stantially, our way is plain, and the character of Moses as a prophet of God, and by a divine commission the approved lawgiver of Israel, is shown in the light in which the New Testament presents it. In maintaining this consistency throughout the whole range of the sacred writings, we might be presented with many objections to the character of Moses, from the Pentateuch, that are accounted formidable, if not insuperable. To engage in these, at this time, comes not within our present plan. The work would extend this article too far for our present convenience, and perhaps that of our readers. Still we think such an undertaking from some able and experienced pen, might render the public an essential service.

S. C. L.

ART. XIV.

Literary Notices.

1. The History of Civilization, from the Fall of the Roman Empire, to the French Revolution. By F. Guizot, the Prime Minister of France, Author of "History of the English Revolution of 1640." Translated by William Hazlitt. Volumes 2, 3, 4. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 200 Broadway, &c. 1846. 12mo.

2. An Exposition of a Book, published by D. Appleton & Co., called Hazlitt's Translation of Guizot's History of Civilization. By R. W. Haskins, A. M., &c. Buffalo: Steele's Press. 1846. 8vo. pp. 55.

MR. HASKINS'S pamphlet contains a rather indignant censure of the American publishers, for having reprinted Guizot's work in the faulty translation of Mr. Hazlitt. But howsoever grave the offence may be deemed, we suppose it is easily enough accounted for, if we consider the adventure of Messrs. Appleton & Co. in what is probably its true light,merely that of a business transaction. When they learned that a translation was about to appear in England, they announced the work in their "Monthly Literary Bulletin," in order to secure to themselves the chance of reprinting it; and when they, at length, received a copy, they put it to press, without knowing, perhaps, whether it was well or ill done. It proves, on examination, to be ill done. It is neither precise 18

VOL. IV.

nor elegant. But, after all, it is not quite so positively bad, as Mr. Haskins seems to think. His passionate complaint, too, of "the mental vassalage of this country to the British press," is, we think, equally exaggerating. It is not improbable that, to the sensitiveness he feels on this matter, we owe the vehemence of the censure he passes on the Messrs. Appletons. That the literature of England should have a greater influence among us, than that of any other foreign country, is both natural and proper, as she is the mother of our language, and the store-house whence the larger part of our reading is derived. And that this influence should be, in some respects, oppressive, is unavoidable, so long as we persist in refusing all arrangements for an international Law of Copy-right. If we will not be just enough to allow our grounds to be fenced, lest we lose the chance of appropriating ("conveying, the wise, it call ") the stray flocks of our wealthier neighbor, it would, at least, be manly in us, not to complain, when his herds come in and starve out our own. Still, we say, if we must have an irruption of foreign literature to trample down our native growth, let it be the English, rather than that of any continental nation.

ume,

Passing by the faults of the translation, let us look at the substance of M. Guizot's work. We formerly gave a notice of his first volume, "The General History of Civilization in Europe." The three volumes, now before us, are but a more extended and thorough development of that outline. As in the first, the subject is treated with reference chiefly to France, the country which is regarded, by the author, as the acknowledged centre of European civilization, the focus, as it were, where all its rays converge, and where they may be studied in their strongest light. In the execution of his vast and complicated task, Guizot shows the same wonderful reach of comprehension, as in the first vol- the same coolness of judgment, united with extraordinary sprightliness of thought, the same clear insight of causes and effects, and the same familiar acquaintance with the principles and workings of human society. In addition to these, the more particular character of his present work brings out his thorough knowledge of the facts in detail that belong to his history, and gives scope to his remarkable tact at distinguishing the significant from the insignificant, in the mass of his materials. In one respect, Guizot is, to us, an enigma: a genuine Frenchman in his attachments, yet with nothing French in the structure of his mind, or in the character of his thoughts, except their activity. We are struck with admiration at the breadth of survey which he so naturally holds in view, and at the ease with which he simplifies a complication of details, and brings the chaos into order. In a

few metaphysical inquiries, that he has occasion to make, we think the French part of his nature betrays him into some hasty conclusions, which too much resemble the flippant, compromising philosophisms of Cousin. It is in the domain of social life and civil polity, that he is at home. For this, he appears to be singularly endowed and qualified, both as an historian and a philosopher. We cannot too earnestly recommend his work to all such as would study human nature in its social relations, and learn the origin, growth and tendency, of the various institutions, both civil and religious, of modern history. Of course, it is not a book to be read for amusement; it must be laboriously studied, if used at all. We have marked the following, on the tendency of our present civilization, which we present in the translation of Mr. Haskins :

"The course of civilization, and in particular that of French civilization, has given rise to a great problem, peculiar to our own times, and in which the whole future is interested, not our future, only, but that of humanity entire; and which we, that is to say, our generation, are, perhaps, especially called upon to resolve.

"What is the spirit which now prevails in the intellectual world, in its research after truth, for whatever object? A spirit of rigor, of prudence, of reserve; a scientific spirit, a philosophic method. It carefully observes facts, and permits generalizations but tardily, progressively, and just so far, only, as the facts themselves will justify them. For more than half a century, this spirit has prevailed in the sciences relating to the material world; and it has been the cause of their progress and their glory. The tendency of the same spirit now is more and more to penetrate the sciences of the moral world, - politics, history, philosophy. Everywhere the scientific method extends and confirms itself: on all subjects one feels the necessity of taking facts as a basis and a guide, persuaded that they are the materials of science, and that no general idea can have any real value unless it issues out of the womb of facts, and has its growth constantly sustained and supported by them. Facts now constitute, in the intellectual world, the accredited authority.

