agent in the matter; but in any case the loyal and harmonious co-operation between the two leaders in the moment of supreme crisis is one of the most impressive spectacles of the war, and can only serve to increase our admiration for the General whose self-negation made it possible. Foch himself has paid a magnificent tribute to the work of the British Army and to the soundness of Haig's general plan of a converging series of attacks. Mr. Dewar's chapters have thus done great service; but at the same time they have done the genius of Foch and the British Government great disservice by unduly stressing their weaknesses and their failures and belittling or ignoring their successes. It was impossible for any Government to see clearly and to see the problem whole without first tentative experiment and certain failure on the ruins of which final success was constructed. One must avoid rashness of judgement and be fair to Mr. Lloyd George and to the men on whose shoulders rested for the time the terrible burden of ultimate decision, and the determination of the country on whose goodwill and self-sacrifice the final issues of defeat or victory lay. And Mr. Dewar's very obvious partisanship contains a very danger for the soldier whose genius he would ardently seek to enhance.

Until August 8, 1918, the Staff at G.H.Q. remained in a subdued mood. It knew that Ludendorff still held the initiative, but it realized as it did not after the March offensive and until the appointment of the Generalissimo that it was now part of a vast fighting machine with almost unlimited American reserves, and no longer a separate entity. The magnificent bearing of the Americans, the spirit of the French, the confidence of the British, the favourable situation on the Eastern Front, the failure of the submarine campaign, the internal troubles in Austria all contributed to the prevalent feeling of optimism on the part of the Allies and to a corresponding depression on the part of the enemy. Foch had played for a heavy stake on the Marne. Had he lost, it would have meant disaster final and irretrievable for France. But his stroke succeeded and Foch enjoyed the full and unhesitating confidence of the Allies.

At first the German papers persisted in regarding the

British stroke East of Amiens between 8th-11th August as an unfortunate incident which had not yet been satisfactorily explained, for nothing could have been more disturbing to the German Higher Command and the complacency of the German people than to have sustained defeat at the hands of an enemy they affected and believed to have permanently crippled on the 21st of March. Prisoners and machine guns, tanks and artillery taken at this stage of the war were losses which it was impossible to make good. The German success of March 21st and the following weeks provided a temporary stimulant to the drooping spirits of the troops in line and the impatient and anxious public at home. But after August 8, the moral of the enemy was worn down slowly but surely. A memorandum by Ludendorff urged the necessity for extreme economy in man-power. A captured order by the same General warned officers and men going on leave against 'giving voice to utterances which are calculated to awaken feelings of doubt as to the preparedness of the Army for battle'; while another, most ominous of all, ordered the kits of all men going on leave to Rhenish Westphalia to be searched for concealed arms which might be used in the Revolution after the War. The refusal of individuals and of complete units to go into the line pointed to an unmistakable acceleration of the process of disintegration and demoralization of the once mighty German Army. Between 8th-25th August the British captured 45,000 prisoners and 467 guns. Apart from the paralysing uncertainty as to where our next blow would fall our incessant bombing of the enemy's main railway routes, stations and detraining points rendered the transport of reinforcements and munitions to a threatened point a matter of constant and increasing difficulty. The Austrian divisions which were identified on the Western Front did nothing to raise the moral of their Allies, who as a matter of fact made no attempt to disguise the contempt in which they held them. Ludendorff's orders, which began to appear with increasing frequency, threatened and appealed by turns. One dated 4-8-18 contained the following passage: 'I am under the impression that in many quarters the possibility of an enemy offensive is received with a certain amount of apprehension. There is nothing to

justify this apprehension provided our troops are vigilant and do their duty... Officers and men must be imbued with the bitter determination to conquer-both on the defensive as well as on the offensive.' One time the German public is assured that the Allied reserves are exhausted and that the American Army in France is a myth. A few days later comes the damaging admission that the German Armies are being attacked with overwhelming superiority of numbers and that a million and a quarter Americans have already landed in France; that all enemy attacks were beaten off although the enemy succeeded in penetrating the German lines at various points; that the original line was restored but that it was several kilometres behind the line of yesterday; that the enemy losses were enormous and their own inconsiderable. The impression which the German communiqués sought to convey was that of an heroic German Army fighting undismayed aganist overwhelming hordes of infantry, tanks and cavalry, which, incidentally, these same communiqués claimed had been annihilated by this same German Army. No attempt to salve the national vanity at a time when the British were finding it impossible to cope with the number of prisoners who surrendered, was available to restore lost military prestige and conceal the unpalatable truth.

