United States from France, in case of her recognizing the claims which we shall make in their behalf, and al debt which might arise from a loan by the Government of the United States to that of France, during the war. The one is the result of an arrest of their property without their consent; the other would be a voluntary act of the Government of the United States, and a breach of their neutrality. There is an additional objection to the latter: If the United States should make such a loan, it would give too much reason to suppose that their government had consented, in a collusive manner, to the capture of the vessels of their citizens, and had thus heen furnishing France with supplies to carry on the war. Our instructions are express, not to stipulate for any aids to France, either directly or indirectly, during the war. With respect to a secret stipulation, a loan cannot be made without an act of the legislature: but if the executive were adequate to it, we have had an instance of an injunction of secrecy on members of the Senate, on an important subject, which one of the members thought himself warranted in publishing in the newspapers; and of frequent instances of secrets which have otherwise escaped secrecy, in this instance, might therefore be considered, if the measure was in itself admissible, as being impracticable. General Marshall observed, that we had considered the subject with great solicitude, and were decidedly of opinion, that we could not, under any form, make a loan which could be used during the war; that we could not tell what our government would do, if on the spot; but were perfectly clear, that without additional orders, we could not do what France requested. Mr. Gerry observed, that the government and nation of the United States, as well as ourselves, were earnestly solicitous to restore friendship between the two republics; that as General Marshall had stated, we could not say what our government would do, if on the spot; but if this proposition met the wishes of the government of France, General Marshall and himself had agreed immediately to embark for the United States, and lay before our

1

government the existing state of things here, as it respected our nation, to enable them to determine whether any, and what other measures on their part were necessary. Mr. Talleyrand made no observation on this proposition: but enquired whether we expected soon to receive orders. Mr. Gerry mentioned an answer he had received to a letter sent by him in November: and General Marshall stated, that our first dispatches were sent on board two vessels at Amsterdam, on the 28th of November; from which Mr. Talleyrand could form as just an idea as we could, when an answer might be expected: but he did not think it probable one would arrive before a month to come. General Marshall told him, we knew that our government had not received our dispatches on the 8th of January; and we could not tell when they might be received. He asked whe ther our iutelligence came through England? General Marshall answered that it did not; and General Pinckney said, that american papers as late as the 8th of January mentioned the fact.

There was some conversation about the time when these instructions might be expected; and General Marshall suggested a doubt whether our government might give any instructions. He asked, with some surprize, whether we had not written for instructions? and we answered, that we had not: and Mr. Gerry said that we had stated facts to our government, and conceived that nothing more was necessary. General Pinckney observed, that the government knowing the facts, would do what was proper; and that our applying or not applying for instructions would not alter their conduct. Mr. Talleyrand then enquired whether we had not sent any one to the United States. General Pinckney said no and Mr. Gerry added, that soon after our arrival we had made propositions to send one of our num ber, which were not accepted. General Marshall further added, that those who had communicated with us, had told us we should be ordered out of France immediately; and we had supposed that we should be

ment. Mr. Gerry then observed that the government of France must judge for itself; but that it appeared to him, that a treaty on liberal principles, such as those on which the treaty of commerce between the two nations was first established, would be infinitely more advantageous to France than the trifling advantages she could derive from a loan. Such a treaty would produce a friendship and attachment on the part of the United States to France, which would be solid and permanent, and produce benefits far superior to those of a loan, if we had powers to make it. To this observation Mr. Talleyrand made no reply. We parted without any sentiment delivered by the minister on the subject of our going home to consult our government,

we

As we were taking our leave of Mr. Talleyrand, told him that two of us would return immediately to receive instructions of our government, if that would be agreeable to the Directory: if it was not, we would wait some time in the expectation of receiving instruc tions.

Message du Président Adams au Congrès, en Date du 18 Juin, 1798, pour lui transmettre la Dépêche No. 8 des Ministres Plénipotentiaires à Paris.

Message from the President to Congress.

