Official determination of claims in general. As to effect of officers' determination upon claims. Stanton v. U. S. (C. C. 1889), 37 Fed. 252, 254, modified (1895) 70 Fed. 890, 17 C. C. A. 475. Rejection of claims or reporting the same adversely. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, gave to United States circuit courts jurisdiction of claims against the United States, except claims heretofore rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same." Held that, the Comptroller of the Treasury having charge of the adjustment of accounts against the Government, a rejection of an account by him is a reJection by a department authorized to hear and determine the same. Bliss v. U. S. (C. C. 1888), 34 Fed. 781. Act Mar. 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505), sec. 2, gave the circuit and district courts concurrent jurisdiction, within certain limits as to amount, of all matters which by sec. 1 "the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine," including all claims founded on any law of Congress, except for pensions, or on any contract with the Government: "Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to either of the courts Lerein mentioned jurisdiction to hear and determine claims which have heretofore been rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same." By R. S. sec. 269, it is made the duty of the First Comptroller of the Treasury" to superintend the adjustment and preservation of the public accounts, subject to his revision." R. S. 191 provides that "the balances which may from time to time be stated by the auditor, and certified to the heads of departments by the Commissioner of Customs, or the Comptroliers of the Treasury, upon the settlement of publle accounts, shall not be subjeet to be changed or modified by the heads of departments, but shall be conclusive upon the executive branch of the Government, and be subject to revision only by Congress or the proper courts." Held, that the proviso must be limited to a rejection of a claim, or an adverse report thereon, by a court, department, or comthission which determines the rights of parties, and that therefore the disallowance of a marshal's account for fees by the First Comptroller of the Treasury was not within the proviso, as his decision was conclusive only within the executive department. Harmon v. U. S. (C. C. 1890), 43 Fed. 560; judgment affirmed, U. S. v. Harmon (1893), 13 S. Ct. 327, 147 U. S. 268, 37 L. Ed. 164. Under act Mar. 3, 1887, forbidding dis trict courts to entertain claims against the Government, "which have heretofore been rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same," the court must dismiss a claim rejected by the Comptroller of the Treasury. Preston v. U. S. (D. C. 1888), 37 Fed. 417, following Bliss v. Same (C. C. 1888), 34 Fed. 781, and Rand v. Same (D. C. 1888), 36 Fed. 671. Act Feb. 22, 1875 (18 Stat. 333), which requires that the accounts of district attorneys, clerks, marshals, etc., shall be forwarded, "when approved," to the proper accounting officers of the Treasury," does not make presentation to such officers a condition precedent to a right of action, nor is rejection of a claim by the accounting officers of the Treasury such a determination of a "commission or department authorized to hear and determine," within the meaning of the act of Mar. 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505), as will bar an action in the proper courts. Erwin v. U. S. (D. C. 1889), 37 Fed. 470, 2 L. R. A. 229. Set-offs and counterclaims.-See secs, 458, 464, post. While no direct suit can be maintained against the United States, a party against whom suit is brought by the United States to recover money may set up any claim he has to such money. U. S. v. Ringgold (1834), 8 Pet. 150, 163, 8 L. Ed. 899. The difference in quality and fuel value between the coal called for by the contract and a cargo of inferior coal furnished to the Government and paid for may be set off against the Government's liability to the same contractors under a later contract, where the parties agreed that the acceptance of the inferior coal should be a purchase outside the contract, and the contractors were notified before delivery that they would be charged with the difference if the coal proved inferior. Barry v. U. S. (1913), 33 S. Ct. 681, 229 U. S. 47, 57 L. Ed. 1060, affirming judgment Peabody v. Same (1910), 45 Ct. Cl. 532. Under act Mar. 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505, 506), providing for the bringing of suits against the United States, the court has power to render judgment for the United States for any balance found due on a setoff or counterclaim. U. S. v. Saunders (1897), 79 Fed. 407, 24 C. C. A. 649. The Tucker Act, conferring on Federal district courts jurisdiction over certain suits against the United States, does not authorize a recovery of demands against the United States on counterclaims. U. S. r. Nipissing Mines Co. (1913), 206 Fed, 431, 124 C. C. A. 313, modifying judgment (D. C. 1912), 202 Fed. 803. Limitations. A right of action against the Government, under a contract for cartage of imported goods in its custody, accrues as soon as the money becomes due, without a prior presentation of the claim to the executive department for allowance; and hence the six years limitation in the act of Mar. 3, 1887, begins to run from that time, and is not interrupted by such presentation of the claim, or while it is under investigation or in course of auditing by executive officers. U. S. v. Utz (1897), 80 Fed. 848, 26 C. C. A. 184, reversing judg ment Utz v. U. S. (C. C. 1896), 75 Fed. 648. One suing the Government, under the act of Mar. 3, 1887, providing for bringing suits against the United States, is barred as to any part of his demand arising over six years before filing his petition. Timmonds v. U. S. (1898), 84 Fed. 933, 28 C. C. A. 570. 