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your Lordship now, that in a 15 or 16 ships cast away on the coast of this province, which I can in my own knowledge say to be so many, there hath perished at least a 6,000 or 7,000 men, of which there hath been put to the sword, first and last, by my brother George and in Mayo, Thomond, and Galway, and executed one way and another, about 700 or 800, or upwards, besides those that be yet alive' (September 21, Sir R. Bingham to Fytz-Wylliam).

This merciless severity was perfectly deliberate. Sir Richard, at a later date, speaks of

'divers gentlemen of quality and service. . . which being spared from the sword, till order might be had from the Lord Deputy how to proceed against them, I had special direction sent me to see them executed as the rest were' (December 3, Bingham to the Queen).

Slaughter of prisoners in cold blood was a practice not confined to Englishmen. The men who fought against the Armada knew well that if taken by the Spaniards they would not have long to live. The Marquis of Santa-Cruz, first commander-in-chief of the Armada-'aquel rayo de la guerra, padre de los soldados, venturoso y jamas vencido 'capitan,' as Captain Duro calls him-had obtained a horrible notoriety by his massacre of the prisoners that fell into his hands after the battle of Terceira. That the atrocious practice was generally regarded as proper and natural is shown. by the unconcern with which it is mentioned in the correspondence in this collection. The total loss to the Spanish navy has never been exactly computed. Professor Laughton observes that, according to the official Spanish reports, of the 130 ships which originally composed the Armada, about half got home again after the campaign; but allowance must be made for those which did not go further than Corunna, and those which turned back in the Bay of Biscay.

How was the overwhelming success of the English won? The answer will be found in these volumes. First of all, notwithstanding all the charges which have been brought against it by writers of the present age, England had a firm, far-seeing, and diligent government. We are so accustomed to regard elaborate peace-time preparations for war as the exclusive discovery of our own time, that we may well be astonished at the completeness of the measures ordered by Elizabeth for the defence of her kingdom, at their fitness, and at the methodical manner in which they were carried out. The resources of the country, especially in war material and naval stores, being so limited as they then were, it is nothing short of astounding that the equipment of our forces should have been so perfect as it was. Let two

instances of judicious provision for future needs be cited. Elizabethan England was unequal to the manufacture of cables for large ships. They were ordered in advance from Russia. The powder-mills and arms-factories of the country were quite incapable of meeting the sudden demand for gunpowder and weapons which arose. The Government sent agents abroad to purchase them.

The condition of Her Majesty's ships was as nearly perfect as that of any ships could be. The credit for their efficiency has very properly been given to Sir John Hawkyns, for few men have deserved so well of their country. But the Queen and the Ministers who supported Hawkyns against the naval architects and shipwrights of the dockyards-who hated to see a seaman supervising the construction of ships-merit no small commendation. The report of Messrs. Pelt and Baker* (i. 38) shows to what lengths these men could go. Their professional skill was highly regarded by their contemporaries and, truly, was beyond dispute. Their skill as naval architects was as nothing to their powers of mendacity. Appointed to examine the terms of an arrangement with Hawkyns for the maintenance of the ships of war in reserve, Pelt and Baker had the bardihood to accuse the great seaman of the abominable crime of enriching himself at the expense of the efficiency of the fleet. Their reason for making this atrocious charge they were simple enough to disclose. It was the objection of dockyard employés to 'making an officer a purveyor.' †

Of the triumphant manner in which Hawkyns was cleared of the charge the correspondence before us contains many proofs.

'I have been aboard every ship that goeth out with me,' says Lord Howard, and in every place where any may creep, and I do thank God that they be in the estate they be in; and there is never a one of

*Pelt was 'master-builder,' i.e. head naval architect to the Government; Baker was master shipwright,' a designation which was replaced a few years ago by 'chief constructor.'

Hawkyns's account is interesting. He writes (March 3) to Burghley: When the shipwrights saw I took a course to put the navy in such order as there should be no great cause to use any extraordinary reparations upon them, then they saw the multitude of their idle followers should lack their maintenance, and so began to bruit out weakness in the state of the ships; but they knew not where' (i. 87). The dogma that a ship of war exists for the benefit of the dockyard, and not the dockyard for the benefit of the ship, was not so generally accepted in the sixteenth century as it is in the nineteenth,

them that knows what a leak means' (February 21, Howard to Burghley).

The Elizabeth Bonaventure' by the fault of the pilot came aground on a sand.' The Lord Admiral reports that

'the next tide, by the goodness of God and great labour, we brought her off, and all this time there never came a spoonful of water into her well' (March 9, Howard to Burghley).

'And,' says Howard again, evidently with Messrs. Pelt and Baker in his eye,

'if it may please God to continue her Majesty's ships as strong to the end of the journey as they have done hitherunto, her Majesty may be sure (what false and villainous reports so-ever have been made of them) she hath the strongest ships that any prince in Christendom hath' (June 14, Howard to Walsyngham).

Those who suppose that an organised system and detailed plans of national defence were invented in the last half of the nineteenth century, in the home of military pedantry on the Spree, would do well to ascertain what their own forefathers did when England was threatened by a mighty enemy. When revolutionary France avowed her intention of effecting the conquest of England and Ireland, the Englishmen of the time, instead of imitating the methods of countries circumstanced altogether differently from their own, looked up what had been done by our fellow-countrymen in days of national danger. The results of the inquiry were embodied in two reports addressed to the Minister by Mr. John Bruce. The titles of these are worth reprinting here. One, dated January 6, 1798, is—

'Report on the arrangements which have been adopted in former periods, when France threatened invasion of Britain or Ireland, to frustrate the designs of the enemy by attacks on his Foreign Possessions or European Ports, by annoying his Coasts and by destroying his Equipments.

This title by itself conveys a lesson in strategy.

The other is dated May 17, 1798, and is headed:

Report on the Arrangements which were made in the internal Defence of these Kingdoms, when Spain, by its Armada, projected the Invasion and Conquest of England; and Application of the wise proceedings of our Ancestors to the present Crisis of public Safety."' This is the way in which Englishmen who knew from actual experience what serious war meant, to whom the glorious First of June was a recent memory, to whom St. Vincent was but of yesterday, and in whose ears the can

nonades of Camperdown were still ringing, approached the great problem of national defence. In Bruce's second report will be found much information on the measures devised for meeting an invader who might succeed in landing. Allowance being made for change of conditions, the principles of these measures are worth following in our own time; and we cannot reasonably deny to those who devised them the merit of understanding their business. Several documents referring to the Armada were printed by Bruce in his appendix, among them some-not very faithfully transcribed -which Professor Laughton also gives us from accurate transcripts.

Elizabeth has been accused of shocking ingratitude to her valiant seamen. It has been asserted that, by her shameful parsimony, she starved them through insufficient, or poisoned them through unwholesome, victualling; that she kept them short of ammunition when in the very presence of the enemy; and that she refused to pay them punctually their well-earned wages. We do not doubt that every one of these allegations has been made in good faith; but we are sure that they would not have been made by any one familiar with naval customs as they existed till a very recent date. With regard to the victualling, Professor Laughton points out that the queen, personally, had nothing to do with it. Like the capable ruler that she was, she left it to the proper officials. And almost every page of these volumes,' he adds, tells of the unceasing care with which it was con'ducted.'

The belief that insufficient victuals were supplied, owing to sheer stinginess and a desire to avoid reasonable and necessary expenditure, is shown to be groundless by the fact that ample quantities were provided. On August 28 (O.S.) Howard, at Dover, indicates that he had a surplus.

'I have caused all the remain of victuals to be laid here and at Sandwich, for the maintaining of them that shall remain in the Narrow Seas.'

On the same day Sir J. Hawkyns says:

'Here is victual sufficient, and I know not why any should be provided after September, but for those which my Lord doth mean to leave in the Narrow Seas.'

Burghley himself noted on July 24 that Howard's fleet was victualled 'unto the 11th of August,' and that orders had been given and money delivered' to victual it up to September 7. On July 27 he noted that Lord H. Seymour's


Navy Records

tember 8, and that the force was to be victualled their transport had been money for the commodities orders had been given to paid. On August 9 he not and Seymour up to the victual Howard up to Septem

11th. These orders were enforced. The articles required were provided, though they could not always be got on board the ships just when they were expected.

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The weather continued so extreme,' says Ilawkyns on August 26, 'and the tides come so swift, that we cannot get any victuals aboard but with trouble and difficulty.'

'You would not believe,' says Howard, 'what a wonderful thing it is to victual such an army as this is in such a narrow corner of the realm, where a man would think that neither victuals were to be had nor cask to put it in.'

On July 22 Darell reported that for her Majesty's ships at Plymouth victuals had been provided up to August 10.

'Only the haste of my Lord Admiral was such in his setting forth upon Saturday morning, by reason he had received some intelligence of the Spanish fleet, as that divers of his ships had not leisure to receive the full of their last proportions.'

Even in the last decade of the nineteenth century the sudden assemblage of a large fleet at an out-of-the-way anchorage-say on the west coast of Ireland-is apt to be attended by considerable difficulty in procuring fresh provisions; and it is still not altogether unknown for ships of war to put to sea unexpectedly, and leave a part of their stores. behind.

Howard's letters, it is true, teem with urgent representations as to the deficiency of victuals; but a careful perusal of these State papers makes it certain that it was not the quantity shipped, but the stock in reserve, about which he was anxious. Though both he and Seymour may have come near the end of their supply, they never actually ran out. Howard's opinion was that the reserve should be enough for six weeks. The Council, or the queen, considered that a month's stock would suffice. Most men in the Lord Admiral's place would have held his opinion; but that of the Council was unquestionably justified by the result. Howard also had misgivings as to the sufficiency of the supplies on board those merchant ships attached to his fleet, which were victualled, in accordance with the system of the time, by their own towns. On August 29 he wrote to Walsyngham, of certain ships which he was sending to their homes, We are fain to help them with victuals to bring

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