honor to forward you herewith the translations of the report sent me in answer to my inquiry from General Oshima, in command of the Japanese armies in Korea. He added, in sending that report to me, that there was no semblance of any fact that the Japanese soldiers struck any foreigners with the fist, that they have blocked the passage on the public way, and that no lady was ever hustled, nor her chair pushed from the road into the ditch; in fact, no lady having been perceived by the soldiers. I have, etc., K. OTORI. [Inclosure 4 in No. 27-Translation.] Report of General Oshima to Mr. Otori in regard to the complaint of Mr. Gardner, British acting consul-general at Seoul. About 6 o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th instant the sentinel posted near the river in about 100 yards from the public road, on the west side of Aben village, noticed two foreigners marching toward him from the public road across the field to the southeasterly direction. The sentinel, of the name of Maltashi, told them to stop and showed by gesture; but as the foreigners proceeded in spite of the remonstrances of the sentinel, seemingly to say that they did not understand the Japanese, the latter barred them with a rifle in hand, at the same time reporting the matter to the tent. Meanwhile the foreigners forced aside the sentinel and entered into the bivouac. Seeing what was going on there, Corporals Arada, Machaca, and Adachi also came to stop them, but they forced in. When these foreigners got into the bivouac they were again told by a sentinel that they were not allowed to be there, but they, maybe, perhaps, because they could not understand what the sentinel said, behaved in a heedless manner, without paying the slightest attention to the remonstrance. Lieutenant Gato then ran up to them from the tent, and stopped and asked them why they have entered into the bivouac. They said that they were taking a walk. Then the officer told them that nobody is allowed to enter into the bivouac and asked them to go away at once. The foreigners yet refused to listen. Thereupon came Sublieutenant Tshido and Sergeant Tshii, who, with Lieutenant Gato, made all these efforts by words and gestures to tell the foreigners to go away. At last the foreigners were led out of the bivouac by a guide, after having given the name hereto affixed. My name is Chr. T. Gardner, C. M. G., Her Majesty's consul-general, Seoul. [Inclosure 5 in No. 27.] Mr. Otori to Mr. Gardner. HIS IMPERIAL JAPANESE MAJESTY'S LEGATION, Seoul, July 16, 1894. SIR: I have received this morning, to my great surprise, a telegram from our minister for foreign affairs conveying the telegram from His Imperial Japanese Majesty's minister at London that Her Britannie Majesty's foreign office received a telegram from you that I have demanded Korean Government to dismiss the naval instructor to Korea, Mr. Collwell. I am also informed that a telegram to the same effect has been sent by you to Her Britannic Majesty's legation in Tokyo. I have now the honor to demand of you the immediate and thorough contradiction of your telegram above mentioned, because I have never made such a demand to the Korean Government. I can not help in this connection expressing my deep regret for your having taken such a hasty step in regard to an affair of such grave importance without previously letting me know of the matter. I have, etc., K. OTORI. [Inclosure 6 in No. 27.] Mr. Gardner to Mr. Otori. JULY 17, 1894. SIR: I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of yesterday's date. I would suggest that you should apply through usual channels for any information you may desire as to the communications made by me to my Government. I have, etc., C. T. GARDNER, Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General. [Inclosure 7 in No. 27.] PAPER PRESENTED TO THE THREE KOREAN OFFICIALS BY MR. OTORI. The urgent demands for putting these things into operation is made as advice by my Government, but your Government has a perfect right to take the advice or not. Matters to be discussed within three days and to be decided and put into operation within ten days. I-A. Reorganization of the duties and service of the several officers in the various departments. The affairs concerning internal administration and external relations according to the oid system belong to the head government, but the presidents of the six departments ought to have their respective duties and responsibilities, and the old custom of having one influential man to govern and interfere with the duties of the others must be abolished. The persons comprising the household department of His Majesty shall not be heard in the administration of national affairs, and the organization of that department shall be distinctly separate from any departments governing the nation. I-B. The management of commercial intercourse and friendly relations with foreign nations is very important and must be carefully administered; therefore, the minister of that department must be a man who has great influence and can bear heavy responsibility. I-F. The former method of selecting officers shall be abolished, so that a large range may be opened for making selection of proper persons. I-G. The payment of money for official appointment is the source of corruption and must be decidedly prohibited and abolished. I-J. The custom of officers, whether high or low, hunting for money or bribes must be prohibited by new laws. II-F. The public roads and highways must be widened and improved and railroads built between Seoul