According to the phrenologists, the faculties are not mere passive feelings; they all tend to action. When duly active, the actions they produce are proper or necessary; in excess or abuse, they are improper, vicious, or criminal. Small moral organs do not produce abuses; but they are unable to prevent the abuse of the animal organs, as the larger tend to do; thus, small Benevolence is not cruel, but it does not offer sufficient control to Destructiveness, which then impels to cruelty. Large organs have the greatest, small the least, tendency to act-each faculty producing the feeling or idea peculiar to itself. Seeing that all the organs tend to action, the Creator must have intended a legitimate sphere of action for them all. He could never have created either bad or unnecessary faculties.

also true.

The PROPENSITIES and SENTIMENTS cannot be called into action by the will. We cannot fear, or pity, or love, or be angry, by willing it. But internal causes may stimulate the organs, and then, whether we will or not, their emotions will be felt. Again, these feelings are called into action in spite of the will, by the presentation of their external objects-Cautiousness by objects of terror, Love by beauty, and so on. The force of the feelings, whether excited from within or without, will be in proportion to the activity of the temperament. Excessive action of the affective faculties, or the removal of their object, causes pain. Excessive rage is painful to Destructiveness; and the death of an infant pains the Philoprogenitiveness of the mother. Insanity is a frequent result of over-activity of the affective feelings. An affective faculty may be diseased, and yet the intellect sound. The converse is When the organ is small, its feeling cannot be adequately experienced. Hence the frauds of those with small Conscientiousness and large Secretiveness and Acquisitiveness. The will can indirectly excite the affective feelings, by setting the intellect to work to find externally, or conceive internally, the proper objects. This accounts for different turns and pursuits. The value of the truth, that large organs give strong, and small weak impulses, is incalculable in society; all the practical arrangements by which persons may be selected to perform certain functions, and excluded from others where they would be profitless or unsafe, depend upon it. Moral training by educators is founded on it. The weak faculties should be strengthened, and the strong regulated. Lastly, the affective faculties do not form ideas, but simply feel; and therefore have no memory, conception, or imagination. They have Sensation only; in other words, they feel. Hence Sensation belongs to all the faculties which feel, and to the external senses and nervous system in general. Sensation, therefore, is a state or condition, not a faculty, as it is held to be by the metaphysicians.

The KNOWING and REFLECTING FACULTIES, or Intelleet, form ideas, perceive relations, and are subject to, or rather constitute, the Will; and minister to the affective faculties. They may be excited by external objects, and by internal causes. When excited by the presentation of external objects, these objects are perceived, and this act is called PERCEPTION. It is the lowest degree of activity of the intellectual faculties; and those who are deficient in a faculty cannot perceive its object. We often see, for example, inability to perceive melody, colour, analogy, or necessary consequence, from defective Tune, Colouring, Comparison, and Causality. Every faculty, as a percipient, has its own perception.

CONCEPTION is also a mode of action of the faculties, not a faculty itself. It is the activity of the faculties from internal causes, either willed, or involuntary from

a high pitch of vivacity. Thus, Perception is the lowest degree of activity of any of the intellectual faculties, Conception the second, and Imagination the highest. Imagination is often confounded with Ideality, but is quite distinct from it. Each faculty conceives in its own way. Form conceives forms, and may imagine them exquisitely beautiful; Tune conceives music; and so on. Curious effects result when these faculties are morbidly active. The whole mystery of spectral illusions is thus made plain.

DREAMING, to account for which so many volumes have been written in vain, is at once explained by the excitability of the organs from internal causes; and as some organs may be awake while others are asleep, the disjointed images of our dreaming moments are, to the phrenologist, a thing which was to have been expected. The kind of dreams most frequent with us could be predicted by the phrenologist from the size of the predominating organs.

MEMORY, too, is not a faculty, but a mode of action. It necessarily follows that there can be no such thing as the general memory of the metaphysicians, but every faculty must have its own memory. Memory belongs, however, only to the intellectual faculties. It differs from Conception and Imagination in this, that it recollects real objects or events which it has actually perceived, and adds the consciousness of time elapsed since they were perceived. The other named modes of action do not require realities or time.