451. Jurisdiction over claims against the United States.-The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters: First. All claims (except for pensions) founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress, upon any regulation of an Executive Department, upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable: Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to the said court jurisdiction to hear and determine claims growing out of the late civil war, and commonly known as 64 war claims," or to hear and determine other claims which, prior to March third, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, had been rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same. Par. 1, sec. 145, Judicial Code, act of Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1136). That from and after the passage and approval of this Act the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims shall not extend to or include any claim against the United States based upon or growing out of the destruction of any property or damage done to any property by the military or naval forces of the United States during the war for the suppression of the rebellion; nor to any claim for stores and supplies taken by or furnished to or for the use of the military or naval forces of the United States, nor to any claim for the value of any use and occupation of any real estate by the military or naval forces of the United States during said war; nor shall said Court of Claims have jurisdiction of any claim which is now barred by the provisions of any law of the United States. Sec. 5, act of Mar. 4, 1915 (38 Stat. 996). See ante, 450 and notes. 452. Filing claim prohibited while suit is pending in another court.-No person shall file or prosecute in the Court of Claims, or in the Supreme Court on appeal therefrom, any claim for or in respect to which he or any assignee of his has pending in any other court any suit or process against any person who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, mediately or immediately, under the authority of the United States. Sec. 154, Judicial Code, Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1138). Notes of Decisions. Claims pending in other courts. A suit pending in a United States circuit court, no matter in what part of the country, can not be treated as pending in a court of foreign jurisdiction. All courts of the United States are within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Peterson v. U. S. (1890), 26 Ct. Cl. 93. 453. Time limit for filing claims.-Every claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement thereof is filed in the court, or transmitted to it by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as provided by law, within six years after the claim first accrues: Provided, That the claims of married women, first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years, first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the petition be filed in the court or transmitted, as aforesaid, within three years after the disability has ceased; but no other disability than those enumerated shall prevent any claim from being barred, nor shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively. Sec. 156, Judicial Code, act of Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1139). 454. Form of petition to the Court of Claims.-The claimant shall in all cases fully set forth in his petition the claim, the action thereon in Congress or by any of the departments, if such action has been had, what persons are owners thereof or interested therein, when and upon what consideration such persons became so interested; that no assignment or transfer of said claim or of any part thereof or interest therein has been made, except as stated in the petition; that said claimant is justly entitled to the amount therein claimed from the United States after allowing all just credits and offsets; that the claimant and, where the claim has been assigned, the original and every prior owner thereof, if a citizen, has at all times borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States, and, whether a citizen or not, has not in any way voluntarily aided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion against the said Government, and that he believes the facts as stated in the said petition to be true. The said petition shall be verified by the affidavit of the claimant, his agent or attorney. Sec. 159, Judicial Code, act of Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1139). 455. Petition to the Court of Claims must show ground for relief.-When it appears to the court in any case that the facts set forth in the petition of the claimant do not furnish any ground for relief, it shall not authorize the taking of any testimony therein. Sec. 165, Judicial Code, act of Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1140). 