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in a shout of laughter, for the prophet cling to him. He is charming in conhad proved ridiculously naïve. It vin- versation. Nor is it hard to imagine dicated, if you will, the Clemenceau him one of the most noted duelists of method; but none the less it is scarcely the day. He has the manner which goes to be recommended.
with swordsmanship: alertness, an inThere is also something of the knight trepid eye, a certain bluff heartiness. adventurer about M. Clemenceau. If Yet he is practical withal, and comhe disconcerts some people by his boy- bines the acuteness of a man of busiish spirits, - for, temperamentally, he ness with the instincts of a preux has never grown up,
- they yet feel, chevalier. in spite of themselves, how steadfast He has a double character: one half he is and how wise, beneath a mask of student and philosopher, some one almost truculent indifference. He has caught him reading Theocritus in the the fault common to his intellectual true spirit of Macaulay's Scholar, countrymen of relying too much upon the other half man of action. And, formulæ. 'It must be so, for I have sometimes, no doubt, the philosopher is proved it by mathematics.'
uppermost, killing the physical activAgain, his large generosity, broad ity. Again, a temperamental impageneral ideas, and ardent nature cause tience to cut a way through difficulties him to overlook the defects of meaner may lead to drastic measures which anmen in their malevolence and sordid other judgment would repudiate. Inaims. But, for all that, he is the one deed, the balance is hard to establish, man conspicuously necessary to the for his Gallic nature is speedily aflame salvation of France. His strong, brave and his temper leaps to the combat spirit rises to the height of the national at the signal of attack. Yet generally emergency. So far from being fright- it is well controlled by a brain that is ened by the twin dragons of Boloism steel-cold in its analysis and piercing and Bolshevism, he feels strengthened power. by his struggle with both. He has trans- Between Boloism and Bolshevism he fixed both with his sword.
has risen to great authority as the one The world in arms loves a fighter. solid rock of government in France. He That is why Clemenceau has secured is the symbol of the nation. Who shall the very first place in the heart of the dare to cast him down? And the army, army. It loves his spirit, the élan and realizing his moral force behind its bravoure of a Frenchman of the old belligerent one, acclaims him the great school, directed by the science of the patriot. And when he returns from new. Moreover, he is a deep-dyed Re- visiting the Front, to his home on rue publican - one who has suffered for Franklin, he feels cheered and supthe cause. He makes the same appeal ported by the welcome he has had from to the common soldier as does Joffre, the troops. Sometimes a poilu places for he will pat a sentry on the shoulder in his car as a mark of especial favor a and call him mon amii'
piece of rude carving from the trench, Yet, for all his democracy, he is the a walking-stick, with handle fashioned last man to flatter ignorance and meg.
in the Premier's likeness, or a pipe of alomania. Some accuse him of being good French briar. And these trophies an aristocrat at heart- unquestionably of poilu affection touch him more, I an old-world distinction and courtesy think, than the proudest gifts.
THE WESTERN FRONT AND POLITICAL STRATEG!
BY ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME
I TRUST that I have shown in my find for the Allies three of the unknot earlier articles in this magazine, first, quantities of the strategical equati that the strategy of the Allies ought, which they must necessarily solve. M. like that of the Germans, to be a shall see that the working out of te strategy of the political sciences, under ethnographical, national-psychologic penalty of remaining in a dangerous and geographical unknown quantitcondition of inferiority; second, that (the last in its relation with the fr action on the part of the Allies confined two) is sufficient to bring out clear to the Western Front is not enough to possibilities of complete and compara make their victory certain, but that, tively speedy victory which have neve to be effective, their action must em- as yet been distinctly envisaged by the brace the whole theatre of war now Allies. represented by Pan-Germany in its entirety.
PAN-GERMANY ANALYZED FROM THL The partisans of the Western Front theory believe that every effort put
' POLITICAL SCIENCE' STANDPOINT forth elsewhere must work to the dis- It is the purpose of this analysis : advantage of that front. The exact disclose, first, the nature of the people contrary is true, on condition that the embraced in Pan-Germany, considere : field of action far away from the West- as a whole; second, how far the getern theatre is wisely chosen.
graphical distribution of such of the Strong evidence of this is seen in the peoples as are anti-Pangermanist wol consideration that the German offen- enable them (in case certain conditives sive in the West would have been im- as to providing them with arms shouk possible if the Allies had been saga- be fulfilled) to manifest their seno cious enough to replace the vanished ments to good purpose. Russian front by an insurrectionary The total population of Pan-Ge front extending from the Baltic to many amounts to 180,000,000 souls their lines in Macedonia - which is made up of two sharply contrasted el what the Germans would inevitably ments. have done had they been in the place 1. The Germans and their vassak of the Allies.
