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No. 2.

Dépêche des Ministres Américains au Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, en Date du 8 Novembre, 1797. Ils rendent compte de plusieurs entrevues qu'ils avaient eues avec les Agens Secrets de M. de Talleyrand, et avec M. de Talleyrand lui-même ;-les Agens Français continuent d'insister sur l'Argent à donner, et sur l'Emprunt à fournir; et les Ministres Américains, de l'autre côté, demandent, pour Base de la Négociation, la Cessation des Hostilités contre le Commerce d'Amérique; on donne d'ailleurs à entendre aux Ministres Plénipotentiaires que, s'ils accordent le Cadeau qu'on leur demande pour le Directoire, ils auront la Permission de rester à Paris, mais sans cependant étre reconnus, ni reçus en leur Qualité diplomatique. On leur suggère de certaines Propositions (v. Pièce A.) qu'ils auraient à faire à M. de Talleyrand comme venant d'eux-mêmes. Les Ministres Américains y répondent, (v. Pièce B.) et prennent la Résolution de ne vouloir plus avoir de Communications indirectes avec le Gouvernement Français. Ils se monrent aussi inébranlables au Sujet de l'Emprunt qu'ils regardent comme contraire à la Neutralité que les EtatsUnis professent.

Dear Sir,

Paris, November 8th, 1797.

We now enclose you, in thirty-six quarto pages of cypher, and in eight pages of cyphered exhibits, the sequel to the details commenced in No. 1, dated the 22d of last month; and have the honor to be, your most obedient humble servants,

CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY,
J. MARSHALL,

E. GERRY.

Colonel Pickering.

October 27th, 1797.

About twelve we received another visit from Mr. X.

in the papers, and then said, that some proposals from us had been expected on the subject on which we had before conversed; that the Directory were becoming. impatient, and would take a decided course with regard to America, if we could not soften them. We answered, that on that subject we had already spoken explicitly, and had nothing farther to add. He men tioned the change in the state of things which had been produced by the peace with the emperor, as warranting an expectation of a change in our system; to which we only replied, that this event had been expected by us, and would not in any degree affect our conduct. Mr. X. urged, that the Directory had, since this peace, taken a higher and more decided tone with respect to us, and all other neutral nations, than had been before taken; that it had been determined, that all nations should aid them, or be considered, and treated as their enemies. We answered, that such an effect had already been contemplated by us as probable, and had not been overlooked when we gave to this proposition, our decided answer; and further, that we had no powers to negociate for a loan of money; that our government had not contemplated such a circumstance in any degree whatever; that if we should stipulate a loan, it would be a perfectly void thing, and would only deceive France, and expose ourselves. Mr. X. again expatiated on the power and violence of France: he urged the danger of our situation, and pressed the policy of softening them, and of thereby obtaining time. The present men, he said, would very probably not continue long in power; and it would be very unfortunate if those who might succeed, with better dispositions towards us, should find the two nations in actual war. We answered, that if war should be made on us by France, it would be so obviously forced on us, that on a change of men, peace might be made with as much facility as the present differences could be accommodated: we added, that all America deprecated a war with France; but that our present situation was more ruinous to us than a declared

war could be; that at present our commerce was plundered unprotected; but that if war was declared, we should seek the means of protection. Mr. X. said, he hoped we should not form a connection with Britain; and we answered, that we hoped so too; that we had ail been engaged in our revolution war, and felt its injuries; that it had made the deepest impression on us ; but that if France should attack us, we must seek the best means of self defence. Mr. X. again returned to the subject of money: Said he, gentlemen, you do not speak to the point; it is money: it is expected that you will offer money. We said that we had spoken to that point very explicitly: we had given an answer. No, said he, you have not what is your answer? We replied; it is no; no; not a six-pence. He again called our attention to the dangers which threatened our country, and asked, if it would not be prudent, though we might not make a loan to the nation, to interest an influential friend in our favour. He said we ought to consider what men we had to treat with; that they disregarded the justice of our claims, and the reasoning with which we might support them; that they disregarded their own colonies; and considered themselves as perfectly invulnerable with respect to us; that we could only acquire an interest among them by a judicious application of money; and it was for us to consider, whether the situation of our country did not require that these means should be resorted to. We observed, that the conduct of the French Government was such as to leave us much reason to fear, that should we give the money, it would effect no good purpose, and would not produce a just mode of thinking with respect to us. Proof of this must first be given us. He said, that when we employed a lawyer, we gave him a fee, without knowing whether the cause could be gained or not; but it was necessary to have one, and we paid for his services, whether those services were successful or not so in the present state of things,

individuals were to render, whatever might be the effect of those good offices. We told him there was no parallel in the cases; that a lawyer, not being to render the judgment, could not command success; he could only endeavour to obtain it; and consequently, we could only pay him for his endeavours: but the Directory could decide on the issue of our negociation. It had only to order, that no more american vessels should be seized, and to direct those now in custody to be restored, and there could be no opposition to the order. He said, that all the members of the Directory were not disposed to receive our money that Merlin, for instance, was paid from another quarter, and would touch no part of the douceur which was to come from us. We replied, that we had understood, that Merlin was paid by the owners of the privateers; and he nodded an assent to the fact. He proceeded to press this subject with vast perseverance. He told us that we paid money to obtain peace with the Algerines, and with the Indians; and that it was doing no more to pay France for peace. To this it was answered, that when our government commenced a treaty with either Algiers or the Indian tribes, it was understood that money was to form the basis of the treaty, and was its essential article; that the whole nation knew it, and was prepared to expect it as a thing of course; but that in treating with France, our government had supposed,. that a proposition, such as he spoke of, would, if made by us, give mortal offence. He asked if our government did not know, that nothing was to be obtained here without money? We replied, that our govern ment had not even suspected such a state of things. He appeared surprised at it, and said, there was not an American in Paris who could not have given that information. We told him, that the letters of our minister bad indicated a very contrary temper in the government of France; and had represented it as acting entirely upon principle, and as feeling a very pure and disinterested affection for America. He looked some

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what surprised; and said briskly to general Pinckney: well, sir, you have been a long time in France and in Holland; what do you think of it? General Pinckney answered, that he considered Mr. X. and Mr. Y. as men of truth, and of consequence he could have but one opinion on the subject. He stated, that Hamburgh, and other states of Europe, were obliged to buy a peace; and that it would be equally for our interest to do so. Once more he spoke of the danger of a breach with France, and of her power, which nothing could resist. We told him that it would be in vain for us to deny her power, or the solicitude we felt to avoid a contest with it; that no nation estimated her power more highly than America, or wished more to be on amicable terms with her; but that one object was still dearer to us than the friendship of France, which was our national independence; that America had taken a neutral station: she had a right to take it: no nation had a right to force us out of it: that to lend a sum of money to a belligerent power, abounding in every thing requisite for war but money, was to relinquish our neutrality, and take part in the war: to lend this money, under the lash and coercion of France, was to relinquish the government of ourselves, and to submit to a foreign government imposed upon us by force : that we would make at least one manly struggle before we thus surrendered our national independence: that our case was different from that of one of the minor nations of Europe; they were unable to maintain their independence, and did not expect to do so: America was a great, and so far as concerned her self-defence, a powerful nation: she was able to maintain her inde pendence; and must deserve to lose it, if she permitted it to be wrested from her: that France and Britain had been at war for near fifty years of the last hundred, and might probably be at war for fifty years of the century to come; that America had no motives which could induce her to involve herself in those wars; and that

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