Robert B. Lynch, of the same date, which accompanied it. I should be glad if you could obtain for it favorable consideration. Very faithfully yours, WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Hon. Sir FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE, &c., &c., &c. No. 152.] Mr. Thurston to Mr. Seward. UNITED STATES CONSULATE, SIR: I have the honor to transmit the enclosed letter, at the request of Colonel Lynch. I am, with respect, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Mr. Lynch to Mr. Seward. D. THURSTON, United States Consul. MILITARY PRISON, Toronto, Canada, December 6, 1866. SIR: I had the honor and pleasure of being introduced to you many years ago by an old and attached friend of yours, the late Richard Murphy, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, who, if I recollect right, lived with you at Auburn. Little did I then expect that I would be now addressing you from a condemned felon's cell, in Canada. But my case has been laid before you, and the Rev. Mr. McMahon and myself are under a deep debt of gratitude to you and to our government for your prompt interference in our behalf. I went to Canada as a peaceable American citizen, a non-combatant, to report the incidents, &c., &c., of the Fenian campaign, not expecting to be at all interfered with, haying violated no law. Mr. McMahon was similarly situated; he was there as a minister, attending to the wounded and dying, and administering the rites of his church, without distinction. By your direction a new trial has been applied for, which the judges have denied, though we could prove beyond all doubt that we had no military connection with the Fenian organization. The matter now rests with the governor-general, who it is supposed will commute the sentence to a term in the provincial penitentiary. But we implore you to urge our free pardon, and not allow us to be sent as common felons to the penitentiary. We are innocent of having done any wrong, and could prove it if we were permitted. To men of our age and condition in life it would be worse than death. You have always been the friend of our race and religion, and in the name of humanity save us from this humiliation. We are satisfied you would be willing to do anything in your power for the prisoners, and we make this appeal to you in the hope you will procure us a free pardon; and we take this occasion to state that the United States consul, Mr. Thurston, has been unremitting in his kindness and attention to the interest of the prisoners, and deserves our warmest gratitude. Trusting you will forgive the liberty I have taken in addressing you, and once more begging your kind offices in our behalf, I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, &c., &c. Mr. ROBERT B. LYNCH. Mr. Seward to Sir F. Bruce. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, December 29, 1866. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 3d ultimo, upon the subject of the establishment of light-houses and the placing of buoys at certain designated points on the Chinese coast, with a view of facili tating the navigation of such coasts and harbors. In reply I have the honor to state that the government of the United States heartily concurs with that of her Majesty's in causing proper steps to be taken to induce the Chinese government to carry into effect the measures aforenamed. In accordance with the suggestions of her Majesty's government, instructions have been given to Mr. Burlingame, at Peking, to co-operate with her Majesty's minister there in pressing the matter upon the attention of the Chinese government. I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your obedient servant, WILLIAM H. SEWARD. The Hon. Sir FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE, &c., &c., &c. Sir F. Bruce to Mr. Seward. WASHINGTON, January 3, 1867. SIR: With reference to my note of the 30th of December, 1865, and to your reply of the 16th of February of last year, on the expediency of arriving at a common understanding as to the expense of maintaining foreign lunatics in asy lums, I am instructed by her Majesty's government to inform you that from the answers received it appears that a general agreement on the subject cannot be arrived at. Under these circumstances they are of opinion that there is no other alternative than that of dealing with such cases as they arise, I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant, FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE. The Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, &c., &c., &c. Sir F. Bruce to Mr. Seward. WASHINGTON, January 7, 1867. SIR: Her Majesty's government having had under their consideration your despatch to Mr. Adams, dated August 27th, 1866, on the claims of citizens of the United States against Great Britain on account of losses inflicted on American commerce by cruisers of the so-called Confederate States during the civil war, have addressed to me a despatch setting forth their views on the various subjects to which it alludes, and containing certain proposals on their part by which they consider that a settlement of these claims may be effected. In bringing their proposal under your notice, I cannot do better than follow the method adopted by Mr. Adams, and I have therefore the honor to enclose copy of the despatch, with a request that you will inform me at your convenience whether the government of the United States are prepared to accept the principle of arbitration, as contained in that despatch. I am instructed at the same time to state that, independently of these claims, there may be other demands on the part of American citizens arising out of the events of the late civil war, while there are certainly numerous British claims arising out of those events which it is very desirable should be inquired into and adjusted. The two governments were in communication with each other on this subject in the latter part of the year 1862, and the draft of a convention for a settlement of these claims was actually under consideration. Circumstances, however, prevented the matter being proceeded with at that time; and, indeed, it was premature to enter upon it while fresh claims were liable to start up. The time seems now favorable for reviving the subject, and her Majesty's government think that they may fairly invite the government of the United States to undertake, in the event of an understanding being come to between the two governments as to the manner in which the special American claims alluded to in the enclosed despatch shall be dealt with, that, under a convention to be separately but simultaneously concluded, the general claims of the subjects and citizens of the two countries arising out of the events of the late war may be submitted to a mixed commission, as in a former instance; the commission to be charged with the examination of such claims with a view to their eventual payment by the government adjudged to be responsible. I have the honor to be,with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, &c., Sr., sv. FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE. Lord Stanley to Sir F. Bruce. FOREIGN OFFICE, November 30, 1866. SIR: I transmit to you, herewith, copy of a note which I have received from the United States minister at this court, enclosing copy of a despatch from Mr. Seward, in which he again brings before her Majesty's government the claims of United States citizens against Great Britain, on account of losses inflicted on American commerce by cruisers of the so-called Confederate States during the late civil war. In regard to the date of this note, it is necessary that I should explain that on its receipt, I stated verbally to Mr. Adams the impossibility of replying to it without consulting my colleagues, and the consequent probability that my answer must be delayed for some weeks. The claims in question are now, for the first time, brought under the notice of her Majesty's present advisers; and the length of time which has elapsed since the termination of the civil war justifies the hope that they may be dispassionately considered on both sides. It is therefore with no desire to revive a controversy which has been carried on at great length, and in which every argument bearing on the subject has been advanced and discussed, but with a view to facilitate the impartial examination of the grounds on which these claims are based, that her Majesty's government feel bound to notice expressions and statements in Mr. Seward's despatch which they consider unsupported by evidence, and which, in justice to their predecessors in power and to the honor of the country, they cannot allow to pass unexamined. And first, with regard to the assertion made at the commencement of the despatch, that "the Sumter, the Alabama, the Florida, the Shenandoah, and other ships of war were built, manned, armed, equipped, and fitted out in British ports, and despatched therefrom by or through the agency of British subjects;" and "were harbored, sheltered, provided, and furnished, as occasion required, during their devastating career, in ports of the realm, or in ports of British colonies in nearly all parts of the globe" It can scarcely be necessary, after the protracted controversy that has taken place on this subject, to enter minutely into the history of the several vessels mentioned. It must have escaped Mr. Seward's recollection that the Sumter did not proceed from a British port, but was an American vessel, and commenced her career by escaping from the Mississippi. With regard to the Alabama, the Florida, the Shenandoah, and the Georgia, (the other vessel mentioned in the schedule of claims,) they were undoubtedly of British origin. But the United States government will hardly contend, that the mere fact of a vessel having been built in the port of a foreign power, or having been originally despatched therefrom, can of itself render the government of that country responsible for the use which may be made of such vessel after it has passed from their control. The Alabama was, when she escaped from England, wholly unarmed and unequipped as a vessel of war. She received her armament and warlike equipment, her commander and crew, in Angra bay, Azores, a possession of the crown of Portugal, where the British govern, ment could not have exercised any jurisdiction or control over her proceedings, even if they had had the opportunity of so doing. The Florida, under her original name of Oreto, left England unarmed and unequipped, but suspicion having attached to her, she was seized, and proceedings were instituted agaiust her in the British admiralty court at Nassau, which failed for want of proof, and she was eventually equipped as a confederate cruiser in the port of Mobile, at that time in the occupation of the confederates. The Shenandoah left England unobserved, and, therefore, unquestioned, and for anything that had transpired, on a legitimate voyage, and was only armed, equipped and manued as a vessel of war off Funchal, a possession of the Crown of Portugal. The first intimation which was received of her proceedings was from her Majesty's consul at Teneriffe, reporting the transfer of crew and armament to her from the Laurel, at the Desertas, off Funchal. Mr. Adams's letter on the subject was dated the 18th of November, 1864, at which time she had already commenced her depredations. This fact appears from the despatch from the United States consul at Rio de Janeiro, of