Puslapio vaizdai
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pose that God will exert his infinite power to perpetuate sin and misery, which are acknowledged to be the works of the devil, who, being a finite agent, could not be the cause of any thing infinite, as no cause can produce an effect superior to itself.

It is evident that whatever is infinite, cannot admit of either increase or diminution; for a progressive or mutable infinity is a contradiction in terms; for if an addition can be made, it is evident that it was not infinite previous to such addition: for example, if every sin is an infinite crime, A. commits a crime to-day, which renders him infinitely criminal; he commits another sin next day....he must now either be more than infinitely criminal, or the first crime being infinite, precluded the possibility of increase. According to this scheme, sin would be an absolute unit, that could admit of no addition. But if we were, for argument sake, to admit this statement, that the first sin being infinite, could admit of no augmentation, it will not support the conclusion which Mr. Strebeck wishes to establish, viz. that because sin' is an infinite evil, it is just to inflict an infinite punishment upon the sinner; as it will be remembered that his most weighty argument to prove sin to be an infinite evil, is, that Christ

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has made an infinite atonement and satisfaction for sin; agreeably to the phraseology of John, when he saw Jesus coming to him, says, Behold the lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world. Now if Christ (who is the head of every man) has made an infinite atonement and satisfaction for sin in the aggregate, to wit, the sin of the world, how can it be either just or merciful to inflict an infinite punishment upon the persons for whose sins an infinite atonement has been made by the Saviour of the world, who hath tasted death for every man ?† And who is also the propitiation for the sins of the whole world.t

John testifies, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world, and not as the Partialists conceive, the Saviour of a few individuals; the majority being consigned to the devil, not because the Deity could not save them, but because he did not wish to do it! But what will become of this fine scheme, if what we are told by John be true, to wit, that the Son of God was manifested, on purpose to destroy the works of the devil, which are acknowledged to be sin and misery? However, if Mr. Stre

* John i. 29. + Heb. ii. 9. 1 John ii. I, 2. § 1 John iv. 14. || 1 John iii. 8.

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beck can fairly demonstrate that sin is an infinite evil, we must grant that it cannot be destroyed; and, in consequence, that Christ's mission must prove abortive.

But as we conceive that there cannot be a more self-evident axiom, than that whatever has not been infinite eternally cannot be made so in time (not even a parte post) without the immediate sustaining power of God; and as God has sent his beloved Son into the world to destroy the works of the devil; and not only his works, but the old traitor himself;* we therefore cannot believe that God is divided against himself, or that Christ, mistaking the design of his mission, should, instead of destroying the works of the devil, destroy the souls of men, who were "created (en auto) in him (di auto) by him, and (eis auton) for himself,† should he stock the infernal regions with subjects, and establish the kingdom and dominion of the devil upon a basis equally permanent with that of his Father.... Was it for this purpose he was sent into the world? No, verily, he was sent to be the Saviour of the world; and to do the will of his Father, whose will is, that all men should be saved, and come unto the knowledge of the truth;

* Heb. ii. 14. † Colos. i. 16.

1 John iv. 14.

and for this purpose he gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time:* and we trust he will not leave the ransomed in possession of the enemy: for he has promised, that if he should be lifted up from the earth, he would draw (pantas anthropous) that is, all men unto him. And because he is faithful who hath promised, we believe him. St. Paul told the Galatians seventeen hundred years ago, that Christ had redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us. But we shall gain little by a redemption from the curse of the law, if Mr. Strebeck has discovered a curse of the gospel that will answer the purpose quite as well. But if we can collect his precise meaning from the circuitous method by which he endeavours to prove the truth of one controvertible proposition by another, which requires proof as much as the first, we will endeavour to analyze the subject more critically. The drift of his circular argument appears to be an attempt to prove, that the dignity of the being offended, and not the knowledge or capacity of the being offending, constitutes the scale or standard of criminality. He observes in the 25th page, that "It is material to the present argument, to understand distinctly in what point of light the

1 Tim. ii. 3, 4, 6, † John xii. 32. † Gal. iii. 13.

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Universalists consider sin." He then states Doctor Chauncey's sentiments, who says, " In what point of light soever we take a view of sin, it is certainly in its nature a finite evil. It is the fault of a finite creature, and the effect of finite principles, passions, and appetites." This, says he, is the light in which he (Dr. Chauncey) considered sin. And now follows the conclusion which he draws from this view of it. "To say that the sinner is doomed to infinite misery for the finite faults of a finite life, looks like a reflection on the infinite justice and goodness of God."

Mr. S. then observes, that the whole stress of the argument rests upon this inquiry, whether sin be a finite or an infinite evil? It is of importance to examine this subject, for if sin be but a finite evil, the conclusion would be undeniably correct, that it would be unjust in God to punish the sinner eternally for his finite offences. He says, considered subjectively, as the mere act of a finite being, it would appear that sin is only a finite evil. But we are to reason on the heinousness of offences, not only from the state of the subject, but likewise from that of the object of them. He then states a case to shew the dif ferent degrees of criminality, of which a person would be guilty, who might have offended his

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