merely the memory, is exercised; and the grammatical knowledge of the language, thus derived, from a familiarity with the language itself, is more satisfactory and valuable than the insulated knowledge obtained from the formal grammars, inasmuch as it is drawn from the original and only source, by our own exertions, and may be employed even to test the accuracy of those very grammars. At the same time, by such a mode of study our knowledge of universal and philosophical grammar, is promoted to a degree which cannot be expected from a too slavish and mechanical study of the formal grammars.

Thus it appears, that in order to translate a passage, the first thing necessary is, to bring together, in accordance with the laws of our vernacular construction, the scattered words of the original, guided by our grammatical knowledge of the modifications of form which words undergo for the purpose of syntactical construction. If we can thus compact the whole, and bring together the parts which, from their terminations and other inflexions, we know to be closely connected, what remains but a knowledge of the meaning of those words in our own language.

And here commences a serious difficulty. Almost every word has several kindred significations. The lexicon may furnish some or even all of these. But the lexicon, unless it be one of the largest class, and then only in comparatively few passages, cannot inform us which of these meanings applies in a particular passage or connection.

For example: "Disciplina" according to Ainsworth denotes discipline;" "instruction;" "information;" "skill;" "science;" "a profession;" "a trade;" "a fashion;" "a way;" a custom ;""a "a sect of philosophers;""an example." But it remains for the translator to adopt and apply that signification which consists with the connection; in other words, the connection must be consulted; the claims of several nearly allied meanings must be weighed; the connection, in short, must determine the peculiar shade of meaning which in each particular case is demanded.

The origin of a lexicon is similar in many respects to that of a grammar. Its authority, as a source of information, depends, not merely on the reputation of the compiler, but, more especially, on the fidelity with which its materials have been drawn from the original fountain, the language itself. The lexicographer discovers new significations. He can invent none. We cannot, therefore, implicitly rely on the "dixit" of any lexicon;

or "pin our faith to the sleeve" of any lexicographer. Frequently a word is sufficiently defined by the connection in which it is found. The lexicon, in such a case, can only confirm what we have, by our own examination, clearly ascertained to be the fact. Keeping this principle in view, in conjunction with the liberal use of the grammar just recommended, the exercise of translating rises to an unspeakable importance. It is unique in its character. For myself-I speak only my own opinion I know of no adequate substitute, and no competitor as a means of intellectual culture.

The connection in which a word is found, may not always be sufficiently explicit to determine, precisely, its meaning. This circumstance, apparently so discouraging, constitutes one of the most striking advantages of the study of languages. In this case, we must, for the present, receive, from the lexicon, the meaning which seems the most satisfactory, leaving the passage to receive the necessary illustration from another portion of the same author, where the same word may occur in a more explicit connection, or the same thought in different words. This postponement or temporary suspension of our decision-this bar to our immediate judgment, while the mind is abroad, in other portions of the field, and ready to seize and apply the required illustration, constitutes one of the peculiarities of this exercise, and one of the most important in its bearing on intellectual discipline.

From the rapid sketch of the process pursued in translating a passage into our vernacular tongue, it is manifest, not only that much judgment and a nice discrimination are requisite, in the selection and application of the meanings, but that a constant demand is made on our knowledge of the idiomatic constructions of our language. The importance of this part of the exercise will excuse my indulging in more extended observations.

In all languages we meet with idioms- peculiar modes of expressing a thought. The language of common conversation abounds with them. They are generally sententious; sometimes very elliptical; and, when transferred to another language, by means of a literal translation, lose their force, or express but feebly and awkwardly the idea. Nay, in some instances, a strictly literal translation of an idiomatic phrase, is the quintessence of nonsense. And, in every instance, they receive their full force, in another language, only by employing the corresponding idiomatic expressions.

A few examples will explain my meaning.

The Romans said "duos parietes de eadem fidelia dealbare ;" which, when literally translated, runs thus, "to whitewash two walls out of the same bucket;" but, properly translated, by means of our corresponding idiom, it runs thus, " to kill two birds with one stone.' The German translates by means of the corresponding idiom of the German language, viz. "mit einer Klappe zwey Fliegen schlagen," which literally denotes, “to kill two flies at one slap." Thus, the English phrase, "to kill two birds with one stone," is the proper representative of the Latin and the German phrases just cited, that differ in literal signification, both from one another and from the English one.

Again; the Romans said "nodum in scirpo quaerere," i. e. "to search for a knot in a bulrush," i. e. " to look for a knot in the stalk of a plant which does not naturally contain them." But the corresponding English idiom is, " to stumble on plain ground."

66

Again; пlvvei tivi, in Greek, denotes, literally, "to wash one." But in common language, it meant also "to chide" or reprimand" or "rebuke one sharply." So the Germans, in the same sense say, einem den Kopf waschen, "to wash one's head," which the Hollanders express by "washing one's ears." The Italian, to denote the idea of " much promise and no performance," or, " much bluster and no action," says: "tempesta seuz' acqua, 99.66 a tempest without water," or, "a storm without rain," equivalent to our "much ado about nothing," or, "a great cry and little wool."

