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hour; for we shall have that last quarter Caillaux is a genius of another sort. of an hour.'
This vibrant language, uttered in the Chamber last March, stirred even the Socialists, and M. Clemenceau was urged to 'carry on' by a thumping majority. When he speaks thus clearly, with the voice of France, he is neither to be silenced nor to be upset. And the Socialists know that, and know, also, that the paramount anxiety of the proletariat is not the destination and ultimate fulfillment of their catchwords and devices for social salvation, but the speedy conclusion of the war. In confusing this clear issue, in impeding the accomplishment of this steady aim, how would they justify themselves before the electorate?
All loyal citizens of France must rally to the Clemenceau banner. The purity of his aims, the known strength of his reforming zeal, are the instruments of his power, instruments more cunningly shaped and better adapted to his hand than any he could choose in the arsenal of politics.
What are the problems with which he is faced? They are, obviously, internal and external war within and war without. For Germany has attacked along the line of least resistance in seeking to seduce the vain and ambitious by dreams of conquest or a rich emolument. And that subtle sapping proved, indeed, as dangerous as gas-shells on the Western front. How can we reconcile this turpitude and treason with the superb heroism of the Marne, of Verdun, and of the Aisne? While the heart of laborious France has always been true, vast cosmopolitan Paris has been tempted and tainted by pacifism and worse. Bolo Pasha is a figure from the Arabian Nights, incredible in his magnificence and folly.
'Tu m'as défait,' he exclaimed with heart-sick melancholy to his wife, when he learned of the assassination of Calmette for his exposures - true or false in the Figaro. I know of no more tragic destruction of a glistening web of power such as Caillaux had woven for himself. He felt that he had been ruined by the rash act of his wife. Gone all his grandiose projects of becoming President of the Republic, and for bringing about a swift peace with the consequent title for posterity of saviour of his country! All had disappeared in the smoke of Madame Caillaux's revolver.
For Jacques Caillaux, ex-Premier of France, is not the vulgar adventurer building a bubble fortune out of sunbeams. He has statesmanlike views. He believed that France had put her money on the wrong horse, that she should have backed Germany instead of England, and thus got rid of the danger to her economic development which had thwarted her national life for half a century. Remove this menace, make peace, establish economic relations with Germany that was, apparently, his receipt for war-worn France. Unfortunately, he disregarded a great historic wrong; he applied no remedy to an open sore; he thought only of immediate adjustments. Deep and dangerous, alas! were his methods of achieving his ideal. He had a Jesuit's belief that the end justified the means. His words not only concealed his thoughts, but created a false impression. While apparently adhering to the Entente and making many declarations in that sense to English correspondents (myself among them), he was, if report speaketh true, striving to bring about a quite different orientation of French foreign policy. His duplicity has not succeeded. We will leave him to face his trial, with the sug
gestion that ambition, and not money, for he inherited amply from his father, has made him mad and induced him to regard himself as a Napoleon capable of carrying out a new sort of revolutionary Eighteenth Brumaire. His fanatical belief in himself has brought him to the sorriest pass for a man of his position and attainments.
M. Malvy is a conspirator of a commoner kind-slack and complacent in the discharge of his duties and rather weak than willfully wrongdoing. The Republic certainly has need of surer servants, after its generally satisfactory existence for nearly half a century. Happily, there is Clemenceau, the ‘Incorruptible' as well as 'green' in his perennial youth. As the author of the discoveries, with Gaston Calmette and Gustave Hervé, who wrote, the one and the other, in the Figaro and the Victoire accusing and urging punishments, it is right that he should be the authorized justiciar of the Republic. There is none better qualified to lead his country into the paths of an honorable peace, by reason of the strength of his convictions and his consistent loyalty and disinterestedness. After a long life of great political influence, he remains a poor man and is proud of it.
But he has the defects of his qualities. One is a sporting indifference to minor consequences. He is not afraid of risks. Sometimes those that he takes seem unnecessarily great. He decrees the liberty of the press and removes the shackles of the censorship. The effect is a new and hardened tone in public comment. The windows are open and fresh air is let in. But even so salutary a process is accompanied by danger; for, accompanying the wholesome draft is a wave of défaitiste propaganda. Intent on winning the war, he disregards this abominable enterprise, to which Gustave Hervé - the patriot converted from anti-militar
ism-calls his attention. But he cam long be proof against it. His consid tion for criticism springs from his desire to be free. His ardent tempe ment chafes at unintelligent rest tions. Every one knows how his res paper, the Free Man, became the in Chains (L'Homme Enchaîné) beca he felt that way about the censor's a tivities. On the very day when he came Premier, he restored the old t L'Homme Libre, and every journa in France was a free man. But, as G. tave Hervé himself says, superior: the right of the press is the safety: the country. That is the first law.
M. Clemenceau's tendency, perhan is to play with a situation and nee: lessly prolong it. We saw this chara teristic in the strike in the North lowing the great mining disaster a Courrières. He dallied with diffic ties, tasting a pleasure therein, a protested that conciliation would effer everything - until it was almost to late to effect anything. Bloodshed, deed, came before tranquillity in th: tormented region. And in the move ment in the South, where the wine-grow ing departments threatened to brea with the Republic, in order to expres their dissatisfaction with laws affectin their prosperity, he showed the sam habit of temporization-even a sort flippancy, as it seemed.
But although the disaffection gre until it became really serious, the Pre mier finally put an end to it by meth ods most suggestive of comic opera. must have rejoiced the spirit of irony which is so strong in him. The wine growers' leader, whose impassioned ontory had fascinated thousands, walk one Sunday into M. Clemenceau's d fice and was swiftly and quietly packe off home he had come to Paris 1 escape arrest with a hundred franc (M. Clemenceau's) in his pocket pay his fare. Thus ended the rebellion
in a shout of laughter, for the prophet had proved ridiculously naïve. It vindicated, if you will, the Clemenceau method; but none the less it is scarcely to be recommended.
There is also something of the knight adventurer about M. Clemenceau. If he disconcerts some people by his boyish spirits, -for, temperamentally, he has never grown up, they yet feel, in spite of themselves, how steadfast he is and how wise, beneath a mask of almost truculent indifference. He has the fault common to his intellectual countrymen of relying too much upon formulæ. 'It must be so, for I have proved it by mathematics.'
Again, his large generosity, broad general ideas, and ardent nature cause him to overlook the defects of meaner men in their malevolence and sordid aims. But, for all that, he is the one man conspicuously necessary to the salvation of France. His strong, brave spirit rises to the height of the national emergency. So far from being frightened by the twin dragons of Boloism and Bolshevism, he feels strengthened by his struggle with both. He has transfixed both with his sword.
The world in arms loves a fighter. That is why Clemenceau has secured the very first place in the heart of the army. It loves his spirit, the élan and bravoure of a Frenchman of the old school, directed by the science of the new. Moreover, he is a deep-dyed Republican-one who has suffered for the cause. He makes the same appeal to the common soldier as does Joffre, for he will pat a sentry on the shoulder and call him 'mon ami.'
Yet, for all his democracy, he is the last man to flatter ignorance and megalomania. Some accuse him of being an aristocrat at heart-unquestionably an old-world distinction and courtesy
cling to him. He is charming in conversation. Nor is it hard to imagine him one of the most noted duelists of the day. He has the manner which goes with swordsmanship: alertness, an intrepid eye, a certain bluff heartiness. Yet he is practical withal, and combines the acuteness of a man of business with the instincts of a preux chevalier.
He has a double character: one half student and philosopher, some one caught him reading Theocritus in the true spirit of Macaulay's Scholar,the other half man of action. And, sometimes, no doubt, the philosopher is uppermost, killing the physical activity. Again, a temperamental impatience to cut a way through difficulties may lead to drastic measures which another judgment would repudiate. Indeed, the balance is hard to establish, for his Gallic nature is speedily aflame and his temper leaps to the combat at the signal of attack. Yet generally it is well controlled by a brain that is steel-cold in its analysis and piercing power.
Between Boloism and Bolshevism he has risen to great authority as the one solid rock of government in France. He is the symbol of the nation. Who shall dare to cast him down? And the army, realizing his moral force behind its belligerent one, acclaims him the great patriot. And when he returns from visiting the Front, to his home on rue Franklin, he feels cheered and supported by the welcome he has had from the troops. Sometimes a poilu places in his car as a mark of especial favor a piece of rude carving from the trench, a walking-stick, with handle fashioned in the Premier's likeness, or a pipe of good French briar. And these trophies of poilu affection touch him more, I think, than the proudest gifts.
THE WESTERN FRONT AND POLITICAL STRATEGY
BY ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME
I TRUST that I have shown in my earlier articles in this magazine, first, that the strategy of the Allies ought, like that of the Germans, to be a strategy of the political sciences, under penalty of remaining in a dangerous condition of inferiority; second, that action on the part of the Allies confined to the Western Front is not enough to make their victory certain, but that, to be effective, their action must embrace the whole theatre of war now represented by Pan-Germany in its entirety.
The partisans of the Western Front theory believe that every effort put forth elsewhere must work to the disadvantage of that front. The exact contrary is true, on condition that the field of action far away from the Western theatre is wisely chosen.
Strong evidence of this is seen in the consideration that the German offensive in the West would have been impossible if the Allies had been sagacious enough to replace the vanished Russian front by an insurrectionary front extending from the Baltic to their lines in Macedonia - which is what the Germans would inevitably have done had they been in the place of the Allies.
I have already indicated the broad outlines of the plan based on this conception.1
The object of the present paper is to
1 See chapters XII and XIII of the second (enlarged) edition of Pan-Germany; the Disease and Cure. Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press. 1918.
It is the purpose of this analysis t disclose, first, the nature of the peopl embraced in Pan-Germany, considere as a whole; second, how far the ge graphical distribution of such of the peoples as are anti-Pangermanist wou enable them (in case certain conditions as to providing them with arms should be fulfilled) to manifest their sent ments to good purpose.
The total population of Pan-Ge many amounts to 180,000,000 souk made up of two sharply contrasted el ments.
1. The Germans and their vassa -or pro-Germans, numbering, s 94,000,000.
2. The slaves
There are, in fact, confined in Pa Germany against their will, the eno mous number of 86,000,000 Slavs, Lat ins, and Semites, belonging to fourtee
This fact is of preponderating in
portance: for this vast aggregation of French, Belgians, Alsace-Lorrainers, Danes, Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, Ruthenians (with a reservation to be indicated below), Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Roumanians, Italians, Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, are anti-German by conviction. They are well aware that only the decisive victory of the Entente can put an end to their slavery.
Having studied most of these oppressed peoples on the spot for more than twenty years, being familiar with their interests and their sentiments, I assert that here is a psychological situation of supreme interest to the Allies. Furthermore, I maintain that these 86,000,000 Slavs, Latins, and Semites, by reason of the strategic importance of the regions they occupy, representon the single condition that they are supplied with means of effective action closely adapted to their peculiar situation a force capable of affording infinitely more valuable assistance in bringing about victory than any that the 182,000,000 inhabitants of the former Empire of the Tsars could ever have contributed.
The immense advantage that the Allies can derive from this state of affairs will appear fully in the light of the deductions which can be drawn from the following analysis of the various peoples of Pan-Germany. The essential object of this analysis is to determine the numbers, in each of the main groups which make up the population of Pan-Germany, that is to say, the Germans and pro-Germans on the one hand, and their slaves on the other, (1) of men and of women, respectively; (2) of men mobilized in the armies of Pan-Germany; (3) of men not mobilized, who, therefore, have remained at home or are employed in munition factories.
How the ethnological analysis is worked out. From these various
points of view, it would manifestly be impossible to derive figures which are rigorously accurate; but it is proper to observe that even approximate accuracy is sufficient to make our deductions of very practical value. And it is possible to reach that point by starting from these three bases of reckoning:
(a) In respect to those whom we term the slaves, we shall distinguish between subjects of the Entente countries and subjects of the Central Powers. The latter alone can be regularly mobilized in the armies of Pan-Germany.
(b) We shall assume that females make up half of the total population of a country. In many countries the number of females is slightly above fifty per cent; but the difference is generally so small that it could not cause a serious error in the deductions which serve as a basis of our argument.
(c) We shall assume that the Germans have mobilized twenty per cent of their subjects and of the subjects of their vassal-allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This proportion is large enough to do away with. any danger of an estimate below the facts. Indeed this figure of twenty in one hundred of the whole populationconsequently including women--is the highest among known results of the various mobilizations. Moreover it corresponds with the results of the German mobilization so far as the information gleaned in three years enables us to determine it. Lastly, this figure embraces practically all the physically sound men between 15 and 60 years. In selecting it as a basis, therefore, we may be assured that we do not underestimate the mobilized forces of PanGermany.
An analysis of the first group, the 94,000,000 Germans and pro-Germans would result as follows: