ination by Danish cruizers. Now it appears, in the first place, that they did not seek convoy for any purpose, but that they were forced into it. Apart, however, from that question, there were not any Danish laws or ordinances, which they knew of, subjecting them to capture; nor could they apprehend or anticipate any such; the less, as they had previously passed through the sound, or belt, in safety, and without convoy; hence they had not any motive to seek convoy as a protection against Danish cruizers. They had, indeed, other inducements to put themselves under convoy; the decrees of his majesty the emperor of France (since, happily for the harmony between the United States and France, repealed) were then in force that system, working against the English orders in council, produced such a state of things with regard to the commerce of America, that scarcely one of its ships could move on the face of the ocean without being exposed, under this unfortunate co-operation of hostile systems, to capture and confiscation: hence it is not surprising if American vessels have, from time to time, been terrified into the convoy, now of one party, now of the other. But had this happened in the cases before us, yet it would not have formed a just ground of capture and confiscation; for, the merits or demerits of the Berlin and Milan decrees out of the question, those decrees have not been adopted by Denmark indeed, at the time the vessels were taken, his majesty had not assumed any course, with respect to the American commerce, from which evil was to be apprehended: hence, I beg leave to repeat, that the vessels in question cannot be presumed to have sought protection under British convoy for the purpose of avoiding his cruizers. But, if the contrary had been proved, if it stood confessed that they had sought convoy against Danish cruizers; in that case they would have been liable to capture certainly, but it is equally certain that they would not have been liable to condemnation. I must again totally deny that the rule laid down in the article of the royal instructions above cited, is supported by any principle to be found in the law, and I can confidently ask your excellency to show me any authorities in its favor. If the writers be silent on the subject, then their silence is to be construed favorably for the neutral; it supposes that his right to sail under convoy, in all cases, is indisputable; what is not expressed, against this claim, cannot be implied; but, I will add, that all the analogies to be drawn from the law are in favor of the neutral. In this view, the rule laid down in the instructions, by its sweeping latitude, forms its own condemnation ; for it would comprise not only vessels which might accidentally be within sight of, or at any indefinite distance from, an enemy's convoy, but vessels found in an enemy's harbor under cover of his guns. But the law says, that neutral goods so found under his forts, within his territory, or even on board his vessels at sea............. which is to be as immediately and totally under his protection as is possible........ that these are not liable to confiscation, but shall be restored to the neutral owners. The doctrine laid down by Grotius in the "de jure belli ac pacis" on this point, has never been refuted, but has, on the contrary, been adopted by subsequent writers: treaties, indeed, may have said otherwise, but treaties change not the law, they bind only the parties to them. I may equally ask your excellency to shew me examples in the practice of nations, countenancing the rule laid down in the royal order; and I can quote, in favor of the neutral right, the example of England......a power which neither your excellency or myself are disposed to extol for her moderation in the exercise of her belligerent rights, or for any dispositions which she has manifested favorable to those of neutrals.......England herself has never gone to the extent of condemning vessels upon the mere ground of their having been taken under enemies' convoy, but she has captured them in that situation and acquitted them. I might occupy your excellency's attention by expatiating on the conduct of Denmark in former times, by carrying back your view to a confideration of that great fyftem of neutral rights, which the fo boldly adopted and fo ably supported, in the year 1780-which are again recognized in her convention with Sweden of 1794--- which the has fubfequently co-operated with Ruffia to establish, and the leading feature of which still appears in the very royal inftructions on which I have been commenting: but it would be an ungrateful task, and not neceffary to be undertaken, because the mere mention of the fubject carries conviction to the mind on the point to which I would apply it, and because, on every other, I have already faid more than enough to establish the chief position with which I began: viz. that nothing to be found in the law will authorize the condemnation of neutral property upon the mere fact of its being found under enemies convoy, and that therefore on due proof of its neutrality, it must be acquitted. I confider it to be a propitious circumftance, that in acting upon this very important question, his majesty's government is unembarralled by the claims of privateerimen, and that the cafes of thefe veffels are thus prefented in the plaineft form, unmixed with any extraneous matter, the captures having been made by public ships, leaving the fulleft fcope to the magnanimity and justice of his majesty's difpofition. I have the honor, &c. G. W. ERVING. [Documents to be continued.] [Debates in Congress---Continued.] House of Representatives, January 17. MR. M'KEE rofe with deference, to perform a duty which he owed to his constituents, by delivering his fentiments on the very important subject before the committee, though he confeffed himfelf very inadequate to do juftice to it. He deemed the quef tion of great magnitude; as he feared, if we were to proceed to build up a large naval establishment, it would affect the deftinies of this nation to the lateft pofterity. