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manlike initiative in the unofficial circles of agriculture, it is refreshing to note the vision and scope of the recommendations made by the secretary of agriculture in his annual report, the more notable of which were:

The continuance and extension of scientific investigation in the interest of control of plant diseases and insect pests.

Increased support by States for rural schools in the carrying on of courses in the issues of rural life, good roads, sanitation, medical service, and hospital facilities in rural communities.

A far-reaching program for increasing crop yields to meet the intense competition that will come when the world returns to normal. This proposal visualizes a program for increasing the productivity of land already under cultivation, as well as the bringing of unused land, public and private, under cultivation. Extensive surveys are suggested as preliminary to this.

The development of bureaus to aid farm-seekers and promote settlement plans.

A fundamental examination of the problem of tenancy. The conditions of leasing, it is suggested, may need changes that will make for better methods of agriculture, increase the length of tenancy, insure an equitable division of returns, and safeguard the tenant when he has unexhausted improvements on a farm when he terminates his tenancy. Measures to decrease absentee landlordism are suggested as necessary. Farm ownership must be increased if Latifundia perdidere Roman is not to be repeated in the United States.

The protection and perpetuation of forests, with an enlarged program of publicly owned forest, and a continuous and detailed inventory of forest re

sources.

A carefully worked-out program of assistance in marketing, looking toward the elimination of wastes and abuses, and the promotion of orderly distribution.

Federal aid in the building of good roads, to the extent of $100,000,000 annually for at least four years, beginning with the fiscal year 1922, if the financial situation in which the Government then finds itself will permit.

The building up of personal-credit unions for the benefit of farmers whose financial standing and scope of activity render accommodations through the ordinary credit channels difficult.

Regulation and control of stock yards and packing-houses, and the protection of rural consumers against misbranded, adulterated, and worthless feeds and fertilizers.

A fresh and comprehensive survey of American rural life and the possible creation of a rural life commission, probably with a permanent status.

As the democratic movement spreads, it will find itself obliged to reckon fundamentally with an agricultural world. After all, there are few nations that can be classified as urban. Nine tenths of the Russian people are agricultural. The Balkans, Poland, Asia Minor, and much of Austria are strongly rural. When democracy ultimately strikes China and India, it must play its part in an agricultural stage-setting. It behooves the world to look to a statesmanlike treatment of rural life, if the increasing democratizing of life is to mean safety and progress instead of confusion.

BARGAINING IN THE BALTIC FROM the autumn of 1915 the Baltic Provinces have presented an increasingly tangled puzzle. At the moment of writing certain despatches make interesting the tracing out of the conflicting national interests that center there. The particular point of interest is the possibility of a fundamental clash of French and British policy in the Baltic and the larger Russian problem. Writing in 1914, one would have treated the problem of national interests in the Baltic Provinces as a contest between Russian and German interests. A combination of factors in the general Russian situation may, however, make these provinces a theater of conflict between French and English interests. Let us see how this may come about.

The first fact to bear in mind is that Russia proper will always have a vital interest in the Baltic Provinces. The Bolshevik leaders of Russia have, of course, renounced all nationalistic and

imperialistic claims; but the fact remains that when the Russian situation is composed, whether under Bolshevik or counter-revolutionary forces, the elementary necessities of access to the sea and legitimate bases for sea-power as well as frontier defensibility will remain. And any Russian government will contrive to secure these necessities when the situation is normalized. The Baltic Provinces are in truth Russia's "window on the Baltic," through which alone she is most likely to be able to maintain free sea communication with the outside world. Russian sea-power depends finally upon the ports of these provinces, unless the Black-Sea-outlet problem is solved. Russia will not always remain an area of confused and hemmed-in idealism; she must sooner or later deal in Realpolitik, because the anticipated international millennium has not arrived. As long as the Baltic Provinces are in unfriendly hands or in a state of unstable independence, all northwest Russia lies open to attack. It is true, of course, that the number of Russians in the Baltic Provinces is small and that the culture of the Baltic Provinces is German rather than Russian, but until we get a league of nations that really works, nations must themselves keep close watch on the problems of access to the sea, naval bases, and defensible frontiers. Here, then, is the fact of first importance in the Baltic situation.

The interests of a recuperated Germany in the Baltic Provinces lie clear. German control of the Baltic Provinces would mean a strong hold on Russia, naval mastery of the Baltic when Germany once more has a fleet, and would open up to German emigration and exploitation an area one sixth as large as the entire pre-war German Empire. Petrograd would invite easy attack from Germany in a future war.

These would seem to be the logical interests that would clash in the Baltic Provinces. What suggests that France and England may come into the picture? At this writing there are no definitely announced government policies of either France or England that admit of definite analysis and valuation, but certain rumors and tendencies afford food for reflection. It may help us to read the

news of the next few weeks with greater insight if we have these tendencies in mind.

First of all, it is to the interest of France to see Russia restored as an integrated nation, with such defensible frontiers as may give a sense of security and enable Russia to buckle down unafraid to the task of economic rehabilitation, and with such assured access to the sea as will minister to the maximum revival of her economic life and trade. All this, because France is holding the bag on the Russian debt. French fingers itch for unpaid interest and principal. The French have seen no hope of the desired Russian restoration under the Bolshevik régime, so they have left no stone unturned to bring support to the anti-Bolshevik leaders. The French leaders have played a clever hand in keeping England at the job of waging war on Bolshevik Russia despite protests from certain English quarters. France has made little sacrifice in the matter of Russian intervention. There will be Anglo-French harmony as long as England continues to spend blood and treasure in fighting France's battle for a restored, integrated Russia that may be expected to repay the debt to France. But how long will Winston Churchill and the Northcliffe press be able to gull England into this costly, futile, and unstatesmanlike intervention? Certain straws indicate that a strong wind is gathering against this policy. Before this comment reaches the reader a good gale may have set in the opposite direction-a gale that the interventionists may not be able to weather.

Two rumors, reported as from "unimpeachable" sources, whatever that has come to mean in despatches, indicate a negative policy respecting Russia and a positive policy respecting the Baltic Provinces on the part of England that may prove bitter to the French palate, despite "agreements" that may assert hearty coöperation of French and English policy in these matters. The first rumor is to the effect that Italian and English statesmen have arrived at an agreement on two important principles, the first of which is Hands off in Russia. The despatch, it is true, carries assurthat Downing Street breathes

easier because "there is now a real disposition shown by the Italians and also by the French to coöperate." But the next sentence in this London despatch to "The Sun" betrays concern over French sensibilities in the matter. The The sentence asserts that "great care was taken to avoid creating an impression that the Italians and British were going to confront the French as a bloc." The argument upon which this non-intervention policy was discussed was reported to be somewhat as follows:

The Bolshevik argument has been that the antis were counter-revolutionists and this prevailed to obtain the support of the peasants, who do not want the old regime of the Czar. If the Bolsheviki now attain undisputed power in Russia, as is likely, they must abandon terrorism, as there will be nobody to terrorize, and if they wish to retain the support of the mass of the people they must abandon their own oppressive measures, which no longer will be justified by a state of civil war. Therefore, as happened after the fall of Robespierre, any Russian Government left alone must become moderate.

In short, there seems to be a tendency toward the belief that if communism is a patently impossible scheme, the thing to do is to leave it alone in the sunlight to wither from its own lack of intrinsic vitality, and not to persist in giving Lenine and Trotzky a chance "to save their faces" in the martyrdom of military defeat. It is doubtful that French concern over the Russian debt will permit French policy to take such a philosophical attitude toward this long-time and roundabout way of getting at the real Russia. France knows that she must long defer hope of payments under such an experiment. Will she cling to the hope that military force can erect more quickly a stable government in Russia that will discharge the debt? If she does, then we may expect English adherence to any "hands-off" policy to produce Anglo-French tension. So much for the negative Russian policy.

