forty-two hundred and thirty-three, forty-four hundred and twelve, and forty-four hundred and thirteen of the Revised Statutes and regulations pursuant thereto shall be followed on the harbors, rivers and inland waters of the United States. The provisions of said sections of the Revised Statutes and regulations pursuant thereto are hereby declared special rules duly made by local authority relative to the navigation of harbors, rivers, and inland waters as provided for in Article thirty, of the Act of August nineteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act to adopt regulations for preventing collisions at sea." Sec. 1, act of Feb. 19, 1895 (28 Stat. 672). Notes of Rules applicable to certain waters.-For decisions under the rules governing vessels navigating harbors, rivers, and inland waters, see 1410, ante; governing vessels navigating the Great Lakes and their tributaries, see 1447, ante. Applicability of rules.-A rule of supervising inspectors adopted before but not promulgated at the time of a collision, is not applicable thereto. The Narragansett (D. C. 1871), Fed. Cas. No. 10,016. Construction of particular rules.-The rule requiring the up-stream boat to give the first signal to indicate its choice of sides does not apply when there are 18 feet of water above the bars. Keys v. The Ambassador (D. C. 1859), Fed. Cas. No. 7,747. Inspectors' rule 1 relating to passing sigLals by meeting vessels can not be construed as authorizing a vessel to dictate to another to pass contrary to the statutory requirement, but it does authorize a vessel to propose passing starboard to starboard which becomes binding when agreed to by the other. The Milwaukee (D. C. 1871), Fed. Cus. No. 9,626. As the rules of the United States supervisors do not specify the short bends in the river at which certain precautionary signals are to be made by steamers, it is a matter within the discrimination of the navigators of the river to determine the places where, by the rules governing pilots, signals are to be given. Kennet r. Union Ins. Co. (1875), 27 La. Ann. 26. Passing signals. Under rule 1 of the pilot rules, relating to the passing of steamers on rivers, which requires the pilot of the ascending steamer to Jrst indicate the side on which he desires to pass, bis signal is controlling, unless the descending steamer shall deem such passing dangerous, and shall indicate such fact by danger signals and by a contrary signal, as required by the rule. Hudson r. Monongahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. (1905), 136 Fed. 173, 69 C. C. A. 85. Where the ascending steamer Ohio River, after signaling her course, changes her signal, and the descending steamer answers that she will keep her course, the ascending steamer is bound to Decisions. follow the course first signaled. The Quickstep (C. C. 1870), Fed. Cas. No. 11,509. If an ascending steamer fails to return the signal of a steamer descending, and chooses rather to make a cross signal, the of acceptance this by the descending steamer does not excuse the pilot of the other for his first fault. U. S. v. Keller (C. C. 1884), 19 Fed. 633. Where an overtaken vessel signals her consent that the other shall pass on her starboard side, knowing that there was shallow water and rocky bottom there, she must be careful not to crowd the other vessel while passing, even to make a landing. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. r. The Lake Superior (D. C. 1875), Fed. Cas. No. 12,244. Where two steamers are running in the same direction, and the one astern, under the eighth rule for the government of pilots on western rivers, signals her desire to pass the one ahead, the latter is bound to answer the signal, and the failure to respond is a fault in her; but such failure, SO far from exonerating the pursuing steamer from taking the care demanded by the circumstances to avoid a collision, calls for special caution on her part. The D. Newcomb (D. C. 1883), 16 Fed. 274. Entering channels. The Mississippi be low the mouth of the Ohio is not, at any "narrow point or at any stage of water, a channel," within the meaning of supervising inspector's rule 3; the term only refers to the "chutes" running behind the island. Sinnott r. The Dresden (D, C. 1854), Fed. Cas. No. 12,908. The pilot of a descending towboat is not culpable in not warning the ascending boat against entering the channel, where both boats are plainly in sight of each other. Each of two approaching vessels may assume that the other will reasonably