and I regret, greatly regret, that it has been always thought neceffary to array the agricultural intereft against naval equipment. Let me ask the committee, with me, to take a more dignified view of this fubject, and examine it as a mean of national defence, as it will give fecurity to life, liberty and property. Whilst in the great scheme of nature, good is mixed with evil; a refort to force will occafionally be indifpenfable, and a nation not only willing but determined to be free muft at fome time, if not always, be prepared for defence. When that neceffity occurs, what is at the difcretion of the nation? Only the quantum and kind of force. It has been argued by all, and the decifion is wife, that if you refort to force, it fhould be equal, or more than equal, to the contemplated object On that ground, I will leave it, and take up the other alternative-the kind of force. Shall we, then, rely for defence and fecurity on bayonets or fhips, on regiments or 74s? I hefitate not, before this committee, and this nation, to declare my preference to the latter-and why prefer them? Because lefs dangerous to your civil inftitutions, lefs coftly and more efficient. If we confult the faithful page of history, we find no inftance where a naval commander has overturned his government. As navies have been in ufe time immemorial, and there has been no inftance, it is fairly inferable that there will be no inftance; reafon fupports what hiftory affirms. It has been faid of the failor, that his home is on the deep. Absence denies them the means of intereft and intrigue. The force under their command cannot be marched on land. The general only becomes dangerous, as he can march his army at his heels, as the influence he has gained in the camp follows him to the city. The admiral, poffeffing neither the means nor intereft, nor power, how can he be dangerous? To illuftrate this from history, look to Holland. Did De Ruyter or Van Tromp innovate on the Dutch government, or was it the Prince of Orange, at the head of the army-a general-made Stadtholder? Yet my friend from Pennsylvania (Mr. Seybert) has instanced Holland as one of the nations deftroyed by her navy. I cannot but think, to use an expreffion of his own, that his reafon was on the wing, and that he did not take time fairly to view the cafe. I ask a reconfideration, when I am fure that my well-read friend will accord with me, that it is to the fatal influence of the House of Orange that the fad catastrophe of the nation is attributable. To the British history I appeal alfo as illuftrative of this point. Have not her naval equipments exceeded all nations, and is her government lefs favorable at this moment to the rights of humanity than thofe of her neighbors, who may be faid to have a steelbegirted thore, whofe ramparts are bayonets? For the many years which the British navy have ruled the ocean, what has been the influence of her admirals in the councils of the nation? None, fir, neither in France nor in Britain was an admiral ever prime minifter. Here let me ask, if Cromwell was an admiral ? But, fays my friend from Pennsylvania, the British navy has had a fatal tendency to bring the nation into war, as faid Mr. Sinclair. Let me ask my friend, for a moment, to ease his wing from the purfuit after the fpeculative opinions of Sinclair, by fhewing us the inftance in which the influence of the navy led the nation into war? Was it that influence that broke the peace of Amiens? I think not. Nor will my friend, to excufe Mr. Pitt's crufade against the French revolution, fay that the navy was the cause of that war. The preceding war was that of the American revolution. Stamp and tea taxes evince how much agency the navy had in the production of that war. Where then is the inftance? I fhall, I hope, be excufed for faying that I had rather have the opinion proved by the inftance than the inftance by the opinion. But, fir, the patriotic opinions of our country are against me, and the Virginia refolutions, as penned by our chief magiftrate, and the able fpeech of Mr. Gallatin, are quoted. To the firft I anfwer, the meffage, at the opening of the feffion, page 10, fays, "Your attention will, of course, be drawn to fuch provisions on the fubject of our naval force, as may be required for the fervices to which it may be beft adapted. I fubmit to Congrefs the feasonableness of an authority to augment the stock of such materials as are imperishable in their nature, or may not at once be attainable." I confider every report coming from the heads of departments, a cabinet act. In that view, I beg leave also to make a general reference to the report of the Secretary of the Navy. As to the opinion of Mr. Gallatin, I would be understood as holding in as high efteem as any one, that great and good man. He fhall have my everlafting gratitude for the good he has done his country. To his opinion fhall I contraft my own? No, fir, I will beg leave to read from the notes on Virginia, page 291: "Wars then must fometimes be our lot; and all the wife can do, will be to avoid that half of them which would be produced by our own follies and our own acts of injuftice; and to make for the other half the beft preparations we can. "Of what nature fhould thefe be? A land army would be ufelefs for offence; and not the beft nor fafeft inftrument of defence. For either of thefe purposes, the fea is the field on which we fhould meet an European enemy. Ou that element it is neceflary we fhould poffefs fome power. To aim at fuch a navy as the greater nations of Europe poffefs, would be a foolish and wicked waffe of the energies of our countrymen. It would be to pull on our own heads that load of military expenfe, which makes the European laborer go fupperless to bed, and moiftens his bread with the fweat of his brows. "It will be enough if we enable ourselves to prevent infults from those nations of Europe which are weak on the fea; becaufe circumstances exift which render even the ftronger ones weak as to us. Providence has placed their richest and moft defenceless poffeffions at our door; has obliged their most precious commerce to pass, as it were, in review before us. To protect this, or to affail us, a fmall part only of their haval force will be rifqued across the Atlantic. The dangers to which the elements expofe them here are too well known, and the greater dangers to which they would be expofed at home, were any general calamity to involve their whole fleet. They can attack us by detachment only and, it will fuffice to make ourfelves equal to what they may detach. Even a fmaller force than they may detach, will be rendered equal or fuperior by the quicknefs with which any check may be repaired with us, while loffes with them will be irreparable till too late. "A fall naval force then is fufficient for us, and a fmall one is neceffary. What this fhould be, I will not undertake to fay. I will only fay, it fhould by no means be fo great as we are able to make it. Suppofe the million of dollars, or 300,000 pounds, which Virginia could annually fpare without diftrefs, to be applied to the creating a navy. A fingle year's contribution would build, equip, man, and fend to fea, a force which fhould carry 300 guns. The reft of the confederacy, exerting themselves in the fame proportion, would equip in the fame time 1500 guns more. So that one year's contributions would fet up a navy of 1800 guns. "The Britifh fhips of the line average 76 guns; their frigates 38. 