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the train of our thoughts is not regulated by chance: and if it depend not upon will, nor upon chance, by what law is it governed? The question is of importance in the science of human nature; and I promise beforehand, that it will be found of great importance in the fine

arts.

It appears, that the relations by which things are linked together, have a great influence in directing the train of thought. Taking a view of external objects, their inherent properties are not more remarkable, than the various relations that connect them together: Cause and effect, contiguity in time or in place, high and low, prior and pofterior, resemblance, contrast, and a thousand other relations, connect things together without end. Not a fingle thing appears solitary and altogether devoid of connection; the only difference is, that some are intimately connected, some more flightly; some near, some at a distance.

Experience will fatisfy us of what reason makes probable, that the train of our thoughts is in a great measure regulated by the foregoing relations: an external object is no sooner presented to us in idea, than it suggests to the mind other objects to which it is related; and in that manner is a train of thoughts composed. Such is the law of succession; which must be natural, because it governs all human beings. The law, however, seems not to be inviolable: it sometimes happens that an idea arifes in the mind, without without any perceived connection; as, for example, after a profound fleep.

But, though we cannot add to the train an unconnected idea, yet in a measure we can attend to fome ideas, and dismiss others. There are few things but what are connected with many others; and when a thing thus connected becomes a subject of thought, it commonly fuggests many of its connections: among these a choice is afforded; we can insist upon one, rejecting others; and sometimes we insist on what is commonly held the flighter connection. Where ideas are left to their natural course, they are continued through the strictest connections: the mind extends its view to a fon more readily than to a servant; and more readily to a neighbour than to one living at a distance. This order, as observed, may be varied by will, but still within the limits of related objects; for though we can vary the order of a natural train, we cannot diffolve the train altogether, by carrying on our thoughts in a loose manner without any connection. So far doth our power extend; and that power is sufficient for all useful purposes: to have more power, would probably be hurtful, instead of being falutary.

Will is not the only cause that prevents a train of thought from being continued through the strictest connections: much depends on the prefent tone of mind: for a subject that accords with that tone is always welcome. Thus, in good spirits,

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spirits, a chearful subject will be introduced by the flightest connection; and one that is melancholy, no less readily in low spirits: an interesting subject is recalled, from time to time, by any connection indifferently, strong or weak; which is finely touched by Shakespeare, with relation to a rich cargo at sea:

My wind, cooling my broth,
Would blow me to an ague, when I thought
What harm a wind too great might do at sea.
I should not fee the sandy hour-glass run,
But I should think of shallows and of flats;
And fee my wealthy Andrew dock'd in sand,
Vailing her high top lower than her ribs,
To kiss her burial. Should I go to churcli,
And fee the holy edifice of stone,

And not bethink me strait of dangerous rocks ?
Which touching but my gentle vessel's fide,
Would scatter all the spices on the stream,
Enrobe the roaring waters with my filks;
And, in a word, but now worth this,

And now worth nothing.

Merchant of Venice, Act 1. Sc. 1.

Another cause clearly diftinguishable from that now mentioned, hath also a confiderable influence to vary the natural train of ideas; which is, that, in the minds of some persons, thoughts and circumstances crowd upon each other by the flightest connections. I ascribe this to a bluntness in the discerning faculty; for a person who cannot accurately diftinguish between a flight connection and one that is more intimate, is equally affected by each: such a perfon must necessarily have a great flow of ideas, because they are introduced by any relation indifferently; and the flighter relations, being without number, furnish ideas without end. This doctrine is, in a lively manner, illustrated by Shakespeare.

tween

Falstaff. What is the gross sum that I owe thee? Hostess. Marry, if thou wert an honest man, thyself and thy money too. Thou didst swear to me on a parcel gilt-goblet, fitting in my Dolphin-chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitfun-week, when the Prince broke thy head for likening him to a finging man of Windfor; thou didst swear to to me then, as I was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make me my Lady thy wife. Canst thou deny it? Did not Goodwife Keech, the butcher's wife, come in then, and call me Gossip Quickly? coming in to borrow a mess of vinegar; telling us the had a good dish of prawns; whereby thou didst defire to eat some; whereby I told thee they were ill for a green wound. And didst not thou, when she was gone down stairs, defire me to be no more so familiarity with such poor people, saying, that ere long they should call me Madam? And didst thou not kiss me, and bid me fetch thee thirty shillings? I put thee now to thy book-oath, deny it if Second Part, Henry IV. Act 11, Sc. 2.

thou canst?

On the other hand, a man of accurate judgment cannot have a great flow of ideas; because the

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the flighter relations, making no figure in his mind, have no power to introduce ideas. And hence it is, that accurate judgment is not friendly to declamation or copious eloquence. This reafoning is confirmed by experience; for it is a noted obfervation, That a great or comprehenfive memory is seldom connected with a good judgment.

As an additional confirmation, I appeal to another noted observation, That wit and judgment are seldom united. Wit confifts chiefly in joining things by distant and fanciful relations, which surprise because they are unexpected: such relations, being of the flightest kind, readily occur to those only who make every relation equally welcome. Wit, upon that account, is in a good measure incompatible with solid judgment; which, neglecting trivial relations, adheres to what are substantial and permanent. Thus memory and wit are often conjoined: folid judgment seldom with either.

Every man who atttends to his own ideas, will discover order as well as connection in their fucceffion. There is implanted in the breast of every man a principle of order, which governs the arrangement of his perceptions, of his ideas, and of his actions. With regard to perceptions, I observe that, in things of equal rank, such as fheep in a fold, or trees in a wood, it must be indifferent in what order they be surveyed. But, in things of unequal rank, our tendency is, to view

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