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tive Egyptian who does not ardently desire to see his country independent, I have failed to find him. Nor has the British commission, headed by Viscount Milner, backed by a British army, and with the power to hand out attractive jobs at fat salaries, been able to get a single Egyptian to come out in favor of the British protectorate. When Viscount Milner suggested to the Grand Mufti that there were Egyptians eager to testify in favor of the protectorate, but did not, owing to intimidation, the religious head of the Egyptians gave to him Cardinal Mercier's answer to Baron von der Lancken, "Every country has its traitors."

The Egyptian nationalist movement has followed the evolution of other nationalist movements during the World War. Before the war it was weak and hesitating for the reasons I have given above. But between 1914 and 1918 the Egyptians, like other subject races of Europe and the near East, were awakened from unspoken dreams to the tangible hope of a glorious national revival. I had the privilege of spending several months in Egypt during this awakening. I saw people transformed from apathy or despair to living, burning hope by the promises of Balfour, Asquith, and Viviani. They were not hostile to the British. Far from it. They thought the great struggle of freemen all over the world against militarism and brute force, as symbolized by the German Kaiser, was causing the British to see a new light in the matter of their own dealings with subject

races.

One day, after a luncheon at which the sultan gathered to meet me the members of his household and of the Egyptian cabinet, I persuaded Sultan Hussein to accord me an interview in which he would express his devotion to and faith in the Allied cause and would at the same time recognize the reasonableness of the British expectation to continue to control the Suez Canal and the foreign and financial affairs of Egypt after the war. I explained to him how helpful such a declaration would be to prevent false hopes on the part of Germany in regard to the nationalist movement. I told him

frankly that I had been sent to Egypt by Mr. James Gordon Bennett to help the Allied cause, and that at that critical moment of the war a statement from him would render immense service to the British in the near East. Two days later the sultan sent Dr. Nimr, editor of a Cairo newspaper, to ask me to recall the interview. It was too late. I went to the palace to explain to the sultan that my cablegram had already gone. He sat for a moment in silence, and then his eyes filled with tears.

"I believe that we must agree to British control of our foreign affairs," he said, “or I should not have allowed the interview in the first place. But I fear a misunderstanding both on the part of my own people and of the British. The British Government asked me to take the sultanate when they deposed my nephew. I accepted the post and the war-time protectorate because we do not want the Turks and Germans in Egypt. Great Britain's interests and ours are identical when it comes to winning the war. But I do not want my people to think that I was unfaithful to the independence of Egypt. We have the definite promise of the British Government, only this is not the time to discuss the question in public. We shall have to wait until the end of the war."

The sultan requested his prime minister, Rushdi Pasha, to go into the matter with me in detail. I had several long talks with Rushdi Pasha. He explained to me why the war-time protectorate was established and why he, prime minister of the deposed Abbas Hilmi, had agreed to continue to hold office under the new régime. Rushdi Pasha feared the invasion of Egypt by the Turks and the Germans and believed that the Egyptians had every interest in not only keeping quiet during the war, but also actively coöperating with the British against what was a common enemy. In the presence of Adly Yeghen Pasha, minister of education, Rushdi Pasha outlined for me the grievances of the Egyptian people against the British, and the program of changes in the internal administration of Egypt which he proposed to present to the British Government in London when the

victory of Allied arms was assured. It was a reasonable program, and did not go so far as the unconditional independence of the Hedjaz or the implications in the repeated assurances of Allied statesmen. Rushdi Pasha wanted to get rid of the graft of English officials managing the internal affairs of the country in their own interest and in the interest of British manufacturers and merchants, and he demanded the recognition by Great Britain of Egypt's sovereignty over the Sudan and right to participate in any profits coming from the Sudan. The two Egyptians told me that only in this way would the Egyptians ever be masters in their own country. "We want for Egyptians the offices held by Britishers, and we want control of the revenues of our country, after foreign interest payments are guaranteed, so that we may educate our people. Our principal indictment of British rule is its utter disregard of the obligation of spending a fair part of the money derived from taxes on the education of the people. The British are deliberately keeping the Egyptians from getting an education, and then they tell the world that we are incapable of governing ourselves!"

What happened to the Egyptian nationalist cause between November 11, 1918, day of the armistice, and June 28, 1919, day of signing the Treaty of Versailles, demonstrates that the world was not made safe for democracy simply by our victory over Germany. A rigid control of all communications leaving Egypt and deliberate misrepresentation of the facts in the case were the two means British officials in Egypt hoped to use to annex Egypt to the British Empire. But the British in Egypt were poor psychologists. They overestimated the power of machine-guns and bayonets to stifle the voice of a nation. They did not realize that the civilized world had changed its ideas a bit since 1914. If they had kept the promises made to the Egyptians during the war and had acted in good faith, the Egyptian question could have been solved without damage to British prestige and to British imperial interests.

