The executive power, 1.

Term of office, 2.

Succession of Vice President, 3.
Succession of cabinet officers, 4.
Restrictions, 5.

Commander in Chief, 6.

Advice of cabinet officers, 7.

Pardoning power, 8.
Treaties, 9.

Appointment of officers, 10.

Recess appointments, 11.
Commissions, 12.

Threats against the President, 13.

Nature and extent of executive power in general. The executive power is vested in the President, and so far as his powers are derived from the Constitution he is beyond the right of any other department except in the mode prescribed by the Constitution through the impeaching power. Kendall v. r S. (1838), 12 Pet. 524, 610, 9 L. Ed. 111; Marbury v. Madison (1803), 1 (ranch, 137, 166.

The President can use his power only in the manner prescribed by Congress. (1860) Op. Atty. Gen. 517.

Departments of government. In general, and except at certain points where they necessarily touch each other, the three great departments of the Government move apart, each in its orbit. (1854) 6 Op. Ay Gen. 326, 344, citing Martin v. Hunter (1816), 1 Wheaton 304, 329.

The theory of the Constitution is that the powers of the Government are divided into

rate departments, and so far as these Towers are derived from the Constitution the departments may be regarded as independent of each other, but beyond that all are subject to regulations by law touching the discharge of duties required to be perfd. Kendall v. U. S. (1838), 12 Pet. 54. 610, 9 L. Ed. 1181.

Status and operation of executive departmenta-The President speaks and acts through the heads of the several depart

n's in relation to subjects which appertan to their respective duties. Wilcox t. 2k (1839), 13 Pet. 498, 513, 10 L. Ed. 24. U Sr. Eliason (1842), 41 U. S. (16 291; Williams v. U. S. (1843), 42 U. 1 How, 290; U. S. r. Jones (1855). 1 Fow 92; (1863) 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 527;

U. S. v. Hay (1902), 20 App. D. C. 576. The official acts of the heads of the exthe ecutive departments promulgated in regular course of business are presumptively the acts of the President. U. S. v. Farden (1878), 99 U. S. 10, 19; Wolsey v. Chapman (1879), 101 U. S. 755; Runkle v. U. S. (1887), 122 U. S. 543, 577; McElrath v. U. S. (1876), 12 Ct. Cl. 201; Belt v. U. S. (1879), 15 Ct. Cl. 92, 107.

The duty of the President of the United States, in general, requires his superintendence of the administration; yet he can not be required to become the administrative officer of every department and bureau, or to perform in person the numerous details incident to services, which, nevertheless, he is, in a correct sense, by the Constitution and laws, required and expected to perform. Williams c. U. S. (1843), 42 U. S. (1 How.) 290, 11 L. Ed. 135.

The President, in the exercise of his executive power, may act through the head of the appropriate department, and the heads of departments are his authorized assistants in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts promulgated in the regular course of business are presumptively his acts. Perovich r. Perry (1909), 167 Fed. 789, 93 C. C. A. 209.

The President may act through the head of a department; and the acts of the head of a department are to be deemed the acts of the President, except where he must act judicially. Truitt c. U. S. (1903), 38 Ct. Cl. 398.

For an exposition of the Constitution of the office of Attorney General as a branch of the executive administration, see (1854) 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 326.

By the explicit and emphatic language of the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President of the United States. In the perception, however, of the fact that the actual administration of all executive power can not be performed personally by one man, that this would be physically impossible, and that, if it were attempted by the President, the utmost ability of that one man would be consumed in official details instead of being left free to the duty of general direction and supervision, in the perception of this fact, the Constitution provides for the subdivision of executive powers, vested in the President, among administrative departments, using that term in its narrower and ordinary sense. What those "executive departments" shall be, either in number or functions, the Constitution does not say, any further than to determine that certain appointments may be made by their "heads," respectively, and that the President may require in writing the advice of any such "head" or "principal officer in each of the executive departments," for which reason those officers are sometimes characterized, and not improperly, as "constitutional advisers" of the President. (1855) 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 453, 460.

To constitute the "executive departments," through the instrumentality of which, in part, the President was to administer government, became one of the earliest objects of the first constitutional Congress; and we must look to its acts for knowledge of the administrative system, which, in its great outlines, the statesmen of the constitutional era established as it exists at this day. Id.

Many things may be done by the head of an executive department without the actual signature of the President, which, when done, are his acts; but in such case the documents should declare it to be the act of the President performed by the head of the department as his representative. (1898) 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 82.

Relation of executive to judicial department in general. The relation of the executive to the judicial department stated in an opinion by Washington, J. Lockington v. Smith (C. C. 1817), Fed. Cas. No. 8,448.

The power of the President of the United States is independent of the judiciary in all duties imposed on him by law which are of a political and executive character. Guthrle v. Hall (1891), 34 Pac. 380, 1 Okl. 454.