JUDGMENT, in its proper sense, is the perception of adaptation, fitness, and necessary consequence; and is a mode of action of the reflecting powers. In a certain sense, the knowing faculties may each be said to possess judgment; as Colouring judges of colours, Form of forms, Tune of music. When, however, we use the word judgment, we mean right reasoning, sound deciding. To this a proper balance of the affective faculties is essential. There is no sound judgment, even with great reflecting powers, if any of the feelings are excessive. Hence the difficulty of convincing each other experienced by heated controversialists. What is called a person of good sense, is one who has not only clear and strong reflecting powers, but well-balanced feelings, thus allowing the reflecting powers to have undisturbed action.

CONSCIOUSNESS is the knowledge which the mind has of its own existence and operations, whether these last are affective or intellectual; but as it does not reveal the existence or nature of the powers themselves which think and feel, it was an error in the metaphysicians to attempt to discover these powers by reflecting on their own consciousness. As they could have, by this means, no access to know the consciousness of others, they fell into the error of supposing all men constituted alike.

ATTENTION is not a faculty, but the stretch, application, or tension, of any or all of the intellectual faculties.

ASSOCIATION is that succession of ideas in the mind, each seeming to call up that which succeeds; so that, in our waking hours, the mind is never without an idea passing through it. This is a state or condition of the faculties, not a faculty. The metaphysicians have endeavoured to discover laws by which, in every mind, this succession is regulated. This attempt is utterly vain-as vain as to subject the succession of the fleeting clouds or fitful breezes to regular laws. The uniform associating powers, according to the old notions, are resemblance, contiguity in time and place, and contrast; yet any one who thinks on the subject, cannot fail to be sensible that there are many connecting links of thought which cannot be reduced to any of these three. The phrenological view is, that the predominant faculties in each mind create the associations. It is in the philosophy of Mr Stewart that Association is made to play a part most disproportioned to its actual nature. He even holds that Association produces new principles of action, and names Avarice (which phreno

NUMBER 61.

INTRODUCTORY.

It is impossible to imagine man, such as we know him, existing out of society. Man is a being who, from his birth to his death, is continually undergoing changes from weakness to strength, and from strength to weakness. Without the aid of others, the child could not live to become a man. Again, any one man's powers of observation would be quite inadequate to procure for him any thing like the amount of knowledge which a number of men, imparting their information to each other, and disputing about it, store up by means of this co-operation. Lastly, the wishes, fears, likings, and dislikings, in which a man habitually indulges, and the actions which they prompt him to undertake, and the opposition which he meets with from others, contribute to form what we call his peculiar character. These feelings could not be excited to the extent they are, with out the sympathy and antipathy of beings like himself, nor could be any where meet with opposition to his wishes so strong as what he experiences from the rivalry of his fellow-men. In short, man is, during a great part of his life, dependent upon the assistance of others for the preservation of his existence; the passions which spur him on to act are excited, or at least strengthened, by the sympathy or opposition of men feeling like himelf; his knowledge is increased, and his wits are sharpened, by conversation with other men. It is barely possible to imagine a creature of flesh and blood, with a thinking principle like our own, living in utter solitude; and such a being, could it exist, would differ widely from man made what he is by living among

creatures like himself.

Again, government of some kind or another seems necessary to the very existence of society. Two men cannot be long together, but there will be a chance of their both desiring to take possession of the same object, or one of them wishing the other to give up some parsuit in which the latter is engaged, in order to assist him in his. The stronger, or the cleverer of the two, contrives to force or persuade his companion to comply with his wish; in other words, he governs him. Among all rude people, we find women, and children eld enough to be able to work, in short, the weaker members of society, governed by the strong-made to do what the strong want them. In societies a little Lore advanced, we find individuals not possessed of much bodily strength, making up for the want by cunning, by winning manners, or by reasoning, or by a mixture of all these. The kind of government which, as a society advances in civilisation, immediately succeeds that which savage tribes call the "fightingmen," is that of the priests. Priestly government, in its rudest form, is found in the fetishes of the Negro nations, and the "great medicines" of the red Indans of America. It is a proof of a narrow mind, when a man can see nothing but what is bad even