In the next column to the despatch just discussed, another London despatch asserted that in the first week of January the British Government considered plans looking toward a positive policy in the Baltic Provinces. Keeping in mind

the vital relation that the Baltic Provinces must assume to a restored, integrated Russia, it would be interesting to know how France will feel regarding the plans indicated. Briefly the plans fall along these lines:

It is suggested that negotiations between a London group and the governments of Esthonia, Letvia, and Lithuania, negotiations extending over several months, have resulted in a plan about to be concluded under which a private group or groups of English capitalists will enter into a business partnership with these governments. Here are some of the details of the partnership proposed:

The London banking group agrees to establish in each of these Baltic countries, in partnership with the governments, a bank modeled after the Bank of England. Each bank, it is suggested, will have both an issue and a banking branch. Reserves are to be built up, debased currencies to be restored, and a full program of currency reform carried out. In all this, assurance is given that there will be a "full share of control by representatives of the nations concerned."

The London banking group and the Baltic governments, it is suggested, will effect a "timber agreement" for the laudable purpose of "bringing about a flow of exports." For fifteen years the state forests, under this agreement, will be administered by this "partnership" and then turned back to the Baltic governments.

The London group, under this agreement, will get a monopoly of the flax exports of these Baltic countries. Assurance is given that "the group in this will act only as agents, however, taking only a small commission on the sale of the flax and handing over to the Governments all the other proceeds "

The London "Globe" article that outlines the plan describes it as a plan “of practical reconstruction" and as a "real alternative to Bolshevism" and asserts that it will get business back into its normal channels "so that these new states can maintain their independence." Then, too, it is suggested that it "should also be a great help to the British interests in general, not only in relieving the shortage of flax and timber, but in pro

viding an excellent means of entry into Russia." The latter quotations are the despatched paraphrases of the article.

Will France, already a bit exasperated by the Persian and Syrian tangles, see in this a plan of "practical reconstruction" or will she prefer to see this whole Baltic situation left open to fit into the program of a restored Russia? These despatches are discussed here not as though they were accomplished facts of government policy, but simply as valuable bits of information to keep in mind while reading the future news of AngloFrench relations.

It is really too bad that these generous assumptions of "the white man's burden" must invariably bring international complications in their trail!

GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS WHEN General Tasker H. Bliss returned some weeks ago to the United States after his distinguished service abroad, there was no fanfare of trumpets to welcome him. The press did not seize upon the occasion to record and approve the intellectual strength, broad vision, and great action which marked his service throughout the war and the deliberations of peace. Much has been said and written to the effect that Mr. Wilson surrounds himself with men of indifferent abilities. There are stubborn exceptions to this. The case of General Bliss certainly stands as a brilliant repudiation. of this criticism. The long list of the general's activities that lay behind his appointment as chief of staff of the Army of the United States in 1917, in succession to General Scott, was marked by a painstaking and creative intelligence. His services in Cuba and in the Philippines were of high quality and in his steady rise in the army to his present eminent position he has always been the scholar, the statesman, the man of action, in highly effective combination. When all the facts are disclosed, we shall probably discover that of all the Americans at the peace conference General Bliss, for his grasp of military and political affairs and for his genuine statesmanship, won the highest respect and admiration from the distinguished statesmen of the Allied countries. It was

He

General Bliss who formulated an argument for the unified command which Lloyd George is reputed to have described as the ablest bit of argument for policy produced during the war. enjoys the fullest admiration of Lloyd George, Sir Douglas Haig, Clemenceau, and others. It bespeaks a fundamental soundness in the American Army and the American character that a career that had been relatively a peace-time career in the army could have produced a man with such singular military effectiveness, to say nothing of the broader grasp of world politics. The mind of General Bliss was at no time during the peace conference deluded by the prevalent political casuistry that dragged the Peace of Versailles so far below the laudable war aims of the Allied bloc. His voice was raised in protest when the Shan-tung negation of democracy was perpetrated. While scanning the horizon for abilities worthy of Presidential responsibilities, it might be well to look into the case of General Tasker H. Bliss, a soldier whose rare breadth of mind and vision would lift him out of the class of soldier Presidents.

