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and seamen. Nothing less would give Canadians any vital interest in naval defence. But all this requires time and thought to work it out in an effective way and it involves questions which ought not to be hastily decided. We see to-day how the Liberal leaders have already found it expedient to alter their programme of 1909 from a fleet of six cruisers to a totally different two unit system. Haste and premature decision in this question mean waste and inefficiency. And it is not less important to give time for the full consideration of that other question, the constitutional relation of Canada to the general system of the defence of the Empire. It is this question which involves the most important difference between the attitude of the Premier and that of Sir Wilfrid on the subject of a permanent naval policy. It is the question whether Canada shall frankly assume a form of constitutional responsibility in connection with the defence of the Empire or not.

SIR WILFRID'S NAVAL BILL OF 1909.

Sir Wilfrid's Naval Bill of 1909 (the Act of 1910) quietly decided this question—in the negative. It avoided any permanent or fixed responsibility in connection with the defence of the Empire. It put the Canadian navy-to-be at the service of the Empire only after an Order-in-Council to that effect, that is, only if the Canadian Government of the day chose to take part with Britain on any particular occasion. Sir Wilfrid's Bill read as follows:

In the case of an emergency the Governor-in-Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the naval service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the naval service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships and vessels.

The meaning of this section of the Bill was made clear in the discussion which took place on the 20th April, 1910. Mr. Borden asked Sir Wilfrid, then Premier, whether a Canadian ship meeting a ship of similar armament belonging to a power at war with Great Britain would fight or not, and Sir Wilfrid replied: "I do not know that she would fight. She should not fight until the Government have determined whether

she would go into the war. That is, as Sir Wilfrid further admitted, our ships (and inferentially our ports and harbours) would in effect be neutral until the Canadian government had made up its mind to participate in the war. That is a perfectly clear position and a good deal may be said in its favour from a merely or narrowly Canadian point of view. But it must be judged by the possibilities it admits of and these possibilities were historically manifested in the slowness and obvious reluctance with which Sir Wilfrid as Prime Minister of Canada consented to allow Canadian soldiers to participate in the South African war. He was, as we all know, forced into it by the sentiment of the country. I have no doubt Sir Wilfrid's reluctance can be explained in a perfectly reasonable way. Perhaps he thought the war was to be only a petty struggle with a small power instead of a crisis in the development of the Empire such as it turned out to be. But the fact remains all the same and it throws a clear light on the possibilities of the situation under Sir Wilfrid's Naval Bill. An autocratic premier, all powerful with his party, might again be mistaken in his estimate of a situation and might detach Canada's whole naval strength from the Empire at a critical moment, or render a strategic movement abortive at a critical moment, and in naval warfare there is always a critical moment at the outbreak. He might do this from pure misjudgment of the situation, or from natural aversion for war, he might do it in spite of the general sentiment of the Canadian people, but the fact is there that under Sir Wilfrid's Act he might do it. Such an organization can hardly be considered as constituting part of a fixed or permanent system of naval defence for the Empire. I do not deny that it may have its advantages, but it cannot properly be called 'a permanent policy' at all; it is rather a policy of 'wait and see' all the time, and in a military sense presents less of a united front to possible enemies than the ordinary alliances between states. Is it not possible to do something a little better than that in the way of united defence? I do not even conceive it to be necessary that the arrangements for defence should be unalterable for all time; it is only advisable for military purposes that they can be counted on as part of a system of defence while they last.

Sir Wilfrid's Bill had the clear imprint of the old English political school in which he was bred with its belief in decentralization and detachment as heaven-sent solutions of all difficulties. That school did much good service in its day. Where the situation required more freedom, more liberation of local forces, its policy was naturally attended with success, and this of course was very often the situation in the old British Empire which consisted of one powerful country and a number of weak dependencies, the strongest of which had not yet found its legs. But all the same the policy of mere detachment and separation is not one which can be applied everywhere and always without consideration. Where the situation requires building up, where it calls for the recognition of new unities, new embodiments of growing forces and aspirations, it may easily miss the road. Germany has built itself up into a great empire and Italy into a first-class Power by following an opposite policy, while Austro-Hungary, to which Gladstone used to appeal so fondly as an example, is sinking into a secondary position of dependence on Germany, and in the north the visions once cherished of a great Scandinavian empire have dwindled into the international insignificance of three petty isolated states, because for twenty critical years Johan Sverdrup and the poet Björnson believed there was no limit to the merits of decentralization. The system which binds the British Empire together with its variety of peoples must be always of the freest and most elastic, allowing each of the great self-governing parts perfect freedom of self-government. But still one cannot build up on purely decentralizing and disintegrating principles. There must be a recognition of a new integrating force somewhere, in some form, or no new unit of power with the ideals and hopes which it carries can be born into the world and maintain its place there. The British Empire is virtually becoming such a new unit of power, with its new combination of self-governing communities, rich with possibilities of many kinds for all English-speaking nations, and also, perhaps, for some to whom English is not a native tongue. And there could be no safer sphere in which such a new integrating force could show itself than in a general system of naval defence.

