ble with the genius of our Constitution and laws. (1821) 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 482.

The President may grant a conditional pardon, and he may remit a part of the peralty or punishment without remitting the whole. (1872) 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 124.

The President can pardon a deserter so as to re-enfranchise him, i. e., remove the disabilities imposed by sec. 21 of the act c Mar. 3, 1565 (13 Stat. 490), and at the same time make the pardon conditional upon his not becoming thereby entitled to ary moneys forfeited; and a condition of this sort would exclude any right to the Tuy referred to in the joint resolution of Mar 1, 1870 (No. 18). Id.

Misdemeanor.-If the action of the Presidat on an application for pardon of an offense styled by the laws of the United States a misdemeanor depends simply on the question of necessity for pardon, such recessity exists, unless the applicant is to be prevented from freely changing his residece under penalty of losing his rights of citizenship thereby, for the reason that in some States a person convicted of a misdemeanor loses his right to vote, to sit as Juror, etc. (1895) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 242.

Offenses in territory. The President of the United States alone has the power to pardon offenses committed in a Territory in violation of acts of Congress. (1855) 7 Op Atty. Gen. 561.

Relief of sureties and remission of debts.-After return of execution on scire facias against the surety of an absconding criminal charged with violation of acts of Congress, The only mode of relieving the surety is by exercise of the pardoning power of the Provident. (1854) 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 408.

The pardoning power of the President es not embrace the renission of judgments against sureties on criminal recogLiners or debts due the United States. (1×64) 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 124. See, also, note. p. 40, post, as to "Operation and effort of pardon în general."

Prisoner being punished for contempt.The President has power to pardon for conempt Castner v. Pocahontas Collieries GC, (C. C. 1902), 117 Fed. 184.

The pardoning power applies as well to Darba ats imposed for contempt of the process of the United States as for the vioistion of any other law. (1845) 4 Op. Atty.

against him-sets forth in his petition for pardon an ex parte statement of facts which, If true, would show him to have been improperly convicted, the President is neither required nor authorized to inquire into the truth of the alleged facts, or to grant a pardon on the assumption that they are true. To do either would be an abuse of the pardoning power. (1820) 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 359.

Applications for pardon are addressed to the President, who may act on them upon his own examination simply, or, before acting thereon, may refer them to any of the executive departments for advice. (1872) 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 20.

An application having been with that view referred by the President to the Secretary of War, and the latter having afterward submitted the same to the Attorney General for his opinion thereon, the Attorney General declined to give an opinion on the ground that to do so would be merely to advise the Secretary as to what he should advise the President. Id.

Delivery and acceptance of pardon.--The provision of 16 Stat. 235, prescribing the mode of proving the loyalty of the claimant, under 12 Stat, 820, providing for the collection of abandoned and captured property in insurrectionary districts, and for the tak ing possession by the Government, for the true owner, of the proceeds of such property, and declaring, in effect, that the unqualified acceptance of a pardon by such claimant, without a disclaimer of guilt, is conclusive evidence of his having committed the acts pardoned, but that it shall be null and void as evidence of the rights conferred by it, is unconstitutional, as invading the powers of the executive branch of the Government. U. S. v. Klein (1871), 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128, 20 L. Ed. 519.

A par from the President, to be effective, ist be accepted. Burdick v. U. 8 (1915), 35 Sup. Ct. 267, 236 U. S. 79, 59 L. Ed. 476: Curtin v. Same (1915), 35 Sup. Ct. 271, 236 U. S. 96, 59 L. Ed. 482, reversing judgment U. S. v. Burdick (D. C. 1914), 211 Fed. 492.

Ex

A pardon is not effective until delivered to the prisoner or to some one for him, being until that time subject to withdrawal and being merely a promise of pardon. parte Harlan (C. C. 1909), 180 Fed. 119; decree affirmed, Harlan c. MeGourin (1910), 31 Sup. Ct. 44, 218 U. 8. 442, 54 L. Ed. 1101, 21 Ann. Cas. 849.

Where a pardon is to begin and take ef fect from the day on which a prescribed oath is taken by the person pardoned, such pardon does not take effect until the oath is taken, and the formal acceptance of the pardon does not supersede the necessity of

The pardon may possibly apply to a different person or to a different crime.

It may be absolute or conditional. It may be controverted by the prosecutor and must be expounded by the court. These circumstances combine to show that this, like any other deed, ought to be brought before the court by plea, motion, or otherwise. U. S. v. Wilson (1833), 7 Pet. 150, 161; Ex parte Reno (1877), 66 Mo. 266.

The recital of a specific, distinct offense, in a pardon by the President, limits its operation to that offense, and such pardon does not embrace any other offense for which separate penalties and punishments are provided. Ex parte Weimer, 8 Biss. C. Ct. 321.

