time causes, were denominated consuls; and the celebrated code by which they were directed was thence called the consulate of the sea. (Il consolato del mare.) Those consuls were mere civil judges, unconnected with the military or feudal system; but in the north, where feudality most flourished, and where the judiciary power was considered as a necessary appendage to military grandeur, the constable, who was at the head of the land armies, and the admiral who commanded the naval forces, could not, consistently with the dignity of their stations, be without a portion of the judicial authority; while every petty baron had a court of his own. The constable therefore invested his lieutenants as the barons did their stewards, with the power of deciding on all matters and differences which arose out of the wars; and the jurisdiction over maritime affairs naturally fell to the share of the admiral. His court was established on the model of the consular courts; and those maritime contracts which are regulated by the consolato del mare and the laws of Oleron, were the subject matters of their civil jurisdiction.

Of this fact there is sufficient evidence to be found in the ancient records that are preserved in England in the Black Book of the admiralty. Among these, is an ancient statute of king Edward I. by which he ordained with the consent of his barons, "that the stewards of their courts should not hold plea of any thing concerning merchants or mariners, whether it be on charter-parties of vessels, obligations or other deeds, even though it should be under forty shillings. Otherwise they should be proceeded against by indictment; and if found guilty by a jury of twelve, they should be imprisoned at the discretion of the lord high admiral."*

In the reign of Edward III. was made the celebrated inquisition of Queensborough, which is to be found in Zouch's Jurisd. of Adm. Ass. p. 34. It contains a list of offences which the court of admiralty had then from time immemorial been authorized to inquire of and punish; and among those is that "of judges entertaining pleas of causes belonging to the admiral,

* See the text of this statute in Master Rowghton's articles, printed with the original of this book. p. 152, 3. 4.

and of such as in admiralty causes, sue in the courts of common law." Zouch 36.

This was not, we presume, directed against the king's courts, over whom we do not think that the lord high admiral ever claimed any jurisdiction or control; but against the mul titude of inferior courts with which England was filled at that period. The court of admiralty, indeed, claimed to be and was then considered as one of the king's superior courts, and as such exercised the power of checking and controlling inferior jurisdictions, and particularly the baron's courts, which at that time ruled almost omnipotent within their respective precincts.

The sturdy barons could not submit to be checked in the midst of a judicial career, which to them was so profitable. For it must not be imagined that they were very ambitious of the honour of administering justice to their inferiors; and that for that alone they would have been anxious to obtain or preserve a share of the judicial authority. But a war of confiscations was then waged by the lords against their vassals. To secure forfeitures, waifs, strays, heriots, deodands, and a variety of other feudal perquisites, was the real reason which induced them to keep that power in their hands. The obsequious stewards, appointed by and removable at the will of the lords, seldom failed to decide similar causes in favour of their imperious masters. Among their perquisites, not the least important to them, were those of wrecks; and they seldom failed to appropriate to themselves the vessels and goods which were unfortunately cast upon the English coast. As wreck was within the proper maritime jurisdiction of the lord high admiral, he interfered with them, not with a view of rescuing the shipwrecked property for the benefit of the owners, but in order to obtain it himself as a droit of his office. At that time several of the maritime towns enjoyed franchises of their own, and were exempted from the jurisdiction of feudal lords and their stewards. There the municipal authority, whose manners were softened and refined by the plastic influence of commerce and the fine arts, preserved such shipwrecked property as came within their bounds, and restored

it to the owner. To them the exercise of that and other parts of the admiral's jurisdiction became intolerable: and in the reign of Richard II. they laid their complaints before parliament.* The barons, as may be supposed, lent them a ready ear, and their remonstrances speedily procured the famous statutes of 13 Richard II. cap. 5. and 15 Richard II. cap. 3. by which wreck was, among other things, expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the court of admiralty.