"In the real order, in the social world, in government, administration, and political economy, quite another tendency manifests itself. In these the empire of ideas, of reasoning, of general principles, of what is called theories, prevails. Such is evidently the character of the great revolution that has been achieved in our times, as of all the labors of the eighteenth century. Nor does this character belong solely to a particular crisis, an epoch of transient destruction. It is rather the permanent, regular and settled character of the social state, as established and proclaimed

on all sides. This state rests on discussion and publicity; that is to say, on the predominance of public reason, of doctrines and convictions common to all. On the one hand, facts have never before occupied so commanding a place in science; and on the other, never have ideas so fully swayed the exterior world.

“It was, indeed, otherwise, a century since, when, in the intellectual world, in science, properly so called, facts were but badly studied, and but little respected; theory and imagination had both full scope. Men delivered themselves wholly to the vagaries of hypothesis, and risked themselves without any other guide than the thread of their deductions. In the political order, on the contrary, in exterior affairs, facts alone predominated, and these were esteemed the only natural and legitimate authority. No one, on slight grounds, ventured to contest their legitimacy, even while they deplored them. Sedition was then more common than intrepidity of thought; and it would have ill become the human mind, to claim, for an idea in the name of truth alone, any part in affairs here below.

"The course of civilization has, then, reversed the ancient order of things; for it has established the empire of facts, where formerly the unrestrained movement of the mind alone prevailed, and the influence of ideas where the authority of facts has almost exclusively reigned.

"So true is this, that its results are impressed, and deeeply impressed, even upon the reproaches, of which the existing civilization is the object. What say the adversaries of that civilization, when they speak of the present state of the human mind, and the tendency of its labors? They accuse it of dryness, and contraction. This vigorous and positive method, this scientific spirit, degrades thought, say they, freezes the imagination, robs the intellect of its grandeur - its freedom; and contracts and materializes the soul. Has the question reference to the state of society -to what is attempted, to what is effected therein? Then it is said we pursue only chimeras, embarking on the faith of theories; while facts, alone, are necessary to be studied, respected and cherished-experience, alone, is worthy of faith. In this way existing civilization is accused, at once, of dryness and of reverie, of hesitation and precipitancy, of timidity and temerity. As philosophers, we are accused of crawling in the dust; as politicians, of essaying the enterprise of Icarus, and of meriting his fate.

"It is this double reproach, or, more properly, this two-fold peril, gentlemen, that we have to repel. Indeed, we are required to solve the problem that gives birth to it. Upon us is imposed the task of causing the empire of facts more and more to prevail,

in the intellectual order, and in the social order, the empire of ideas; with governing, more and more, our reason, in accordance with reality, and reality according to our reason; with maintaining, at the same time, the rigor of the scientific method, and the legitimate empire of the intellect. Nor is there, in this, anything contradictory-far from it. On the contrary, it is the natural and necessary result of the situation of man as a spectator in the midst of the world, and of his mission as an actor in its affairs. I assume nothing, gentlemen; I do not attempt to explain; I only describe what exists. We are thrown into a world that we have neither created nor invented; we find it as it is, we observe it, we study it; it is, indeed, very necessary that we should take it as a fact, because it exists without us, independently of us: It is upon facts, alone, that the mind can exercise itself; facts are its only proper material; and when it discovers in them general laws, these laws are, themselves, facts which the mind itself verifies. Such are the requirements of our situation as spectators, as observers. As actors we have very different duties to perform When we have observed the facts of exterior life, the knowledge of them developes in us ideas, which are superior to those facts: we then feel ourselves called upon to regulate, to reform and perfect the existing state of things: we feel ourselves capable of operating upon the world, and of extending therein the glorious empire of reason. Such is the mission of man: as a spectator he is subject to the facts that surround him; as an actor he possesses himself of these, and impresses them with a more pure and regular form. I am sustained, then, in what I just now advanced, namely, that there is nothing contradictory in the problem which we have to resolve. It is true that a double peril is linked to this two-fold task. In studying facts, the intellect may allow itself to be overwhelmed by them; it may be abased, contracted, materialized; it may be led to believe that there are no facts but such as strike us at a glance; such as are nearly in contact with us, and fall, as we say, under our senses;- -a great and monstrous error, gentlemen. There are facts far removed, immense, obscure, sublime, exceedingly difficult to reach, to observe, to describe, but which are not the less facts, nor the less important for man to study and to know; and if he misconceives or forgets them, his thought will, indeed, be prodigiously abased and degraded, and all his science will bear the impress of this abasement. It is possible, on the other hand, that the ambition of the human mind, in its action on the real world, may be precipitate, excessive and chimerical; that it may be led astray, in prosecuting too far and too vividly, the empire of its ideas over that of things. But what proves this double peril, if not the double mission to which it gives