among individuals of the same species, prevents almost entirely the effect of novelty, unless distance of place or fome other circumstance concur; but where the resemblance is faint, fome degree of wonder is felt, and the emotion rifes in proportion to the faintness of the resemblance. The highest degree of wonder arifeth from unknown objects that have no analogy to any species we are acquainted with. Shakespeare in a fimile introduces that species of novelty : As glorious to the fight As is a winged messenger from heaven Romeo and Juliet. One example of that species of novelty deserves peculiar attention; and that is, when an object altogether new is seen by one person only, and but once. These circumstances heighten remarkably the emotion: the fingularity of the spectator concurs with the fingularity of the object, to inflame wonder to its highest pitch. In explaining the effects of novelty, the place a being occupies in the scale of existence, is a circumstance that must not be omitted. Novel ty in the individuals of a low class is perceived with indifference, or with a very flight emotion: thus thus a pebble, however fingular in its appearance, scarce moves our wonder. The emotion rises with the rank of the object; and, other circumstances being equal, is strongest in the highest order of existence: a strange insect affects us more than a strange vegetable; and a strange quadruped more than a strange infect. However natural novelty may be, it is a matter of experience, that those who relish it the most are careful to conceal its influence. Love of novelty, it is true, prevails in children, in idlers, and in men of shallow understanding: and yet, after all, why should one be ashamed of indulging a natural propenfity? A distinction will afford a fatisfactory answer. No man is ashamed of curiofity when it is indulged in order to acquire knowledge. But to prefer any thing metely because it is new, shows a mean taste, which one ought to be ashamed of: vanity is commonly at the bottom, which leads those who are deficient in taste to prefer things odd, rare, or fingular, in order to diftinguish themselves from others. And in fact, that appetite, as above mentioned, reigns chiefly among persons of a mean taste, who are ignorant of refined and elegant pleasures. One final cause of wonder, hinted above, is, that this emotion is intended to stimulate our curiosity. Another, somewhat different, is, to prepare the mind for receiving deep impressions of of new objects. An acquaintance with the various things that may affect us and with their properties, is effential to our well-being: nor will a flight or fuperficial acquaintance be sufficient; they ought to be so deeply engraved on the mind, as to be ready for use upon every occafion. Now, in order to make a deep impreffion, it is wifely contrived, that things should be introduced to our acquaintance with a certain pomp and folemnity productive of a vivid emotion. When the impreffion is once fairly made, the emotion of novelty, being no longer neceffary, vanisheth almost instantaneously; never to return, unless where the impreffion happens to be obliterated by length of time or other means; in which cafe, the second introduction hath nearly the same solemnity with the first. Designing wisdom is no where more legible than in this part of the human frame. If new objects did not affect us in a very peculiar manner, their impressions would be fo flight as scarce to be of any use in life: on the other hand, did objects continue to affect us as deeply as at first, the mind would be totally engrossed with them, and have no room left either for action or reflection. The final cause of surprise is still more evident than of novelty. Self-love makes us vigilantly attentive to self-preservation; but felflove, which operates by means of reason and reflection, reflection, and impels not the mind to any particular object or from it, is a principle too cool for a fudden emergency: an object breaking in unexpectedly, affords no time for deliberation; and, in that cafe, the agitation of surprise comes in seasonably to rouse self-love into action: furprise gives the alarm; and if there be any appearance of danger, our whole force is instantly fummoned up to shun or to prevent it. CHAP. CHAP. VII. RISIBLE OBJECTS. S UCH is the nature of man, that his powers and faculties are soon blunted by exercise. The returns of fleep, suspending all activity, are not alone fufficient to preserve him in vigour : during his waking hours, amusement by intervals is requifite to unbend his mind from ferious occupation. To that end, nature hath kindly made a provifion of many objects, which may be diftinguished by the epithet of risible, because they raise in us a peculiar emotion expressed externally by laughter: that emotion is pleasant; and being alfo mirthful, it most successfully unbends the mind, and recruits the spirits. Imagination contributes a part by multiplying such objects without end. Ludicrous is a general term, signifying, as may appear from its derivation, what is playfome, sportive, or jocular. Ludicrous, therefore, seems the genus, of which risible is a species, limited as above to what makes us laugh. However easy it may be, concerning any particular object, to say whether it be risible or not, it seems difficult, if at all practicable, to establish any |