During the final phase of the conflict there was no undue optimism on the part of the Staff. There had been so many unexpected happenings during the past years of disappointment and of hope deferred that they had learned that, in war, it is unsafe to prophesy and unwise to predict. The news of the surrender of Austria was received only with moderate enthusiasm and peace talk was discredited by troops who had daily ocular experience that the enemy was still in front of them and prepared, apparently, to fight a hard defensive battle. For every advance by the Allies his machine guns exacted their price. Despite the enormous preponderance of men and guns against him, the enemy seemed able to choose the time and manner of his withdrawal, until it almost appeared that, unless economic conditions in Germany became impossible, it would be increasingly difficult to obtain a satisfactory decision in the field. But the end was nearer than

we knew and the calm, impressive manner in which the gigantic war machine of the Allies moved forward pointed only to one conclusion that was inevitable and absolutely final.

What shall we say, then? As the war recedes the gigantic panorama stands out in greater and more dramatic relief. We see in proper perspective the magnitude of the struggle and the manifold difficulties of those who were charged with its immediate direction and the colossal and unprecedented scale of the military operations involved. We cannot, therefore, in estimating the military capacity of leaders, apply criteria which have sufficed in former campaigns. It is impossible to conceive Haig as the one supreme military genius in a world of dilettante muddlers or to imagine he will one day emerge from the clash of personalities as the paramount figure overtopping all his contemporaries. The whole matter must be left to the after judgement of history. It is regrettable that certain very glaring misrepresentations should have been made by General Mangin and M. Madelin as to the rôle played by British troops on individual occasions. But it serves little purpose to attempt to confute these errors. The statements have been made, and future historians dealing with the Great War will turn to these writers as authorities and will thus continue to write history as Frenchmen will want it to be written. It is unlikely, if humanity continues in its present unregenerate condition, that either the French or the English will give the other excessive credit for the final victory, while the Americans, being casually referred to by either, will, no doubt, ultimately arrogate the supreme claim to themselves. It is unlikely that Sir Douglas Haig's Command will do more than stir very gently the dovecots of the ex-Generalissimo's Staff. The one certain thing that we can admire in Mr. Dewar and Colonel Boraston is the unshaken loyalty which prompted their gallant and chivalrous essay. Of Field Marshal Earl Haig Mr. John Buchan writes: 'He, more than any other man, made the final conception of Foch possible. He had not the great Frenchman's gift for strategy, but he had the scarcely less valuable power of creating the weapons for the strategist to use. He was a master in the art of training troops, the greatest Britain has seen since Sir John Moore, and under his guidance the

British Army produced most of the main tactical developments of the campaign. He had his failures, as Foch had, but no failures or disappointments could shake his confidence in the ultimate issue. Drawing comfort from deep springs, he bore in the face of difficulties a gentle and unshakable resolution'. . But 'one figure alone among the commanders on any side stands out in the full heroic proportions. By whatever standard we judge him, Ferdinand Foch must take rank among the dozen greatest of the world's captains. . . He was both an artist and a man of science; he worked at a problem by the light of reason and knowledge; but when these failed he was content to trust that instinct which is an extra sense in great commanders. His instinct was a happy compound of patience and ardour; he could follow Fabian tactics when these were called for, and he could risk everything on the sudden stroke. He was not infallible, any more than Caesar or Napoleon, but he could rise from his mistakes to a higher wisdom. In a word, he had a genius for war, that rarest of human talents. In the splendid company of the historic French captains he will stand among the foremost-behind, but not far behind, the greatest of all.' Can anything more be said; can anything further be added to this most comprehensive and discerning of appreciations?

J. A. ROY.