and gun vessels at 8 guns each, the force ftationed in the American feas will mount a total of 237 guns; that on the Halifax and Newfoundland ftation alone will mount 680 guns, a force in itfelf very fuperior to that of all the vessels belonging to the American navy, independent of gun-boats. The American vessels now in actual service are-5 frigates, 3 fhips and 7 brigs, befides gun-boats. We have in ordinary-5 frigates (two of which are probably fo rotten as to be unworthy of repairs), befides gunboats. Our whole force amounts to but 20 vessels, independent of gun-boats, and mounts a total of 524 guns!

Sir, I fear the British force in the American feas is too competent for our intereft-they may defpatch many more. The ftatement of the gentleman from S. C. (I allude to his reference to the navy lift for 1801) was very favorable to his purpose. I do not attribute his ufing it to any finifter views; I know he was not in posseffion of that for the laft year.

The British ftations at Halifax and Bermuda afford every facility to fit and repair. They from thence can at all times watch our vessels; and, fir, they will not neglect to oppofe them by a double force. From the view we have juft taken, I ask you, fir, what must be the probable rusult of hoftilities on the ocean?

Sir, we fhall find it very difficult to man a confiderable fleet in the United States; seamen will not abandon the merchants to enter on board fhips of war at half the rate of wages; numerous privateers will be fitted out in all our ports, they will pay higher wages than the government, and the best men will be diverted from the national fervice. Sir, we need the best feamen to combat thofe of Great-Britain; they have the advantage of long experience in the best regulated fervice. I entreat you, at no time defpife your enemy, you will thus be the better prepared to encounter him. I cordially assent with my friend from S. Carolina in the declaration, that the American tars are as brave as thofe of any other nation; but, sir, at the fame time we must do juftice to thofe of G. Britain, they are not to be treated with contempt. Men are of more confequence than fhips; the naval combats of Europe prove, that a small number of the fhips well manned, will defeat a greater number when they are indifferently manned. The conteft between Great Britain on the one part, and France and Spain on the other part, are decifive on this head. Sir, to man our fhips we fhould have to refort to the odious practices of Great Britain and France; impressment and naval confcription would be the order of the day. Men of obfervation and experience declare the fe as the inevitable confequences of a naval eftablishment-press gangs would difturb the peace of your cities-your feaports would become the conftant theatres of riot and debauchery. Sir, the citizens would not yield to this ftate of things; perfonal liberty in our country is too highly prized to fuffer fuch violation.

'The gentleman from South Carolina, thinks that impreffments are not abfolutely necessary to man a navy, he doubts whether

this method is adopted in any other country befides Great Britain. I will read an official document to fatisfy him on this fubject; it is a letter from Mr. Russel, our charge d'affairs at Paris, to Mr. Monroe, dated July 14, 1811: "Sir, I have the honor to hand you herein, a copy of my note of the 18th inft. to the duke of Bassano, claiming the release of twenty three American feamen, ftated to have been pressed into the French fervice at Dantzic and its vicinity. When I called on the Duke on the 9th, he acknowledged the receipt of this note, and faid that he fhould immediately write to the minifter of marine on the fubject. In the converfation which I had with him yesterday, he informed me that he had performed this engagement, and that the minifter of the marine had replied that no American citizens had been preffed by his orders, that the city of Dantzic had been required to furnish a certain number of seamen, and was alone refponfible for the manner in which it had complied with this requifition. The Duke of Bassano alfo added, that my note had been laid before the Emperor, and that his majefty had ordered that on the arrival of the feamen from Dantzig at Antwerp, where they were expected yesterday, all that were American citizens fhould be difcharg ed, and the city of Dantzig should be required to furnish others in their stead."

