage of the empire, so that she was not forced to step down from the lofty position which the marriage with Agrippa had given her. Tiberius, furthermore, was a very handsome man and for this reason also he seems not to have been displeasing to Julia, who in the matter of

husbands considered not only glory and


The marriage of Julia and Tiberius began under happy auspices. Julia seemed to love Tiberius and Tiberius did what he could to be a good husband. Julia soon felt that she was once more to become a mother and the hope of this other child seemed to cement the union between husband and wife. But the rosy promises of the beginning were soon disappointed. Tiberius was the son of Livia, a true Claudius, the worthy heir of two ancient lines, an uncompromising traditionalist, therefore a rigid and disdainful aristocrat, and a soldier severe with others as with himself. He wished the aristocracy to set the people an example of all the virtues which had made Rome so great in peace and war: religious piety, simplicity of customs, frugality, family purity, and rigid observance of all the laws. The luxury and prodigality which were becoming more and more wide-spread among the young nobility had no fiercer enemy than he. He held that a man of great lineage who spent his substance on jewels, on dress, and on revels was a traitor to his country, and no one demanded with greater insistence than he that the great laws of the year 18 B.C., the sumptuary law, the laws on marriage and adultery, should be enforced with the severest rigor. Julia on the other hand loved extravagance, festivals, joyous companies of elegant youths, an easy, brilliant life full of amusement.

For greater misfortune, the son who was born of their union died shortly after and discord found its way between Julia and Tiberius. Sempronius Gracchus, who knew how to profit by this, reappeared and again made advances to Julia. She again lent her ear to his bland words and the domestic disagreement rapidly became embittered. Tiberius,- this is certain,-soon learned that Julia had resumed her relations with Sempronius Gracchus, and a new, intolerable torment was added to his already distressed life. According to the Lex de adulteriis, he as husband should have made known the crime of his wife to the pretor and have had her punished. He had been one of those who had always most vehemently denounced the nobility. for their weakness in the enforcement of this law. Now that his own wife had fallen under the provisions of the terrible statute,

to which so many other women had been forced to submit, the moment had come to give the weak that example of unconquerable firmness which he had so often demanded of others. But Julia was the daughter of Augustus. Could he call down, without the consent of Augustus, so terrible a scandal upon the first house of the empire, render its daughter infamous, and drive her into exile? Augustus, though he desired his daughter to be more prudent and serious, yet loved and protected her; above all he disliked dangerous scandal, and Julia dared to do whatever she wished, knowing herself invulnerable under his protection and his love.

To this hard and false situation Tiberius, fuming with rage, had to adjust himself. He lived in a separate apartment, keeping up with Julia only the relations necessary to save appearances, but he could not divorce her, much less publish her guilt. The situation grew still worse when political discontent began to use for its own ends the discord between Julia and Tiberius. Tiberius had many enemies among the nobility, especially among the young men of his own age; partly because his rapid, brilliant career had aroused much jealousy, partly because his conservative, traditionalist tendencies toward authority and militarism disturbed many of them. More and more among the nobility there was increasing the desire for a mild and easy-going government which should allow them to enjoy their privileges without hardship and which should not be too severe in imposing its duties upon them.

On the other hand Julia was most ambitious. Since, after the disagreements with Tiberius had broken out, she could no longer hope to be the powerful wife of the first person of the empire after Augustus, she sought compensation. Thus there formed about Julia a party which sought in every way to ruin the lofty position which Tiberius occupied in the state, by setting up against him Caius Cæsar, the son of Julia by Agrippa, whom Augustus had adopted and of whom he was very

fond. In 6 B.C., Caius Cæsar was only fourteen years old, but at that period an agitation was set on foot whereby, through a special privilege conceded to him by the senate, he was to be named consul for the year of Rome 754, when Caius should have reached twenty. This was a manouver of the Julian party to attract popular attention to the youth, to prepare a rival for Tiberius in his quality as principal collaborator of Augustus, and to gain a hold upon the future head of the state.


The move was altogether very bold; for this nomination of a child consul contradicted all the fundamental principles of the Roman constitution, and it would probably have been fatal to the party which evolved it, had not the indignant rage of Tiberius assured its triumph. Tiberius opposed this law, which he took as an offense, and he wished Augustus to oppose it, and at the outset, Augustus did. But then, either because Julia was able to bend him to her desires or because in the senate there was in truth a strong party which supported it out of hatred for Tiberius, Augustus at last yielded, seeking to placate Tiberius with other compensations. But Tiberius was too proud and violent an aristocrat to accept compensations and indignantly demanded permission to retire to Rhodes, abandoning all the public offices which he exercised. He certainly hoped to make his loss felt, for indeed Rome needed him. But he was mistaken. This act of Tiberius was severely judged by public opinion as a reprisal upon the public for a private offense. Augustus became angry with him. and in his absence all his enemies took courage and hurled themselves against him. The honors to Caius Cæsar were approved amid general enthusiasm and the Julian party triumphed all along the line; it reached the height of power and popularity, while Tiberius was constrained to content himself with the idle life of a private person at Rhodes.

