On the breaking out of the war, she recedes before the advancing Austrians. She leaves Szeczeny, and wanders about in search of a home for herself and her children; until at last, closely pressed on all sides, after a hundred dangers, fatigues, and disappointments, and after separating from her children for their sakes and her own, she is compelled to appeal to the humanity of strangers, who protect her on her journey through Moravia, and on her flight over the Prussian frontier.

This is the substance of Madame Pulszky's narrative; agreeably diversified with sketches and anecdotes from Magyar life, as well as with ancient legends from Hungarian history and modern passages in the late war of independence. It cannot fail to excite an interest in readers of all classes,-in those who open a book at random only for amusement, as well as in those who look to literature for something more enduring. As far as we ourselves are concerned, we have to thank these volumes for a lesson of graver and deeper import. It appears from many parts of her narrative that Madame Pulszky is not a heartless woman. Her very want of practice in the craft of authorship gives the critic a greater confidence in his inferences from what she writes. How then can we explain that evident absence of all interest in her native land, which every line of her narrative betrays? And how is it that her heart so opens and overflows with a new affection-amor tam improvisus ac repertinus-for the country of her adoption? There is more in this than the conjugal relation will account for. Is it that Hungary presents itself as an object of attachment, in a sense that Vienna cannot ?

The answer to these questions is in itself a condemnation of what Austria has been, and, we fear also, of what Austria still is. Madame Pulszky is most Austrian when she seems most forgetful of Austria. That country has not, in fact, any distinct geographical or even political existence. It is an abstraction. Before the revolution, the name was used to express the joint influence and action of certain bureaucratic despots: at the present moment it embodies the power and the will of the army and its commanders. Austria exists through them and for them. She now has no resting place on the shores of the Adriatic or at the foot of the Alps: neither the moors and pine-forests of Lithuania, nor the Pusztas of Hungary condescend to own in her even the moral superiority of their Empire-State. But the presence of a mixed army of Bohemians, Moravians, Croats, Germans, Lombards, Tyrolese, and Magyars, impresses on each of the various provinces which they hold in subjection to the sovereignty of the House of Hapsburg-Lorrain, the name and the historical attributes of Austria. This historical distinction,

1850.

Absence of National Character in Austria.

507

however, is neither sought for when wanting, nor envied to those who possess it; and though the natives of the various provinces may cleave to the love and the traditions of their home, their patriotism is confined to the 'kingdom,' ' duchy,' or 'county,' which gave them birth. The undoubted bravery of the troops which fight under the double-headed eagle of Austria, is as little deserving of the name of patriotism as the zeal of the Prætorian guards, who fought with equal devotion, whether against the Cæsars or against the enemies of the Cæsars, is entitled to that sacred name. The inhabitants of Vienna and of Austria Proper have not even a provincial patriotism to support them in their narrow path of political virtue. For, subjected to the immediate sway of a reigning faction, and open to the irruption of a hundred conflicting nationalities from the south and north, east and west, their city, the capital of the Austrian empire, has long since come to be the common sewer' of every nationality,—while it can give birth to none. Her chief characteristic is her want of character; while her most immediate political misfortune is her utter inability to exist under any other government and under different circumstances.

These are not Madame Pulszky's assertions. That lady would not, we fear, sanction the conclusions to which we have come; supported though they are by her own statements and the various books and pamphlets which have lately been published on the Austrian revolution and the Hungarian wars.

In conclusion, we disclaim any imputation of willingly going out of our way to say offensive things. The Austrian press has frequently accused the organs of public opinion in this country of a meddling desire to widen the breach between the various classes, provinces, and nationalities of Austria. We have no such wish. Far from it. But we must speak of public events and public characters, of the conduct of governments as well as of individuals, according as we find them. Windham, speaking of Bonaparte, refused to adopt the subterfuge of the timid citizen who called after the burglars, - You honest gen'tlemen, that are breaking into my house;' or to imitate the Irishman in confusing the names of things, by advertising the silk stockings which he had lost, under the name of worsted, in the hope of getting them back so much cheaper. Actions do not change their nature, in consequence of their being committed by persons in high places: and if humanity, truth, and justice had no other home on earth, they ought to find one in the breasts of kings,-and, we will add, the representatives of kings. Great successes and great misfortunes make an open space around them: and publicity follows in the track of fate. That

VOL. XCI. NO. CLXXXIV.

M M

this should be so, is some consolation to the innocent; while it is the only punishment,-from which there is no escape, even for hardhearted and triumphant guilt.

ART. VIII. — An Essay on the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion. By GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, Esq. London:

1849.

6

MR. LEWIS in literature resembles the maker of a special survey in geography. He takes an apparently small province in philology, politics, or philosophy, extends to every part of it a minute investigation, and produces a map always more full, and, generally, more accurate, than could have been obtained if he had chosen a wider field, and consequently a smaller scale. The essays on the use and abuse of political terms-on Irish disturbances, on the Irish in England, and on the government of dependencies, are instances. None of these subjects had ever before been made the matter of an express treatise : some of them, such as The Condition of the Irish in England,' had scarcely been adverted to. In his hands they have all acquired importance. No future writer on any of the matters of which they form parts will disregard them, or will venture to treat them without adverting to the researches and opinions of Mr. Lewis. There is one great difference, however, between the territorial and the moral surveyor. A man may make a perfect map of a parish without having ever quitted it. knowledge or his ignorance of the adjoining parishes or of the county is unimportant. No one can write well on any moral question without having thought much on all the questions that bear on it directly, and on many with which it appears to have little or no connection. The great variety of the matters into which Mr. Lewis, as a philosopher, has inquired, and of those with which, as an administrator and statesman, he has had to deal, contributes materially to the fulness and to the soundness of his special discussions.