The conviction having been of two of fenses, and the pardon reciting only one, the pardon perates upon the offense recited. State v. Foley (1880), 15 Nev. 64.

Notice of President's action.-A telegram signed with the surname of the Attorney General of the United States, purporting to state the decision of the President on an application by a convicted prisoner for a commutation of sentence will be presumed authentic and is sufficient notice of the President's action, which, as the court will take judicial notice, may properly be taken in such matters through the Department of Justice. Perovich v. Perry (1909), 167 Fed. 789.

Revocation.-A pardon by an outgoing President may be revoked by the incoming President before its delivery to the prisoner. In re De Puy (D. C. 1869), Fed. Cas. No. 3,814.

Operation and effect of pardon in general. A pardon, if granted before conviction, prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching, and if granted after conviction removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores the person pardoned to all his civil rights. A person pardoned by the Presi dent for participation in the Rebellion can not be excluded from the practice of his profession as an attorney before the courts by his failure to comply with the act of Jan. 24, 1865, requiring attorneys to take a test oath. Ex parte Garland (1866), 4 Wall. 333, 377, 18 L. Ed. 366.

Proclamation of the President of Dec. 25, 1868 (15 Stat. 711), granting unconditional pardon and amnesty to participants in the Rebellion, includes aliens domiciled in the United States who gave aid and comfort to the Rebellion. Carlisle . U. S. (1872), 16 Wall. 147, 21 L. Ed. 420.

President's proclamation of December 25, 1868, granted an unconditional pardon to participants in the Rebellion and enabled persons otherwise entitled to recover from the United States proceeds of captured and abandoned property, though no proof be made that the claimant gave neither comfort nor aid to the rebellion. Armstrong v. U. S. (1871), 13 Wall. 154, 20 L. Ed. 614.

The President's proclamation of Dec. 25, 1868, granting unconditional pardon and amnesty to participants in the Rebellion, relieves claimants of captured and abandoned property from proof of adhesion to the United States during the Civil War and makes it unnecessary to prove such adhesion or personal pardon for taking part in the Rebellion. Pargoud v. U. S. (1871), 13 Wall. 156, 20 L. Ed. 646, reversing (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 337.

The proclamation of the President extending unconditionally and without reservation a full pardon and amnesty for treason, with a restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution, does not give a person pardoned a right to the proceeds of his property which had been confiscated by the Government, sold, and the proceeds paid into the TreasKnote v. U. S. (1877), 95 U. S. 149, 152, 24 L. Ed. 442.

ury.

Where property of a person has been confiscated for treason, pardon revests in him the power of disposition over the reversion of such property, expectant on the termination of the confiscated estate; it having been in suspension during his disability. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Bosworth (1890), 10 Sup. Ct. 231, 133 U. S. 92, 33 L. Ed. 550.

The full and unconditional pardon of a person convicted of larceny and sentenced to imprisonment therefor completely restores his competency as a witness, although it may be stated in the pardon that it was given for that purpose. Boyd v. U. S. (1892), 142 U. S. 453, 12 Sup. Ct. 292, 35 L. Ed. 1077.

A pardon is prospective and not retrospective in its operation, and where an alien convicted of felony was thereafter pardoned the pardon did not operate to obliterate or wipe out the fact of the commission of the crime nor make it appear that his behavior had been that of a man of good moral character to entitle him to admission to citizenship. In re Spenser (C. C. 1878), Fed. Cas. No. 13,234.

Α "pardon or "amnesty secures against the consequences of one's acts, and not against the acts of themselves. It involves forgiveness; not forgetfulness. U. S. v. Swift (D. C. 1911), 186 Fed. 1002.

Wire the President's pardon restores a eal to his legal rights and fully re

sh'm of the disabilities legally attarting to his conviction, it does not destrot an existing fact that his service was Dot faithful and honest. (1898) 22 Op. A 1. Gen. 36.

A recruiting officer has the right to reJect a candidate for enlistment in the Army whose service during his previous term was #t honest and faithful, notwithstanding

President's pardon of the offense. Id. The effect of a pardon is to obliterate the case and make him who had been an e nder as innocent, in legal contemplation, 2 if he had never offended, to remove all sabilities incident to the offense charged, and to restore to him all civil rights which he would have had if he had not offended, so far, at least, as it is in the power of the rnment to make it so. (1908) 26 Op.

