question came on to be discussed, and when the order of the day for the consideration of it in the house of lords was read, The earl of Darnley rose to move an address which would amount to an approbation of the conduct of his majesty's present ministers: he could not withhold his approbation of their conduct since they came, into office, especially when contrusted with that of their predecessors, whose servile imitators they had proved themselves not to be, as be had expected. The convention on the table was a striking instance of that. It was evident from that document, that they had not continued to bully and insult the powers of Europe; but that, by a judicious mixture of firmness and moderation, they had induced them to lay aside their unjust pretensions, and had finally settled, upon an equitable and permanent basis the maritime law of nations. Upon the principles of the law of natioas depended the greatness and prosperity of Great Britain as a maritime power. And yet this law of nations, although clearly ascertained by the ablest ministers of all countries in Europe, has yet been frequently violated and broken in upon by reason of the political interest and prejudices of the different countries. It was not surprising that in the last war our unparalleled successes at sea, and the vast extension of our commerce, should awaken the jealousy of other powers, and dispose them to join in a coalition contrary to our interests. He thanked God, however, that ministers had firmness and energy enough to convince them that they did not want spirit to maintain the just rights of the country. [His lordship then complimented lord Nelson who sat near him.] Among the parts of the treaty, particularly to be attended to, the first and most important was, the abandonment of that false and dangerous proposition that "free ships made free goods." This was effectually done away by the third article of the convention, which discriminated what was to be reckoned contraband and liable to seizure. The second point of importance was, "the right of search of ships under convoy, with the exception of privateers." The third important point regarded what was called the contraband of war." The convention in this respect differed as with respect to Russia, and with respect to Sweden and Denmark. With Russia, this contraband of war extended only to military warlike stores; whereas with Denmark and Sweden this point was settled according to ancient treaties subsisting between the countries, by which treaties were also ascertained what should be termed a blockaded port: this is now settled to mean a port so blocked by the enemy's ships, as that it cannot be entered with safety. The principal merit which he thought belonged to this treaty was, that it prepared the way for the peace with France, which, although he was aware that this was not a time for its discussion, he considered as absolutely necessary for the country. concluded by moving an address, "thanking his majesty for his communication, anti assuring him of the cordial concurrence and approbation of that house, as the most effectual means of reestablishing He friendship friendship with the Northern Powers, and maintaining the maritime rights of this country." Lord Cathcart, in seconding the address, took a general view of the events which preceded this convention with Russia. He considered that on no single occasion did this country gain such an accession to its character, as by the spirit and decision with which it broke the combination that was forming against it. A glorious victory opened our way into the Baltic, and the moderation as well as firmness of our government had secured, as the fruits of it, the maritime rights of the country. He considered the conduct of his majesty's ministers throughout the whole of this arduous transaction as worthy of the highest degree of praise. Lord Grenville said, it was impossible for him to agree in that unanimous approbation recommended by the noble lords who had just spoken. In the first place, he conceived it highly premature to give their approbation to a treaty which must still be a subject of discussion between this country and the Northern Powers (the ratification of all those powers not being yet obtained): but he had another and much more forcible objection; it did not secure for this country the objects for which the war was commenced, and which the treaty professed to have obtained. The consi leration of this treaty was widely different from that of the treaty lately concluded with France. The latter being a treaty of peace made with an enemy, was absolutely binding on the national faith, and parliament had little more to consider than the conduct of ministers in making it. This, however, being a convention with a state in amity, if there was any thing defective in the treaty it might be a subject of future explanation and amicable arrangement; he therefore felt particularly desirous of pointing out the consequences which would result from the treaty in its present shape, and anxious that his majesty's ministers would settle, by future arrangement, what was defective in the present. As the question of neutral rights had been agitated, he wished it might be for ever put to rest, and that the treaty should constitute a code of laws, which might be appealed to on any future occasion. In order to judge whether the present treaty had succeeded in obtaining the objects of the contest with the Northern Powers, he should state what those objects were, which he thought might be reduced to five distinct points. The first point which was asserted on the part of this country was, that neutral nations should not be permitted in war time, either to carry coastways, from one port of an enemy's country to another, the commodities of that country; nor convey home to an enemy's country the produce of its colonies; and that such property, although in a neutral bottom, was seizable under the maritime law of nations. Were neutrals allowed to exercise such privileges with respect to belligerent powers, the eneiny could carry on every species of commerce without the least interruption or annoyance from this country in war time. The second point was, that free ships did not make free goods: if the contrary principle, which the Northern Powers contended for, was was once admitted, France could in war time derive supplies of every thing necessary for her support in war, in defiance of all our efforts to prevent them. The third principle related to the contraband of war, by which neutral nations were not to be allowed to supply an enemy with those necesscries of war, which it might be in want of either for offence or deAnce, and among those articles naval stores are the most important. The fourth point related to convoy, and under this it was asserted that neutral vessels, even sailing under convoy, should not be exempted from the liability of search. The fifth point related to blockaded ports. The principle which we contended for under this point was, that no vessel should be suffered to enter a port blockaded by a cruising squadron, inasmuch as by throwing in supplies they might enable the port to hold out longer against us, and that any vessel attempting to enter, and bound to such blockaded port, was liable to seizure. The neutral powers, on the other hand, wished to restrict the signification of a blockaded port, to that before which a blockading squadron was so place, as to render it apparently unsafe for a vessel to enter. Having recapitulated those, as the grounds of the original contest between Great Britain and the Northern Powers, his lordship proceeded to consider how far the terms in the present treaty went towards obtaining them. In the first place he observed, that the expressions used in this treaty were ambiguous, and drawn from a document most hostile to us, namely, the convention of the armed neutrality. One of the first articles would, from