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Choves) has faid, that it is time to go into the eftablishment of a permanent navy, because the veffels already on hand would be liable to decay. If it fhould be the will of Congress, faid Mr. M. to go into the bufinefs of building a navy, it will be neceffary to enter upon it with all poffible energy. Therefore, if any attempt fhould be made to leffen our prefent force, he fhould be oppofed to it. But he was decidedly oppofed, and forever fhould be opposed to the application of a cent to repair those old hulks of veffels, which are fit only for fuel. The gentleman from S. Carolina has faid, that he has great prejudices to encounter. Mr. M. would have thought that the deliberate opinion of a majority of Congrefs, expreffed upon more than one occafion, was entitled to a more respectful term, than prejudices-thofe decifions proceeded from the honeft convictions of fome of the best friends of the country. Mr. M. could not refrain from noticing the reafoning of the committee, in their report on this fubject. They lay, "The important engine of national ftrength and national fecurity which is formed by a naval force, has hitherto, in the opinion of the committee, been treated with a neglect highly impolitic, or fupported by a spirit fo languid, as while it has preferved the exiftence of the establishment, has had the effect of loading it with the imputations of wafteful expence and comparative inefficiency." Mr. M. afked whether the ingenuity of man could find language which could caft a more fevere cenfure on the late adminiftration, than is contained in thefe ftrictures of the committee. It is well known, that our Treasury was in flourishing circumftances during the late administration, and yet no recommendation was made by the executive in favor of increasing our naval eftablishment. The extenfion of the navy was not thought of till the year 1812; but now we are told that to neglect the commencement of a permanent navy fyftem, "impolitic under any circumstances, is the more fo, when it is demonftrably clear that this nation is inevitably deftined to be a naval power." Mr. M. denied this doctrine," that it is demonftrably clear that this nation is inevitably destined to be a naval power," and he believed that if the attempt were made to make it fuch, it would prove the destruction of our happy conftitution. He would proceed to fhew on what ground he fupported the opinion that the maintenance of a permanent naval eftablishment would prove ruinous to this country. For this purpose, he fhould be under the neceffity of fubmitting fome calculations to the Houfe; for tho' he had heard a courfe of this kind condemned, as fit only for the counting-house of the merchant, he confidered it as the most conducive to correct legiflation. It is certainly a matter of juft cal culation, when we are called upon to establish a permanent navy, to fhew that fuch an inftitution would coft more than any advantage to be derived from it would compenfate. Having faid this much in favor of his mode of counting the cost, he hoped if he fhould make any incorrect ftatement, that it would be rectified by gentlemen better acquainted with the fubject than he pretended to be. And though his calculations might, in fome instances, be thought, at prefent, too high, he would venture to say, that hereafter they will be found to be under the truth. The ordinary expences of the year 1812, including Expence of the new army of 31,000 men, and 9,400,000 10,000,000 540,000 714,981 Building the new frigates, this years appropriation 1,000,000 1,500,000 Expence of fortifications, as per report, purchafing of timber, docks and new Navy Yard 2,000,000 The navy including the veffels propofed to be repaired, which coft originally $2,285,000, onetwelfth part of this fum will be required, annually for fubftantial repairs 190,416 25,345,397 From which amount deduct this year's revenue, as eftimated by the Secretary of the Treasury 8,200,000 17,145,397 Remaining in the Treasury, dollars 3,946,418, of which 2,947,818 may be applied towards the above deficiency 2,947,818 Balance to be provided for by loans 14,197,579 Mr. M. fuppofed that the current expences of the government for the year 1813 would be the fame as in 1812. He would there. fore make an estimate of the amount of difbursements for that year. For the year 1813. Annual expence of the new navy, including the Current expences repaired frigates One-twelfth of the coft of the navy for repairs 19,400,000 1,549962 357,083 For finishing new frigates, and supplying deficiencies on this head Appropriation for the 12 feventy-fours (fay one-half the fum neceflary to build them) Intereft on the new debt of 14 millions 1,000,000 1,998,000 840,000 25,145,045 From which deduct the annual receipts, allowing them to be equal to thofe of 1812 8,200,000 16,945.045 To be fupplied by loans Allow for taxes and excefs of calculation For the year 1814. 2,945,045 14,000,000 Admitting the army to be reduced to 20,000 men, the current expences will be 16,066,666 Annual expence of the new frigates, including re pairs 1,907,045 Annual expence of fix 74's including repairs 1,436,204 To be fupplied by loans Appropriation for finishing the other fix 74's From which deduct the annual revenue Suppose taxes, &c. to pay For the year 1815. Current expences, fame as 1814, army included 16,066,666 Annual expence of frigates, including repairs Annual expence of twelve 74's Intereft on the new debt Deduct the revenue 8,200,000 |