THE RAID ON RADICALISM

THE raid on radicalism with its attendant deportations is in full swing at the moment of writing. The whole process has brought to light afresh the two fundamental attitudes toward the problem of dealing with unrest and radical agitation. These two attitudes are equally clear-cut. One attitude is based upon the belief that nothing save a policy of severe and uncompromising repression will tide us over this dangerously unsettled time. The partizans of this policy affect to locate the cause of all of our unrest at the door of alien and misguided agitators. By a severely logical process they reason that, if agitators are the sole cause of unrest, the wholesale deportation of the agitators will usher in a healing era of content. A very large party holding this view seem to go no further in their political thinking than the negative act of deportation or jailing. That is to say, they invest all of their energy in denunciation. leaving neither time nor inclination for

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the construction of positive political and economic programs. This party is composed of two distinct groups, men whose selfish interests are at stake in the resisting of all political and social change, and certain arid-minded politicians who have = quickly seized the chance to ride into popular favor by waving the flag and I shouting "Americanism." It is probably true that seventy-five per cent. of the politicians who are attempting to capitalize the legitimate revulsion against un-American alien agitators could not, if cross-examined, give a clear and conIstructive definition of the "AmericanIism" of which they pose as apostles. O Many men are to-day using the cry of "Americanism" as a smoke-screen to cover a bankrupt political intelligence.

These comments have nothing whatever to do with the justice of deportations. The writer, along with the vast majority of Americans, feels that the present deportations represent a fine example of social and political sanitation, a much needed house-cleaning; but we are obliged to analyze critically such social and political phenomena for attendant developments that strike deeply at the roots of our whole system of political thought and action. The final safety of democracy depends upon our keeping up a constant flow of criticism over the policies and methods employed in dealing with unrest. There is a line over which a nation cannot pass without destroying that freedom of thought and speech which is the very soil of social and political progress. The danger is not that we will go too far in the deportation of alien agitators. The gods are witness to the fact that we have been dangerously tolerant of this breed in the past. The danger lies in the fact that we may become so proficient in the censorship of thought and speech, while dealing with alien agitators, that we will bring a finished art of repression to bear upon a legitimate divergence of opinion among our own people. It is an unhealthy thing in a democracy to develop a facility for bringing the big stick into play whenever vigorous protest arises against a prevailing policy. The very soil of our liberty has been fertilized by the blood of rebels. But as Secretary Lane well said, "We have had

our revolution," and by it we set up a government in which the ballot is to be the one legitimate method for effecting change. We are not recreant to our traditions of freedom when we demand that no appeal be made from that tribunal. We are justified in repressing and deporting not only those who appeal directly to violence to overthrow our form of government, but even those who advocate effectively although peaceably a change in that fundamental fact of our government.

The other fundamental attitude toward agitation is a "hands-off" attitude. It is said that any and every proposal should be let alone to stand or fall by the test of the survival of the truest. That every proposal should be given a chance to compete in the intellectual market. That the most effective measure against any agitator is to hire a hall for him and give him a chance to betray the insanity of his creed, or if his creed prove sane, give him a chance to serve us by proving it. There is little doubt of the theoretical attractiveness of this attitude. It seems to show a brave belief in the invulnerability of our own ideas. But in practical operation this attitude is open to even greater abuse and danger than a marked degree of censorship, if sanity is used in censorship. Free speech can be made a fetish instead of a healthy policy.

If we are to get to a normal basis for political progress we must contrive to find and follow the difficult line of action that lies somewhere between the "shoot'em or ship-'em" policy and the "handsoff" policy. We must display a healthy intolerance to agitation that strikes at the roots of a democracy committed to political action, without letting that intolerance besmirch our traditions of tolerance to any sincere agitation that is willing to trust its case to the suffrage of the American people. This middle policy can be abused; it lacks the theoretical clearness of a more dogmatic attitude, it calls for constant watchfulness of our liberties in its operation, but it is the practical path to follow. Force in the hands of statesmen is salutary, although force in the hands of demagogues, Bourbon' or Bolshevik, usually spells tyranny.

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