His

Mr. J. S. Mill has remarked, that the least satisfactory parts of a treatise are generally the opening portions, in which the author sketches his subject and defines his principal terms; these being the most abstract parts of his work, and therefore those as to which he is most likely to be accused of confusion or impropriety, and indeed most likely to be guilty of them. The case before us is no exception. We are inclined to object both to the nomenclature and to the classification of the first chapter; and, as the subject is important, we shall state our objections at

1850.

Matters of Fact and Matters of Opinion.

509

some length. We will begin by extracting Mr. Lewis's opening sentences:

'As the ensuing Essay relates to matters of opinion, it will be necessary for me, at the outset, to explain briefly what portion of the subjects of belief is understood to be included under this appellation, and what is the meaning of the generally received distinction between matters of opinion and matters of fact.

'By a matter of fact, I understand anything of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation. It is true that even the simplest sensations involve some judgment. When a witness reports that he saw an object of a certain shape and size, or at a certain distance, he describes something more than a mere impression on his sense of sight; his statement implies a theory and explanation of the bare phenomenon. When, however, this judgment is of so simple a kind as to become wholly unconscious, and the interpretation of the appearances is a matter of general agreement, the object of sensation may, for our present purpose, be considered a fact. A fact, as so defined, must be limited to individual sensible objects, and not extended to general expressions or formulæ descriptive of classes of facts, or sequences of phenomena,—such as, that the blood circulates, the sun attracts the planets, and the like. Propositions of this sort-though descriptive of realities, and therefore, in one sense, of matters of fact-relate to large classes of phenomena which cannot be grasped by a single sensation, which can only be determined by a long series of observations, and are establishdd by a process of intricate reasoning.

be

'Taken in this sense, matters of fact are decided by an appeal to our own consciousness or sensation, or to the testimony, direct or indirect, of the original and percipient witnesses. Doubts, indeed, frequently arise as to the existence of a matter of fact, in consequence of the diversity of the reports made by the original witnesses, or the suspiciousness of their testimony. A matter of fact may, again, be doubtful in consequence of the different constructions which may put upon admitted facts and appearances in a case of proof by (what is termed) circumstantial evidence. Whenever such doubts exist, they cannot be settled by a direct appeal to testimony, and can be resolved only by reasoning,-instances of which are afforded by the pleadings of lawyers and the disquisitions of historians upon contested facts. When an individual fact is doubted upon reasonable grounds, its existence becomes a matter of opinion.

'Matters of opinion, not being disputed questions of fact, are general propositions relating to laws of nature or mind, principles and rules of human conduct, future probabilities, deductions from hypotheses, and the like, about which a doubt may reasonably exist. All doubtful questions, whether of speculation or practice, are matters of opinion. With regard to these, the ultimate source of our belief is always a process of reasoning.

'The essential idea of opinion seems to be, that it is a matter about

which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can, without absurdity, think differently. The existence of an object before the eyes of two persons would not be a matter of opinion, nor would it be a matter of opinion that twice two are four. But when testimony is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may become doubtful, and therefore a matter of opinion. For example, it may be a matter of opinion whether there was a war of Troy, whether Romulus lived, who was the Man in the Iron Mask, who wrote Junius, &c. So the tendency of a law or form of government, or social institution; the probability of a future event; the quality of an action, or the character of an historical personage,—may be a matter of opinion.

6

Any proposition the contrary of which can be maintained with probability, is a matter of opinion.'*

According to the last of these definitions, matter of opinion is opposed, not to matter of fact, but to matter of certainty. But according to an earlier definition, propositions which are established by a process of intricate reasoning, -such as the attraction of the planets by the sun,- however certain, are excluded from matters of fact, and therefore considered matters of opinion.

We believe that in common use, each of these expressionsmatter of fact and matter of opinion is ambiguous.

Sometimes we use the term matter of fact, as it is defined by Mr. Lewis, to mean an event or phenomenon which we know from consciousness of sensation. So used it is opposed to matter of inference. Thus the destructiveness of cholera is a matter of fact. The mode of its propagation a matter of inference. That the sun appears to go round the earth, is a matter of fact. That it is stationary, is a matter of inference. Sometimes, on the other hand, we use the term matter of fact to express, not the sort of evidence on which a proposition rests, but its certainty. In this sense of the word, matter of fact is opposed not to matter of inference, but to matter of doubt. Thus there would be no impropriety in calling the existence of a Deity a fact, though ascertained only by inference. In this sense the immobility of the sun might be called a fact.

A similar ambiguity belongs to the expression, matter of opinion.

Sometimes it denotes the knowledge acquired by inference as opposed to that acquired by perception. Thus we might say, that the moon gives light is a matter of fact; that it is uninhabited is matter of opinion. The redness of the blood is a fact; its circulation an opinion. The assassination of Cæsar

* Pp. 1-4.