perform its duty under the laws of navigation. The Rescue (D. C. 1885), 24 Fed. 44. Presumptions and burden of proof.Where the findings show that the signals of approaching boats were understood, and there is no complaint in the pleadings touching the point, it will be presumed that they were made at the proper distance, The Charles Morgan v. Kouns (1885), 115 When a barge is run into which has not complied with the requirements of the rules as to lights, the burden of proof is upon the owners of the barge, in a libel for damages, to show that the damage did not result from the failure to comply with the law, and they can not recover unless they so show. The La Fayette Lamb (D. C. 1884), 20 Fed. 319. In an action growing out of a collision of vessels consequent upon a failure of one to respond agreeably with the signal of the other, as directed in the navigation laws, the burden of proof is on the vessel that fails so to respond, to explain the failure satisfactorily to the court. The Mary Ida (D. C. 1884), 20 Fed. 741. Weight of evidence.-When an ascending boat, having given two whistles, was hit on the port bow, and the other boat was injured on the starboard bow, there is convincing evidence that the ascending boat was at fault. The Des Moines (1872), 154 U. S. 584, 14 Sup. Ct. 1168, 20 L. Ed. 821. 1509. High seas defined.-The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, empowered and directed from time to time to designate and define by suitable bearings or ranges with light houses, light vessels, buoys or coast objects, the lines dividing the high seas from rivers, harbors and inland waters. Sec. 2. act of Feb. 19, 1895 (28 Stat. 672). Notes of Decisions. Designation of lines. On the question whether a collision occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States, held, that a line drawn by the secretary by virtue of this section was not intended to pass beyond a marine league from shore. Carlson 2. United New York Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n (D. C. 1899), 93 Fed. 468. Transfer to Secretary of Commerce.-The authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by this section was transferred to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor by sec. 10, act of Feb. 14, 1903 (32 Stat. 829). (1904) 25 Ap. Atty. Gen. 149. Jurisdiction of courts.-This act is for the purpose of delimiting the inland waters of the United States, to inform navigators where the inland rules of navigation as distinguished from the international rules become applicable, but does not change the boundaries of any Federal judicial district, nci enlarge the jurisdiction of any particular Federal court. U. S. v. Newark Meadows Imp. Co. (C. C. 1909), 173 Fed. 426. 1510. Inland waters defined. The words "inland waters" used in this Act shall not be held to include the Great Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters as far east as Montreal; and this Act shall not in any respect modify or affect the provisions of the Act entitled "An Act to regulate navigation on the Great Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters," approved February eighth, eighteen hundred and ninety-five. Sec. 4, act of Feb. 19, 1895 (28 Stat. 672). 1511. State regulation of pilots.-Until further provision is made by Congress, all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the States respectively wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the States may respectively enact for the purpose. R. S. 4235. Notes of Decisions. Pilots and pilotage are rightful subjects of legislation. The Alcalde (D. C. 1887), 30 Fed. 133, 135. The adoption of compulsory pilotage regulations by a State, under this section, does not violate Const. U. S. art 1, sec. 9, cl. 6, which provides that no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another. Thompson v. Darden (1905), 25 Sup. Ct. 660, 198 U. S. 310, 49 L. Ed. 1064, afirming judgment Darden v. Thompson (1903), 44 S. E. 755, 101 Va. 635. Recognition of State acts.-This provi sion indicates that Congress did not doubt The power of the States to legislate on the subject of pilots. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia (1851), 12 How. 299, 317, 13 L. Ed. 996; In re McNiel (1871), 13 Wall. 236, 241, 20 L. Ed. 624; Wilson v. McNamee (1880), 102 U. S. 572, 573, 26 L. Ed. 234. An admission can not be inferred from this section of the concurrent rights of the States with Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States, since it merely adopted the existing and prospective laws of the States. Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 9 Wheat. 1, 207, 6 L. Ed. 23; Wilson v. McNamee (1880), 102 U. S. 572, 573, 26 L. Ed. 234. Effect of acts of Congress for licensing pilots of steam vessels. The act of 1852 providing for the inspection of steam vessels and the licensing of their pilots ap plied only to pilots for their voyages, not in entering or leaving harbors, and did Lot supersede State laws recognized by this section. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. C. Jelle (1864), 2 Wall, 450, 460, 17 L. Ed. 805. Source of authority of State. The State pile tage laws are enacted under an original power of the States, not under one conferred by the United States. The Chase (D) C. 1882), 14 Fed, $54. Extent of authority of State. Each State may license pilots, and provide regulations for their government and employment; but it can not exclude others duly licensed elsewhere from employment on the public waters of the Nation, either on the ground that those waters are within the terri torial limits, or on the ground that the vessel to be piloted is bound to a port within its territory. The Clymene (D. C. 1881), 9 Fed. 164; The William Law (D. C. 1882), 14 Fed. 792. Though Congress may legislate on the subject of pilotage throughout the United States, It has not manifested an intention to overrule the State laws except in one instance, and the law of a State imposing a forfeiture for the neglect of a vessel to take a pilot is not invalid. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia (1551), 12 How, 299, 320, 13 L. Ed. 996 Louisiana may make it a criminal offense for a pilot not duly qualified under its laws to pilot a foreign vessel from the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans, though he holds a license under Mississippi. Leech r. Louisiana (1909), 29 Sup Ct. 552, 553, 214 L. 175, 53 L. Ed. 956 Where parties have a right, under the laws of the United States, to pilot Vosseis in and out of the Mississippi River to the sea through South Pass, although they are not duly licensed and commissioned branch pilots under the laws of Louisiana, to imprison them for exercising this right is to imprison them in violation of the laws of the United States. United States ex rel. Spink (C. C. 1884), 19 Fed. 631; contra, State v. Livaudais (1884), 36 La. Ann 122. A State statute regulating pilotage and providing for a board of pilot commissioners with authority to license pilots and giving the commissioners 5 per cent of the fees collected by the pilots provides for a commission forming an essential part of pilotage establishment recognized by this section. The Queen (1913), 206 Fed. 148, 124 C. C. A. 214. This act does not authorize a State to fix the compensation of pilots for services which are strictly those of salvors not pilots. Hobart r. Drogan (1836), 10 Pet. 108, 120, 9 L. Ed. 363, Waters to which laws may extend.-A State may permit or require its pilots to tender their services to inward bound vessels at a greater distance from the shore than 3 miles, or the outward limit of the pilot ground. Wilson . McNamee (1880), 102 U. S. 572, 574, 26 L. Ed. 234; The Whistler (D. C. 1882), 13 Fed. 295. State pilot laws have sufficient effect beyond the State boundaries to fix the compensation of pilots. The Nevada (D. C. 1874), Fed. Cas. No. 10,130. The breakwater in Delaware Bay constitutes, within the act of Congress and the usage of navigation, a "port," in the proper and maritime sense of the term; and the offer of a Delaware pilot to take a vessel from sea into the breakwater is the exercise of a legitimate authority on his part, and the refusal of a vessel to accept his services entitled the pilot to half pliotage, according to the State law. The William Law (D, C, 1882), 14 Fed. 792. Vessels subject to State laws.- Where a steamship coming into the port of Now York was spoken by a licensed pilot who offered his services, which were refsed, such pilot had no lien for a sum clared to be in lieu of services as provided by pilotage laws. Leitch r. The George Law (D. C. 1858), Fed. Cas, No. 8,223. A State law making it unlawful for a vessel of her class to move at a greater speed than 4 miles per hour governs the movements of a Government trat sport leaving Norfolk Harbor. Southern Rail way . U. S (1910), 45 Ct. Cl 322. Authority of Territories.