which a copy was forwarded to Earl Russell by Mr. Adams, on the 7th of April, 1865. The Georgia escaped inquiry in a similar manner, and was equipped, manned and armed off the coast of France, and presumably in French waters, but unquestionably not within the jurisdiction of the British Crown. She sailed from the Clyde on the 2d of April, 1863, having cleared for Alderney. Mr. Adams's letter stating that she was intended for a cruiser was not received until the 8th of April, the very day on which, as was subsequently shown, she was receiving her armament off the French coast. Instructions were sent to the governor of Guernsey, but she proceeded to Cherbourg, without touching at the Channel islands. As regards the reception of these vessels in British ports, it must be remembered that when they appeared in those ports they did so in the character of properly commissioned cruisers of the government of the so-styled Confederate States, and that they received no more shelter, provision, or facilities, than were due to them in that character. For a recognized belligerent has a right to expect, in the ports of a neutral power, the same degree of hospitality as is conceded to its antagonist, subject to such restrictions as may be indifferently imposed on both; and it has never been alleged that greater freedom of intercourse was allowed to, or that less restrictions were imposed on, the cruisers of the confederate than on those of the United States in British ports in any quarter of the globe. The instructions issued by the British government to its civil, naval and military authorities, with which the government of the United States are well acquainted, sufficiently establish this fact. Nor can it be said that those instructions were drawn up in an unfavorable spirit to the United States. The prohibition to bring prizes into British ports, and the limit placed on the supply of coal, told principally against the confederate ships, and prevented them from using British ports as their basis of operation. The treatment of these vessels was, therefore, no more than the legitimate consequence of the state of civil war which existed in America, and which was recognized by her Majesty in her proclamation of neutrality. On the subject of this proclamation, Mr. Seward proceeds to make remarks which her Majesty's government cannot admit to be justified by the facts. They have never as yet met with any refutation of the statement contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, and already quoted by Lord Russell, in his note to Mr. Adams, of May 4th, 1865, that "this greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popular commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local, unorganized insurrections. However long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprang forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war. The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name, and no name given to it by him or them could change the fact." Her Majesty's government cannot understand how, in the face of such a conclusion, declared by the highest judicial authority of his country, and in direct contradiction with the action of the government of which he is a member, Mr. Seward can characterize a contest, which he has at the commencement of his despatch termed "a civil war," as "a domestic disturbance, which, although it had severe peculiarities, yet was in fact only such a seditious insurrection as is incidental to national progress in every State." Her Majesty's government find it also laid down in the judgment above quoted, that "the proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed, which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure under the circumstances peculiar to the case." Again, in the judgment of the district court of Columbia, on the Tropic Wind, given June 17th, 1867, it was ruled that the facts of the secession of the southern States, " as set forth by the President, with the assertion of the right of blockade, amount to a declaration that civil war exists--that blockade itself is a belligerent right, and can only legally have place in a state of war. Her Majesty's government are, therefore, at a loss to conceive how the term "intervention" can be applied to a proclamation which did no more than acknowledge a state of war, first recognized by the President of the United States himself, and which was issued with the express purpose of warning her Majesty's subjects from any participation in the conflict. Mr. Seward's argument that the declaration of British neutrality tended to encourage and create a civil war, which would not otherwise have extended beyond the character of a local insurrection, can scarcely better be met than by a reference to the legal decisions above mentioned. In opposition to the opinion he expresses that the proclamation was unnecessary and premature, it may be justly urged that her Majesty's government had to provide at a distance for the lives and interests of British subjects on or near the seat of war, that they had to consider the rapidity with which events were succeeding one another on the American continent, the delay which must elapse before intelligence of those events could reach them, and the pressing necessity for definite instructions to the authorities in their colonies, and on their naval stations near the scene of the conflict. They had, as Lord Russell has stated, but two courses open to them, on receiving intelligence of the proclamation of block ade, namely, either that of acknowledging the blockade, and proclaiming the neutrality of her Majesty, or that of refusing to acknowledge the blockade, and insisting upon the right of her Majesty's subjects to trade with the ports of the south where the government of the United States could exercise no fiscal control at that time. Of these alternatives, it is hardly open to question, that that which they pursued was at once the most just and the most friendly to the United States. It is only necessary to add that, before the proclamation was issued, seven of the States of the Union had declared their secession, and that they possessed a formally constituted government, which carried on the administration in a regular manner; which had possessed itself, in some cases by force, of the fortified ports within its territories, and which had proclaimed its intention of issuing letters of marque. Before the intelligence of the course adopted by her Majesty's government could reach America, the legislatures of three more States had provisionally declared their adhesion to the confederation thus established; upwards of one hundred thousand militia and volunteers had been called out by the President of the United States; active measures had to be taken for the defence of the capital; military and naval preparations were hurrying ou; a repetition on a much larger scale of the collisions which had already taken place between the opposing forces was imminent; the blockade of the southern ports had actually commenced; and the right of search and capture had already been exercised over British vessels. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be admitted that the recognition of the insurgent States as belligerents was premature, or that their insurrection was thereby encouraged; nor can it be supposed that the British government could refuse to the Confederate States that belligerent character which the United States themselves implicitly granted and subsequently allowed to them. But if Mr Seward means to base the present claims on the ground that the British government should, while acknowledging the blockade, have awaited the arrival of a confederate ship of war in British ports before admitting the possession by the Confederate States of a ship of war, and therefore their right to be treated on the high seas as a belligerent power, & reference to dates will show that the question would have been raised on the arrival of the Sumter at Trinidad, and of the Nashville at Southampton, some months before Mr. Adams laid his first complaint against the vessels mentioned in the summary of claims. It is difficult to see what injury the United States government can allege, or what redress they can claimon this score. Still more difficult is it to understand the process of reasoning by which the acts of British subjects in furnishing assistance and supplies to the Southern States can be traced to the issue of the proclamation. Undertakings of this nature, in favor of either of the belligerents, were equally in contravention of its terms, and those who engaged in such enterprises did so at their own risk. The United States, whose communication with Great Britain was unioterrupted, received assistance of this illicit nature to a very much larger extent than their antagonists. Mr. Seward goes on to say, that "when the municipal laws of Great Britain proved in practical application to be inadequate to the emergency, the British nation omitted for various reasons, which seemed to the United States insufficient, to revise those laws." To this statement a simple answer may be given. That the foreign enlisment act, like every other enactment, is liable to evasion, and that it was on more than one occasion successfully evaded, no one has ever attempted to deny. But, looking at the nature of the evasions which actually occurred, it must be asked, whether these could have been prevented by any practicable amendment of the law? It was not for want of legal power in the authorities, nor from disinclination to use that power, but solely from the deficiency of evidence, that the Florida was not detained in Euglaud, and that when subsequently seized at Nassau, she was released by the authorities there. In the case of the Shenandoah and Georgia, no steps could be taken, because no information was given of their designs until they bad escaped from British jurisdiction. As regards the Alabama, the case viewed in this respect appears still stronger. The law would, in the opinion of her Majesty's government, have justified her detention. That detention was actually decided upon; and it was only in consequence of an unexpected stratagem that she succeeded in escaping before orders for that purpose arrived. To whatever cause her escape may be attributable, it did not take place in cousequence of any want of stringency in the act. Nor, after that unfortunate occurrence, were the British government unwilling to respond to Mr. Adams's appeal for more effective measures to prevent such proceedings. They answered it by a proposal for a simultaneous revision of the law of both countries. As the opinion of the United States government, expressed in reply, was to the effect that their own law was not in need of amendment, it is to be presumed that a complete assimilation of the British act to that law was all that they expected or desired. Yet the British law is substantially identical with that of the United States, with the exception of two provisions, the insertion of which, whatever may be their value in other respects, would have been wholly inef fective to prevent the particular infractions of neutrality complained of. The first of these provisions requires that the owners or consignees of armed vessels, sailing out of the ports of the United States, and belonging in whole or in part to citizens thereof, shall give security to double the value of the vessel and cargo, that such vessel shall not be employed by them |