4. Gen. 617.

An Executive pardon is effective to reve from the offender the disability which

s conviction of a felony. People v. Bwn (1872), 43 Cal. 439, 13 Am. Rep. 14%

Set to exceptions therein provided, alon by the President restores to its repient all rights of property lost by the * pardoned, unless the property has, bi judicial process, become vested in other Osborn e. U. S. (1875), 91 U. S. 474; (1852) 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 532. Reef from fines, penalties, and forfeitres

A full pardon and amnesty by the nt for all offenses committed by the er of property seized under act Aug. 6, 7. "to confiscate property used for inBurretionary purposes" relieves such owner

charged from the sentence. U. S. v. Lukins (C. C. 1841), Fed. Cas. No. 15,638.

An Executive pardon would relieve the person pardoned from penalties and disabilities; but could not authorize officers of the Government to pay him moneys which might be due to him, if they were prohibited from so doing by a subsequent statute. Hart's Adm'r v. U. S. (1880), 16 Ct. Cl. 459.

crime Where a person convicted of a against the United States was sentenced to fine and imprisonment and subsequently received an unconditional pardon from the President, but previous thereto had paid the amount of the fine to the marshal, by whom it was deposited in court, where it still remains, held, that the fine was remitted by the pardon, and that the money should now be restored to the person pardoned. (1872) 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 599.

A pardon by the President works a remission of a pecuniary penalty already paid, unless the money has actually passed into the Treasury (overruling the decision in 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 1). Id.

Restoration to rights of citizenship.An Executive act restoring a convicted criminal to the rights of citizenship is not a pardon and does not remove the legal infamy, and so long as the judgment of guilt remains the disability to testify necessarily continues. People v. Bowen

(1872), 43 Cal. 439, 13 Am. Rep. 148.

Restoration of Army or Navy officer to former rank.-A pardon by the President will restore an officer whose rank has been reduced by sentence of a court-martial to his former relative rank according to the date of his commission. (1869) 12 Op. Atty. Gen, 547.

C., a lieutenant commander in the Navy, was sentenced by a court-martial to suspension for one year, and to retain his then present number on the list of lieutenant commanders for that time. The sentence having been executed, he applied to be restored to the number on said list which he thereby lost. Held, that the restoration could not be effected by the President otherwise than by a pardon. (1881) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 31.

The punishment imposed (loss of numbers) being a continuing one, is still subject to the pardoning power, which, when exercised, would have the effect to restore the officer to his former rank according to the date of his commission. Id.

9. Treaties.

*

*

Treaty powers in general.-Although power is given to the Executive, with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties, the power is nowhere conferred to make laws to carry the stipulations of treaties into effect. Prigg . Pennsylvania (1842), 16 Pet. 539, 619, 10 L. Ed. 1060.

The power of the legislative department of the Government to exclude aliens from the United States can not be surrendered by the treaty-making power. Chinese Exclusion Case (1889), 130 U. S. 581, 600, 9 Sup. Ct. 623, 32 L. Ed. 1068.

The treaty power of the United States extends to the protection to be afforded to the citizens of a foreign country owning property in this country and to the manner in which that property may be transferred, devised, or inherited. Geofroy v. Riggs (1890), 133 U. S. 258, 264, 10 Sup. Ct. 295, 33 L. Ed. 642.

The treaty-making power vested in our Government extends to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign Governments, and it can make treaties providing for the exercise of judicial authority in other countries by its officers appointed to reside therein. In re Ross (1891), 140 U. S. 453, 480, 11 Sup. Ct. 897, 35 L. Ed. 581.

Where the Senate fails to consent to a proposed treaty, it has no legal force and proceedings taken thereunder are of no avail. In re Sutherland (D. C. 1892), 53 Fed. 551.

No constitutional objection is perceived to a provision in the proposed consular convention between the United States and Great Britain, conferring upon the courts of each country jurisdiction of offenses committed on vessels of the other on the high seas. (1890) 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 644.

The President has no power to make treaties except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members present. A treaty, therefore, which has not been thus ratified, is wholly inoperative to affect antecedent laws or the rights acquired under them. United States v. Frelinghuysen (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1883), 2 Mackey, 299.

The general power to make treaties confers authority to negotiate with other Governments, and to form compacts relative to the proper subject-matter of treaty stipulation, such as peace, war, commercial intercourse, alliances, etc. State (1843), 13 N. H. 537.

Pierce v.

The police of the several States, regarded as separate governments, is not a subjectmatter to which the treaty-making power extends. Id.

The political rights of the people of the several States as such are not subjects of treaty stipulation. Id.

Nature of treaties.-A treaty is, in its nature, a contract, not a legislative act. It is equivalent to an act of the legislature whenever it operates without the aid of any legislative provision. Foster v. Neilson (1829), 2 Pet. 253, 314, 7 L. Ed. 415.

A treaty with a sovereign as such inures to his successors and the Government of the United States. The Sapphire (1870), 11 Wall. 164, 168, 20 L. Ed. 127.