and other important places to the harbors and telegraphic lines connected between districts and commercial places in every province, so that facilities for travel, transportation, and communication may be afforded. The railroads and telegraph lines are to be discussed upon within ten days, but work on the same to be begun when materials are procured. Matters to be discussed and put into operation within six months. I-C. In the reorganization of the different bureaus the nominal ones ought to be abolished or combined with others. I-D. The present number of the districts is too great, so they must be combined and new limits made to them, so that their number will be diminished and the expenses of their administration lessened without interfering with the good of the service. I-E. The superfluous officers, whether high or low, should be dismissed. I-H. The amount of the salaries of each of the officers, high or low, shall be fixed according to modern custom and made sufficient for them to live properly. I-J. The custom of officers, whether high or low, of districts levying money for private purposes must be stopped by newly enacted laws. II-A. The receipt and disbursement of the Government must be critically settled and examined according to a regular system of accounts. II-B. The method of keeping books and accounts of receipt and disbursement must be strict, clear, correct, and exact. II-C. The monetary system must be changed and definitely fixed. II-E. The unnecessary minor expenses must be diminished and ways of increasing the revenue must be sought out and examined. II-G. The custom-houses and business in the commercial harbors of each province must be under the Government of Korea without any interference of any other nation. Matters to be discussed and put into operation within two years. II-D. The farming land of each province must be clearly numbered and surveyed so as to make a proper basis for taxation. II-. Surveying the farming land so as to make a proper basis for taxation for the reformation of the national revenue. II-F. The public roads and highways must be widened and improved. III-A. The ancient laws not in accordance with modern custom must be abolished and the laws remodeled according to such new custom. III-B. The administration of justice must be changed and the law department must be made just and correct. IV-A. Military officers must be educated. IV-B. The old system of navy and army must be abolished, and the soldiers drilled by the modern system of tactics to the extent that the national revenue can afford. IV-C. The organization of the police-force system is very important, so stations must be established in Seoul and every town, and the rules for the police strictly fixed. V-A. Every branch in education must be changed and modern methods adopted, and primary schools established in each district, so that all the children may be educated. V-C. Bright men from among the scholars must be selected and sent to foreign countries to learn all branches of education and to acquire knowledge of arts and sciences. [NOTE. The above is an unofficial translation, and while it may not be critically correct, it is believed to be substantially so.] Mr. Gresham to Mr. Bayard. No. 28.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SIR: I regret that the situation in Korea and the relations between China and Japan have not improved since the Department's instruction of the 7th instant was sent to Mr. Dun, the text of which was cabled to you on the 14th. War between Japan and China, with its attendant misery in Korea, seems not improbable. The following statement will enable you to understand more clearly what has occurred here and the extent to which this Government has exercised its good offices in the interest of peace: The Government of Korea, through its minister at this capital, having represented that its independence was seriously menaced by the presence within its borders of large bodies of Japanese and Chinese troops; that it was unable to defend itself, and that in its great peril it desired the disinterested advice and friendly intervention of this Government, an instruction was cabled to Mr. Sill, our minister to Seoul, on the 22d ultimo, directing him to exert such influence as he possibly and fairly could to avert the Korean Government's apprehended danger. Two days later Mr. Sill replied that the revolution which for some time had existed in Korea had been suppressed by that Government, but that thousands of Chinese and Japanese troops still occupied the country; that their presence was a serious menace to Korean integrity; that China favored the simultaneous withdrawal of both armies, but Japan, seemingly meditating war, refused, and that Korea earnestly desired the United States should intervene for her protection. On the 28th ultimo the Korean minister again appeared at the Department, and imparted the information that the Japanese minister at Seoul had called at the palace and requested that political changes be made in the Korean Government, at the same time stating that Japan would not withdraw her troops until such changes had been made; that, being unable to resist Japan, Korea relied on the disinterested friendship of the United States, and that he was instructed to explain to this Government the importance of a conference of neutral powers to adjust the pending difficulties and avert war. A few days. later the minister made a third visit to the Department, by direction of his Government, and requested that the representatives of the United