Sir, I further object to a navy, because it will be the means of exciting many wars, which, without the establishment, may be honorably avoided. It is faid, nations are involved in war, in proportion to the extent of their navies, and fome assert (Brougham) that a perpetual war is one of the two modes which are necessary to fupport a powerful naval establishment. Sir, a naval establishment will create a new and a dangerous intereft in our country. Nothing is more common than to be told, that fuch are the wishes of the naval intereft of Great-Britain, and that this or that war must be entered upon to gratify them. For my part, fir, I fhall be very forry indeed, if ever the period arrives in the United States, when any particular intereft in the community fhall direct the government, whether it be naval, agricultural, manufacturing or commercial-the general welfare fhould be the fole great ruling principle in the national councils.

Sir, I am deterred, when I confider the fate of all thofe nations who at different periods have been famous for their navies. The naval ftrength of the Hanfeatic league was fuch, two centuries paft, as to excite terror on the part of England. Thefe, fir, dittant free cities, are now the appendages of mighty France, and have no political exiftence. Who has not heard of the once formidable fleets of Venice and Genoa? At one time England was indebted to the latter for officers to command her thips of war. Alas! these republics are now configned to oblivion. Denmark was at one time the mistress of the ocean; by means of her fleets fhe often invaded England, and held her in a state of fubjection. The Danes heretofore burned London, Paris and other great cities-they are now controlled by France, and they have had their

Copenhagen defeat. Holland, with her Van Tromps and De Ruyters, occupied the Britifh channel at pleafure-this power defeated the navies of England and Franc-where is Holland now? Incorporated as a part of the French empire. Spain boafted of her invincible armadas-Elizabeth of England, by nature haughty, proud and ambitious, trembled at the very mention of them, until they were difperfed and deftroyed by ftorms at fea-Spain is now the vassal of France. Not very long fince the navy of France failed triumphant along the British coaft, looked into Portfmouth harbor, and taunted British fpirit. I ask you, fir, where is the ftrength of which thefe nations formerly boafted? All are inoperative, and dread the gigantic power of the Britith navy-they are in part fick in dry docks, or are blockaded in their ports.

Mr. Chairman, Great-Britain, though at this time triumphant in every fea, if the perfifts in her expenfive naval establishment, with her prefent debt of 800,000,000/. fterling, which was chiefly created for her navy-Great-Britain, fir, I fay, with all this, muft fink under the pressure. She will hereafter derive very little fatisfaction from her brilliant victories on the 1ft of June off Cape St. Vincents, Camperdown, Aboukir and Trafalgar.

Shall I be pardoned, fir, when I fear our vessels will only tend to fwell the prefent catalogue of the British navy? Of the 1042 vessels which the possessed in July, 1811, 109 were captured. from the French, 46 from the Danes, 25 from the Spaniards, 24 from the Dutch, and 3 from the Italians, making a total of 207 captured thips, or one fifth of her whole navy.

Small fhips are proper for the fervice of the United Statesby their agency we fhall be able to annoy the convoys of an enemy. The privateers which were fitted out in every port during our revolutionary war, destroyed much of the British commerce, even in the British and Irish channels, whilft the frigates which were built by the government, did little or nothing--but two of them remained at the conclufion of the conteft. The enemy will not watch your fmall vessels; they may enter all your fmall inlets, where heavy vessels cannot venture to approach them, and at the conclufion of the war, they may be fold for the merchant fervice. Ifhall not follow the gentleman in his remarks on the bill before the committec-I fhall vote againft it, though it is my Frefent intention to appropriate the fums requifite for the repair. ing and equipping our prefent fhips of war-I will go no further. I tell you, fir, naval victories in the end would prove fatal to the United States-the confequcuces which have uniformly followed in other countries must take place here. If the United States fhall determine to augment their navy, fo as to rival thofe of Europe, the public debt will become permanent; direct taxes will be perpetual; the paupers of the country will be increafd; the nation will be bankrupt; and I fear the tragedy will end in a revolution.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORTER.

No. 27.] TWELFTH CONGRESS.... FIRST SESSION. [1811-12.

[Debates continued.]

DEBATE ON THE NAVY BILL-Concluded.]