456. Burden of proof of loyalty of a claimant.-Whenever it is material in any claim to ascertain whether any person did or did not give any aid or comfort to forces or Government of the late Confederate States during the Civil War, the claimant asserting the loyalty of any such person to the United States during such Civil War shall be required to prove affirmatively that such person did, during said Civil War, consistently adhere to the United States and did give no aid or comfort to persons engaged in said Confederate service in said Civil War. Sec. 161, Judicial Code, act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1139). Notes of Decisions. Power of Congress. Where a claimant's rights, if any, are created by the statute which refers the claim, it is within the constitutional authority of Congress to specify as a condition to relief that he be found loyal in fact. Austin v. U. S. (1890), 25 Ct. Cl. 437. Congress may require proof of loyalty in fact, as distinguished from innocence in law, as a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of courts, without regard to pardon. Lincoln v. U. S. (1914), 49 Ct. Cl. 300. Construction and operation in general. This statute, being an enactment of former statutes, is to be construed as the original statutes were construed by the Supreme Court. Lincoln e. U. S. (1914), 49 Ct. Cl. 300. And this section must be executed with the limitations previously imposed by the Supreme Court. The proceedings go on under the Code Just as under the original statutes relating to loyalty. Duncan v. U. S. (1913), 48 Ct. Cl. 488. "Aid or comfort" to rebellion in general.--"Aid or comfort" defined. Young v. U. S. (1877), 97 U. S. 39, 24 L. Ed. 992. A loyal person surrounded by contending armies is not bound to abandon his family; and removing it to a retired place of safety, though within the Confederate lines, is not aid and comfort. Hayden v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 475. Involuntary patrol duty in the "home guard" of Mobile, not military, but in the nature of police duty, is not "aid or comfort." Miller v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 288. It is not aid or comfort to the rebellion for an alien, resident abroad, to purchase the products of the insurrectionary districts for ordinary business purposes through a commercial house within the rebel lines, and to accept and pay drafts abroad drawn for the purchase price of the products. Harrison v. U. S. (1870), 6 Ct. Cl. 323. The more writing of a letter during the rebellion by a British subject resident within the insurrectionary districts, addressed to the head of the rebel Government, unaccompanied by the sending, uttering, or publishing thereof, is not an act of aid or comfort to the rebellion, though it coutain proffer of services. But the writing and sending of such a letter is aid and comfort to the rebellion, in violation of the alien's proper neutrality. Medway v. U. S. (1870), 6 Ct. Cl. 421. To unite in forming a copartnership for the purpose of running the blockade, shipping cotton, and bringing into the insurrectionary States articles suited to the wants of the people, the sanction of the Government to be first given, and nothing in fact being done by the copartnership, does not constitute aid or comfort to the rebellion. Austell v. U. S. (1871), 7 Ct. Cl. 599. The bombardnent of Sumter was the beginning of the I bellion, and if from that event a citizen did faithfully and consistently adhere to the United States, his previous errors should not be deemed sufficient to attach to him the infamy of treason. Culliton v. U. S. (1869) 5 Ct. Cl. 627. See Lynch v. U. S. (1867) 3 Ct. Cl. 392. Presumptions and burden of proof.-The presumptions of loyalty are in favor of a claimant residing before and during the Rebellion in a loyal State, though he continue to own and work a plantation in Louisiana, as they are against one residing in a disloyal State. Turner v. U. S. (1867), 3 Ct. Cl. 400; Wayne v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct C 426; Fordham v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 469. But see Thomas v. U. S. (1867), 3 Ct. Cl. 52, as to presumptions as to a colold freeman residing in insurgent States. The residence of a citizen of a loyal State, for the purpose of gain, in a territory where the Rebel force holds sway, is prima facie evidence of giving aid and comfort. Stark v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. CI. 280. But where a claimant shows that his residence within the insurrectionary States during a part of the Rebellion was involuntary, and establishes his loyalty for the remainder, a presumption exists in favor of his loyalty. Ealer v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 372. The presumption of disloyalty does not attach to the citizen of a loyal State who was temporarily in the South at the outbreak of the Rebellion, and, being aged, infirm, and poor, was unable to escape. Spain v. U. S. (1869), 5 Ct. Cl. 598. The court will regard with suspicion the loyalty of a person who held Confederate bonds, or who embarked in the organi zation of a company designed to purchase steamers with a view to import and export merchandise. Claussen v. U. S. (1867), 3 Ct. Cl. 253. A claimant should establish