and thirteen pieces of silver-gilt-produced his credentials and kissed hands; he then attended the banquet in Divan, and thus formally took his place among the diplomatic agents accredited to the Porte.

His position, like that of the Venetian ambassador, was a double one; he was paid by the Levant Company to act as their commercial agent and consul-general. and he was accredited, but not salaried, by the Crown as English ambassador. His financial position was often trying. The Queen was extremely parsimonious, while the Company was at times in difficulties and remiss in payment. We know that the French ambassador received a salary of 10,000 ducats, and two per cent. on all French goods brought into Turkey; the Venetian 8000 ducats of gold, and the cottimo, or one per cent. on all Venetian goods entering Turkey; the Imperial ambassador had 16,000 dollars a year. 'I am allowed 3000 ducats,' wails Barton, Harborne's successor, and yet as much required at my hands as at theirs.' 'I had not in all my household sixpence of money to pass the water,' Barton says again, 'so miserably am I treated by the Company as not to have had a penny allowance from them this twelvemonth.'

The ambassador's diplomatic duty was, if possible, to win the sympathy of the Turk for the English, and for the Protestant group of European nations; also to prevent the conclusion of a truce, or a peace, with Spain which would relieve that country from the standing menace of a Turkish attack on its Italian possessions, and would thereby allow Philip to concentrate his whole forces on the western conflict. In discharging this mission, the ambassador was aided by the fact that he could always point to Elizabeth and, later, to Henri IV (until he reverted) as the champions of Protestantism and the natural enemies of Spain and the Pope; further, he could urge that by favouring England, the Turk would help to keep Spain busy, and would thus secure a free hand in the prosecution of the Persian war, which was a standing menace to his oriental frontier. Consequently the question of creed assumed a diplomatic importance which explains the frequent allusion to Elizabeth as the bulwark against 'idolaters," and the resentment of the French ambassador when his

master Henri III was described as one. Furthermore, Philip was hampered in his negotiations for a truce with the Turk by his piety and his pride. He could not bring himself to make the first advances; and, instead of sending a fully-accredited ambassador to the Porte, he chose to work through mere agents, whose efforts Harborne and Barton and Lello easily rendered abortive. Nor, as his Catholic Majesty, could he well seek truce or peace with the head of Islam; the mere rumour that he had concluded a truce in 1581 brought a message from Pope Gregory XIII, to the effect that, as the King of Spain had come to terms with the infidels, the Pope could no longer sanction the tax on the clergy and on ecclesiastical property, and that in expiation for such an offence, Philip must turn all his attention to crushing heretic England.

On the commercial side, the ambassador appointed consuls, and was expected to foster English trade in the Levant, securing concessions, protecting merchants, administering justice between co-nationals and redeeming slaves. As a matter of fact, the English Levant trade was not very flourishing during the earlier life of the Company; and, though some business was carried on in the Archipelago and in Syria, comparatively few ships visited Constantinople itself. The Venetian ambassador, in opposing the establishment of an English embassy in Constantinople, pointed out to the Grand Vizir that in one whole year only one English ship, and that a small one, had reached the Golden Horn; 'moreover,' he added, 'she carried more guns than goods, which fully proves her real intent to go pirating on her home journey.' The English, he said, would not get return cargoes, for they were well supplied with wool and leather, Turkey's chief exports; the presence of the ambassador was, therefore, useless, and merely jeopardised the Franco-Turkish alliance. Morosini was, of course, acting on instructions from home and urging a hostile suit; but he was not altogether wrong in his estimate of English trade at that date. The truth is that the English were beginning at the wrong end; their sea-power in the Mediterranean could not develope from the eastern half. The midland sea is, comparatively, a narrow sea; and the trade-route through it was exposed

to hostile attacks all the way to the Levant. It was essential that the development should begin in the West and spread eastward by a series of stations where the fleets could shelter and refit; the same necessity had governed Venetian development, when, after the Fourth Crusade, she was forced to approach the East by the stations of Corfu, Coron (in Messenia), Candia and the Islands. As a matter of fact the historical development of English sea-power in the Mediterranean has moved from West to East by Tangiers, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Egypt, and is still obeying that trend.

The presence of the English ambassador and his diplomatic and commercial activities at once ranged against him the representatives of France and Venice. Every device was adopted by Morosini and de Germigny to damage the social and diplomatic position of Harborne. The fact that he was the Company's agent, as well as the Queen's representative, gave the Frenchman the pretext to declare that he was no ambassador, merely a merchant: and, thus prompted, the terrible Uludschali publicly insulted Harborne by saying, 'Just look at this fellow who wants to stand on an equality with France and Venice.' As heretics, the English were represented by the Catholic ambassadors as pariahs, outside the pale of European nations; and again Uludschali remarked, 'They're a bad lot, these Lutherans.'