Though I have a sincere respect therefore for Sir Wilfrid's constitutional scruples on this question, because they do not

represent a mere party opposition but lie deep in his political life and convictions, I doubt if his old constitutionalism is a very good guide in this new situation, even from a purely Canadian point of view. For it cannot be good for Canada, it could not be good for any nation to take the permanent advantages and benefits of a situation but accept no responsibilities in connection with it. For that is the meaning of Sir Wilfrid's curious statement: "When England is at war, we are at war; but it does not follow that because we are at war, we are actually in the conflict." (Hansard, Dec. 15, 1912). That is quite true as a historical statement. We were "not in it," as Sir Wilfrid points out, in the contest with France at the beginning of the 19th century, nor in the Crimean war of 1854, and it is easily conceivable that we might not "be in it" actively in some kinds of war in the future, but to make that irresponsibility fixed and permanent now that the feeble ununified Canada of the past has given place to the large and prosperous Dominion of to-day is a use of history which refuses altogether to take note of the new character and the new ideal of the British Empire. And indeed that is the one great and persistent defect in Sir Wilfrid's policy in general on Imperial questions. It would not be good for Canada to sit down in a situation which was too soft and selfishly secure, which called for no real forethought, no clear acceptance of responsibility. Great nations are not trained in that unheroic way but have, as a necessary part of their education, the prudent and thoughtful acceptance of responsibility. I do not think Canadian youth, as I know them in Ontario, want to be trained in that way. The United States to-day with its Monroe doctrine and new oversea responsibilities has assumed tasks which obviously will not grow lighter with time. But these tasks give it an honourable place in the movement of human civilization. No nation could merely sit down in a corner and eat its pumpkin pie and be anything but-little Johnnie Horner.

MR. BORDEN'S CONCEPTION OF A PERMANENT NAVAL POLICY.

This is the problem involved in the naval question which Mr. Borden is evidently considering with the honesty, moderation and thoughtfulness which seem to be his characteristic qualities. Like many others, perhaps, I was for a long time.

rather disconcerted at the want of certain qualities in Mr. Borden as a leader. His speeches have few or no brilliancies, he rarely makes a point with the vivacity which strikes the popular imagination. But he has qualities which make up for the want of those brilliancies. His speech is temperate and thoughtful, a positive relief to the ear amongst the many falsetto notes which come from both sides of the House. And he takes hold in a quiet solid way which indicates a careful and comprehensive study of the subject. His speech in introducing his naval bill was singularly free from irritating matter and avoided all attempts to point sentences at the opposite party. But he left no doubt as to the main difference between his views and theirs regarding a permanent policy. His definite or fixed relation to a general system of defence for the Empire is far from an accidental or optional relation, and he insisted on the principle that this participation in the naval defence of the Empire entitled the Dominions which undertook it "to share also in the responsibility for and in the control of a foreign policy." But he recognized that the problem here involved complex and difficult questions requiring time and study for their proper solution. His words were: "But I conceive that its solution is not impossible; and however difficult the task may be, it is not the part of wisdom or of statesmanship to evade it. And so we invite the statesmen of Great Britain to study with us this, the real problem of Imperial existence." (Hansard, p. 714).

In short, the permanent policy which Mr. Borden approves is one which looks upon the British Empire with its wide sphere of activities and possibilities as part of the Canadian's heritage he repeatedly uses the word—as well as his sheltering roof, and he would have him take his place therein frankly and boldly. Sir Wilfrid's policy, on the other hand, reduces Canada's relation to Great Britain and the Empire to an accident and an option as much as it can. His Canadian navy would be a local organization merely, which might theoretically and conceivably be standing by as neutrals while German or Russian ships were in conflict with British and Australian ones. I do not think that very likely to occur in fact, but it illustrates correctly enough the difference between Sir Wilfrid's policy and Mr. Borden's.

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