1800 guns then would form a fleet of 30 fhips, 18 of which might be of the line, and 12 frigates. Allowing 8 men, the Brit ifh average, for every gun, their annual expenfe, including fubfiftence, clothing, pay, and ordinary repairs, would be about 1280 dollars for every gun, or 2,304,000 dollars for the whole. I ftate this only as one year's poffible exertion, without deciding whether more or lefs than a year's exertion fhould be thus appli ed." The circumftances under which thefe two great men delivered thefe two variant opinions were not lefs different than the circumftances under which they were formed. The first was given under the irritation of oppofition and in the heat of debate. The latter fprung from the afylum facred to patriotifm and philofophy. The early habits of the first were formed in a country far removed from nautical views, but where indeed the ufe of the bayonet was well underflood. The latter had juft had the American revolution in review before him, nay more, he had been a bufy actor; yes, he had witneffed that a British force, confined to their works in New. York, by General Washington, with the aid of a fmall marine, could fend a detachment to Petersburg and Richmond in Virginia; and if thofe towns did not experience the deftructive effect of fire, as all the tobacco in them did, it was owing to the mercy of the enemy. He had feen Cornwallis march triumphantly from Chestertown to Virginia. A French fleet came to our aid, gave us the command of the water, and the laurels were fhorn from the brow of this popular British general, and himself made captive. Here then, we have a mountain view, oppofed to a water prof pect-theory to experience. I truft I fhall not be confidered as prefuming too much in deciding in favor of the practical opinion. A land army, therefore, is not the fafeft inftrument for defence; but the fea is the element on which we fhould meet an European enemy. Let us then count the coft. Will naval equipment be more costly that an army? The argument of my friend from South Carolina (Mr. Cheves) is unanswerable on that head. He has, I believe, purpofely omitted one fact in corroboration of his ftatement for me. I will fupply it as well as I can. It is this, that the experience of the British nation retrofpectively confirms his view, as to the comparative expenfe between land and naval equipment. From the British ftate papers, as recorded in the Annual Regifter, Vol. 3d, page 122, the navy expenditure was : For the year 1760, Vol. 5th, page 150, Navy 3,640,000 800,000 3,640,000 Series of seven Army Ordnance 728,716 Vol. 6th, page 175, Navy 3,408,777 Army 3,053,476 Vol. 7th, page 157, Navy 1,202,229 Army 1,840,761 years. The Annual Register 1786, ftates the expenditures, perhaps I ought to say supplies, were for the year 1786, Navy 1,800,000 Army Ordnance 1787, Navy Army Ordnance 1788, Navy Army Ordnance 1789, Navy Army Ordnance 1791, Navy Army Ordnance This is a feries of five years at that period, beginning at 1795. Army Ordnance 1796, p. 82, Navy Navy ordnance Army Ordnance for do. 1798, p. 38, Navy Army Navy 1,291,000 12,619,000 11,370,000 1,615,000 15,800,000 15,900,000 1,738,000 No one will question the safety with which reliance may be placed on the British expenditure for land and naval purposes. To aid this view, I will observe that in many instances of the supplies the estimate appears to have been made at 4l. per month for each man, whether in the land or sea service. Is it necessary to call the attention of the committee to the fact, that in the course of years reviewed, the British navy has been every where successful; the army only occasionally so. If then the experience of the past and the best estimate of the future, evince that the naval equiqment is not more costly than land equipment, and since an army is not the safest instrument of defence, we are led to enquire into its effect or applicability to our situation. If the view be taken as some have done, that the force you are to provide is to give additional security to commerce, then indeed were argument unnecessary, as it is self-evident that regiments are altogether inefficient for that object. If limited to my view, namely, for the defence of our sea coasts, the shores of our bays and rivers, and for the protection of that great highway that lies between Orleans and Maine, the peculiar application of naval force is almost as apparent. Take a view of the sea coast, its extent, the number and boldness of its rivers, and it will point at once to the kind of force necessary for its protection. That view will shew you also the extent of the interest at stake which it is the duty of the gov ernment to defend. I thank the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. M' Kee) for his calculation. I did not hear him accurately, but have no doubt of its correctness. He came to this result with the building 20 ships of the line and 40 frigates, you would, at the end of the war, be $80,000,000 in debt. Admit it. On your sea coast and rivers you have not less than 15 or 20 towns,worth on an average the sum of $80,000,000. To save one then would compensate the expence, and my object includes besides all the farms and farm houses, to say nothing of the lives of their inhabitants which would be of equal and There is I believe greater amount in value than all the towns. then left the coasting trade, which, as within the mark, I will state at $80,000,000. How then stands the calculation of the enemies of our system? How great the saving over the cost? And on us is the duty to make it. My district strikingly evinces the inefficacy of bayonet defence. There is within its bounds more water than land; and you cannot go five miles in but few directions without meeting with navigable water? nay, sir, my state exemplifies it. We count in our bounds the expanded bosom of the Chesapeake, the bold tide of the Potomac, navigable 100 miles into the interior of the state; the James river as extensive; the Rappahannock and York but little |