But at Rome Livia still remained. From that moment began the mortal duel between Livia and Julia.

(To be continued)

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Rear-Admiral, United States Navy (Retired). Author of "The Influence of Sea Power on History," etc.


INLESS present expectation be greatly deceived, within two decades two events will have altered very materially the territorial conditions which underlie the capacity of the United States to exert power at sea. Such changes on land influence materially the subsequent dispositions of the Navy, enabling it to be more effectively utilized. One of these events will be the opening of the Panama Canal. The other, already past, has been the war with Spain, issuing in the independence of Cuba from European control, and in the territorial acquisitions of the United States resulting from the war.

acquisitions have advanced the southern
maritime frontier of this country from the
Gulf coast to a line coincident with the
south shore of Cuba, prolonged to Porto
Rico; throwing into the second line the
Gulf harbors, from Key West to the
Mississippi. These are thus reduced to
the order of purely defensive ports, in-
stead of the primary rank of naval bases.
for offensive operations held by them
twenty years ago,-a change to which
have contributed also the hydrographic
difficulties of entrance and exit, consequent
upon the greatly increased size of battle-
ships. This new condition is summarized

From a military point of view, these in, and effected by, the cession of Guanta

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namo as a naval base; provided, of course, that due measures are taken for the security of the base, so that ships may not be tied to the defense of a position the one value of which will be that the fleet can depend upon it for supplies and repairs, yet leave it for a measurable time to its own protection, sure of finding it and its resources safe upon return.


THE Occupation of the Canal Zone under conditions of complete sovereignty (with qualified exceptions in the cities of Colon and Panama) may be regarded accurately, from the military point of view, as a most helpful modification of our proper coast-line; making it, by the interposition of Guantanamo, practically continuous for a fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It will be continuous, because possessing throughout adequate points of support, -the one service which from the military point of view the land renders to the sea. To secure this condition, however, the Canal, like Guantanamo, must be fortified. There is unhappily much exaggerated talk on one side and the other as to the relative advantages of navies and fortifications for purposes of defense. Neither is secure without the other. As I have said, a fleet must be able to go away for a calculated time, with a reasonable prospect of finding its ports unsurprised, still its own, when it returns. The port must be able to spare the fleet for a similar period, confident that it can look out for itself till reinforced or supplied. The analogy is that of an army in campaign, which is crippled in movement if it has to garrison its bases as well as to carry on other necessary operations.

A number of eminent citizens, more actuated by a commendable desire for peace than instructed in military considerations, have lately put their names to a paper directed against the fortification of the Canal. In this they say, among other things, "with all the fortifications possible it is still apparent that . . . in time of war a guard of battle-ships at each of its entrances would be an absolute necessity, and equally apparent that with such a guard the fortifications would be unnecessary." I fear some naval officers, at home and abroad, dubbed in England the Blue

Water School, are partly responsible for this popular impression of the need of the constant presence of battle-ships. It is precisely in order that a constant guard of battle-ships may not be necessary that fortifications are requisite. Fortifications liberate a fleet for action, whenever elsewhere required; and, by preserving the Canal for use as a bridge between the two oceans, render unnecessary the maintenance of a big fleet in both.



THE maintenance of the Canal in effective operation is one of the large elements in the future development of Sea Power in the Pacific. No other nation has in the Canal the same interest of self-preservation that the United States has. Not only is this true as regards the Panama Canal, but no similar condition of dependence upon a canal exists anywhere else to near the same degree. The closest parallel is Suez, as compared with the Cape of Good Hope. Suez offers Great Britain an inside route to her great Australasian colonies, as well as to India; but the existence of the British Empire does not depend upon that route as vitally as the ability of our thickly settled Atlantic coast to come to the aid of the Pacific depends upon Panama, as compared with Magellan. This necessity is so urgent as to make the Canal, as before said, essentially a part of the coast-line of the United States.

The primary object of the Canal may have been commercial, or it may have been military. I doubt whether many of those conspicuous in its advocacy and inception analyzed to themselves which of these two obvious features was chief in their individual estimation. From either point of view, and from both, the opening of the Canal will conduce decisively to influence the development of Sea Power upon the Pacific. Its effect will be much the same as that of the construction of a new railroad judiciously planned, which opens out the new country through which it passes, or to which it leads, and thus not only renders it available to commerce, but by perpetual interaction of population and production increases both. More people, more wants; more people, more produc

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