Encroachment on executive by judiciary.— The courts can not rightfully interfere with executive action in any case where an executive officer is authorized to exercise judgment or discretion in the performance of an official act. Decatur v. Paulding (1840), 14 Pet. 497, 514, 10 L. Ed. 559; Taylor v.

Kercheval (C. C. 1897), 82 Fed. 497; Dudley v. James (C. C. 1897), 83 Fed. 345.

While the head of a governmental department is not subject to mandamus or Injunction in any matter involving the exercise of discretion, these writs may yet be issued against him in relation to matters wherein he performs a mere ministerial duty, or is without power to act at all. Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. (1892), 147 U. S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123, affirming (1892) 20 D. C. 555.

The courts have no power to compel, by mandamus, an executive officer to perform an act which is discretionary with him. U. S. v. Seaman (1854), 58 U. S. (17 How.) 225, 15 L. Ed. 226; Gaines v. Thompson (1868), 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 347, 19 L. Ed. 62; Browning v. McGarrahan (1869), 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 298, 19 L. Ed. 579; U. S. v. Black (1888), 128 U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12, 32 L. Ed. 354.

The President of the United States can not be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an unconstitutional act of Congress, nor will a bill for that purpose be received by the Supreme Court, whether the President is described by his official title or simply as a citizen of a State. Mississippi v. Johnson (1866), 71 U. S (4 Wall.) 475, 18 L. Ed. 437.

The courts may compel an executive officer to perform a mere ministerial act. U. S. v. Schurz (1880), 102 U. S. 378, 26 L. Ed. 167. But the courts have no authority to enjoin Federal officers against performing any merely ministerial act. McElrath v. McIntosh (C. C. 1848), Fed. Cas. No. 8,781.

Mandamus will not lie to compel a pubHe officer to do a particular thing which his superior in authority has lawfully ordered him not to do. Butterworth v. U. S. (1884), 112 U. S. 50, 5 Sup. Ct. 25, 28 L. Ed. 656.

While the head of a governmental department is not subject to mandamus or injunction in matters involving the exercise of discretion, yet such writ may be issued against the Secretary of the Interior, where he attempts, without authority of law, to annul the action of his predecessor in office, approving the location of a railroad's right of way over public lands. Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. (1893), 147, U. S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123.

The executive power can not be revised and corrected by the judicial. Astrom v. Hammond (C. C. 1842), Fed. Cas. No. 596.

Equity courts have no jurisdiction or authority to enforce rules promulgated by the President placing office deputies in the marshal's office in the classified civil serv

our territorial integrity and the protection of our foreign interests are intrusted in the first instance to the President. (1898) 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 13.

Return of relics taken for safe-keeping during Civil War.-The Mount Vernon relics (so called), which were removed from Arlington by the military authorities in 1862 for safe-keeping, and deposited in the Smithsonian Institution, were the private prop erty of George Washington Custis Lee, having passed to him under the will of his grandfather, George Washington Park Custis, on the death of his mother, Mary Ann Randolph Lee, and the Government having taken possession of these articles solely for their safe-keeping, and never having acquired title to them, the President has the power to return them to their rightful owner. Their restoration now is quite as much within the scope of Executive authority as has been their preservation. (1901) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 437.

Power to forgive, discharge, or reduce debts. There is no statute under which the President may forgive, discharge, or reduce generally debts due to the United States. (1864) 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 124.

Compromise of claims.-The Executive may compromise doubtful claims by taking a conveyance of lands, in satisfaction, and may afterwards sell and convey them. U. S. v. Hudson (C. C. 1843), Fed. Cas. No. 15,413. See, also, U. S. v. Lane (C. C. 1844), Fed. Cas. No. 15,559.

Right to decide as to withholding letter written to President. In the case of a letter written to the President, and in the hands of the prosecuting attorney, the President alone can decide as to the propriety of withholding parts of it, and he can not delegate his discretion. U. S. v. Burr (C. C. 1807), Fed. Cas. No. 14,694.

Assent to proceedings as to deserting seamen. A legislative act of the British Colony of New South Wales, enacted that certain proceedings may be had in its court as to deserting seamen of any foreign country in that colony, provided its Government assents. Held, that the President can not give such assent on the part of the United States, but that it can only be done by treaty or act of Congress. (1853) 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 209.

Disposition of buildings on land mistakenly supposed to be public land. An application should be made to Congress to authorize a disposition of the buildings, placed on land mistakenly supposed to be a part of the public domain, as neither the President nor the Secretary of War has authority to dispose of the same. (1891) 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 284.

Disposal of public lands by lease.-The President of the United States has no authority by virtue of his office to lease the lead mines of Iowa. He can not dispose of public lands by lease without express authority from Congress. Lorimier v. Lewis (Iowa, 1843), 1 Morris, 253; 39 Am. Dec. 461.

Tenure of office. The Executive power is continuous, without regard to the governing person, and there is no interruption of the authority or any necessity of the re

newal of credentials of public ministers on a change of Presidents. (1855) 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 582, 590.