CONTENTS.

SECTION I.

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to its

possible grounds and reasons. p. 1.

It is useful not to suffer Infidelity to be always the assailant of

revealed religion, but occasionally to carry the war into the

country of the enemy himself. By such a process it will

be found, that to reject revelation evinces more credulity

than to retain it: because the difficulties attendant upon

unbelief are greater than the difficulties attendant upon

belief. p. 1.

I. A statement of the possible grounds and reasons of Infi-

delity. p. 2.

1. A discussion of the first possible ground, that a reve-

lation from heaven cannot, in the very nature of

things, take place. p. 4.

2. A discussion of the second possible ground, that a

revelation from heaven is in itself so improbable an

occurrence that it beggars all credibility. p. 4.

3. A discussion of the third possible ground, that the

evidences, upon which our reception of a system

claiming to be a divine revelation is demanded, are

so unsatisfactory, that they are insufficient to com-

mand our reasonable assent. p. 7.

4. A discussion of the fourth possible ground, that nu-

merous objections exist in the case of each system

claiming to be a divine revelation; which objections

cannot be answered. p. 8.

5. A discussion of the fifth possible ground, that, as

various theological systems have alike claimed to

be revelations from heaven, the presumption is, that

all these systems are equally impostures. p. 12.

6. A discussion of the sixth possible ground, that our

unassisted reason is sufficient, and therefore that a

revelation is unnecessary. p. 15.

II. A summary of the grounds of a Christian's belief. p. 18.

III. A summary of the grounds of an infidel's unbelief. p. 19.

IV. Conclusion. p. 20.

SECTION II.

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in the abstract

rejection of all revelation from God. p. 21.

Deism presents so many difficulties, that, unless they can be

satisfactorily removed, the presumption will be, that a

revelation from God to man has actually been made. p. 21.

I. Though the deist may be able to prove from the frame of

the world, that it must have been created, he is unable

to prove that it was created by one only God. p. 22.

II. If it be allowed to him for the sake of argument, that

there is one only God, he is unable to demonstrate the

moral attributes of that being. p. 26.

1. He cannot demonstrate the justice of God. p. 27.

2. He cannot demonstrate the mercy of God. p. 31.

3. He cannot demonstrate the goodness of God. p. 35.

III. Thus unable to demonstrate the moral attributes of God,

he is of necessity ignorant what service will be pleas-

ing to him. p. 37.

IV. All these difficulties in the deistical scheme draw after

them the crowning difficulty, that God, whose works

evince his wisdom, yet acted so unwisely as to place

his creature man in the world without giving him the

least instruction or information relative to his duty.

p. 42.

SECTION III.

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to

historical matter of fact. p. 47.

From the fact of the general deluge, taken as a specimen of the

mode of reasoning from historical matter of fact, may be

demonstrated the additional fact of a direct intercourse

between man and his Creator or (in other words) of a

revelation from God to man. p. 47.

I. Proofs of the fact of the universal deluge. p. 49.

1. Historical proof, built upon the attestation of all

nations to the fact of a general deluge. p. 49.

(1.) The substance of the tradition prevalent among

all nations. p. 50.

(2.) The tradition embodied in the national mythology

and religion of every people. p. 52.

2. Physiological proof, built upon the existing phe-

nomena of the globe which we inhabit. p. 54.

(1.) No circumstance is more thoroughly established

in geology, than that the crust of our globe

has been subjected to a great and sudden revo-

lution by the agency of water. p. 54.

(2.) Various physical matters testify, that this great

revolution cannot have happened at a more

remote period than five or six thousand years

ago. p. 55.

3. Moral proof, built upon the progress of civilization.

p. 64.

(1.) Civilization has always a natural tendency to

spread itself more and more widely, while bar-

barism has a natural tendency to contract itself

within more and more narrow limits. p. 64.

(2.) With this view of the matter, all history, down to

the present time, perfectly agrees. p. 66.

(3.) The necessary inference from such facts. p. 67.

II. The additional fact, of a direct intercourse between man

and his Creator or (in other words) of a revelation

from God to man, demonstrated from the established

fact of an universal deluge. p. 68.

1. The supposition, that the deluge did not cover the

tops of the mountains and that men and animals

preserved themselves by escaping to their summits,

shewn to be untenable. p. 71.

2. The supposition, that a family escaped in a ship built

accidentally and not in consequence of a divine reve-

lation, shewn to be equally untenable. p. 72.

3. The final result is, that, if the fact of the deluge be

admitted, we shall find ourselves compelled to admit

also the additional fact, that a revelation of God's

purposes to his creature man has assuredly taken

place as we find it recorded in Holy Scripture.

p. 75.

SECTION IV.

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to

actually accomplished prophecy. p. 76.

The prediction, selected as a specimen of the argument from

accomplished prophecy, shall be that of Moses respecting

the future destinies and fortunes of the Jews. p. 76.

I. Abstract of the prophecy. p. 78.

II. View of the accomplishment of the prophecy. p. 80.

1. Its accomplishment has taken place in all the nume-

rous particulars of which it is composed. p. 80.

(1.) The first particular. p. 81.

(2.) The second particular. p. 82.

(3.) The third particular. p. 83.

(4.) The fourth particular. p. 84.

(5.) The fifth particular. p. 84.

(6.) The sixth particular. p. 85.

(7.) The seventh particular. p. 85.
(8.) The eighth particular. p. 85.
(9.) The ninth particular. p. 86.

2. The estimate of their own situation by the Jews
themselves. p. 87.

III. The train of reasoning, which springs from the prophecy

and its accomplishment. p. 91.

1. Insufficiency of the first possible deistical solution :

the political foresight and sagacity of Moses. p. 94.

2. Insufficiency of the second possible deistical solution:

a lucky accident. p. 96.

(1.) Essential difference between the leading charac-

teristic of the real prophecy of Moses, namely

complexity; and the leading characteristic of

the pretended prophecy of Seneca, namely

indefinite simplicity. p. 97.

(2.) Dissimilarity in the grounds and reasons, on

which each prophecy is supported. p. 101.

(3.) A tradition of the discovery of America by the

Phenicians was not unknown to Seneca: whence

his prophecy becomes a mere poetical orna-

ment. p. 103.

IV. Summary of the argument. p. 107.

SECTION V.

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to the

facts and circumstances and character of the Christian Dis-

pensation. p. 109.

No small difficulties also attend upon Infidelity in regard to the

facts and circumstances and character of the Christian Dis-

pensation. p. 109.

I. The present existence of Christianity is a naked fact:

hence the only question between the believer and the

unbeliever is, how it first started into existence. p. 109.