million a year. I can remember one occasion being with President Johnson when he had a problem and he was astounded to hear that the emergency fund was $1 million in a budget of $200 billion more or less.

The Congress also provides the President with appropriations called Special Projects White House, which they don't really hold the President accountable for. In a sense this is a courtesy appropriation to the President. It used to be a million and a half in my day. Someone told me it is now two and a half million, which is a little more like it.

The President can use that for staff of the White House. What he can't do with it, I think, is use it to go out to, if you will, a think tank, to go to a foundation and pay for studies or initiatives that he needs and that he isn't getting.

Now, why Presidents haven't asked for it is because, I suppose, it never occurred to them. It occurred to me while I was in the Bureau of the Budget. I raised it with the White House assistants at one time or another while I was there, and they thought it would be a fine idea but they couldn't quite see their President, whether it was Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, asking the Congress for a fund of that kind.

I hope we are a little bit more mature and sophisticated now and perhaps by ventilating the point at a hearing like this someone down at the executive branch will take courage and try to get it.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think that they might have believed it was not politic for the President to admit that within the entire bureaucracy he didn't have the best skills available?

Mr. CAREY. There may well have been difficulties of that kind, but I think that the Budget Bureau and the Budget Director would have been the person who would have had to come up and testify and ask for it, and none of them particularly wanted to.

You have to remember that there is a state of mind that Presidents have about coming to Congress and asking for either additional staff for the White House or for executive office agencies or more free resources, because the way the political business works, as you well know, is that cries go up that the President is trying to feather his nest. And every President wants to set an example of economy and frugality in his own shop.

I think this has contributed directly to the ineffectuality of Presidential management.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Sometimes that might be interpreted as pennywise and pound foolish.

Mr. CAREY. That is right.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How much influence do the advisory commission have on Bureau of Budget actions including the promulgation of regulations?

Mr. CAREY. I guess you are going back to the question of the reports act now, aren't you?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Senator Metcalf raised a question about the ability of advisory committees to influence BOB directives. In your judgment how much influence do they have?

Mr. CAREY. I will say this about it: While I didn't work in the Office of Statistical Standards, I worked in a lot of other places around the Budget Bureau, and from time to time I would be involved in a rhubarb between the Statistical Standards Clearance people and one of the agencies over which I had some cognizance in the Bureau, and

what you see here, Mr. Rosenthal, is a little bit different power situation than Senator Metcalf was describing. He gave a one-sided view of it. I can tell you that the clout and the pressure that comes on to the Budget Bureau from the departments and agencies is consistently stronger than the noises that the Bureau hears from people outside. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Such as the advisory committees.

Mr. CAREY. Like the advisory committees. These advisory committees don't win all the ball games at all.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Does the BOB pay any attention to them at all? Mr. CAREY. Yes; they do pay attention to them. Typically they pay attention to the advisory committees when the advisory committees do their homework well, when the advisory committees are able to make a very persuasive showing of an unrealistic and unreasonable burden, when they can make a showing of duplication in reporting

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Did you say that the only purpose of the advisory committees was to minimize the number of forms that must be filled out?

Mr. CAREY. To minimize the number of forms and to limit the data requests to the essential minimum for the

Mr. ROSENTHAL. No other influence on other regulations that might affect their industry?

Mr. CAREY. Nothing to do with what the Budget Bureau in general does. Let me tell you the Office of Statistical Standards used to be called by many Budget Directors our "wholly-owned subsidiary" for the reason that possibly .00004 percent of the work of the Statistical Standards office ever affected the Director of the Budget, ever came in front of the Director of the Budget or the rest of the Bureau of the Budget.

The clearance function and I hope I don't do my friend down there any injustice on this the clearance function was relatively remote-it wasn't central. There are no fireworks going on down there except in very unusual cases. This is not something that grabs much attention from the Budget Director because the arguments are just not that serious.

I am not saying Senator Metcalf doesn't have a point, and his statement bothers me with regard to the particular case that he is describing here. I think it ought to be gone into. But I am saying taking a long perspective on the whole business, I think that he has overdrawn the power of these advisory committees enormously and the effect they have on the Budget Bureau. They just don't.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You suggested that a commission or study group which possesses congressional mandate exercises more influence throughout the Federal Government, than a group without a mandate. You may recall President Johnson signed the legislation creating the National Commission on Food Marketing. I was one of the 15 members of that Commission. We spent 2 years, and I spent a great deal of time in addition to my congressional activities, on the work of the Commission. After we completed our investigation, we produced this great magnificent document. I don't think anything ever came out of it. I think it was filed away in the Budget Bureau or some other place.

