intended by the noble mover. He most heartily concurred in the object, but most materially differed from him on the means of effecting it. Notwithstanding some difference of opinion among high authorities, among persons for whom he had the greatest veneration, yet he could not help thinking that the law itself was unembarrassed with these contradictions. He considered it so far precise, clear and perspicuous, that it was necessary no new law should be promulgated, otherwise than in the form of a declaratory law, by which it should be announced what had been the law, what was the law, and what ought to be the law, and what should be the law of the land, as to this important particular. On these grounds he could not give his assent to the bill now suggested; and if no other noble lord, more competent than himself, would undertake the business, he should himself move a legislative regulation, with the view to place the question for ever in repose.

Lord Ellenborough perfectly coincided with the sentiments of his noble and learned friend on the woolsack. The labours of his existence had also been devoted to the same arduous duties, and he had attended a circuit the largest in extent, and the most comprehensive in the variety of its business; but neither in the course of his experience on his itinerant duties, nor during his constant application at Westminster-hall, where he might say he had been engaged in almost every important cause, nor since he had been called by his Majesty's pleasure to the bench, where he now had the honour to preside, did he recollect a single instance where the objection had been taken, that the answer of the witness would place the deponent in a situation of responsibility to a civil suit. It was true, that where the reply to the question would expose the witness to the consequences of a criminal prosecution, his lordship always felt it his duty to caution him from the bench; but even in that case, partial communications must not be made; the testimony must not be garbled: if a portion were imparted the whole evidence must be disclosed, and so it was held by the noble and learned Lord whom he had the honour to succeed, with much inferior powers. Although he perfectly agreed with the noble mover on the necessity of some legisla

tive measure, yet he thought the bill now read would be inadequate to the object proposed; it therefore would not receive his support.

Earl Stanhope considered his bill capable of comprising every object suggested by the noble lords who had opposed it, and said that he should move for the second reading on Tuesday next. In the mean time it was ordered to be printed. Adjourned.

Circuit Court of the United States.

PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT,

United States v. Morrow Lowrey, Andrew Lowrey and John Lowrey.

HE Circuit Court of the United States proceeded on

THE

Monday last to pronounce sentence on Morrow Lowrey, Andrew Lowrey and John Lowrey, convicted last week, of opposing the Deputy Marshal, when executing writs of possession issued from that court. An excellent admonition was delivered by Judge Washington to the prisoners, previous to pronouncing sentence.

The prisoners were separately indicted for obstructing the execution of the process of the Circuit Court of the United States, on the 22d section of the act of Congress passed 30th April, 1790, which enacts, "That if any person or persons shall knowingly and wilfully obstruct, resist or oppose any officer of the United States, in serving or attempting to serve or execute any mesne process or warrant or any rule or order of any of the courts of the United States, or any other legal or judicial writ or process whatsoever, or shall assault, beat or wound any officer or other person, duly authorized in serving or executing any writ, rule, order, process or warrant aforesaid, every person so knowingly and wilfully offending in the premises shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned not exceeding twelve months, and fined not exceeding three hundred dollars."

It appeared in evidence that Robert Bowne, a citizen of the state of New-York, had obtained judgments in ejectments against Morrow, Andrew and John Lowry for the premises. held by them respectively, and that writs of possession issued from the Circuit Court to restore the possession of Mr. Bowne. The Deputy Marshal, in proceeding to execute these writs, found the prisoners with others, their associates, on the premises armed in their defence; the doors of their houses closed against him; admittance refused him; and they moreover threatened to take his life if he persisted to execute the process, declaring at the same time they would lose their own lives in defending the possession. He was obliged in consequence to desist from executing the process, and return home.

SENTENCE.

Morrow Lowrey, Andrew Lowrey, John Lowrey! You severally stand convicted, two of you by juries composed of your fellow-citizens, and the third by confession in open court, of a successful, though temporary opposition to the laws of your country, by resisting the legitimate authority of an officer of this Court in the regular discharge of his duty.

