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feeling. They are certainly less sensual than men. How little in comparison do they care for the pleasures of the table!

We may notice three differences in mind with respect to our feelings or sensibilities; strength, delicacy, and refinement.

Strength of feeling exists in those who are capable of feeling intensely and permanently, though they may not easily be roused.

Delicacy of feeling implies that feelings of whatever kind are easily excited.

Refinement of feeling signifies a susceptibility to the pleasures of the intellect, imagination, and affections, rather than to those of sense.

Persons of strong feelings are often difficult to move, but when moved, their impressions are deep and lasting; while those of delicate feelings, though easily warmed, are wont as quickly to cool.

Strong feelings are seldom found but in company with a strong intellect; whereas delicacy of feeling is frequently united with an understanding of no very high order. In common discourse the word sensibility is often used to signify a peculiar susceptibility to the tender impressions, such as pity and love; but in this work it means the simple fact of susceptibility to pleasure or pain,-emotion or sensation in general, without any reference to kind or degree. In the former sense, sensibility is one sort of delicacy, and as it is thought amiable and pleasing, especially in women, it is very frequently put on where it does not really exist. This sort of affectation seems to have been more common formerly than

now, probably, because the reality was more highly prized.

We lately remarked that women have generally more refinement than men. They have also more delicacy, but on the whole less strength of feeling. Their social affections, however, though not so violent as those of men, appear to be quite as lasting, and in the case of love much more so. Their attachment to their children is even more intense than that of fathers, and fully as durable. These are important exceptions. But the self-regarding passions are commonly much stronger in man.

That women surpass us in quick or delicate sensibility there can be no doubt. This is in truth one of their principal charms. It allows them to catch the perfume of a thousand little flowers that strew the path of life, over which the foot of man would pass with unheeding tread. It keeps them attentive to the little wants of all around, enables them to divine a wish even before expressed, to avoid everything that might possibly wound the feelings of others, and it prompts them to seek out, to visit, and relieve the poor and unfortunate. That women are peculiarly alive to pity is proved by the widest experience. The African traveller Park has said, that in all his wanderings among civilized or savage nations, whatever might have been his treatment from man, he had always reason to bless the tender sympathy of woman.

Persons of the strongest feelings are often esteemed cold by such as know them little, because they are not easily moved; while those of delicate feelings

please us at the very first. The union of great strength with delicacy is rare, but not unexampled.

One more distinction deserves to be noticed. Though we are certainly much indebted to nature for refinement, as well as for delicacy and strength of feeling, yet the former depends far more upon education than the two latter. To raise the mind above the pleasures of sense, and fix it on those of the intellect, imagination, and affections, is, as before observed, one grand object of mental culture. This is true refinement, or mental civilization.

I may conclude this head by remarking that dif ferent orders of mind require very different treatment in order to keep them in a healthy state. Persons naturally of high spirits and of delicate sensibilities, if they have fit objects at home, are supported by their buoyancy of humour, and can do without outward amusements, though they relish them much when these fall in their way. Others, of great equanimity of spirits, and of rather dull sensibility, get on in an uniform manner, without at all thinking of such amusements, which they are little capable of enjoying. The former can do without, but the latter cannot relish them.

There is a third class, however, naturally rather of low spirits, but of lively sensibilities. To them, pleasures, commonly so called, are not only agreeable, but useful; for, by varying the train of ideas, they prevent melancholy, and improve the whole tone of mind. While these can relish amusements, they cannot well do without them.

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CHAPTER II.

ON SOME PARTICULAR DESIRES.

SECTION I.--The Principal Desires enumerated.

AVING treated of desire in general, we come

HAV

now to consider some of the particular desires. It has already been remarked that it does not belong to a work of this nature to give a general analysis and classification of the emotions, or to trace the sources from which they spring. This is the province of pure mental philosophy, otherwise called metaphysics. Moral science views the emotions chiefly in their effects upon human conduct and human happiness, and as desires and fears are the most important in this respect, it naturally pays the greatest attention to these. Even when thus limited the subject is still sufficiently vast, probably quite enough of itself to fill a volume, and therefore we shall be excused from entering into a minute detail, that would draw us too far away from the main track which we wish to pursue. Having already made sundry observations on desire in general, we shall now content ourselves with remarks on the more important species.

We must begin by calling to mind the grand distinction, which was formerly laid down between the self-regarding and the social desires. Now, almost every good which we are capable of desiring for

ourselves may be classed under one or other of the eight following heads: 1. Sensual gratifications. 2. Amusement. 3. The Affections of others. 4. Wealth. 5. Power. 6. Reputation. 7. Knowledge; and lastly, what is necessary to them all, Continued Existence.

It will be remarked that we have not put pleasure as a separate object of desire, and for this reason, that pleasure is intimately associated with each, so much so, indeed, as to have induced many to suppose that we never really long for any thing else, however varied the forms in which it may present itself:

"Whate'er the motive, pleasure is the mark,"

says Young, and many are of his opinion. To settle this disputed point, belongs not to a work like the present, but to purely mental philosophy. Whether pleasure be or be not our sole aim, one thing is certain, that we cannot wish for any thing without connecting with it ideas, either of positive pleasure or of the absence of pain. These ideas are, at least, inseparably united with every thing that we long for. It may sometimes remain in doubt, whether the pleasure in prospect first give rise to the desire, or whether certain objects directly rousing desire, pleasure follow after and react upon the previous passion; but whichever view we may adopt, desire and pleasure are indissolubly associated. In either case, our moral conclusions must remain the same. It is because the question is a purely speculative one, or has at least no perceptible application to practice, that it appertains to metaphysical and not to moral philosophy. It would require but a very slight dif

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