- or pro-Germans, - numbering, so I have already indicated the broad 94,000,000. outlines of the plan based on this con- 2. The slaves ception.
There are, in fact, confined in ParThe object of the present paper is to Germany against their will, the endi 1 See chapters XII and xm of the second (en; ins, and Semites,
belonging to fourtes
mous number of 86,000,000 Slavs, Lailarged) edition of Pan-Germany; the Disease and Cure. Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press.
This fact is of preponderating im
portance: for this vast aggregation of points of view, it would manifestly be French, Belgians, Alsace-Lorrainers, impossible to derive figures which are Danes, Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, Ru- rigorously accurate; but it is proper to thenians (with a reservation to be indi- observe that even approximate accucated below), Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Rou- .racy is sufficient to make our deductions manians, Italians, Armenians, Greeks, of very practical value. And it is possi
, and Arabs, are anti-German by con- ble to reach that point by starting from viction. They are well aware that only these three bases of reckoning: the decisive victory of the Entente can (a) In respect to those whom we put an end to their slavery.
term the slaves, we shall distinguish beHaving studied most of these op- tween subjects of the Entente countries pressed peoples on the spot for more and subjects of the Central Powers. than twenty years, being familiar with The latter alone can be regularly motheir interests and their sentiments, I bilized in the armies of Pan-Germany.
assert that here is a psychological situa- (6) We shall assume that females tion of supreme interest to the Allies. make up half of the total population of Furthermore, I maintain that these a country. In many countries the num86,000,000 Slavs, Latins, and Semites, ber of females is slightly above fifty per by reason of the strategic importance cent; but the difference is generally so of the regions they occupy, represent- small that it could not cause a serious on the single condition that they are error in the deductions which serve as supplied with means of effective action a basis of our argument. closely adapted to their peculiar sit- (c) We shall assume that the Geruation — a force capable of affording mans have mobilized twenty per cent infinitely more valuable assistance in of their subjects and of the subjects bringing about victory than any that of their vassal-allies, Austria-Hungary, the 182,000,000 inhabitants of the Bulgaria, and Turkey. This proporformer Empire of the Tsars could ever tion is large enough to do away with have contributed.
any danger of an estimate below the The immense advantage that the Al- facts. Indeed this figure of twenty in lies can derive from this state of affairs one hundred of the whole population will appear fully in the light of the de- consequently including women - is the ductions which can be drawn from the highest among known results of the vafollowing analysis of the various peo- rious mobilizations. Moreover it correples of Pan-Germany. The essential sponds with the results of the German object of this analysis is to determine mobilization so far as the information the numbers, in each of the main gleaned in three years enables us to groups which make up the population
the population determine it. Lastly, this figure emof Pan-Germany, - that is to say, the braces practically all the physically Germans and pro-Germans on the one sound men between 15 and 60 years. hand, and their slaves on the other, In selecting it as a basis, therefore, we (1) of men and of women, respectively; may be assured that we do not under(2) of men mobilized in the armies of estimate the mobilized forces of PanPan-Germany; (3) of men not mobil- Germany. ized, who, therefore, have remained
I at home or are employed in munition factories.
An analysis of the first group, the How the ethnological analysis is 94,000,000 Germans and pro-Germans worked out. - From these various would result as follows:
18,800,000 by the Vorwärts of February 28, 15 Non-mobilized males 28,200,000
which went so far as to declare Females
that the demands of the Intera Total
Socialist Conference at London wo Now, if we study the situation, we never be accepted by the Central Po shall notice that the Germans and pro- ers. Furthermore, the majority of Germans are disadvantageously group- German Socialists, by reason of the ed. The Germans in Germany alone Teutonic mental habit and their form a solid block. They touch the changeable atavism, are profoun. Magyars only on the West. The loy- gratified by the military successes alty of the Magyar proletariat to the Germany and the resultant enorm German alliance might be seriously booty. shaken for the reasons set forth here- (6) German Workmen in Austria after. The Bulgarians are entirely sur- They are anti-Slav. They have, :( rounded by foes except on their Otto- sure, organized some strikes, but the man frontiers. As for the Turks, aside movements cannot be regarded as my from the small still-existing fraction of posed to the policy of Vienna, for the
Turkey in Europe, adjoining Bulgaria, took place, by a strange coincider - Anatolia and the Kurd country, early in 1918, at the very mome"
- the people throughout all the rest when Count Czernin was multiply of the Ottoman Empire are hostile to his pacifist manœuvres, intended them.