On November 13, 1918, Premier

Rushdi Pasha, with the approval of the sultan, asked the British military authorities for passports for himself and Adly Yeghen Pasha to go to London to discuss the status of Egypt with the British Government. The request was flatly refused. Realizing that he had been deceived and was a prisoner in his own country, the premier resigned. So did Adly Yeghen Pasha. No attention was paid to the resignations. Thinking that he might be able to convince the British of the madness as well as the bad faith of the course they were following, Rushdi Pasha remained in office for several months. Despite the efforts of the military and police to prevent a vote, the Egyptian Legislative Assembly and all the leading men of Egypt balloted for and elected a national delegation to the peace conference. Premier Rushdi Pasha strongly advised the British high commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, to allow this delegation to go to London and there arrange with the British Government to participate in the peace conference. Sir Reginald, who had spent his life in serving British interests in that part of the world, felt that the delegation was representative and the wish to speak for Egypt reasonable. But neither the opinion of Rushdi Pasha nor of the high commissioner prevailed against the occult influences that were determined to use the victory in the World War to sanction definitely the British title to Egypt.

On March 8, 1919, after the British authorities had failed to secure the consent of any influential Egyptian to succeed Rushdi Pasha, they decided to employ intimidation. Saad Zagloul Pasha, Mohammed Pasha Mahmoud, Ismail Pasha Sidky, and Hamad Pasha ElBassil, the president and three prominent members of the delegation chosen to represent Egypt at the peace conference, were arrested without warning and hurried secretly from their homes. They were not given a chance to say good-by to their families, arrange their business affairs, or even pack their clothing. Without any charge having been made against them, they were deported from Egypt on a war-ship and thrown into jail at Malta. The British authorities have had a year to justify

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this act. They cannot do so. Not even by the widest stretch of imagination could they bring suspicion of conspiracy or disorder against these men, who had always been trusted by the British themselves. Saad Zagloul Pasha, president of the delegation, is the best-loved man in Egypt, and I have been told over and over again by the highest British officials who had known him for years that he is a man of excellent judgment, conservative temperament, and unimpeachable character. He is idolized by the fellaheen because of his lifelong devotion to their interests. When the British arrested a lot of school-boys for expressing in an orderly manner the sentiment of love of country that is instilled into English school-boys in the same way they are taught to respect God, they gave their names as "Saad Zagloul" one after the other. And they persisted in this tribute to the hero of Egypt despite flogging and the withholding of food. Some of the little fellows were not more than eleven or twelve.

The three associates of Zagloul Pasha were men of the same high character. Mohammed Pasha is å graduate of Balliol College, Oxford. One of his friends of university days, a British official in Egypt, told me once that Mohammed Pasha was one of the finest and squarest fellows that had ever gone through Balliol. I can say the same of dear old Hamad Pasha, chief of the Bedouins of the Fayum, who has more personal power than any man in Egypt. He speaks French and English well enough to get along in a Paris salon, and until he espoused the nationalist cause, was the host and friend of English officials, archæologists, and sportsmen. The brutal deportation did not break up or intimidate the national delegation. Zagloul Pasha's place was temporarily taken by Sharawi Pasha. Sidky Pasha is a quiet gentleman of the old school,

who would be in the House of Lords were he an Englishman. He is a great landed proprietor, generally respected for justice and fair dealing.

It was the deportation of these leaders of the Egyptian people that led to the so-called revolt. The British authorities tried to represent the troubles in Egypt as an uprising against public order that had to be suppressed, troubles instigated by Bolshevist agitators, and an example of what would happen if the mailed fist were removed for a minute. In response to this charge, the Egyptians published a White Book, giving documentary evidence concerning the promises and negotiations before the deportation of Zagloul Pasha and his associates, and extracts from official court proceedings and photographs to prove the atrocities committed by British troops against an unarmed population. They begged the peace conference to send an international commisison to Egypt to make an investigation and promised to stake their cause upon the report of such a commission.

When the British authorities realized that the Egyptian situation was getting out of hand and that the people could not be intimidated into giving up their demand for self-government without exterminating them, the national delegation was allowed to proceed to Paris, and the four leaders at Malta were released and dumped at Marseilles with no explanation or apology offered.

After Easter, the delegation finally arrived at the peace conference, but despite their letters to Messrs. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson, their case was not heard. Their communications were ignored. Finally, the Treaty of Versailles was signed with the article arranging the British protectorate over Egypt.

