Puslapio vaizdai
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a paffion; and when the defire is fulfilled, the passion is said to be gratified. Now, the gratification of every passion must be pleasant; for nothing can be more natural, than that the accomplishment of any with or defire should affect us with joy: I know of no exception but when a man stung with remorse desires to chastise and punish himself. The joy of gratification is properly called an emotion; because it makes us happy in our present situation, and is ultimate in its nature, not having a tendency to any thing beyond. On the other hand, forrow must be the result of an event contrary to what we defire; for if the accomplishment of defire produce joy, it is equally natural that disappointment should produce forrow.

An event, fortunate or unfortunate, that falls out by accident, without being foreseen or thought of, and which therefore could not be the object of defire, raiseth an emotion of the same kind with that now mentioned; but the cause must be different; for there can be no gratification where there is no defire. We have not, however, far to seek for a cause: it is involved in the nature of man, that he cannot be indifferent to an event that concerns him or any of his connections; if it be fortunate, it gives him joy; if unfortunate, it gives him forrow.

In no situation doth joy rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of any violent distress of mind or body; and in no situation doth

doth forrow rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of what makes us happy. The sensibility of our nature serves in part to account for these effects. Other causes concur. One is, that violent distress always raises an anxious defire to be free from it; and therefore its removal is a high gratification: nor can we be pofsessed of any thing that makes us happy, without wishing its continuance; and therefore its removal, by crossing our wishes, must create forrow. The principle of contrast is another cause: an emotion of joy arifing upon the removal of pain, is increased by contrast when we reflect upon our former distress: an emotion of forrow, upon being deprived of any good, is increased by contrast when we reflect upon our former happiness :

Jaffier. There's not a wretch that lives on common charity,

But's happier than me. For I have known
The luscious sweets of plenty: every night
Have slept with soft content about my head,
And never wak'd but to a joyful morning.
Yet now must fall like a full ear of corn,
Whose bloffsom 'scap'd, yet's withered in the ripening.

Venice Preferv'd, Act 1. Sc. 1.

It hath always been reckoned difficult to account for the extreme pleasure that follows a ceffation of bodily pain; as when one is relieyed from the rack, or from a violent fit of the stone.

stone. What is said explains this difficulty, in the easiest and fimplest manner: cessation of bodily pain is not of itself a pleasure, for a non-ens or a negative can neither give pleasure nor pain; but man is so framed by nature as to rejoice when he is eased of pain, as well as to be forrowful when deprived of any enjoyment. This branch of our constitution is chiefly the cause of the pleafure. The gratification of defire comes in as an accessory cause : and contrast joins its force, by increasing the sense of our present happiness. In the cafe of an acute pain, a peculiar circumstance contributes its part: the brisk circulation of the animal spirits occafioned by acute pain, continues after the pain is gone, and produceth a very pleasant emotion. Sickness hath not that effect, because it is always attended with a depreffion of spirits.

Hence it is, that the gradual diminution of acute pain, occafions a mixt emotion, partly pleafant, partly painful: the partial diminution produceth joy in proportion; but the remaining pain balanceth the joy. This mixt emotion, however, hath no long endurance; for the joy that arifeth upon the diminution of pain, soon vanisheth, and leaveth in the undisturbed poffeffion that degree of pain which remains.

What is above observed about bodily pain, is equally applicable to the distresses of the mind; and accordingly it is a common artifice, to prepare us for the reception of good news by alarming our fears.

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SECT. IV. Sympathetic Emotion of Virtue, and its caufe.

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NE feeling there is that merits a deliberate view, for its fingularity as well as utility. Whether to call it an emotion or a paffion, seems uncertain: the former it can scarce be, because it involves defire; the latter it can scarce be, because it has no object. But this feeling, and its nature, will be best understood from examples. A fignal act of gratitude produceth in the spectator or reader, not only love or esteem for the author, but also a separate feeling, being a vague feeling of gratitude without an object; a feeling, however, that disposes the spectator or reader to acts of gratitude, more than upon an ordinary occasion. This feeling is overlooked by writers upon ethics; but a man may be convinced of its reality, by attentively watching his own heart when he thinks warmly of any fignal act of gratitude: he will be confcious of the feeling, as distinct from the esteem or admiration he has for the grateful person. The feeling is fingular in the following respect, that it is accompanied with a desire to perform acts of gratitude, without having any object; though in that state, the mind, wonderfully bent on an ob

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ject, | ject, neglects no opportunity to vent itself: any act of kindness or good-will, that would pafs unregarded upon another occasion, is greedily seized; and the vague feeling is converted into a real passion of gratitude: in such a state, favours are returned double.

In like manner, a courageous action produceth in a spectator the passion of admiration directed to the author: and beside this well-known paffion, a separate feeling is raised in the spectator; which may be called an emotion of courage; because, while under its influence, he is confcious of a boldness and intrepidity beyond what is usual, and longs for proper objects upon which to exert this emotion:

Spumantemque dari, pecora inter inertia, votis
Optat aprum, aut fulvum descendere monte leonem.

Eneid. iv. 158.

Non altramente il tauro, oue l'irriti
Gelofo amor con stimoli pungenti,
Horribilmente mugge, e co'muggiti
Gli spirti in se risueglia, e l'ire ardenti:
E'l corno aguzza a i tronchi, e par ch' inuiti

Con vani colpi a'la battaglia i venti.

Taffo, Canto 7. ft. 55.

So full of valour that they smote the air
For breathing in their faces.

Tempest, Act Iv. Sc. 4.

The emotions raised by music independent of

words, must be all of this nature: courage rou

fed

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