By the first of those statutes it was enacted that the admiralty should only meddle with things done upon the sea, as had been used in the reign of Edward III. and by the second that he should not have cognizance of contracts, pleas and quarrels, and other things rising within the bodies of counties, nor of wreck. It seems, however, that notwithstanding these statutes the court of admiralty continued to exercise its ancient jurisdiction with but little interruption from the courts of common law, until the reign of James I.; that even in that reign and while Lord Coke sat on the bench, prohibitions were not frequent; that in the reign of Charles I. the agreement which had been made under Elizabeth between the courts of admiralty and common law, for the settlement of their respective jurisdictions was renewed; and it was not until the reign of Charles II. that a serious struggle took place between the two authorities; which finally terminated in favour of the common law.

The contest was dexterously managed on the part of the civilians by Exton, Zouch and Godolphin, who were able and eminent jurists. In the support of the doctrines which they maintained they displayed all the ingenuity and force of reason; but although the weight of argument was manifestly and decidedly on their side, yet the superior power and influence of the king's courts of common law prevailed.

But the works of these civilians may be consulted with great advantage by those who are desirous of becoming intimately acquainted with the nature and extent of the ancient jurisdiction of the English court of admiralty, and the usurpations, for so they must now be called, of the courts of common law.

* 3 Reeves Eng. Law 197.

They interpreted the statutes of Richard in such a manner as not to leave the court of admiralty any civil jurisdiction whatever. This was an interpretation which could not have been the intention of the framers of the law, who undoubtedly meant to leave them, except as to wreck, the same jurisdiction which they had exercised in the reign of Edward III. And we have seen above what that was. But the courts of common law determined that if a contract was made at sea, but to be executed on land, or made on land to be executed at sea, in either case, the common law had jurisdiction exclusive of the admiralty. What contracts then were those which remained within the jurisdiction of the latter court? Who can conceive an idea of a contract made at sea to be performed at sea? an instrument, for instance, made in one latitude to be executed in another? The civilians more rationally interpreted the statutes to mean, by things and contracts done at sea, those things and contracts, which, although the instrument by which they were evidenced may be made on land, yet are of a maritime nature, and are usually performed at sea: such as contracts of affreightment and the like; of the cognizance of which the admiralty was clearly possessed in the reign of Edward III.

The question, however, is now at rest in England; and the high court of admiralty has submitted to the restrictions which the courts of common law have imposed upon its jurisdiction. Yet in later times, those courts have appeared to regret that those encroachments had been carried so far; and the decisions, since the time of Lord Mansfield, breathe a spirit of much greater moderation than those of his predecessors. On several points, where it was doubtful, the admiralty jurisdiction has been secured and fortified by clear and explicit adjudications; in other cases, it has been evidently enlarged: as in that of suits on bottomry contracts under seal. Menetone v. Gibbons, 3 Term Rep. 267. There it was determined that the jurisdiction of the court of admiralty does not depend on the locality of the contract but on the subject matter. This is the very principle for which the civilians have so long contended; and it only now remains to apply it with proper liberality in

order to restore to the courts of admiralty that jurisdiction of which they have been deprived by the jealousy of the courts of common law.

We would not have entered so fully into this subject, but that we think there arises out of it an important question under the constitution of the United States. By that instrument, the United States are invested with the judiciary powers in all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Is that jurisdiction the same which the high court of admiralty of England formerly possessed? or is it restricted by the statutes of Richard II. and the adjudications of the English courts founded upon them?

We are decidedly in favour of the former principle; because we think that a more extensive admiralty jurisdiction in the United States would be highly advantageous to maritime commerce, by promoting uniformity of decision and a greater dispatch of business, in that important branch of our civil concerns. We content ourselves, however, with barely suggesting this interesting question, which we leave to be investigated and determined by those who are the proper judges, and who are eminently better qualified for the task than we can pretend to be.

BY

Limitation of Actions in Maryland.

Y the act of 1715, ap. ch. 23. it is provided that all actions of trespass quare clausum fregit, of trespass, detinue, surtrover or replevin for taking away goods or chattels, of account, contract, debt, book, or upon the case, other than such as concern the trade or merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors and servants who are not residents within the state; all actions of debt for lending, or contract without specialty, and of debt for arrearages of rent, must be sued within three years ensuing the cause of such action; and those on the case, for words, or of trespass of assault, battery, wounding and imprisonment, within one year.

But if, at the time when the action accrues, the party be under twenty one, feme-covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned