hostile feelings that persisted after the Peace of Ghent, and to the ready jealousy between the mother country and her former colonies (a sentiment whose depth and nature has always been misunderstood by outside Powers), Alexander probably believed that he could count on this new cause of difference to secure the acquiescence of the Washington Cabinet in an antirevolutionary program in the Spanish colonies.

Following the Congress of Vienna the particularistic views and "traditional interests" of the Great Powers had further postponed the consideration of the Turkish question and the affairs of the German Confederation. Intervention in America doubtless appeared to Alexander a less dangerous source of possible international friction. Indeed, as we shall later see, American affairs became not only a convenient issue but also the first matter with which the newly constituted "Confederation" was to concern itself during the three years preceding the Congress of Aix-laChapelle and throughout the succeeding Era of International Conferences. The policy favored by the Tsar led to the formal mediation which the European monarchs now undertook with respect to South American affairs.

Spain, Russia and Great Britain were all at this time great American Powers. The King of Spain was nominally (actually, in the eyes of legitimist Europe) the ruler of a territory geographically the most important in the New World. His title of Emperor of the Indies represented a claim which, although disputed by a vigorous minority, was still respected by a large part of the population of South America. In the beginning of this struggle, hardly a fraction of the population was interested in throwing off the Spanish allegiance. The dominant classes, including an all-powerful clergy, were generally hostile or indifferent to a revolution which, in its natural course,would eventually attack their own privileges. The Indians and half-castes forming the bulk of the population were neutral or inclined to favor the home government.1

On the northern continent of America the Tsar of Russia was the ruler of vast possessions whose vague frontiers stretched from Alaska far down the coast to California. In 1812, Baronov, the Russian governor whose aggressive policy had earned for him the name of the "Little Tsar," succeeded in establishing a colony

1 Shepherd, op. cit., p. 70.

not far from Bodega Bay, but 30 miles to the north of San Francisco. The Russian-American company (instituted by the ukase of July 8, 1799) had been granted exclusive jurisdiction of the American coast north of the 55th degree of north latitude. These claims had been the basis for Russian diplomatic protests in 1808 and 1810 against the encroachment of traders from the United States, which had received respectful attention in Washington. While the Government at Washington was prepared to treat with consideration the claims of Powers long established on the American Continent, this toleration had no application to Powers like Austria, Germany and France, who now began to consider Ferdinand's plight with sympathy. The influence of all Europeexcept a negligible minority-was to be exercised to counteract the growing triumph of the republican spirit.

The unavowed principle underlying the attitude of the Powers of the Holy Alliance towards the revolutionaries of Venezuela and La Plata was their interest in maintaining the monarchical principle.3

In this connection it should be borne in mind that long after the tyranny of Ferdinand VII had rendered his further rule odious and impossible, a strong sentiment persisted throughout South America for a monarchical form of government. Even Bolivar, the Liberator, was far from being a convinced republican:

Would to God (he exclaimed in a letter which foreshadows an American "League of Peace") that some day we might enjoy the happiness of having there an august congress of representatives of the republics, kingdoms and empires of America to deal with the high interests of peace and of war, not only between the American nations but between them and the rest of the globe.

In a work entitled La Monarquia en America, Señor C. A. de Villanueva has considered at length the early history of this movement. The first separatist movement "to preserve the throne of the Indies for Ferdinand VII" found itself without a leader

1 Cleland, "The Early Sentiment for the Annexation of California." Reprint from The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVIII, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (1914-1915), p. 7. 2 Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia, p. 47.

Writing at a somewhat later period, Chateaubriand, the French Ambassador in London (May, 1821), voiced their policy as follows: "If Europe is obliged to recognize the de facto governments of America, its whole policy should be aimed toward the encouraging of the establishment of monarchies instead of republics, whose principal exports would be their principles." Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'outre tombe, vol. VII, pp. 400-401.

Moore, "Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism," Columbia University Quarterly, September, 1915, p. 347.

after the abdication of Bayonne and the assumption of the royal authority by Joseph Bonaparte. A A strong desire was, however, manifested all over South America to replace the dethroned Bourbons by monarchs of the same dynasty. The monarchical movement was, however, defeated by the partisans of the Junta of Cadiz in Buenos Aires; while in Caracas (December, 1811), acting under the advice of the American Consul Lowry, the revolutionists adopted a republican form of constitution.2 According to the same author, the Congress of Tucuman (1816) "was openly monarchical," although it eventually decided for a republican form of government.

At a later date Hyde de Neuville, Louis XVIII's Minister at Washington, filled his dispatches to Richelieu with plans for founding one or more monarchies in South America-thrones which should be occupied by princes of the House of Bourbon. He even entertained hopes of securing the acquiescence of the United States in this plan in exchange for the good offices of France with respect to the cession of Florida.^

Until the real situation was revealed after the opening of the debates at Aix-la-Chapelle, the policy followed by Russia with respect to South America (rather than that pursued by their commercial rival Great Britain) was believed in the United States to be most favorable to the cause of "Liberty." This was largely due to a persistent belief in the Tsar's liberalism. Instructions from the Department of State to John Quincy Adams in London (December 10, 1815) report with apprehension the rumor that "Spain had ceded Florida to Great Britain," and that a British expedition was on its way to that quarter."

Referring to the revolution already "making rapid progress in South America," Mr. Adams is directed to inquire: "What are the views and intentions of Great Britain regarding this important subject? Is it not to the interest of Great Britain that the

1 A strong royalist faction in Buenos Aires entered into negotiations with the court of Portugal (which had found refuge in Rio de Janeiro,) seeking to come to an understanding with the Prince Regent which would enable his Consort, Carlotta (sister of the dethroned Spanish monarch), to assume the government "pending the return of Ferdinand." In Venezuela the patriots sought "to erect the old Captain-Generalcy into an independent province with a king of its own-choosing preferably a prince of the old Spanish dynasty." Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin (La Monarquia en America, vol. 1), p. 10. 2 Ibid., p. 18.

3 Ibid.,

p. 45.

4 Hyde de Neuville, Mémoires, vol. 1, pp. 267–279.

'MS. Instructions, Department of State.

Spanish provinces become independent? . . . In case of a rupture between the United States and Spain at any future time what part will Great Britain take in the contest, it being understood that we shall ask in regard to the Spanish provinces no privileges in trade which shall not be common to all nations?" The Secretary of State soon after informed the American chargé that “a strong suspicion is entertained here by many that the Spanish Government relies on the support of the British." 2

Instructions of the same date direct Levett Harris in St. Petersburg to confirm the views that he had previously expressed of the Tsar's disposition regarding the independence of the Spanish provinces, viz., that he was "believed to favor it." At the close of the year 1816 Harris reported from St. Petersburg that the Tsar was more interested in preserving the tranquillity of Europe than in inviting the hostility of the Government of the United States by representations concerning the conduct of private individuals and the depredations of the so-called revolutionary privateers.3

Thus in 1817 the Tsar's dilemma lay between his desire to secure the support of the United States against Great Britain and his fear that both with respect to Florida and in their conduct towards the South American insurgents the American Government might act in a fashion to contravene the monarchical "mediation."4 Dashkov, the Russian representative at Washington, reported to his government through Count Lieven (February 22/March 6, 1817) that "Monroe is proclaimed President and is resolving to seize Florida by fair means or foul. The fleet will be employed in the Mediterranean before Spain can expect it."

1 MS. Instructions, Department of State.

2 Secretary of State to Mr. Adams in London, February 2, 1816. MS. Instructions. "The only object of high interest that has recently attracted attention here is the difference which at present exists between Spain and Portugal. The Emperor showed great solicitude on this occasion, and at the last circle spoke to the Envoys of those Courts, especially the Portuguese, in a tone to lead to the impression that any attempt made to disturb the tranquillity (sic) of Europe would not be overlooked by His Majesty. Each of these ministers have made official communication to the Russian Ministry of the views and pretensions of their respective courts." Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, December 14/26, 1816. MS. Dispatches, Russia.

Re the Tsar's foreign policy. In a rare anonymous pamphlet entitled A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817, published in New York by Kirk and Mercein (1817), a copy of which is preserved in the files of the Library at West Point Military Academy, occurs an interesting contemporary appreciation of the rôle played by Alexander during this period: "Alexander now wields the huge sceptre of Russia, and displays an ability equal to the task. His philosophical views have indeed been enfeebled by pernicious advisers, but those who have known him in other days still cling to the hope that he will not substitute an unfeeling policy, of which the pillars are tyranny, ignorance and fanaticism.

In September, 1817, the newly-appointed Minister Pinkney wrote from St. Petersburg as follows:

Very friendly relations (displayed occasionally with some parade) exist between the Emperor and the King of Spain, and although it might naturally be expected that out of Europe the Emperor would leave him to manage his own affairs as he could, this case of resistance by subjects to the King's rule, and of an effort to multiply republics may be thought to call for a general combination in Europe to discourage and repress it.. If it is true that a New Congress or rather interview of sovereigns is to take place next summer at Aix-la-Chapelle (as I confidently said and as I believe) the affairs of South America will, I presume, be talked of on that occasion.1

Both countries were anxiously alert to each other's moves. In May, 1817, Dashkov had again written to Lieven:

Certainly the moral effect which America can exercise upon the whole world merits more attention than Europe appears disposed to give Pernambuco has declared its independency as a republic. This is certainly no sudden commotion, but a well prepared revolution which should give cause for apprehension to the Portuguese Government and all of Brazil.

And again on September 24/26, 1817, he notes:

The Americans continue to send help to the Spanish insurgents, lending them privateers and helping them in various ways.2

The anxiety of the State Department with respect to the Tsar's rumored intentions to intervene in America's affairs now became more marked. Mr. Pinkney, instructed to study the policy of Russia, reported the following ominous event: "There is no doubt a Russian fleet will very soon proceed to Cadiz." This refers to a none too creditable transaction through which Tatistcheff had sold (not without profit to his own purse) five unseaworthy ships of the line to Ferdinand to be used to transport troops to South America. His subsequent dispatch was more reassuring:

The sale of the fleet mentioned in my last . . . can scarcely be termed a perfectly neutral proceeding with respect to the Colonies, but, if it be a sale, it seems to show that the Emperor does not mean to embark as a party in the contest.5

Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 13/25, 1817. MS. Dispatches, Russia.

Dashkov to Lieven, MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office.

3 Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 25/October, 7 1817. MS. Dispatches, Russia.

Cambridge Modern History, vol. x, p. 210.

'Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 29/October 11, 1817. MS. Dispatches, Russia.