Puslapio vaizdai
PDF
„ePub“

any sense certain; for probability implies some uncertainty. The maximum of probability implies the minimum of uncertainty, but still that minimum remains, and while it remains there is not absolute repose of mind.

I have said, There are various degrees of certainty;' and you may say, 'How can this be? How can certainty admit of degrees? A thing is either certain, or it is not. It cannot be more than certain.' I answer, 'As far as all the degrees exclude doubt, they are all equal; but inasmuch as the motives whereby the doubt is excluded may be greater or less, more in number or fewer, so the certainty may be said to be greater or less.'

For instance, I am absolutely certain, that is, I have Moral cer- no doubt whatever, that there is a country tainty. called Africa, although I have never seen it; my mind is perfectly at rest as to the fact; it never occurs to me to inquire as to its truth; and I should not give heed to the words of any one who denied it. The motive of my belief is,-because all men say so. That is my major premiss; my minor is, but all men cannot be deceived, or deceive; they cannot all be supposed to have combined in, or to be the victims of, one vast conspiracy to assert a falsehood; and my undoubting conclusion is, therefore, that there is a country called Africa. This is what is called moral certainty. This is the lowest kind of certainty, but still certainty. It excludes all doubt, and produces in my mind perfect repose.

Again, I am absolutely certain that the sun will rise to-morrow morning; and the motive of my certainty is, the unfailing constancy of the laws of nature. This is what is called physical

Physical certainty.

certainty; and it is higher than the other, because the motive is greater.

But there is a higher certainty still. I am certain that twice two make four, and that the whole is greater than any of its parts. This is Metaphysical what is called metaphysical certainty, and it certainty. is the highest degree of natural certainty; and for this reason: such a thing as the universal deception, active or passive, of the world might be imagined; and there might be an interruption of the laws of nature, by their Lawgiver, the Creator of nature. Both are alike conceivable, being within the range of possibility. But such a thing as that twice two should make three or five, or that the whole should not be greater than its part, cannot be conceived as possible; it involves a contradiction. God Himself could not make it so. And this is no derogation from His omnipotence; for the impossible is not the object of, or within the sphere of, power.

higher than

This, then, is what I mean by certainty,-which excludes all doubt, and begets an absolute re- The certainty pose of the mind. And now I affirm that I of divine faith have a greater degree of certainty with regard any of the to truths of the supernatural order, than I have three. with regard to those truths of the natural order. I have a degree of certainty higher than even the metaphysical-the certainty of divine faith. It excludes all doubt, and begets in my mind absolute repose; what St. Paul calls the 'joy and peace of believing.' I am more certain that there are Three distinct Divine Persons who are yet One God, that Mary was immaculately conceived, that her Son was the Eternal Word, and that the Holy Father is His Vicar and infallible, than I am that twice two make four.

But what is the reason? Why is it that I hold all this with absolute certainty, and you do not, although those truths are equally before us both, and we are equal as to our powers of understanding and reason, in forming judgments and arriving at conclusions?

of faith.

The reason is not to be sought for in diversity of The light circumstances, or the difference of our antecedents, education, pursuits, temperament, or mental bias. These will account for much, but not for this.

The reason is this; and I shall preface it by an illustration which will serve to explain it, and make my meaning clear:

I see the crucifix now standing before me on my table as I write; and that because it is visible in itself, and I have the power of vision in my eyes; but, supposing the room were in darkness, I should no longer see it, although it would remain in itself equally visible, and I should have the power of vision in my eyes as much as before. The presence of light, then, is necessary to vision, and its absence precludes it. In the same way, the reason why I, in common with all Catholics, believe those and kindred truths, while you, in common with all who are not Catholics, do not believe them, or hold them with absolute certainty to the exclusion of all doubt, is because we have, by the goodness of God, and apart from any merit of our own, a grace which is called the Light of Divine Faith, while you as yet do not have it. It is not our believing those truths which invests them with truth, or makes them to be true; and your disbelief of them equally does not divest them of that truth which they objectively possess. They are true apart from all affirmation or belief on the one hand, and from all denial or disbelief on the other.

Let me explain farther what I mean by this light of faith. God has given to His intelligent and rational creatures three great spiritual lights; I say spiritual or intellectual, to distinguish them from the material light which affects the bodily eye.

The first is the light of intelligence or reason, called otherwise the light of nature. It is by means The light of of this light that I see clearly, for instance,- nature. that twice two make four, or that the whole is greater than its part. Those are facts within the sphere and compass of my intelligence and reason, which, illuminated by this natural light, apprehends them and holds them with absolute certainty. But take another fact, which is asserted, that in God there are Three Persons, distinct and separate the one from the other, as to their personality, and yet identified with each other, and numerically one, as to their essence, substance, nature, power, will, operation, &c. To my reason, even with its natural light, this seems a paradox; and yet I believe it as firmly, and with as little doubt, as I do that twice two make four.

And why? By reason of a superadded, supernatural light, the light of divine faith-a grace, The light of a quality bestowed by my Maker on my soul, grace. illuminated and fortified by which it can apprehend and embrace undoubtingly truths, which by no power, or faculty, or force of nature I can even have knowledge of, much less embrace.

The third spiritual light bestowed by God is the light of glory, the correlative in the future of The light of the light of grace in the present. By means glory. of it we shall see God, behold Him intuitively, and no longer under veils. We shall seem Him as He is. Now we walk by faith, then we shall walk by sight. But

this last and greatest light does not immediately con cern us now; what I wish to speak of is the Light of Faith.

The repose

This gives absolute undoubting certainty. He who has it has perfect repose of mind, no disposition of faith. to inquire-he has no fear or suspicion of the possible truth of the opposite-and farther, no arguments will avail to persuade him of the truth of the opposite. Just as a clever mathematician might bring me a great number of seemingly irrefragable arguments, to persuade me that twice two make five, and I might fail to answer any one of them, or to see any answer, and yet I should remain firm in my conviction, fully and firmly persuaded in my mind of the truth that twice two make four, and retain my certainty unshaken and untouched; so also a clever controversialist might bring me an equal number of arguments against the truth of the Trinity, or the Immaculate Conception, or the Infallibility of the Holy Father, and, after all, I should remain in my certainty of belief as I was before.

You may put this easily into practice. You may ply a Catholic with argument after argument against some truth of the Catholic religion. You may be clever and learned, and he may be ignorant and a fool, and have not a word to say for himself; and yet you have not affected his belief. He is as certain as ever that his faith is right, and that your opinions are wrong.

But try the converse: will you expose a Protestant to the teaching of one of our priests, and not fear the issue? I suppose in both cases a subject whose intellectual vision is fixed steadily upon the truth, and whose sole desire is to possess it.

We have arrived, then, at this: 1. That the intellect tends of its nature towards the truth, and does not rest

« AnkstesnisTęsti »