Mouse of Representatives, January 27, 1812. MR. NELSON said he would make a few remarks on this question, as this was the first opportunity which he had found of offering his sentiments on a subject, considered, on all hands, as of the first importance to the country. It was not for his own gratification that he should trespass on the patience of the House; not because he feared to send out his vote unaccompanied by a speech; not because those who in any way favor the naval establishment are charged with anti-republican principles. Considerations of this kind he disregarded. It was true, that he, like every other Republican in this House, was alive to the dangers to which the liberties of the country might be exposed from large navy or army establishments. But he had no fears from any naval establishment at present proposed, nor from the expense to be incurred in carrying it into effect. Nor had he any fears from an additional army of 25,000 men, so long as a spirit of republicanism and a love of liberty predominates in this country; but if, by indulging in luxury, and giving way to a corruption of manners, the pure fountain of republicanism should hereafter become polluted, then we might have some ground to fear the effects of a standing army of even 25,000 men, drawn round some ambitious military chief, who might turn them against the govern

ment.

Economy, said Mr. N. is the life and heart of every republican government. It was a deviation from this prínciple which destroyed a former administration (Mr. Adams') and brought into existence the present republican government. So long So long as he felt those attachments to republicanism, which he drew in with his first breath, so long would he lift up his hand against the improvident expenditure of public money, and endeavor to keep the government within those. rules of economy which brought it into existence. But though he was an advocate for economy, he was not for withholding appropriations for an expenditure which he believed necessary for the public safety; nor would the people of this country ever disapprove expenditures of this kind.

Mr. N. was well aware that at the time the republican administration came into power, there had been great complaints against the wasteful expenditure of public money; for having raised an army and increased the navy without necessity; for having constituted a long list of offices unnecessary for the due administration of justice, No. 27.

and for having in many things departed from the true principles of republican economy.

But, in all the complaints which were made against the extravagance of that day, Mr. N. never heard it denied that à moderate naval force was necessary for the protection of the coasts and harbors of this country. And he did not mean to advocate the building of a navy which should be able to meet the navy of G. Britain on the ocean; he wished for such a one only as would protect our commerce in our own waters, and be able to drive off any vessel of war which should come upon our coast for the purpose of annoying and distressing us.

He would forbear to make any insinuations which might be calculated to wound the feelings of any gentleman; but he thought when so liberal a land force had been granted, some attention ought to be paid to the wishes of gentlemen who deemed a small increase of our navy as absolutely necessary for our protection. What, said he, was our object in raising an army of 25,000 men? Was it not to obtain redress for injuries committed on our maritime and commercial rights? Were the injuries committed on the land? Certainly they were not. Will the capture of Canada compel G. Britain to respect our commercial rights in future? He did not believe it would. Canada was not of much use to G. Britain, nor would it be of much benefit to us. It is possible, however, the apprehension of losing Canada may influence G. Britain to repeal or modify her orders in council; if so, it will be very well; but if we proceed to take that country, she will not surrender that which she enjoys without restraint, for the restoration of a barren rock; for, according to his ideas, Canada was of no advantage to G. Britain but as a road and harbor for her vessels.

Mr. N. said it was unneccessary to prove that this country had just cause of war against Great Britain; this had been acknowledged by their own minister, in his correspondence with our Secretary of State. The conduct of this government has been strictly impartial to both the belligerents; none but a madman would insinuate the contrary-the same terms had been offered to both nations; and if one accepted and the other rejected them, they had each their own choice.

Both belligerents, said, Mr. N. have disregarded our neutral rights; have not considered what was due to us as a neutral; but rather how much injury and injustice a neutral country would submit to. Whence has this proceeded? From our own acquiescence. Because we did not resist the first aggression, but acquiesced until accumulated injuries of both nations overwhelmed us with violence. J'ut, we have, at length, determined manfully to rise and maintain que rights, not by bulletins and resolutions, not by appearing only to take war measures, but in a manner which shall convince our enemy and the world that we are in earnest.

But will it be sufficient to raise a land force to go against the British provinces? Suppose, said Mr. N. we get possession of the two