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in these (to us) ludicrous instances of priestly government. The priest-ruler is generally more of a thinking being than the mere "fighting-man." He must have experienced the influence of devotional feeling-rude as his own uncultivated mind, but substantially the same elevating emotion which adds such a dignity to the most enlightened minds-or he would not be capable of laying plans to work upon that feeling in the minds of others. He is not necessarily altogether or maliciously selfish; for history has many examples even of the juggler-priest playing off tricks upon his dupes in order to frighten them into good behaviour. Most governments that the world has scen, have been a compound of the government of the "fighting-men" and the priests an alliance between these two classes, each acknowledging the power of the other, and giving up something to secure its assistance. The few whose strength and courage, or whose ambition and talents, enabled them to become warrior chiefs or priests, were stimulated, some by desire of luxury, some by desire of wealth, some by desire of power, some by desire of doing good. Even the merely selfish among them were obliged to do good to some, in order to procure faithful servants. The government of the wise (the word wise is used here comparatively-they were wiser than those they governed) and the strong was yielded to by some, because they were well used by their rulers, by the rest, because experience taught them that the settled condition of a society in which there is a recognised government, is better than the irregular condi tion of a society in which the ruler of to-day may be the slave of to-morrow. When a government has existed for a considerable time, a number of the persons living under it must have been born under it: it was a government at the earliest time of which they have any recollection, and is a government still. As in every thing else, men jump at the conclusion in this matter, that because they can remember no other state of affairs, there can have been no other. They come to look upon the government under which they live as something that necessarily exists, that cannot be otherwise. It is in this way of thinking that we must seek the origin of those notions regarding the rights of royal and noble families, which, combined with men's sense of the power of the warrior castes, have, from the time that history begins down to a very recent period, made up most men's conceptions of a government.

Some of our readers may think that it was not necessary to take up so much time and room as we have bestowed upon the two preceding paragraphs, in order to prove that men have always lived in society, and that society has always had a government of some kind or another. It can, however, easily be shown, that the detail into which we have entered is not useless. Men need, more often than they confess or are aware of, to be told over again what is not new to them. It is not enough to hear a thing, unless some effort is made to under

valleys to get a notion of the shape, size, and position of hills. Again, if any man would have a correct judgment of what human life really is, and what its value, he must not hastily decide, when in youth or early manhood he sees the untravelled path stretched out before him he must wait till he has at least attained the midway heights of life, and can look back on the ascent he has climbed, forward upon the descent before him. And so, whoever would thoroughly comprehend the principles of civil government-who would obtain such a practical mastery of them, that he shall be able to make them a rule of action-must seek to look at them from different points of view. He must accustom himself, on the one hand, from such a study of the nature of government, and the means of turning it to the best account, as we have just chalked an outline of, to provide himself with a standard whereby to judge the actions of government. And then, again, he must accustom himself to read the history of past ages and other countries, and to keep a dispassionate watch over what is going forward in his own, with a view to find in these observations practical lessons regarding the nature and operation of government, that may modify and render more accurate his abstract opinions, or serve as illustrations and explanations to enable him to understand them more thoroughly.