the fact that he did not give aid and comfort by his intimate associates, or at least by witnesses of whom some knowledge exists that they themselves were loyal, and not by bis employees, or those interested in the property, the value of which is claimed. Id. And must show that he complied with the rigid requirements of the law in relation to allegiance and conduct during the Rebellion. Grossmeyer v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 1. Direct and positive proof of loyalty is required. Dothage v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 208. Claimants held required to prove affirmatively their loyalty. Zellner v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 480. Testimony of a single witness negative in its character, is not satisfactory proof of loyalty, where the claimant voluntarily resided during the Rebellion within the insurrectionary districts, and had friends and neighbors who might testify as to his conduct during the war. Patterson v. U. S. (1870), 6 Ct. Cl. 40. It is sufficient for a body corporate to show that it never gave aid or comfort to the Rebellion, by showing that it was incorporated for a lawful purpose, and that it never applied any part of its funds to aid the Rebellion. Hebrew Congregation Benai Berith Jacob v. U. S. (1870), 6 Ct. Cl. 241. Loyalty which a claimant may seek to establish must be shown both negatively and positively-that he never gave aid or comfort to the Rebellion, that he has consistently adhered to the United States. Wylie v. U. S. (1870), 6 Ct. Cl. 295. See, also, Dereef v. U. S. (1867), 3 Ct. Cl. 163 [C. S. p. 1524]. Amnesty. The proclamation of Dec. 25. 1868, relieves a citizen coming within its terms from making proof of loyalty. Witkowski v. U. S. (1871), 7 Ct. Cl. 393; Waring v. U. S. (1871), 7 Ct. Cl. 501. See U. S. v. Padelford (1869), 9 Wall. 531, 19 L. Ed. 788. And see Pargoud v. U. S. (1868), 4 Ct. Cl. 337. and proof of pardon for any acts of disloyalty committed during the Civil War, and for that purpose the general amnesty granted Dec. 25, 1868, furnishes sufficient proof. Lincoln v. U. S. (1914), 49 Ct. Cl. 300. Expressed sentiments of loyalty, going beyond the Confederate lines, acts of kindness to Union prisoners, rendering services to United States military forces, or freeing slaves held proof of loyalty. Foley v. U. S. (1867). [C. S. p. 1525]. Loyalty not proved.-Gearing v. U. S. (1867), 3 Ct. Cl. 165. [C. S. p. 1525]. 457. Claim dismissed on account of disloyalty.-The said allegations as to true allegiance and voluntary aiding, abetting, or giving encouragement to rebellion against the Government may be traversed by the Government, and if on the trial such issues shall be decided against the claimant, his petition shall be dismissed. Scc. 160, Judicial Code, act of Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1139). Notes of Decisions. Construction and operation in general.This statute, being an enactment of former statutes, is to be construed as the original statutes were construed by the Supreme Court. Lincoln v. U. S. (1914), 49 Ct. Cl. 300. And must be executed with the limitations previously imposed by the Supreme Court. The proceedings go on under the Code just as under the original statutes relating to loyalty. Duncan v. U. S. (1913), 48 Ct. Cl. 488. If one member of a business firm within the insurrectionary districts give aid or comfort to the rebellion, it defeats a recovery as to all of the firm, for the court can not sever the copartners, nor ascertain their individual interests. Schreiner c. U. S. (1870), 6 Ct. Cl. 359. But where the joint owners of captured property bring a joint suit for the proceeds, and the one establishes his loyalty and the other fails to do so, judgment will be rendered in favor of the one to the extent of his joint interest in the fund, and the petition of the other will be dismissed. Meldrim v. U. S. (1871), 7 Ct. Cl. 595. R. S., sec. 1073 (embodied herein), does not require an executor to prove the loyalty of his testator, for only proof of the loyalty of him who sues is required. White v. C. S. 1884), 19 Ct. Cl. 436. Issues. When a party sells goods to one whom he alleges to be the agent of a quartermaster, and all of the allegations of the petition are traversed, he must prove the appointment of both the quartermaster and of his agent. Calkins v. C. S. (1865), 1 Ct. Cl. 382. 458. Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over demands by the United States.The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters: Second. All set-offs, counterclaims, claims for damages, whether liquidated or unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever on the part of the Government of the United States against any claimant against the Government in said court: Provided, That no suit against the Government of the United States, brought by any officer of the United States to recover fees for services alleged to have been performed for the United States, shall be allowed under this chapter until an account for said fees shall have been rendered and finally acted upon as required by law, unless the proper accounting officer of the Treasury fails to act finally thereon within six months after the account is received in stid office. Par. 2, sec. 145, Judicial Code, act of Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1137). |