The British speak of "the nationalist faction" in Egypt, and hint darkly at massacres of Christians and Europeans

1 As an excellent illustration of how American public opinion is being misled, I quote from an otherwise excellent editorial on Foch in the New York "Times," February 8, 1920: "Contemptuous of the impertinent warning given him by one of those humbug 'Nationalist' Pashas who long to revive in Egypt unlimited taxation of the fellaheen and unlimited application of the bastinado, the Tiger sailed gaily toward Alexandria." A scholarly and thoughtful writer penned these lines, but his knowledge of the Egyptian nationalist movement has evidently been gained from a propaganda source, and this grotesque misstatement was worked into the editorial for propaganda purposes. I challenge the New York "Times" editorial writer to bring proof to sustain the charge he makes here against Saad Zagloul Pasha. The triumph of Egyptian nationalism means the betterment of the fellaheen, socially and economically as well as politically. Freedom from the burden of British rule will lessen taxation for the fellaheen and give him an opportunity to get an education, which at present is denied them.

if the British relax their strong military control. This can fool only the uninitiated. As far as I have been able to see, and I have enjoyed exceptional opportunities, the native Christians are fully as nationalist as the Mohammedans. If they have any fear of massacres, the high clergy of the Coptic Church and the intellectual elements among the Copts act most queerly. They have assured me that they are heart and soul with the Mohammedans in demanding independence; Christian priests have preached patriotic sermons in mosques; and hundreds of Coptic young men and boys defied the British machine-guns in the streets of Cairo and Assiut. When I visited the Presbyterian College at Assiut in 1916, one of the seniors, who had high standing, came to me secretly, and begged me not to believe the stories of religious antagonism. "It is the old trick of divide et impera," he explained. "All educated Copts realize that our interests are with our Mohammedan fellow-countrymen against the British. As long as we are under the régime instituted by Lord Cromer, there is no hope of happiness for an educated Egyptian. The British are killing our souls. But with education we awake to self-respect, and we cannot help challenging foreign rule'. We are all willing to die for our freedom."

Viscount Milner's commission went to Egypt to investigate the "troubles." It did not occur to Viscount Milner and his associates that the British protectorate idea was dead, like many other provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. There is no longer the ghost of a chance of getting the Egyptian people to accept the disposition made of their country against their wishes and in violation of the British promises of forty years. The "nationalist faction" is the nation.

The princes of the sultan's family have issued two addresses, signed by all the possible heirs to the throne. The first, to the Egyptian nationalists, declares their adherence to the program of independence; the second, to Lord Milner, warns him of their solidarity in the national demand for complete independ

ence.

Lord Curzon, in a burst of indignation, cried out recently that it was intolerable to suppose that victorious Great Britain would give up her title to Egypt. But her title to Egypt depends solely upon a big standing army, and that standing army Great Britain no longer has to send to the banks of the Nile.

The last resort of the Milner commission was to attempt to convince the powerful religious authorities of the Mohammedans that it was to their best interests to join hands with the British commission in settling the "difficulties." The Grand Mufti replied:

"No Egyptian will accept the protectorate or enter into a discussion with you except on the basis of independence."

Lord Milner warned the Grand Mufti that Great Britain had the power to impose her will forcibly upon Egypt. Immediately the Grand Mufti rose, to signify that the audience was terminated, and said:

"As a religious chief I can only say and affirm that it is impossible to convince the nation of the utility of a thing of which I myself am unconvinced. The entire nation claims its independence, and it would, therefore, be useless to speak in any other language. I do not forget your power. But if Egyptians bend to-day before force, they will seize the first occasion to revolt. The guaranty of force is not eternal." Is it?

1 Do not weigh too lightly this argument about self-respect. Put yourself in the place of the educated Egyptian, who, in the Cromer system, is denied any real authority in the management of his country's affairs. There is always an Englishman over him. The Manchester "Guardian" of January 16, 1920, says: "It was assumed that the Administration was best fitted to decide what was for the good of Egypt, and that the Egyptian people would accept and obey without question, as it had done for nearly forty years. That delusion has gone, swept away by the events of last March." The "Guardian" goes on to demonstrate that the British are losing their hold on Egypt because British officials felt they could ignore "the natives" and run things as they pleased. Two specific illustrations are given. The new Penal Code was drawn up by British officials, and "it did not occur for a moment to the authorities that it was necessary for the Egyptians to have a primary part in shaping the law under which they were going to live." The new Constitution for Egypt under the British protectorate was drawn up without consulting a single Egyptian and presented to Premier Rushdi Pasha. He had known nothing about it. Told he had to accept it, he refused. Then he was threatened. He resigned, and the troubles broke out.

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