Allen of Kansas has estimated there would be a saving of $60,000,000 annually in freight charges for his country by the St. Lawrence route, and that apart from any revenue from power the investment would be profitable for the Americans. Those 18 States produce 70 per cent. of the wheat, 66 per cent. of the corn, and 80 per cent. of the oats produced in the United States. Consequently they have a right to be heard on such an important issue. The Harding administration has been faithful to its election pledges, has sought to deal generously with the interior and agricultural States, and it is not surprising, when it is seen there is a general demand for the completion of the plan, that the Harding administration should take a favourable view of it all. There is an exceptional opportunity to do a valuable service for an important element of the nation.

No doubt American public opinion has changed radically since 1871 when Sir John A. Macdonald had difficulty at the Washington Conference in convincing the United States commissioners that Canada was a factor to be considered, and the British commissioners that Canadian territory was not something to be traded off in a deal with the larger nation. The Americans were still in the mental fog which had inspired Seward to propose that Great Britain should cede Canada in settlement of the American claims. Under the accepted national status of Canada, according to Oppenheim, the territory of this country is not to be considered as the property of the Motherland, but as the rightful property of Canada, its people and government. The right of treaty making power and of direct diplomatic representation, which are being quietly and unobtrusively assumed, enables Canada to deal with the United States in these matters free from any fear that our commissioners are handicapped or are indifferent to our interests, which they might at any time sacrifice for other diplomatic considerations. It is in order that Canadians shall have confidence in their public men in international dealings, whether at London, Paris or Washington. It is time to cast away fears that our men may be bamboozled by the British or Americans; they are quite competent to take care of themselves and the affairs of our country.

It is also in order to point out that negotiations for the joint construction of the proposed ship canal involve some important and far-reaching issues. In going into conference with the Americans there is no call for leaving one's spectacles at home. American imperialism was never more awake than at the present time of universal nationalism. The prospect is that commissioners for the United States will make the best possible bargain for their country, and Canadians may prepare for a real test of their diplomatic efficiency.

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is considered by some Americans as the one big blunder made by American diplomatists. According to John Bassett Moore, 'probably no other diplomatic document to which the United States was a party has given rise to discussions at once so complicated and so prolonged.' That treaty was based on the principle of neutralization. The contracting parties bound themselves to protect the canal and to guarantee its neutrality so that 'it might forever be open and free', and in addition guaranteed to New Granada, later Colombia, the 'perfect neutrality' of the Isthmus and her 'rights of sovereignty and property' over that territory.

After the civil war, Dr. Moore relates, the tone of public utterances changed in the United States. The limitations on control and the absence of a right to fortify the canal, in contrast to Britain's rights on the Suez Canal, led to a demand for a canal under American control. So without impairing the 'general principle' of neutrality established by Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was negotiated, and later amended in two important points by the U.S. Senate. The 'neutralization' of the Panama Canal, according to Dr. Moore, is only nominal, and, he adds, as applied to existing conditions, is 'merely a reminiscent misnomer.' As against the United States, Dr. Moore concludes, 'as sole owner and protector, the present stipulations have no substantial effect beyond assuring the commercial use of the canal on terms of substantial equality.'

After the difficulty about control was cleared up, the Nicaraguan route was abandoned for the Panama route. A treaty was signed with the Government of Colombia without

delay for right of way across the Isthmus. The Colombian Congress objected on the ground that the treaty infringed the national sovereignty and was contrary to the constitution. But the Washington Government proceeded to recognize the independence of Panama, and signed a new treaty at Bogota, on April 6, 1914, providing for the payment of $25,000,000 to Colombia, with other compensations. Notwithstanding the earnest efforts of Presidents Wilson and Harding the money has not yet been paid over. Congress holds that the amount is too high and objects to the clause inserted expressing regret that anything should have occurred to mar the good relations between the two countries. At the urgent request of President Wilson the free tolls policy for U.S. coasting vessels was changed, and all are now on an equal basis. But in granting the President's request Congress was careful to declare that the grant was not to be interpreted as impairing ‘any right of the United States with respect to the sovereignty over or the ownership, control and management of said canal and the regulation of the conditions or charges of traffic.'

It

It might be difficult to explain or justify all the steps in the Nicaragua-Panama affair, and as reputable American writers on politics and diplomacy are satisfied to give the facts and limit the discussion that plan will be followed here. can, however, be said that the history and tactics of American diplomacy will compare very favourably with those of any other great nation. The Presidents of the United States and their secretaries of state have been uniformly able men of integrity. That was particularly true of Theodore Roosevelt, under whose administration the Panama affair was arranged. But it is well to keep in mind that the political system of the United States maintains a distinct separation between the executive and the legislature. Under the Canadian system the Government which negotiates a treaty makes it an issue and on the policy involved will stand or fall with the parliament of the day. It is not so with the executive in the United States. It is quite in order when negotiating with the envoys. of the United States to keep this fact in mind. Many things may occur after treaty terms have been agreed upon.

In connexion with the reluctance of the United States to

mingle in European politics, it can be observed that in its political history the United States has had limited experience in the way of joint arrangements and of co-operation with other countries. For the most part they have either kept out of world politics and arrangements or have been the big partner and director of affairs on this continent. The Monroe doctrine need not be considered as a live factor in relations with Canada, and in negotiations with this country the plans will involve proposals for co-operation and joint management which is not just in line with past experience of the Americans. However, it should be said that so far as the International Joint Commission is concerned it has worked splendidly and given promise for good results in the future.

The free navigation of the St. Lawrence was provided for in perpetuity by the treaty of 1871, along with the Yukon, the Porcupine and the Stikine rivers, to be forever free and open for purposes of commerce to the citizens of both countries. The Americans unquestionably have navigation rights on the St. Lawrence, and those rights include fair consideration by both parties at all times to confer and agree on terms for the best use of the waterway. Any new canal or scheme of improvement must be the subject of arrangement, and it is for Canada to consider how far and how soon the work can be proceeded with.

There is one important question which should be brought up for reconsideration and settlement at the earliest favourable opportunity; that is the Alaska, or more properly the British Columbia boundary issue. The narrow strip of land and the adjacent islands from the Lynn Canal to the Portland Canal should belong to Canada. They are of very limited value to the United States, for since the Alaska boundary decision in 1903, by what (as John Bassett Moore admits) can scarcely be called an arbitration court, the territory has been going back from year to year. The feeling is deep in Canada that we got the worst of the bargain, even though there was some strength in the case of the Americans. If an adjustment can be made of that matter the way might be prepared for settlement of other questions. The territory is not worth much in money value, but it can be made to suit the interest

and convenience of many Canadians in British Columbia and the Yukon.

There is high practical value to be found in the St. Lawrence waterway, as Canadians well know from early times. Only good can come from a thorough critical examination of the proposal from all angles and by men representing all interests. Senator Calder of New York takes the ground that the scheme is not feasible and that an entirely new fleet of ships would have to be built for ocean and lake traffic. It would appear, however, that the proponents of the plan do not build their case on the idea that ships will have to carry cargoes from Chicago and Duluth all the way to Liverpool and Hamburg. My own view, based on limited practical knowledge, is that Montreal, Quebec, Halifax and St. John will remain the chief ports of entry for Canadian ocean trade and that trans-shipments will be made at Montreal of a large proportion of package freight for fast rail delivery to points all over Canada and the continent. The main use of the St. Lawrence route will be for the shipment of grain, and to get the best rates it will be necessary or advisable to have it available at Montreal and New York for part as well as entire cargoes. The main point is to get a low cost delivery for wheat at the seaboard.

According to the testimony of Mr. James A. Richardson, (the prominent Winnipeg grain exporter, who is the third generation of his family of grain exporters), given before the Federal House committee on agriculture and colonization, there are two prime needs for betterment of the western farmer; lower freight rates and lower threshing costs. The cut of approximately 25 per cent. on wheat rates by the restoration of the Crow's Nest agreement goes far to provide for one of the needs, and the farmers can see to it that their threshing bills are cut, just as they have been doing with other costs this year. As is often the case with the reformer or advocate of a new scheme the facts are overstated. That is particularly true of the advantage in freight rates to be secured by the proposed improvements in the St. Lawrence route. The rate from points in Alberta and Saskatchewan to Fort William are just about half of the rates paid from points