States in China, Japan, and Korea be instructed to exert themselves in the interest of peace in Korea, and to ask that the Japanese troops be speedily withdrawn from that country. At these interviews I informed the minister that while the United States sympathized with his Government and desired to see its sovereignty respected, we must maintain toward it and the other powers an attitude of impartial neutrality; that our influence could be exerted with Japan only in a friendly way, and that in no event could we intervene jointly with other powers. On the 28th ultimo our minister at Tokyo telegraphed that the situation in Korea and the relations between the Governments of Japan and China were very critical, but that Japan expected an amicable adjustment, and the day following Mr. Dun again telegraphed asking if the United States would use their good offices to protect the Japanese archives and subjects in China, in case Japan withdrew her minister from Peking. Mr. Dun was promptly instructed that if the Japanese Government should take the step indicated the request would receive the President's friendly consideration, but it could not be granted without the assent of China. At the conclusion of a brief conversation with the Japanese minister a few days later on another subject, I referred to the unfortunate situation in Korea, as I understood it, and informed the minister of the earnest desire of that Government that the United States should make an effort to induce Japan and China to withdraw their troops from Korean territory. The minister replied that the rebellion in Korea was caused by maladministration and official corruption, and that his Government would not withdraw its troops until needed reforms in the domestic administration of Korea had been made. I remarked that in view of the exceptionally cordial relations which for many years had existed between our Governments I felt at liberty to say that it would be very gratifying to the United States if Japan would deal kindly and fairly with her feeble neighbor, whose helplessness enlisted our sympathy. I further remarked that this Government cherished sentiments of sincere respect for both Japan and China, and that the former's apparent determination to engage the latter in war on Korean soil was nowhere more regretted than here. The minister replied that his Government did not covet Korean territory; that its demands were in the interest of peace and that he admitted Korea was an independent sovereign state. On the 29th ultimo Mr. Dun was instructed to ascertain Japan's reason for sending a military force to Korea, and what demands, if any, were expected to be enforced thereby. On the 5th instant Mr. Dun replied that after the first troops had been sent under the convention of 1882, Japan learned of the dispatch of large bodies of Chinese troops, which necessitated an increase of the Japanese force; that the rebellion was due to official corruption and oppression; that Japan had asked as a guarantee of future peace that radical administrative reforms be made in Korea, and had proposed joint action to that end with China, which offer that Government had refused; that disclaiming designs upon Korean territory, Japan would carry out such reforms in defiance of China, and that the good offices of the United States at Peking and Tokyo might reopen negotiations. On the 3d instant a telegram was received from Mr. Denby, our chargé d'affaires ad interim at Peking, saying that the Korean situation was critical; that hostilities were imminent; that the attitude of China was conciliatory in spite of the aggressive action by Japan, and that China had asked the good offices of England and Russia for a peaceful settlement. On the 8th instant the British ambassador read to me an instruction he had received from Lord Kimberley, directing him to ascertain whether the United States would unite with Great Britain in an intervention to avert war between China and Japan. Being furnished with no copy of the instruction, I give the substance of it from memory. The ambassador expressed the belief that only friendly intervention was contemplated. I informed him that this Government could not intervene otherwise than as a friendly neutral; that it had already so intervened with Japan, and I did not think the President would feel authorized to go further in the exercise of our good offices. The next day I handed the ambassador a copy of the instruction sent to Mr. Dun on the 7th, at the same time informing him that this Government could not join another power even in a friendly intervention. On the 11th instant Mr. Dun telegraphed that, after communicating the substance of the Department's instruction of the 7th to the Japanese Government, he was informed that the Japanese troops were not kept in Korea to make war on that country, but to insure order, Korean independence, and to prevent a recurrence of rebellion; that Japan desired the removal of official corruption, peculation, and misgovernment, the real causes of discontent; that China's equivocal attitude prevented Korea from adopting needed reforms, thus endangering the peace of the East; that the insurrection had not been entirely quelled; that, while anxious to withdraw her troops, Japan would do so when, and not before, future order was insured; and that war with Korea was not apprehended. On the 8th instant our chargé d'affaires in Peking informed the Department that the viceroy requested the United States to take the 'See Foreign Relations of the United States for 1885, p. 343. |