Now, the Kerner Commission report was similarly treated although it received a lot of publicity. I have come to believe that very little, any, action results from the work of these commissions.

if

Mr. CAREY. I think I would argue about that. I would say this: While it is quite true that even some congressionally sponsored commission studies don't make it in the long run, their reports don't trigger much in the executive branch and they don't trigger much in the Congress either. I would say you can't generalize too much about it. As far as the Kerner Commission went, I was very much involved in that, and while the noises may not have been heard out on the street, there were very vigorous debates and discussions within the Budget Bureau and the White House about the disposition of the Kerner Commission's recommendations, and pulling and hauling to try to find either legislative solutions or appropriate solutions.

Now, there are some collateral reasons, I think, as to why the Kerner Commission didn't win full Presidential support. These have to do with the state of mind of the President himself on some aspects of the report. Personality questions. All these things get involved.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I have almost lost heart in all these commissions. Mr. CAREY. I don't lose heart about them because I think some of them do produce outcomes. For example, I go back to the work that Senator Kerr was involved in some years ago in the natural resources field. I think that type of work has had some lasting effects. I think the work, as I said, of the early Johnson task forces in the first couple of years before Vietnam produced cramps in the budget led to great social change and social legislation. I don't think we can be just negative about it, Mr. Rosenthal.

Some of these things do have good outcomes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Would you agree that my own personal experience justifies my negative attitude? Nothing came out of the Food Commission report. We spent one and a half million dollars, and I spent a lot of weekends. It is a very frustrating experience.

May I ask one question: What kind of work do you do with Arthur D. Little now?

Mr. CAREY. When I left the Government I had an appointed position there under Mr. Johnson. I went up and out of the career service in 1966. When I left the Government in 1969 I joined Arthur D. Little which is an established consulting organization engaged in the fields of science and engineering, management counseling, and Government consulting, and my principal activities are appropriately enough in public sector problems.

For example, I am working on a number of projects with Federal agencies, with some private organizations, but in all cases they do involve considerations of either governmental organization or public policy.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Our next witness is Thomas Cronin, Research Associate of the Brookings Institution.

Mr. Cronin, we would be glad to have your statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS CRONIN, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE

Dr. CRONIN. All right.

Mr. MONAGAN. This is by Thomas E. Cronin and Norman C. Thomas. Dr. CRONIN. My collaborator is unable to be with me so I will present our paper and research findings.

I would like to say, too, that I would like not to read the entire document because of its length. This is a slightly revised version of a paper soon to be published by Public Policy (Fall, 1970).

Mr. MONAGAN. I think it would be taking more time than we would have available. We will place it in the record at this point and ask you to summarize if you will.

(The statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. CRONIN, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION* AND NORMAN C. THOMAS, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DUKE UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, We are privileged to appear today to discuss some examples of the problems and utility of Government reliance on public advisory committees. We should like to report some of our recent research findings and discuss the difficulties faced by education advisory councils during the latter part of the "Great Society"-Lyndon Johnson administration.

Civic participation, interest group representation, and expert contribution to the determination and execution of public policy are an important development in contemporary society. This development has had a particular impact on national political executives. In this era of participatory democracy the American political executive has to protect himself against the appearance of autocracy or centralized authority. As a result, officials have energetically created additional linkages with their mass publics to supplement their traditional ties with publicly elected legislators. Hence, the creation of various types of advisory devices: task forces, ad hoc study commissions, permanent public advisory councils, and related boards and committees.

Two significant developments during the 1960's resulted in the proliferation of advisory bodies at all levels of American government. First, expansion of Federal domestic programs into all aspects of American life prompted a demand for better understanding of "real needs" and better indicators of program impact. Secondly, with the coming of "the war on poverty" and the pursuit of "the Great Society" it was generally held that all sectors of society must be taken into account, consulted, involved and, above all, "listened to." As the education legislation of the Great Society moved to a series of successive triumphs on Capitol Hill, the administration established council after council to review program progress, develop suggestions for program expansion, and assess program effectiveness.

