I and II of the Treaty of Reichenbach the return of the "lands in Germany held by the French Princes was declared to be the object of the common efforts." Toeplitz (September 9, 1813), the third link in the chain of alliances, ranged Austria on the side of the Allies. The "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig (October, 1813) sealed the military fate of Napoleon. The era of diplomacy was about to begin.1

After Leipzig, even Schwartzenberg, the Austrian military commander, believed the greatest obtainable military results to be achieved. "All . . are of this opinion," he wrote, “but the Emperor Alexander . . . !" Words failed the horrified Austrian tactician on his attempts to describe the determination with which the Tsar continued the pursuit of his enemy. Without a complete military victory the international peace he aimed at was impossible. The advance towards Paris continued, "the army dragging forward, the diplomats murmuring and conspiring." "2 At Châtillon, where Napoleon was negotiating for peace, the conflict of selfish interests broke out afresh. It was already becoming manifest that to find a common ground of agreement among the victors would be a task almost as difficult as Napoleon's overthrow. The French success of Montmiriel and Château-Thierry caused these differences to be momentarily forgotten. But the battles of Arcis-sur-Aube and La Ferée-Champeniose, while restoring the military equilibrium of the coalition, renewed the dissensions of their councils.

The conference at Châtillon was in fact little else than a poorly staged diplomatic comedy which deceived neither antagonist. Napoleon's eagerness to negotiate rose and fell with the varying fortunes of his military campaign. The Allied proposals purposely made more and more unacceptable to France were not even presented until February 17. Badly beaten at the engagement of La Rothière, Napoleon had authorized his representative to make "the broadest concessions."

It

1The text of the Treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach and Toeplitz are to be found in Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traités de Paix, vol. III, p. 234; vol. 1, pp. 568, 571. 2 Sorel, op. cit., part viii, p. 257.

These discussions turned upon Napoleon's successor, the question of the "natural limits," the plan of campaign, etc. The Tsar only consented to take part on "the basis of Frankfort," communicating his reservations in a memoir to Metternich. See Sorel, op. cit., part VIII, pp. 250-255.

required but a few slight successes, however, to encourage him again to resist the Allies' demands.1

One ominous fact must have convinced Napoleon's envoy, Caulaincourt, that his mission was more difficult than ever before; the negotiations of Châtillon were carried out "under a general instruction" wherein the Allies "considered themselves as maintaining one and the same interest." 2

This was the policy to be formally adopted by the important Treaty of Chaumont, an event of the deepest significance to the inauguration of a new political system for Europe, which occurred on March 10. The signatures of all the Allied Powers had been affixed to the same document after Leipzig. But no formal League of the Allies as yet existed, except such as arose from a complicated system of politico-military protocols and treaties, notably those of Reichenbach and Toeplitz. These mainly contemplated military action against the "Enemy of Europe," and only hinted at political arrangements. When the negotiation of a final peace became imminent, the necessity of consolidating the basis of some future common policy binding on all the Allies became apparent.3

It was to secure this important end that the Treaty of Chaumont (bearing the date of March 1) had been proposed. In the preamble it was declared that the high contracting parties,

having offered to the French government terms for the conclusion of a general peace (in case of the refusal by France of these conditions) desire to strengthen the bonds which unite them in the vigorous prosecution of a war undertaken with the intention of bringing a close to the misfortunes of Europe.1

Having thus clearly stated its main objects, the Treaty sets forth its intention "to insure the future tranquillity of Europe by reestablishing a just equilibrium of the powers."

After fixing the subsidies to be advanced by Great Britain, Article V continues:

1 See Talleyrand, Mémoires, vol. 11, p. 151, and A. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, vol. 1, pp. 6-7. Napoleon always believed himself on the eve of a Marengo or Austerlitz. After a theatrical tirade, he had pronounced for a peace at any price on January 4th. Caulaincourt was somewhat disconcerted at the extent of these powers and hampered by ignorance of the military situation. See Sorel, op. cit., part vII, pp. 259–262. 2 Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, pp. 72-79.

Metternich was even believed to be negotiating separately with France. Sorel, op. cit., part VIII, p. 289.

This treaty is given in Martens, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 48.

The contracting parties will agree after the conclusion of the peace with France... to take defensive measures for the protection of their respective territories in Europe against all attempts on the part of France to trouble the results of this pacification.

This was nothing less than the "mutual guarantee" which the Tsar had long advocated. But in order not to raise premature differences between the Allies, the "order of things which shall be the happy outcome of their efforts" was purposely left vague. Certain broad lines of policy were, however, laid down. It was determined that Switzerland should be raised to the rank of an independent state, that Spain should be restored to the Bourbons, and that Germany should form a federal union. In order to carry out these provisions the means to be used were further set forth as "amicable intervention" (Article VI) and, this failing (Article VII), an international army might be raised, each party furnishing a contingent of 60,000 men.

