the train of our thoughts is not regulated by chance and if it depend not upon will, nor upon chance, by what law is it governed? The queftion is of importance in the fcience of human nature; and I promife beforehand, that it will be found of great importance in the fine arts. It appears, that the relations by which things are linked together, have a great influence in directing the train of thought. Taking a view of external objects, their inherent properties are not more remarkable, than the various relations that connect them together: Cause and effect, contiguity in time or in place, high and low, prior and pofterior, resemblance, contraft, and a thoufand other relations, connect things together without end. Not a fingle thing appears folitary and altogether devoid of connection; the only difference is, that fome are intimately connected, fome more flightly; fome near, fome at a distance. Experience will fatisfy us of what reafon makes probable, that the train of our thoughts is in a great measure regulated by the foregoing relations: an external object is no fooner presented to us in idea, than it suggests to the mind other objects to which it is related; and in that manner is a train of thoughts compofed. Such is the law of fucceffion; which must be natural, because it governs all human beings. The law, however, feems not to be inviolable: it fometimes happens that an idea arifes in the mind, without without any perceived connection; as, for example, after a profound fleep. But, though we cannot add to the train an unconnected idea, yet in a measure we can attend to fome ideas, and dismiss others. There are few things but what are connected with many others; and when a thing thus connected becomes a fubject of thought, it commonly fuggefts many of its connections: among these a choice is afforded; we can infift upon one, rejecting others; and fometimes we infift on what is commonly held the flighter connection. Where ideas are left to their natural courfe, they are continued through the ftricteft connections: the mind extends its view to a fon more readily than to a fervant; and more readily to a neighbour than to one living at a distance. This order, as obferved, may be varied by will, but fill within the limits of related objects; for though we can vary the order of a natural train, we cannot diffolve the train altogether, by carrying on our thoughts in a loose manner without any connection. So far doth our power extend; and that power is fufficient for all useful purposes to have more power, would probably be hurtful, instead of being falutary. Will is not the only caufe that prevents a train of thought from being continued through the ftricteft connections: much depends on the prefent tone of mind: for a fubject that accords with that tone is always welcome. Thus, in good fpirits, B 2 fpirits, a chearful fubject will be introduced by the flighteft connection; and one that is melancholy, no lefs readily in low fpirits: an interesting subject is recalled, from time to time, by any connection indifferently, ftrong or weak; which is finely touched by Shakespeare, with relation to a rich cargo at fea : My wind, cooling my broth, Would blow me to an ague, when I thought And not bethink me strait of dangerous rocks? Merchant of Venice, A&t 1. Sc. 1. Another caufe clearly diftinguishable from that now mentioned, hath alfo a confiderable influence to vary the natural train of ideas; which is, that, in the minds of fome perfons, thoughts and circumftances crowd upon each other by the flighteft connections. I afcribe this to a bluntnefs in the difcerning facuity; for a perfon who cannot accurately diftinguish be tween tween a flight connection and one that is more intimate, is equally affected by each: fuch a perfon must neceffarily have a great flow of ideas, because they are introduced by any relation indifferently; and the flighter relations, being without number, furnish ideas without end. This doctrine is, in a lively manner, illustrated by Shakespeare. Falstaff. What is the grofs fum that I owe thee? Hoftefs. Marry, if thou wert an honeft man, thy felf and thy money too. Thou didst fwear to me on a par cel gilt-goblet, fitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a fea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitfun-week, when the Prince broke thy head for likening him to a finging man of Windfor; thou didst fwear to to me then, as I was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make me my Lady thy wife. Canft thou deny it? Did not Goodwife Keech, the butcher's wife, come in then, and call me Goffip Quickly? coming in to bor row a mess of vinegar; telling us she had a good dish of prawns; whereby thou didst defire to eat fome; whereby I told thee they were ill for a green wound. And didft not thou, when fhe was gone down ftairs, defire me to be no more fo familiarity with fuch poor people, faying, that ere long they should call me Madam? And didft thou not kifs me, and bid me fetch thee thirty fhillings? I put thee now to thy book-oath, deny it if thou canft? Second Part, Henry IV. Act 11, Sc. 2. On the other hand, a man of accurate judgment cannot have a great flow of ideas; because the flighter relations, making no figure in his mind, have no power to introduce ideas. And hence it is, that accurate judgment is not friendly to declamation or copious eloquence. This reafoning is confirmed by experience; for it is a noted obfervation, That a great or comprehenfive memory is feldom connected with a good judgment. As an additional confirmation, I appeal to another noted obfervation, That wit and judgment are feldom united. Wit confifts chiefly in joining things by diftant and fanciful relations, which furprise because they are unexpected: fuch relations, being of the flightest kind, readily occur to thofe only who make every relation equally welcome. Wit, upon that account, is in a good measure incompatible with folid judgment; which, neglecting trivial relations, adheres to what are fubftantial and permanent. Thus memory and wit are often conjoined: folid judgment feldom with either. Every man who atttends to his own ideas, will difcover order as well as connection in their fucceflion. There is implanted in the breaft of every man a principle of order, which governs the arrangement of his perceptions, of his ideas, and of his actions. With regard to perceptions, I obferve that, in things of equal rank, fuch as fheep in a fold, or trees in a wood, it must be indifferent in what order they be furveyed. But, in things of unequal rank, our tendency is, to view |