So the Greek phrase, το κοιλον του ποδός δείξαι, which literally, denotes "to show the hollow of the foot," must be translated in English, by the phrase, "to take to one's heels," or, "to give leg-bail."

The familiar English expression, "to hit the nail on the head," may be rendered in the French, by "trouver la fève aù gateau,' "to find the bean in the cake," and in Latin, by gere," "to touch the thing with the point."

rem acu tan

The Athenians, to denote the performance of superfluous labor, said plavz' 10nvase, meaning, literally, "to carry owls to Athens." The Englishman understands this perfectly, when translated, "to carry coal to Newcastle."

Hence it is that Don Quixote, Aristophanes, Theophrastus, (in his Characters,) Shakspeare, (in his Comedies,) Gil Blas, Tassoni, (in his Secchia Rapita.) and other works of this class, VOL. IX. No. 25.

which deal largely in the language and idioms of ordinary conversation, are so difficult to translate into another language, whose corresponding idioms are of very different literal signification, but still are the only phrases adapted to those of the other language.

It yet remains for me to point out, more in detail, the advantages which this exercise proffers. Before, however, entering on the discussion, I beg to be indulged in a few explanatory remarks.

1. I have purposely avoided all allusion to the different degrees of literalness and freedom of translation. This must, in each case, be decided by the circumstances of the pupil and teacher, more particularly the age, attainments, and capacity, of the pupil, and the particular design of the instructor. My intention has been to deal in general principles, leaving their application to be determined by the individual circumstances.

2. For the same reason, I have been silent concerning the greater or less adaptedness of the different accessible languages, to this exercise of translation. It will be manifest from what I have already advanced, that if the exercise of translating, promises so rich a harvest to a faithful cultivator, even in the more barren soil of a less cultivated language, what advantages must be realized, when both the language from which we draw, and the language into which we make the transfer, are copious and refined-enriched with all the accurately defined terms which a philosophical, social, moral, and intellectual culture, alone can furnish. I scarcely, therefore, need to say, that of all the ancient languages, accessible to us, the Greek must claim, for these purposes, our first regards; and of all the modern languages, for the same purpose, the venerable German.

3. I could wish, if possible, to disabuse the public mind in relation to an opinion commonly received, that bears immediately, on a portion of the following discussion; viz. that enlargement of mind, expansion of intellect, comprehensiveness of views, and the capacity of mind which embraces, simultaneously, a multiplicity of objects, are best promoted by the contemplation of the sublime arrangements of the solar system, and the other grand and imposing themes which Astronomy presentscharacterized by vastness, grandeur, and immensity.

This opinion, however, is more specious than solid. For, the enlargement of the capacity of the mind, the formation of habits of comprehensive thought, the expansion of intellect that

enables it to embrace a multiplicity of connected and related objects, depend on the simple fact that the mind is habituated by well directed efforts, to embrace these multitudinous parts; to see their connections; to allow their respective claims; and to collect, compact, and systematize the whole, whether these individual objects be scattered through the immensity of space, or contained, like some exquisite machinery, within the precincts of a nut-shell. The immensity may excite amazement, and a feeling of sublimity, but, so far as the mere intellectual effort and its reaction, are concerned, the two cases stand, to say the least, on an equal footing.

I specify, then, among other advantages of the exercise of translating, when conducted in the manner proposed:

1. The fixedness of attention that is demanded for the accomplishment of this object. This advantage the exercise of translating secures, in common with several other departments of study; and I advert to it here, to show that this power of the mind is not overlooked. So constant is the demand for undivided attention, that a failure here is absolutely fatal to the result.

2. I would specify the habit of nice discrimination, as an advantage to be derived from the exercise of translating. This faculty is not to be confounded with judgment, which also is simultaneously brought into play. Discrimination detects the minutest distinctions. Judgment decides on the fitness of a word or phrase, in our own vernacular tongue, to express exactly, the corresponding word or phrase of the original.

It is

Perhaps no intellectual faculty is more important, than a prompt, keen-sighted discrimination. Happy the student with whom it has become a habit. It is this eagle-eyed vision that detects distinctions, where a vulgar eye can discern none. this discrimination which, in conjunction with the judgment, enables the mind to distinguish; by the words employed to communicate the ideas of the original, the nice shades of thought, and the evanescent hues of sentiment. Nay, the admirable analysis of thought, that is pushed to such an extent by the aid of language, is duly appreciated only by a discriminating mind. Among other exercises promotive of the habit of discrimination, translation, when, properly conducted, is not the least efficient. Let us examine it more closely.

or

A writer of talents and worth, whether poet, philosopher, historian, deals in thought, and in words solely or mainly as