Gentlemen of the Senate, and

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives,

I now transmit to Congress the Dispatch, Number 8, from our Envoys Extraordinary to the French Republic, which was received at the Secretary of State's office, on Thursday the fourteenth day of this month. JOHN ADAMS,

United States, June 18th, 1798.

No. 8.

Dépéche des Envoyés Extraordinaires d'Amérique, à Paris, adressée à M. Pickering, Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, en Date du 3 Avril, 1798, pour lui faire parvenir une Lettre de M. de Talleyrand du 18 Mars, écrite aux Ministres Américains en Réponse à leur Mémoire du 17 Janvier, avec la Réplique des Ministres à la Lettre de M. de Talleyrand.

Dear Sir,

Paris, April 3d, 1798.

We herewith transmit you the copy of a letter written to us by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the 28th Ventôse, (18th March) and purporting to be an answer to our memorial of the 17th of January.

We also send you in this inclosure a copy of our reply, which has been presented this morning. As soon as we certainly know what steps the French Government mean to pursue in consequence of this reply, you shall be informed of them.

We remain, with great respect and esteem, your most obedient servants,

CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY,

J. MARSHALL,

E. GERRY.

Col. PICKERING, Secretary of the United States.

(Incluses du No. 8.)

α.

Lettre de M. de Talleyrand, adressée aux Ministres Plénipotentiaires des Etats-Unis, en Date du 18 Mars, 1798-Suivant ce Mémoire, la France a eu l' Antériorité des Plaintes à l'Egard de l'Amérique. Récapitulation des principaux Griefs: Prétention de connaitre de la Validité des Prises; Détention des Propriétés Françaises; les Croiseurs Anglais favorisés; Arrestation d'une Corvette Nationale de France; Décisions souvent partiales desTribunaux Américains; Renvoi à ces Tribunaux d'Affaires qui auraient dû

de Londres en Août 1795.-Contraste de la Conduite de la France envers les Etats-Unis. Le Ministre Français appuye surtout sur les Procédés de l'Amérique vis-à-vis de la France, à l'Occasion du Traité, signé à Londres par M. Jay, et sur les Clauses mêmes de ce Traité, comme contraires à l'Alliance et à l'Amitié entre la France et les Etats-Unis. De là les Arrétés du Directoire, et les autres Actes, dont se plaint l'Amérique. Le Ministre passe ensuite à d'autres Griefs de la France envers les Etats-Unis ; tels que la Notification, faite en 1796 au Croiseurs Français, que désormais ils n'auraient plus la Permission de vendre leurs Prises dans les Ports des Etats-Unis ; la Licence des Journaux Publics; la Publication de Pam phlets, remplis de Calomnies et d'Invectives contre le Gouvernement Français et le Ton des Actes publics mêmes du Gouvernement Fédéral, où l'on reconnaisait une Inimitié sourde qui n'attendait que le Moment favorable pour éclater. Les Instructions des Ministres Américains, suivant M. de Talleyrand, étaient conçues de Manière, qu'on ne pouvait arriver à des Résultats pacifiques; elles étaient dictées par le Désir de soutenir à tout prix le Traité de Londres, qui formait le principal Grief de la France. Il était manifeste qu'on voulait consommer une Union avec l'Angleterre, pour laquelle on professait un Dévouement et une Partialité, qui depuis long-temps étaient le Principe de la Conduite du Gouvernement Fédéral, C'est en suite de ces Sentimens qu'il avait envoyé en France des Personnes, dont les Relations et les Opinions étaient trop connues pour en espérer des Dispositions sincèrement conciliantes; tandis qu'on s'était empressé d'envoyer à Londres des Ministres bien connus par des Sentimens conformes à l'Objet de leur Mission. Le Peuple Américain ne pourrait qu'avec Regret envisager un pareil Etat de Choses et en prévoir les Conséquences. Cependant M. deTalleyrand finit par déclarer que, malgré la Sorte de Prévention qu'on avait pu concevoir sur les Ministres Américains, le Directoire était disposé à traiter avec celui des trois (M. Gerry,) dont les Opinions, présumées plus impartiales promettaient, dans le Cours des Explications, plus de cette Confiance réciproque qui était indispensable,