Vienna at the opening of the Congress presented an impressive spectacle. Besides two hundred and sixteen chiefs of diplomatic missions, representing with few exceptions all the Christian Powers of Europe,1 this great "international parliament" was attended in person by four kings and two emperors. While the civilized world awaited, with a natural anxiety, the result of the deliberations of the assembled statesmen, a series of balls, carnivals and tournaments varied the monotony of these debates and furnished entertainment for the host of courtiers and their ladies who surrounded the assembled monarchs.2 No one had awaited the formal opening of the great Congress with more eager anticipations than the idealistic Tsar of Russia. His brief stay in St. Petersburg had convinced him that he was once more autocrat, not only by right of law, but also in the hearts of his subjects. It was fortified by the knowledge that his acts were approved by the people of his whole vast Empire that the Tsar had proceeded to Vienna. He was, moreover, confident that the debt which Europe owed him for Russia's powerful intervention in the late wars would make him the natural arbiter of the debates which were to organize a permanent peace.1 Alexander was accompanied on his journey by a complete diplomatic staff. Gentz in his letters criticizes the Tsar's intention to negotiate in person rather than to depend upon the training and experience of his entourage. His determination to do away with intermediaries had resulted in a quarrel between the Tsar and his Grand Marshal, Count Tolstoy. "Persuaded that his kindness towards him could have no bounds, Tolstoy opposed Alexander's appearance at the Congress. His idea was that the Emperor could only play an undignified rôle. Worn out by these representations, his Majesty decided to part with his Grand Marshal." He had early reason to regret his neglect of their excellent advice. The necessity of making rapid decisions amidst the heated debates of the council chamber deprived him of the advantage always maintained by a deputy acting ad referen1 Talleyrand, vol. II, pp. 275 et seq. For an account of these festivities, see La Garde, Fêtes et Souvenirs du Congrès de Vienne. 3 His natural modesty prevented the Holy Synod from conferring upon him, according to the ancient Russian fashion, the title of "Blessed of God" in recognition of his victories. See Rain, op. cit., p. 245. 4 Sorel, op. cit., part vIII, p. 384. 'La Garde, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 197. dum. This egotistical pretension to override the accepted customs of diplomacy was to place the Tsar, on more than one occasion, in a position of inferiority. Equally disquieting was his dependence on individuals like Czartoryski, Capo D'Istria and Laharpe, personally sympathetic advisers rather than sources of information and counsel to which the traditional policy of the Empire required him to give weight.' The deliberations of the Congress of Vienna may be studied in detail in the memoirs of the French and Austrian representatives, Talleyrand and Metternich. For the purposes of our subject they need only be considered in so far as they concern the ensuing era of the international congress and the upbuilding of the "System of 1815." The members of the Grand Alliance were loath to admit new influences to their debates. They preferred to consider the Congress as a council of the Allies. As late as November 1, one month after the assembly of the delegates, Metternich still maintained that "the Congress is not a Congress; its commissions are not commissions." Indeed the only advantage which he consented to accord to the Vienna gathering was that "it seems an opportunity to remove the physical distances that divide Europe.": A few days later he declared that the "very word of Congress terrified the Prussians" and that it would be preferable to call the conference together only after some agreement had been reached with respect to the principal questions involved. 3 In other words he proposed that this great "European" gathering should only be allowed the power of ratification after a division of the spoils of Napoleon's Empire had been made by the victorious Allies. The Tsar's intentions were from the beginning distrusted by many. There was indeed in his policy a curious blending of international idealism and practical advantage to Russia. Behind all his fine phrases a determination was evident to draw profit from the military situation. "The only reward which I ask," he repeated with somewhat affected enthusiasm, "is to be allowed to repair in a measure the great crime committed by Catherine II." By uniting the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, endowed with a liberal constitution, to his own autocratic domain, he planned to restore the ancient 1Cf. Lansing, The Big Four, p. 38. Talleyrand, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 420. Ibid., p. 431. Kingdom of Poland.1 England and Austria, however, were unalterably determined not to permit any change of frontier which might allow a Russo-Prussian entente to become a preponderant force in Europe. Poland according to their plans was again to be called upon to play her historic part as a buffer state. Thus when the Tsar, strengthened by his own conceptions of the debt which Europe owed in return for his sacrifices in the cause of the Alliance, formulated his demands, he found himself faced by a firm coalition determined upon refusal. A series of stormy personal interviews ensued; horrified rumor affirmed that in his conversations with Metternich strong personalities were indulged in on the part of the Tsar2 and that the Austrian envoy's rejoinders had been made in a tone of respectful but ill-disguised contempt. On October 1, Lord Castlereagh wrote to the Tsar, setting forth at length his opposition to the latter's views with respect to the Duchy. This resulted in a sharp interchange of "extra-official notes," wherein Czartoryski