its wording, secure the free conveyance of the colonial produce of the enemy, on the ground of its being the acquired property of neutrals. Although this appeared to be only conceded to Russia, yet Sweden and Denmark would derive the same power if that was made the basis of a general treaty, and in their hands this privilege would be essentially injurious to the country. Another advantage which this clause gave to neutrals was, that it gave them privileges in war which they had not in peace, namely, that of transporting the produce of the colonies to the mother country: this was a privilege which the navigation laws of every state which had colonies reserved to the mother country. As to the second point, the renunciation of the claim that “free bottoms made free goods," this certainly had been obtained, which was only a confirmation of the existing law of nations. The third point, that of contraband of war: he was sorry to see that this part of the treaty went on the ground of the treaty with Russia in 1797. With Russia, a power that had no mercantile navigation, it was an object of no moment; but to grant the same indulgence to other powers would be most dangerous. It was also most strange in the enumeration of warlike stores to leave out those articles which Russia, might be expected to supply, namely, pitch, tar, hemp, cordage, sail cloth, ship timber, and even ships themselves. The fourth point respecting blockaded ports had been in a great measure abandoned by this treaty. Formerly a port was considered to be blockaded, when it was declared to be so, in consequence of a squa dron dron Cruising before it for that purpose, even although that squadron should be driven off for a while by a gale of wind or any other cause. By the present treaty a port is not considered blockaded unless there is a stationary force before it. The next article as to the right of search he considered equally injurious to us. By this article ships were not to be stopped but upon just causes and evident facts. We had always before exercised the right of search upon good cause of suspicion and not upon the evidence of facts. It is often impossible to get facts in the first instance; they usually come out in the search. Notwithstanding the many complaints which had been made against this right of search, he usually found. when those complaints came to be examined, that they were ill founded. He had no objection, however, to depriving privateers of this right of search, but with ships of war the right ought to be maintained in its full extent. The causes for detension and seizure seldom appeared till the search was made; they were not to be perceived at a distance by a telescope. He would suppose, in war time, a Danish frigate was going with a convoy into the port of Brest: the papers on board the frigate convoying them might be perfectly regular, and yet the ships full of naval stores. His lordship concluded, by saying that he found, in every part of the treaty, so much ambiguity and concession, so much variance from the established practice, that he felt himself obliged to deliver his opinion, in hopes, even yet, before it came to be the definitive law for the government of our navigation and marine, that it might be modified and rendered more consonant with our ancient claims, our invariable practice, our national dignity, and our maritime poser. The Lord Chancellor defended this treaty, to the conclusion of which he observed that he had been a party, and consenting to its adoption. He contended that this settlement had been obtained on a great and liberal basis, which showed to the world that Great Britain was not intolerant in her power, and that she did not wish to stand upon trivial nice distinctions. The nation had points, or gained the great objects for which it contended, namely, that free bottoms did not make free goods; that ships of war had the right of search; that the blockade of ports should be recognised as legitimate; that the exercise of those rights should be regulated by clear, intelligible and liberal rules; and what was of more consequence than all, that any casual violation of those rules should not be a ground of quarrel, but should be determined by the tribunals of the country. Those were, as he conceived, the heads of the treaty, and as to the wording of the clauses in their construction, be held an opinion very different from that of the noble lord who spoke before him. He considered that the words were sufficiently explicit to prevent neutrals from carrying on either the coasting trade of an enemy's country, or their colonial trade. France had at one time, in the course of the war, broached the monstrous doctrine, that they had a right to seize and confiscate the property of neutrals, if of British produce. This treaty went on a different principle, principle, and declared that this country would not consider as enemy's property such goods as, having formerly belonged to the enemy, had since become the property of neuters." Although we therefore permitted neutrals to acquire the colonial productions of our enemies, yet we did not allow them to carry on the colonial trade. Almost any other treaty which had ever been made would be found liable to as serious objections, if examined with the same critical acumen. The intention of the parties, however, formed the true interpretation of every treaty. This was a treaty concluded with Russia separately, and it was not to be supposed that all other neutral nations were to come under this arrangement. Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and America, were no parties to it, and could not insist on any of the stipulations of it. His lordship, upon the whole, conceived it as unobjectionable as any treaty which had ever been concluded by this country. Lord Grenville explained. He did not mean that the article with respect to the "contraband of war," which was introduced in this treaty with Russia, would be extended to Lae treaties to be made with Sweden and Denmark; but he meant, that in this treaty it should be put out of all doubt that England genenerally considers naval stores as " contraband of war." Holland and America might again suppose, from the wording of this treaty, tint by the law of nations, on, which they stood, naval stores were not contraband. The Lord Chancellor again repeated that this article in a separate treaty with Russia could not be construed or conceived to extend to any other nation on earth. Lord Holland voted for the address, but not on any of the grounds assigned by the noble mover or seconder. He thought many concessions had been made in this treaty; concessions, which so far from objecting to, he highly approved of; and should vote for the address, because he thought those concessions likely to tend to the preservation of peace, by showing that his majesty's ministers were willing to grant every accommodation that was reasonable to foreign powers. His lordship, after reasoning for some time on the former treaties subsisting between this country and the Northern Powers, as also upon the five heads enumerated by lord Grenville,' agreed with that noble lord, that there still remained in the treaty much room for explanation and amendment. He could have wished that those explanations which the learned lord (the chancellor), had confessed to be necessary, had been obtained before the house was called on for the present vote, but he should, however, support the address. Lord Grenville again rose to explain, in consequence of some expressions of censure used by the noble lord against his majesty's late ministers, for advising a war on mere speculative points. Those points which he had named were by no means speculative points, but rights of the utmost importance, and principles upon which the existence of this country as a maritime power depended. Lord Mulgrave supported the address, but differed from most of the noble lords who had spoken |