cially to deceive Great Britain and Possibilities of insurrection among United States. Moreover, these Ge the Germans and their vassals. (a) Ger- man Socialists in Austria have ne man Workmen in Germany. - An taken sides against the Hapsburgs. effective uprising of German workmen that their attitude, therefore, is not in Germany, like that which the Allied tinctively democratic. We can place ! Socialists have hoped for and expected, more reliance on them than on the S. has never been possible, for the follow- cial Democrats of the German Empir ing fundamental reason. Even if they (c) Bulgarians. — It is impossible i do not accept the term 'Pangerman
think for an instant of their separati; ists,' a large majority of them are Pan- from the Central Empires, which ha germanists in fact. They have, indeed, never been practicable. The Buls i long been convinced supporters of an rians concluded their pact with Berts economic Pan-Germany, that is to say, long before the war, with the ve of Central Pan-Germany at least, the distinct and premeditated determinimmense advantage of which from the tion to acquire the hegemony of standpoint of their material interest, Balkans; and it is theirs, for the me the years-old propaganda directed ment. On many points, indeed, to from Berlin had proved to them long Bulgarian dreams are surpassed. Nos before the war. The German Social they understand very clearly that the Democrats are so bent upon support will be able to retain their preses ing Central Pan-Germany that they conquests only with the assistance a are not willing even to consider the Austria-Germany. Moreover, they ar: liberation of the down-trodden Slavs of very proud to serve as a bridge betwee Austria-Hungary, because their servis Germany and the Ottoman Empire tude is indispensable to the mainten- We must regard the Bulgarians as at ance of Central Pan-Germany. In- solutely devoted to the maintenanc: deed, this was most explicitly expressed of Pan-Germany.
(d) Among the Magyars, on the con- tion of the Magyar proletariat, the inrary, there is a condition of affairs, surrection would extend in a straight lot generally realized by the Allies, line from the Baltic to the Saloniki vhich might, however, be made to for- front, which would be a great advanvard materially the cause of the En- tage in every aspect. ente. The fact is that, if the necessary These eight millions of Magyar proteps were taken by the Allies, the ma- letarians are genuinely desirous of ority of the Magyars might well be peace,
and are not accessible to the imed to revolt against the Pangermanist perialistic seductions which induce the roke of Berlin and the feudal yoke of German Socialists to play the game of Budapest.
the Berlin General Staff. As they cerAmong the ten million Magyars, tainly did not want war, they bitterly here are six millions of agricultural detest those who forced it upon them: aborers and two millions of industrial the great Magyar landed proprietors vorkmen - say, in all, eight millions who exploit them without pity, and male and female) of proletarians by whose feudal spirit is identical with birth, who possess absolutely nothing, that of the Prussian Junkers - with vho sell their physical strength for piti- whom, indeed, these Magyar nobles act ully low wages which they are com
in close association for the preservaDelled to accept, and who are cynically tion of their privileges, the continuexploited by the two millions of no- ance of which would make certain the bles, priests, and office-holders, who are perpetuation of the servitude of the the only real partisans of Germany in Magyar proletariat. Hungary.
As a result of this social condition of This deep social division may be affairs, the pacifist manifestations at made to serve as the basis of a power- Budapest on several occasions have asful revolutionary maneuvre on the part sumed a really serious aspect. For all of the Allies. These eight millions of these reasons, it is rational to conclude Magyar proletarians, who are beyond that these eight millions of proletarians question ruthlessly oppressed by the are capable of rising in revolt against Magyar nobles, fall into three catego their masters, the feudal Magyars, at ries: (a) mobilized men (20 per cent the same time with, or shortly after, of the whole), say, 1,600,000; (b) males the Slavs and Latins of Central Eunot mobilized, who have remained in rope. But such an uprising on their part Hungary, 2,400,000; and (c) females assumes one explicit condition, namely, in Hungary, 4,000,000.
that the Allies fully understand the The net figures of these three cate- really horrible social conditions ungories, as estimated a little further on, der which they live, and assure them might play a very important part in beforehand, formally and with an abthe anti-Pangermanist revolution whose solute purpose to keep their promise, organization we are discussing. The that the first certain result of the triconcurrence of the Magyar proletariat umph of the Entente will be to put an would contribute notably to the disso- end to the agrarian and feudal régime lution of Pan-Germany, for it would in Hungary, which keeps the proletaassure the geographical connecting riat in a state of slavery. Thus the link between the insurrection of the movement to be undertaken in the Polish-Czech regions in the north and Magyar portion of Hungary is, in esthat of the Jugo-Slav regions in the sence, a social movement based upon South. Thus by favor of the revolu- an agrarian revolt.