You have experienced on your trials every indulgence which the Court could grant, and have had the assistance of able counsel to defend you. Every objection in point of law which had the semblance of plausibility was urged in your behalf: for, unfortunately for you, no circumstance occurred in the evidence, which could cast a doubt over your guilt, or extenuate its enormity.

Is it possible that you could for a moment have entertained the expectation, that it was in your power to obstruct, with effect, the streams of justice, which give life to the political body, and by which that liberty which we all profess to love, is refreshed and invigorated? Did it never occur to you, that if a few interested and misguided men of your neighbourhood sanctioned your lawless conduct, that a better intelligence and a superior interest would nerve, if necessary, the arms of a thousand fold your number to crush you?

Guarded as she is by all the power of this nation, Justice sits securely on her seat, and issues her lawful mandates, which no force can successfully resist, but such as is strong enough to overthrow the whole fabric of the constitution. From the nature of our government, it must be so. The courts of justice are the sanctuaries of the law; and it is through the law that our government speaks and acts. Impair, by any means, the power of these tribunals in the lawful exercise of their functions, and you attack the majesty of the law, and sap, most essentially, the foundations of the republic. The government, in a degraded state, may survive the shock, but it ceases to be a government of laws; and liberty expires when force, the only remaining alternative, becomes necessary to coerce obedience to the will of the nation.

Recollect that the state of Pennsylvania, powerful and respectable as she is, forms but a small part of the United States; and that the district of Erie, though it were united in a common effort inimical to the tranquillity of the whole nation, is but a spot on the map of the state. What folly then could tempt you, who with your associates, if you have any, are I trust an inconsiderable minority in your district, to raise your hands against the government of your country, acting lawfully through one of its constitutional organs? You might for a day or a month impede the administration of justice in your particular cases. But it was utterly impossible that your triumph. could be more than temporary, and with the certain loss of possessions which were not legally yours, you doomed yourselves to imprisonment, and to loss of property to which you were entitled.

Should you deem too severe the punishment which the law decrees for your offence, reflect for a moment what had been your situation had the officer persisted in his attempt to do what prudence forbade (but which the laws would have sanctioned,) and you had executed the threats which you wickedly denounced against him. Your lives must then have atoned to your country for her violated laws; but where was the circumstance to extenuate your guilt in the eyes of an offended God?

Suppose you could have influenced numbers to assist you in opposing the execution of the law, how would your guilt have been increased by the treason and punishment of those you had deluded! I mention these circumstances with a view to impress upon your friends the conviction of this truth, that the highest crimes, against the laws of God and of society, are in the train of the offence of which you are guilty. There is every reason to believe, that had the officer been less prudent, you had, in acts at least, been more criminal.

The Court has carefully perused the papers which you requested to be read, with a view, as was supposed, to extenuate your offences, and mitigate your punishment. We have to regret however, that in these documents we discover nothing but an effort, which ignorance only could have suggested, to justify rather than to excuse yourselves.

You complain that the judgments in ejectment upon which the process of execution issued were not sanctioned by the principles of law, were rendered by an incompetent tribunal, and were unfairly obtained. Were we for a moment to admit that these objections were well founded, were there no other means by which you could be redressed, but by a resort to force? if the judgment of this Court were erroneous in point of law, it was subject to the correction of a higher tribunal, as capable, as it would have been ready, to rectify our mistakes. To this tribunal an appeal was made in a case resembling yours in its essential features, for the purpose of obtaining a just exposition of the law of 1792, the great point in the cause, and there it was investigated by professional talents which would do honour to any country. The decision was against your title, and it became the duty of the presiding Judge of this Court, who had entertained a different opinion, as it was certainly yours, to submit to this high authority.

The question of jurisdiction in your particular cases was decided in this Court, how correctly in point of law, it would ill become me to say, but I dare aver that the judgment was influenced by no considerations which could impeach its purity. That the trial, so far as came within our view, was fairly