The upshot of the whole matter, however, was & success for Harborne. The capitulations, implying the covering flag for English traders, were confirmed; and the Grand Vizir told de Germigny that it was useless for him to endeavour to upset the English ambassador: while the Sultan himself declared that he would never expel the foes of his foes,' the Pope and Spain.

In August 1584 de Germigny was recalled because of his failure over the covering flag and the English capitulations; and Jacques Savary de Lanscome was appointed his successor. But before leaving, de Germigny was able to deliver a parting shot at his rival, by inducing the new Grand Vizir to declare that he would undo the work of his predecessor and reopen the whole question of the English capitulations. Morosini, too, was recalled at the expiry of his ordinary three years' service, and was succeeded by Lorenzo Bernardo. Harborne remained

to face his new opponents and to consolidate, if possible, his initial successes.

Harborne's position was, indeed, far from secure. English trade at Constantinople languished; the opportunity to upset the Levant Company's business seemed favourable, had the new French ambassador been a man of diplomatic ability. But de Lanscome was not that; French historians note that his embassy was most disastrous for French interests in the near East. He arrived at Constantinople on March 29, 1586, and, in the very act of his official entry, succeeded in putting himself wrong with the Turks. When approaching the city, surrounded by a brilliant group of State officials, he was asked what he thought of it; he replied that it struck him as so magnificent that the Lord of it must be Lord of the whole world, and added that much of the Sultan's grandeur was doubtless due to his alliance with the King of France, who was now ready to place at his disposal 60,000 harquebusiers. The pashas burst out laughing and said, The Sultan is accustomed to lend, not to receive aid'; and with that they spurred on their horses and left him. Clearly de Lanscome did not understand the Porte, and was not the man to oust Harborne, who lost no opportunity of ingratiating himself with the leading pashas. His position improved. He was able to do much for English slaves in Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, and even secured favourable orders from the Sultan on the subject, though his activities in that direction brought him into violent conflict, and even to blows, with the Capudan. But Bernardo reported that it was clear the Turks were pleased with the English entente, as a counterpoise to Spain while they were engaged in the Persian war. The preparations for the Armada were known to the Turks, but its destination was still doubtful; it might be aimed against Islam; and in that case English help would be of the greatest service. That was the trump-card Harborne was always able to play in the diplomatic game.

There is testimony, moreover, from an unexpected quarter as to the growing prestige of England's seapower, even before the defeat of the Armada established it beyond doubt. In conversation with the Venetian ambassador at Rome, the Pope said that he had news

that the Armada was ready; 'but so too are the English,' continued his Holiness.

'Elizabeth is certainly a great Queen, and were she only a Catholic, she would be our dearly-beloved. Just look how well she governs; she is only a woman and only mistress of half an island, and yet she makes herself feared by Spain, France and the Empire.'

In this satisfactory position Harborne left the Embassy. He set out on his homeward journey early in August 1588, and was succeeded by Edward Barton, who had already been employed on English business at Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. At the time of Harborne's departure Barton must have been in Constantinople, or near it, for his first despatch is dated Aug. 15, 1588. Barton's task was less difficult than his predecessor's. He had not to create, but inherited a position at the Porte. During the course of his Embassy his hands were strengthened, diplomatically, by the defeat of the Armada and the enhanced prestige of his country, as well as by the succession of the Huguenot, Henri IV, to the French throne; while, commercially, the 'vent was now open and thoroughly cleared,' to use Faunt's phrase, though as yet there was no great traffic passing through it. In the process of consolidating the position of English ambassador at the Porte, Barton was opposed, of course, by de Lanscome, whom he finally routed. He was also concerned to thwart the renewed efforts of Spanish agents, the two Marigliani and Ferrari, to secure a truce; and in this, too, he was successful. He could point to the disastrous results of earlier truces, which had allowed Spain to seize Portugal undisturbed, and, if renewed, would enable Philip to attack, and possibly crush, France. The death of Henri III, and the recognition by the Huguenots of Henry of Navarre as King, had seriously shaken de Lanscome's tottering position. Barton could now urge that he no longer spoke for France, but only for the Guises and the League; that Henri IV was, to all intents and purposes, King of France, and, being a Protestant, was the natural ally of Elizabeth, the enemy of Spain, and therefore of necessity the friend of the Turk. So vigorously did Barton press the point that in August 1590 de Lanscome was told by the Grand Vizir