- A Territory has power to pass pliot laws, The Panimi (D. C. 1881), Fed. Cas, No. 10,702. Jurisdiction over suits for pilotage fees. — Courts of adiairaity have jurisdiction of suits for pilotage. Wave v. Hyer (C. C.), Fed. Cas. No. 17,300; The Wave (D. C. 1831), Fed. Cas. No. 17,297. The right to half pilotage held not cognizable on the admiralty side of the court. Arcularius v. Staples (D. C, 1859), Fed. Cas. No. 509b. State statutes relating to pilotage do not affect jurisdiction of Federal court, but only give an additional remedy. The George S. Wright (D. C. 1869), Fed. Cas. No. 5,340. This and the following section by implication make applicable, in favor of pilots, the laws of either New York or New Jersey; and hence a New Jersey pilot may sue in the Federal courts of New York for pilotage services rendered in New York waters. Reardon v. Arkell (D. C. 1894), 59 Fed. 624. Liability of vessel for pilot's negligence. The fact that the master of a vessel is by a State law compelled to take a pilot does not exonerate the vessel from liability for a collision caused wholly through the negligence of such pilot. The China (1868), 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 53, 19 L. Ed. 67; Camp v. The Marcellus (C. C. 1860), Fed. Cas. No. 2,347; The Alabama (D. C. 1867), Fed. Cas. No. 122; Cook v. Curtis (1878), 58 N. H. 507, 1512. Pilots on boundaries between States.-The master of any vessel coming into or going out of any port situate upon waters which are the boundary between two States, may employ any pilot duly licensed or authorized by the laws of either of the States bounded on such waters, to pilot the vessel to or from such port. R. S. 4236. Notes of Decisions. Constitutionality. This section is sustainable as a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia (1851), 12 How. 299, 317, 13 L. Ed. 996. Territories.-The term "State" includes an organized territory. The Ullock (1884), 19 Fed. 207; Neill v. Wilson (1887), 14 Or. 410, 12 Pac. 810. State statutes affected by act.-A State statute which prohibits any one not licensed under the authority of the State from piloting a vessel to a port within the State is void, so far as it interferes with the employment on public waters of pilots licensed by other States bordering thereon. The Clymene (D. C. 1881), 9 Fed. 164. So is the requirement of a State statute that the master receive the first pilot who tenders his services, since this section gives him an election as to which he shall take. The South Cambria (D. C. 1886), 27 Fed. 525. 1513. No discrimination in rates of pilotage. No regulations or provisions shall be adopted by any State which shall make any discrimination in the rate of pilotage or half-pilotage between vessels sailing between the ports of one State and vessels sailing between the ports of different States, or any discrimination against vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, or against national vessels of the United States; and all existing regulations or provisions making any such discrimination are annulled and abrogated. R. S. 4237. Notes of Decisions. Validity of State statutes.-Section 1512 of the Code of Georgia, relating to pilotage, and containing discriminations between vessels sailing between the ports of the same State and vessels sailing between the ports of different States, is in conflict with this section. Spraigue v. Thompson (1886), 6 Sup. Ct. 988-990, 118 U. S. 90, 30 L. Ed. 115. Only the discriminatory features of State pilotage laws are abrogated by this section, Olsen v. Smith (1904), 25 Sup. Ct. 52, 54, 195 U. S. 332, 49 L. Ed. 224. No discrimination in State pilotage laws is made by the Virginia compulsory pilotage charge on all vessels (except coasting vessels having a pilot's license) either inward bound from the sea through the Virginia Capes to Smith's Point, Yorktown, Newport News, or Norfolk, and intermedi ate points, or outward bound to the sea from those points through the Capes, although compulsory pilotage does not prevail in all the inland waters of the State. Thompson v. Darden (1905), 25 Sup. Ct. 660, 661, 198 U. S. 310, 49 L. Ed. 1064, affirming judgment Darden v. Thompson (1903), 44 S. E. 755, 101 Va. 635. The invalidity under this section of Pol. Code Cal. sec. 2468, exempting certain coasting vessels from liability for half pilotage does not exempt a vessel in the foreign trade from such liability under sec. 2466. The Alameda v. Neal (C. C. 1887), 32 Fed. 331, affirming (D. C. 1887), 31 Fed. 366. But half pilotage can not be collected under it from a vessel bound from San Francisco to New York. Freeman . The Undaunted (C. C. 1889), 37 Fed. 662. |