was called upon to defend "the right of Poland to nationality," a contention in convenient accord with one of the principal "points" of Novosiltzov's Instructions. This extraordinary debate, carried on by private correspondence, finally exasperated the Emperor, who refused to continue further negotiations by this means.3 Tolstoy's prophecies respecting the “personal negotiation" of his sovereign were being fulfilled. Above the clamor of contending ambitions and particularistic interests now sounded a new rallying cry, Talleyrand's famous formula of "legitimacy." This principle indeed appeared the only one generally applicable to a situation complicated by so many contending interests. One cause which had restrained Castlereagh from openly opposing the military power wielded by the Tsar was the fact that Great Britain was still embarrassed by the long-drawn-out war with the United States. With the signing of the Peace of Ghent (December 24, 1814), full liberty of action was restored to England's forces. Castlereagh immediately declared himself ready to adhere to Talleyrand's plans, and the latter had the satisfaction of concluding the secret alliance which he had so long desired to form between France, Austria and England (January 3, 1815).1 Thus a few weeks after France had been dragged to the bar to hear the sentence of Europe passed upon her misdeeds, she found herself, through the surprising diplomatic abilities of her chief representative, party to a secret treaty wherein two of her principal opponents formally engaged themselves to act with her in common against "the pretensions recently manifested" by the two remaining members of the great coalition. “In case certain circumstances shall arise," read this document, "from which may God preserve us, Great Britain, Austria and France agree to unite their strength in order to maintain the principles formulated in the Treaty of Paris."2 Only the return of Napoleon from the Island of Elba restored a semblance of harmony to the debates. The alliance and principles of Chaumont were reaffirmed and all the Powers joined in a manifesto decrying the Emperor's treason to the cause of Europe. 3 The end of Napoleon's great adventure of "The Hundred Days" left the Allies in an awkward and ill-defined relationship toward France. A tendency was manifested to hold the twice-restored Bourbons responsible for their failure to prove the blessings of "legitimacy." Moreover, the rivalries and differences which had arisen at Vienna seriously separated the Allies. The secret Treaty of Alliance between France, Great Britain and Austriaforgotten by Louis XVIII in his hasty flight-was known to Alexander. The Tsar, in spite of this proof of Bourbon duplicity, was still disposed to be lenient towards France. Motives of altruism, judged by his allies to be wholly exaggerated, and a kind of mystical piety (which, as we shall later see, resulted in the negotiations leading to the pact of the Holy Alliance), now guided his policy. But the Russian troops had taken only a minor part in the Waterloo campaign and the Tsar found his prestige sensibly diminished. The Prussians now demanded an indemnity of 1,200,000,000 francs, but compromised on a permission to occupy Luxembourg. The situation was also improved by the dismissal of Talleyrand. 1 See Talleyrand, op. cit., p. 550, and Debidour, op. cit., p. 36. Debidour recognizes the full importance of the influence exercised by the War of 1812 upon European affairs during this period. 2 See Talleyrand, op. cit., appendix, p. 561. Ibid., p. 134. The latter, informed by Royal decision that his services were no longer needed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disappeared from the scene. A new minister, the Duke of Richelieu, acceptable both to Russia and the Allies, was installed in his place. It was on these terms that the second Treaty of Paris was signed on November 20, 1815.1 On the same day, another treaty of the utmost significance in the development of the System of 1815 was signed between Austria, Russia and Great Britain. This was known as the Treaty of Alliance and contained the following important clause: Article VI. In order to consolidate the intimate ties which unite the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under their own auspices or by their representative ministers, meetings consecrated to great common objects and the examination of such measures as shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of Europe.2 The above article (which was a substitute for one proposed by the Tsar calling upon the Allies to give proofs of the "permanency and intimacy of their union") had been modified by Castlereagh to suit the reluctance of the English Cabinet to ally themselves definitely to any system of "European action" indefinitely prolonged or even to indorse permanently "the principles consecrated by the Treaties of Chaumont and Vienna." 3 No reference whatsoever was made in the highly practical terms of the articles of either the "Treaty of Alliance" or the Treaty of Paris to a treaty signed on September 26 by the sovereigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia, a pact subsequently known as the "Holy Alliance." It now remains for us to consider the significance of this manifesto and its relation to the System of 1815. Had Alexander rested upon his military laurels as the conqueror of Napoleon, his fame would have been safe for all time. His experiences during the debates of Vienna were in many ways a bitter disillusion to the Tsar-Idealist. As Rain remarks: The aureole of triumph that had long hovered about the head of the Emperor of Russia grew pale during the Congress. He had arrived in Vienna like a conqueror, expecting to play the rôle of arbiter of Europe in the old capital of the Holy Roman Empire-and to hold the position he had assumed since the beginning of the coalition. He had, however, only triumphed among the ladies and in the salons. In the conference |