By 1967, literally hundreds of educators and education advisors were serving the Johnson administration as members of dozens of advisory councils and task forces. Usually, these advisors would meet with officials from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare or its component agency, the U.S. Office of Education. Occasionally these groups and their reports became objects of major interest at the White House and on Capitol Hill. Many councils were required to make annual reports to the President and to the Congress. Throughout the sixties, the Washington political community regarded national advisory councils as important political participants and often paid substantial attention to their appointment and their reports. The sentiment expressed in the following note from a recent Commissioner of Education to a newly recruited advisory council member illustrates this attention:

The Office of Education depends heavily upon such perceptive citizens as yourself to counsel and guide it in its programs. I realize that serving on this committee will add another burden to your already heavily committed schedule. However, it will give you the opportunity to contribute to education and will, I hope, supply you compensating satisfaction.

Needless to say, most educators were delighted at this new national commitment to education and eagerly volunteered to help advise on national policy matters. Education's national lobbies, the various national associations of teach

The interpretations and conclusions in this report are those of the author and do not purport to represent the views of the other staff members, officers, or trustees of the Brookings Institution..

ers, administrators, and higher education institutions seized upon the announcement of new public advisory units as a means for pressing their points of view and securing even further representation in the nation's administrative and policy councils. To the "Great Society" administration officials, these advisory panels appeared to be convenient and dependable resources which could assist in the formulation of new legislative proposals, surround newly launched programs with an aura of "expertness" and legitimacy, and help publicize program accomplishments. Others regarded such bodies as authoritative and independent critical sources of information about pending policy choices. In any event, sparked by the euphoria of the early Johnson years, with his "politics of consensus" and the launching of a campaign to build the Great Society, there was widespread agreement that extensive advisory networks were important, necessary, and desirable.

This paper examines the composition, political perspectives, and self perceptions of members of 26 advisory bodies who helped to counsel and guide the Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Johnson White House during the period 1966-69. The data were obtained for this analysis through a detailed mail questionnaire survey, administered in early 1969, of the full membership of USOE's national advisory groups. Seventy-two percent (176) of the universe of educational advisers cooperated by completing and returning questionnaires. In addition, interviews were conducted with 31 Office of Education Officials down to the level of division chiefs in the operating bureaus.

Expectations

There are two distinct sets of widely different expectations about advisory councils. One set relates to the functions of the councils, the other concerns the relationship of the councils to the public. These functional and representativity expectations guide our analysis.

Congressmen, departmental officials and members of the attentive education community appear to expect advisory councils to perform four major tasks. First, many observers and policymakers expect that the councils will perform their manifest function, to advise with respect to agency policymaking. The councils are to be forces for innovation and creative change in the agencies. Through a process of "organized brainstorming" they are supposed to infuse the bureaucracy with new ideas, approaches and concepts. Congresswoman Edith Green (D-Ore.) and her Special Education Subcommittee summed up the advisory expectation when they observed:

It is the subcommittee's observation that, in general the education community views with flavor the use of advisory committees. It is widely recognized that many outstanding educators and citizens though not available on a full-time basis, do cooperate with the Office through the advisory council system. The resulting range specialized knowledge and expertise made available to the Office of Education could not possibly be brought to bear on the programs and plans of a single agency in any other way.'

A second function that advisory councils are expected to perform is that of criticism. A recent Syracuse University study interprets the heavy emphasis in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act on advisory councils as "a testament to the congressional desire for careful and objective appraisal of agency performance." The councils are also expected to furnish the President and the public with similar appraisals. And at least in theory they might become sufficiently independent of the agencies to allow them to report with detachment and yet be close enough to enable their reports to be comprehensive.

2

Expectations that advisory panels will perform either advisory or critical functions tend to be held by persons outside of the agencies involved. Often administrators will view advisory councils as devices for generating support for their agencies and as shields from external critics, especially in Congress. This does not imply cynicism on the part of bureaucrats as much as it reflects the realities of the competitive struggle for administrative survival.

Finally, some skeptical observers of advisory mechanisms believe that the councils will come forth with few if any new ideas or helpful critiques for the agencies. Rather, the councils will be more likely to reflect the dominant values of the prevailing elites in each policy sphere. They are expected to "legitimate" the already-established preference of the policymakers and their special-profes