In accordance with these views, we propose to subdivide this tract into two sections. In the first, we will treat of the principles or theory of civil government, according to the plan that has been already laid down; in the second, we will analyse the constitution of our own country, in order to point out the actual working of these principles, and to furnish the reader with illustrations of the principles stated in the first section, and an experimental test of their truth. The first of these sections is entitled, THEORY OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT; the second, GOVERNMENT AS IT ACTUALLY EXISTS. Any thing that a mere man can teach another, must be necessarily incomplete the partial knowledge of a limited, a finite mind. When a man has done his best to make a subject clear, he must, if his object be to disseminate truth, rest his hopes of success, in no small degree, on his power of stimulating those he addresses to think and inquire for themselves. It is on this account that we earnestly wish that every one of these our tracts may inspire our readers with the resolution to inquire farther into the matters they treat of. We hope, for example, that we shall be able to give such a foretaste of the important and interesting study to which this number is devoted, as will induce them, when they have leisure, to consult different authors who have treated of it-to compare or contrast their opinions with ours, and with one another. In the hope that some at least may do this, we have added a third section, containing a very short list of the principal authors. It has been the practice of some writers to prefix a history of their science to their systematic explanations of it. To us, on the other hand, a distinct conception of the nature and sphere of the inquiry, such as can only be obtained from entering upon it, is requisite, to enable us to derive advantage from a record of the successive efforts which have brought it to the stage of advancement in which we find it. Every science, however, and most of all a practical science like the theory of government, has light reflected upon it by tracing it from the undeveloped form in which it first presented itself to men's minds, through the various efforts and casualties which have brought it to the condition in which we find it. But the only way to master the history of a science, is to read the works of the great men who have treated of it one after another, and to note how each, taking the subject up where his predecessor left it, has been enabled to advance it. And it is impossible to escape misunderstanding authors, unless, by studying the history of their science, we know the preconceptions which they entertained, and the practical objects they had immediately in view in writing, inasmuch as these necessarily warped their judgment, and led them to adopt their peculiar forms of expression.

SECTION I.-THEORY OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
1. What is Government?

Many writers upon government, some of them of no mean note, have thought it necessary to start with a definition of what they mean by the word government. This affectation of severe exact thinking is copied from the forms of demonstration adopted by mathematicians, but is out of place in reasonings about things which exist independent of the reasoner. The mathematician may define his circle, because part of his process is to construct his circle: but the reasoner on government does not make government; he finds it existing before him. We use the word government in its common, it may be unscientific, but perfectly intelligible, application. When we talk of a government, we mean the same thing as when we talk of the British government or the Chinese government. We mean simply that man or body of men who govern, or, in other words, exercise power over a nation. So long as such a man or body of men possess power over a nation, are obeyed by it, so long are they a government; when they cease to be obeyed, they cease to be a government. They may be an unjust government, and continue to reign, or they may be unjustly deposed; that does not alter the state of the fact. The holders and exercisers of power are a government, by whatever means they exercise that power, or whether they exercise it for good or evil.

The government of a nation is the man or body of men possessing and exercising power over the rest of the community. By power, we mean what was possessed by the centurion who said to our Saviour, "I say to one man, go, and he goeth; and to another, come, and he cometh; and to my servant, do this, and he doeth it." Power, as was intimated in the introductory part of this essay, may be acquired by different means. A strong man punishes a weak man for not obeying his commands; and the weak man, convinced that similar disobedience will always draw down upon him a similar punishment, obeys him ever after. A cunning man persuades a foolish man that he possesses supernatural powers-that his prayers and invocations can call down blessings or curses upon others; and the dupe obeys him, in order to obtain the one and escape the other. A wise man convinces a man of good understanding that he understands what is for their common advantage, and thus persuades him to follow his advice, which is a more polite way of expressing-to obey him. When a certain number of individuals have, by the use of one or more of these means, secured the obedience of a certain number of followers or dependants, another, in the same manner, secures their obedience (and with it that of all their retainers) to himself. In this manner small states were first formed, which, in process of time, by the operation of wars, alliances, and other means, were melted together into great ones. But the greatest and most civilised states, when closely examined, will be found to be still held together by the same means which were originally instrumental in forming small ones. A man who has much wealth, has influence with a certain number of his fellow-citizens. A man who does much good, has influence with another portion of them. A man who is believed in any way to have it in his power to do good or harm to others, possesses similar influence. Two or more of the persons possessing such influence form a party, and choose or are gained by a leader; and the man or association of men who, by this complicated process, command the services of a decided majority of the citizens, are the government.

This is the case in every nation that has a government, whatever the external name and form of that government may be. In an enlightened country like our own, in which men have acquired a habit of obeying the laws, the process is carried on in conformity with the forms of law. In countries less advanced in civilisation (as was the case among our own ancestors), the acquisition of power, and its transference from one