The Treaty of Chaumont thus became an elaboration of the policy determined upon at Toeplitz. While directed against France, it also furnished a treaty basis for future concerted action. Formally renewed at Paris in 1815, and at Aix-laChapelle in 1818, it may be said to constitute the foundation of the "system" which formed the groundwork of European diplomacy until the year 1848.

A great change is observable, however, in the language of this document when it is compared with the generous sentiments embodied in Alexander's Kalisch pronunciamento, or with the liberal ideas contained in his tocsin appeal to the "peoples of Europe." The diplomats of Europe could find no place in a formal agreement for a league to maintain European peace "based on a new conception of public law," which Novosiltzov had discussed with Pitt. The Treaty of Chaumont was the resultant of contending forces and drew its future strength and usefulness from the purposely vague language of the articles dealing with matters which were a subject of controversy between the Powers. The future of Poland was ignored, as well as the question of Napoleon's successor; on the other hand a "balance of Europe" was definitely guaranteed (Article XVI) for a period-which might be extended-of at least twenty years. Although France was the power ostensibly aimed at as a possible disturber of this highly

desirable equilibrium, the terms were general enough to raise the issue to the rank of a great European principle.

With this general affirmation of the solidarity of the great Powers, a principle which he was to affirm with increasing enthusiasm during the ensuing period of diplomatic reconstruction, the Tsar was obliged to be content. Castlereagh, however, had been the controlling influence of the debates and the attitude which he adopted from the beginning had been guided by the terms of definite instructions, which clearly show the limitations England was about to place upon her Continental policy. "The Treaty of Alliance," he declared, "is not to terminate with the war, but is to contain defensive engagements, with mutual obligations to support the Power attacked by France with a certain extent of stipulated succours. The casus foederis is to be an attack by France on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties." 1 It was the development of this policy of "reservations" which in the end was to wreck the whole framework of the Tsar's idealistic proposals for a European confederation. To offset Great Britain's determination to remain aloof from the internal quarrels of Continental Europe, Alexander was soon to propose a plan of action having for its basis a definite recognition of the duty of international solidarity. This policy, "consecrated" in the mystical pact of the Holy Alliance, was to serve ends wholly foreign to the Tsar's earlier ideals.

Accompanied by the King of Prussia, Alexander entered Paris in triumph on March 30, 1814, and Napoleon's abdication was signed a few days later. The first Treaty of Paris followed the signing of a convention, dated April 23, 1814. The article forming the basis of both the convention of April 23 and the ensuing Treaty guaranteed to France "the frontiers as they actually existed on January 1, 1792." This deprived the restored monarchy of all the conquests made by the Republic and the Empire, with the exception of certain territories belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine.

1 These instructions, quoted by Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, p. 66, from the Foreign Office Records, are contained in a Cabinet Memorandum, dated December 26, 1813.

2 Grand Duc Nicolas Mikhailowitch, L'Empereur Alexandre Ier, vol. 1, p. 134. The details of the negotiation of this treaty are given in full in Talleyrand, Mémoires, vol. 11, pp. 172 et seq.

The keynote of Bourbon diplomacy was to ignore past events. When Alexander visited the Paris mint, a medal was struck in his honor which bore on one side the inscription: "To the restorer of peace in Europe"; on the reverse was emblazoned the arms of France, with the words: "In the month of April, 1814, France joined the Grand Confederation of the Powers of Europe." Many months, however, were to elapse before these words had any real significance. The real terms which defined the allied policy toward France were contained in secret articles annexed to the Treaty of Paris.2 These stipulated:

991

The disposal of the territories which his Very Christian Majesty has renounced by the terms of Article III of the Treaty (of Paris), an arrangement from which a real and durable European equilibrium must arise, will be decided at the Congress along lines which shall be determined among themselves by the Allied Powers.

Although the intention of the Treaty of Paris was several times declared to be that of "effacing all traces of the recent unfortunate events,' "3 it was in fact little else than the enumeration of the terms imposed by victorious conquerors upon a fallen enemy.

In addition to the Allies of Toeplitz and Chaumont, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were invited to accede to the Treaty, although a derogation from the Tsar's favorite principle of "united action"-identical treaties were signed separately with France by each of these Powers. By the terms of these treaties eight of the principal Powers of Europe found themselves parties to a general agreement. Their alliance was still chiefly aimed at keeping a ninth great Power in a state of military inferiority, yet the Tsar might well feel that the foundations of his confederation of Europe had been well and truly laid. With the exchange of the ratifications the sovereigns and their representatives dispersed. An era of good feeling, recalling the atmosphere of international solidarity which had reigned during the earlier conferences of the war, once more united the Allies. But as Sorel significantly remarks: "All important matters were but adjourned until the Congress."

1 Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, Memoirs, p. 177. This incident is significant as showing the quick apprehension by the restored government of Alexander's favorite "international" policy.

2 Martens, Nouveaux Supplémens, vol. 1, p. 329.

Talleyrand, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 197.

* See Sorel's important appreciations, op. cit., part viii, p. 346.