A treaty is primarily a compact between two independent nations and depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the honor and the interest of the Governments which are parties to it. Head Money Cases (1884), 112 U. S. 580, 598, 5 Sup. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798.

A treaty is primarily a contract between two independent nations, and for the infraction of its provisions a remedy must be sought by the injured party through reclamations upon the other. Whitney . Robertson (1888), 124 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386.

A treaty is in its nature a contract, and if the consideration fail or important provisions be broken by one party, the other may declare it terminated. Hooper v. U. S. (1887), 22 Ct. Cl. 408.

A treaty is a compact of accommodation relating to public affairs. Pierce v. State (1843), 13 N. H. 537.

Though the convention between the United States and Great Britain for the joint military occupancy of San Juan Island, pending the final adjustment of the international boundary dispute, was not a treaty within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, the power to enter into such a convention is a necessary incident to national government. Watts v. U. S. (1870), 1 Wash. T. 288.

When treaties take effect.-Where, by the terms of the treaty, either of the parties engage to perform particular acts, the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court. Foster v. Neilson (1829), 2 Pet. 253, 314, 7 L. Ed. 415.

The date when a treaty is to go into effect is to be fixed, not by its provision that

I'm to become operative 10 days after exchange of ratifications, but by an act of Cress, where the Senate has added an arminent to the treaty, declaring that

shril not take effect until approved by Congress, U. S. c. American Sugar Refinirg Co. (1906), 26 Sup. Ct. 717. 719, 202 8. 563, 50 L. Ed. 1149, reversing judg. ☛ent American Sugar Refining Co. v. P. S. (C C 1965), 136 Fed. 508.

Where an Indian treaty provided that it shid be obligatory as soon as the same stomid be ratified by the President and Senate, it did not take effect until signed by the President, although it had been previes.y ratified by the Senate and accepted be the Indians. Shepard v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. (C. C. 1889), 40 Fed. 341.

A treaty takes effect from its date when ra*ied, unless a diferent period is fixed, er must be adopted to fulfill the manifest Tetest. In re Metzger (D. C. 1847), Fed. Cas No. 9,511.

Termination of treaties by war.-The tersation of a treaty by war does not div st rights of property already vested der it, nor do treaties in general become extinguished ipso facto by war between the two governments. Society, etc.. v. New Maven (1823), 8 Wheat. 465, 494, 5 L. FA 602.

Invasion or infringement of power by acts of Congress.--Congress is bound to regard public treaties, and has no power to orpim a board of revision to nullify titles ermed thereunder. Reichert v. Felps (1967), 6. Wall. 160, 165, 18 L. Ed. 849. Sec. 2, act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. post, 72, prohibiting officers from ing other lucrative offices, should not le regarded as enacted by Congress to invide the domain of the treaty-making auTrity and establishing restrictions upon ↑ture occasional and temporary commis& terships created by international agreeLett, the nature and functions of which

neither Congress nor the framers of the Constitution could wisely undertake or foresee. (1898), 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 184.

Enforcement, alteration, abrogation, or repeal of treaties by Congress.-The repeal of a treaty can not affect title to real estate acquired by an allen thereunder. Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheat. 259, 4 L. Ed. 234.

So far as a treaty made can be made the subject of judicial cognizance, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal. Head Money Cases (1884), 112 U. S. 580, 598; Whitney v. Robertson (1888), 124 U. S. 190, 195.

Abrogation of a treaty may be justified by a change of circumstances. Hooper v. U. B. (1887), 22 Ct. Cl. 408.

Act of Congress as superseding treaty.An act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty. The Cherokee Tobacco (1870), 11 Wall. 616, 621, 20 L. Ed. 227.

A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress supersede a prior treaty. Ward v. Race Horse (1896), 163 U. S. 504, 516, 16 Sup. Ct. 1076, 41 L. Ed. 244.

Acquisition of territory and settlement of boundaries.-The United States may acquire territory by treaty. American Ins. Co. v. Canter (1826), 1 Pet. 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242. [C. S.. p. 13,885.]

Ratification of action of military governor of Cuba. Ratification by the Executive, Congress, and the treaty-making power of the action of the military governor of Cuba in abolishing a hereditary office, with its emoluments, makes his act that of the United States, and exonerates him from all liability as for a tort in violation of the law of nations, or of a treaty of the United States. O'Reilly De Camara D. Brooke (1908), 28 Sup. Ct. 439, 209 T. S. 45, 52 L. Ed. 676, affirming judgment (D. C. 1906), 142 Fed. 858.

he shall nominate, and

Pubis offee.-An office is a public sta ployment, conferred by the apMot of Government. The term em•• The idea of tenure, emolument, and The duties are continu

ing and permanent, not occasional and transitory, and are defined by rules prescribed by Government and not by contract. .. A Government office is different from a Government contrart.