Now, if we study the situation, we shall notice that the Germans and proGermans are disadvantageously grouped. The Germans in Germany alone form a solid block. They touch the Magyars only on the West. The loyalty of the Magyar proletariat to the German alliance might be seriously shaken for the reasons set forth hereafter. The Bulgarians are entirely surrounded by foes except on their Ottoman frontiers. As for the Turks, aside from the small still-existing fraction of Turkey in Europe, adjoining Bulgaria,

- Anatolia and the Kurd country, -the people throughout all the rest of the Ottoman Empire are hostile to them.

Possibilities of insurrection among the Germans and their vassals. (a) German Workmen in Germany. - An effective uprising of German workmen in Germany, like that which the Allied Socialists have hoped for and expected, has never been possible, for the following fundamental reason. Even if they do not accept the term 'Pangermanists,' a large majority of them are Pangermanists in fact. They have, indeed, long been convinced supporters of an economic Pan-Germany, that is to say, of Central Pan-Germany at least, the immense advantage of which from the standpoint of their material interest, the years-old propaganda directed from Berlin had proved to them long before the war. The German Social Democrats are so bent upon supporting Central Pan-Germany that they are not willing even to consider the liberation of the down-trodden Slavs of Austria-Hungary, because their servitude is indispensable to the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany. Indeed, this was most explicitly expressed

by the Vorwärts of February 28, 19: which went so far as to declare fa: that the demands of the Interal Socialist Conference at London w never be accepted by the Central Pos ers. Furthermore, the majority of German Socialists, by reason of the Teutonic mental habit and their changeable atavism, are profound gratified by the military successes Germany and the resultant enorme booty.

(b) German Workmen in Austria. They are anti-Slav. They have, to sure, organized some strikes, but the movements cannot be regarded as posed to the policy of Vienna, for the took place, by a strange coincidenc early in 1918, at the very mome when Count Czernin was multiply his pacifist manoeuvres, intended espe cially to deceive Great Britain and t United States. Moreover, these Ge man Socialists in Austria have neve taken sides against the Hapsburgs. S that their attitude, therefore, is not dis tinctively democratic. We can place? more reliance on them than on the S cial Democrats of the German Empir

(c) Bulgarians. It is impossible: think for an instant of their separati from the Central Empires, which ha never been practicable. The Bul rians concluded their pact with Bern long before the war, with the ver distinct and premeditated determination to acquire the hegemony of the Balkans; and it is theirs, for the m ment. On many points, indeed, th Bulgarian dreams are surpassed. No they understand very clearly that the will be able to retain their prese conquests only with the assistance Austria-Germany. Moreover, they a" very proud to serve as a bridge betwee Germany and the Ottoman Empire We must regard the Bulgarians as ab solutely devoted to the maintenance of Pan-Germany.

(d) Among the Magyars, on the conrary, there is a condition of affairs, ot generally realized by the Allies, hich might, however, be made to forward materially the cause of the Enente. The fact is that, if the necessary teps were taken by the Allies, the maority of the Magyars might well be ed to revolt against the Pangermanist oke of Berlin and the feudal yoke of Budapest.

Among the ten million Magyars, here are six millions of agricultural aborers and two millions of industrial workmen say, in all, eight millions male and female) of proletarians by birth, who possess absolutely nothing, vho sell their physical strength for pitiTully low wages which they are combelled to accept, and who are cynically exploited by the two millions of nobles, priests, and office-holders, who are the only real partisans of Germany in Hungary.

This deep social division may be made to serve as the basis of a powerful revolutionary manoeuvre on the part of the Allies. These eight millions of Magyar proletarians, who are beyond question ruthlessly oppressed by the Magyar nobles, fall into three categories: (a) mobilized men (20 per cent of the whole), say, 1,600,000; (b) males not mobilized, who have remained in Hungary, 2,400,000; and (c) females in Hungary, 4,000,000.

The net figures of these three categories, as estimated a little further on, might play a very important part in the anti-Pangermanist revolution whose organization we are discussing. The concurrence of the Magyar proletariat would contribute notably to the dissolution of Pan-Germany, for it would assure the geographical connecting link between the insurrection of the Polish-Czech regions in the north and that of the Jugo-Slav regions in the South. Thus by favor of the revolu

tion of the Magyar proletariat, the insurrection would extend in a straight line from the Baltic to the Saloniki front, which would be a great advantage in every aspect.

These eight millions of Magyar proletarians are genuinely desirous of peace, and are not accessible to the imperialistic seductions which induce the German Socialists to play the game of the Berlin General Staff. As they certainly did not want war, they bitterly detest those who forced it upon them: the great Magyar landed proprietors who exploit them without pity, and whose feudal spirit is identical with that of the Prussian Junkers-with whom, indeed, these Magyar nobles act in close association for the preservation of their privileges, the continuance of which would make certain the perpetuation of the servitude of the Magyar proletariat.

As a result of this social condition of affairs, the pacifist manifestations at Budapest on several occasions have assumed a really serious aspect. For all these reasons, it is rational to conclude that these eight millions of proletarians are capable of rising in revolt against their masters, the feudal Magyars, at the same time with, or shortly after, the Slavs and Latins of Central Europe. But such an uprising on their part assumes one explicit condition, namely, that the Allies fully understand the really horrible social conditions under which they live, and assure them beforehand, formally and with an absolute purpose to keep their promise, that the first certain result of the triumph of the Entente will be to put an end to the agrarian and feudal régime in Hungary, which keeps the proletariat in a state of slavery. Thus the movement to be undertaken in the Magyar portion of Hungary is, in essence, a social movement based upon an agrarian revolt.

II

Analysis of the second group, consisting of 86,000,000 anti-Pangermanist slaves

In order to obtain from our analysis results corresponding so far as possible to the probabilities, let us divide these slaves into two categories, based on the degree of effectiveness of their future action, by virtue of their geographical distribution. In each of these categories let us then set apart the subjects of the Central Powers and the subjects of the Entente countries, the mobilized men, the non-mobilized males, and the females.

First Category.-Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals, well placed geographically to act to good purpose if they had the material means of so doing.

This group is itself made up of two geographical elements- the first be

The Turks are detested by the gras: majority of Arabs, a part of whom have already revolted under the leadersh of the King of Hedjaz, or in coöperatie with the Allies in Palestine. As the r of the Arabs live at a distance from th genuinely Turkish regions, the mobi zation cannot have reached them ve extensively.

For these various reasons the Ar anti-Turk movement might be large developed.

As for the Armenians, our estima: of two millions is certainly much ta large if we reflect that about a milli Armenians have been massacred by the Turks since the beginning of the wa

However, we may retain this figure, for the vanished million is balanced by the 1,800,000 Russian subjects of the Caucasus, many of whom have already fought with the Russian troops against the German-Turk combination. The treachery of the Bolsheviks having placed these Armenians in peril of being massacred in their turn, especially at this time, when the Turks are aiming at taking possession of the Caucasus with the aid of the Mussulman element there, we might well find a quite appreciable numerical support among the Armenians of the Caucasus.

(b) In Central Europe:

Poles

Lithuanians

Letts

Ruthenians

Czech-Slovaks

Jugo-Slavs

Roumanians

Total

20,000,000 2,000,000

2,000,000

5,500,000

8,500,000

11,000,000

10,000,000 59,000,000

We must make an important reservation with respect to the Ententophil sentiments of the Ruthenians, because of the anti-Polish Ukrainian policy of the Central Powers. It is possible that the Germans will eventually set the Ruthenians against the Poles; but the Ruthenians occupy only the eastern portion of Galicia, while all the rest of the 59,000,000 people of the group under consideration inhabit the vast regions extending from the Baltic to the southern line of the Balkans (about 1500 kilometres; see the map on page 848).

Now, these regions form the most indispensable and at the same time the most vulnerable strategic base of all military Pan-Germany. In fact all the rail and water lines of communication which connect Austria and Germany with Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey, traverse these regions. Three and a half years of war have demonstrated

VOL. 121 - NO. 6

that without the troops and diverse contributions of the Balkans and Turkey, to which are now added those of Southern Russia, Austria-Germany would long since have been powerless to continue the struggle. In reality, therefore, any serious interference with the Austro-German communications with the East (Russia and the Balkans) will be enough to make the situation very difficult, both morally and materially, for the armies concentrated on the Western front by the Berlin General Staff — and this with remarkable rapidity. We are justified, then, in saying that the vital interior districts of Pan-Germany are practically occupied by peoples favorably inclined to the Entente. This is a fact susceptible of being turned to enormous advantage.

are to-day incapable of action because they are too near the military lines; but who might act most effectively if serious disturbances should arise in Central Europe.

from the 'Political-Science' analysis of Pan-Germany.

The foregoing analysis makes possible certain ethnographical, nationalpsychological, and geographical deduc

(1) to estimate reasonably the moral make-up of the Pan-German armies; (2) to draw up a table of the different elements constituting the insurrectionary forces now latent in Pan-Germany; and (3) to compare the forces of the Entente and Pan-Germany for 1918.

or, let us say, one in five of the entire population of the Central Powers.

From these 28,000,000, it may be said that we should deduct the losses since the war began; but the yearly losses of the Central Powers probably do not exceed their yearly military contingent, which is in the neighborhood of 1,350,000 men. We may, therefore. assume that this yearly contingent balances the losses, and that the total mobilized force of Pan-Germany remains, in round numbers, at 28,000,000.

Hence we arrive at three deductions of the highest importance.

(a) It is exceedingly important to remember that this figure -28,000,000 -represents the grand maximum that the Central Powers can mobilize today; that is to say, so long as they have not succeeded in organizing for military