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tion of the party system; and had they been as liberal as they were national, they might have done much to infuse a democratic spirit into German political ideals. But, unlike English Liberals, the adherents of this party made no real effort to reach the masses. They soon degenerated into a group, identifying themselves exclusively with the industrial magnates. For twenty years this group has been the Chancellor's shuttlecock, tossed about between the Black (Centre) and the Blue (Conservative), now attached to the former, now to the latter, and at times even driven to the last of humiliations courting the Socialists.

In what way can the principle of ministerial responsibility, either to the Reichstag or to the Federal Council, be introduced into such a system? We have seen that no 'government' can command a settled majority, but the word is misleading to English or American ears. There is no imperial government in our sense. It is merely as a member of the Federal Council that the Chancellor takes part in the debates in the Reichstag, and any other member of the Council has the same right. Complete ministerial responsibility to the Reichstag alone means the weakening of the royal prerogative, and consequently of Prussian influence; responsibility to the Federal Council alone would increase the prestige of a body essentially anti-democratic in its constitution. A double-barreled responsibility to both houses - would be quite impracticable. If the federal character of the constitution is retained, the first real step toward true democracy is the conversion of the Federal Council into an elective assembly, and the second is the recognition of the principle of ministerial responsibility to the Reichstag as the popular chamber. If, however, the federal element is destined to become a weaker

and weaker political influence in the constitution, then the democratization of Germany will depend upon the democratization of Prussia.


It is impossible for the closest student to foresee the ultimate political conditions in the German Empire, but tendencies indicate that the natural evolution will follow two main lines: (1) the federal system will approach more and more to the unitary type; (2) the gradual supersession of the agricultural population by a highly organized industrial community is bringing into existence a middle class that will exercise an important influence on the social life of the German people, and indirectly on their political evolution.

The unitary tendencies since the establishment of the Empire have been unmistakable. Forces making for commercial expansion, and for what is called 'world-politics,' have intensified the national consciousness. This in itself tends to break down the old particularism. But in the sphere of purely domestic activity also, forces working in the same direction are clearly traceable. The effort to reduce the law, so far as possible, to one uniform code, the vast body of imperial legislation regulating interstate commerce and the industrial conditions in the whole Empire, the appointment of a school commission to mould, so far as practicable, the educational system on one model, are all the continuation of the Prussianizing process under the new conditions.

Often, during the critical seven and a half years which I spent in Germany, I conversed with Prussians and South Germans whose memories stretched back to the wars of 1866 and 1870, to the days of the anti-Socialist laws and

the conflict between the state and the Roman Catholic Church - Kulturkampf, and I tried to ascertain their estimate of Germany's political progress since those days. One and all seemed to regard any right of selfgovernment, any constitutional power, as a concession from above. On another point also there was something like unanimity that the establishment of constitutionalism in Prussia is inseparably associated with the outlook for political liberalism in the Empire. The Prussian type, they pointed out, is very stable, and seems destined to absorb more and more elements of the national life, because only its extension will satisfy the new aspirations and ambitions. So far from the structure, with all its anomalies, having ever been seriously menaced from within since the foundation of the union, the old distinctions based solely on locality have almost disappeared. Moreover, it is in Prussia that the greatest commercial and industrial advance has been made since 1871, and no section of the people has derived more relative benefit from this advance than the small tradesmen and the skilled artisans in the other states.

It is this question of Prussia's politics that is exercising the minds of German Socialists and Radicals to-day. The centre of political interest is, and will remain for some time, the constitution of the Prussian House of Representatives rather than the position of the Reichstag. The essential elements in the liberalizing of Prussia's political institutions are the substitution of equal adult suffrage for the three-class electoral system, and the recognition of the principle of ministerial responsibility to the representatives.

The details of the three-class system Dreiklassenwahl- have been given too often to call for elaboration here. A general idea of its result in actual

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practice may be obtained from the bare statement of fact that at the 1908 election the Conservatives, with a total of 418,398 votes, secured 212 seats, and the Social Democrats with 598,522 votes, secured 7 seats. The bill promised last year goes some distance in the direction of substituting a more equitable electoral system, and also of liberalizing the Upper House (Herrenhaus). If the present agitation continues, we shall soon see how far the promises then made were sincere, and whether they are backed by the present Chancellor.

Though opposition to the reform of existing political institutions in Prussia is largely centred on aristocracy and privilege, it must be emphasized that no urgent need of democratic selfgovernment seems to have taken strong hold of the intellectual element in the nation. The forces antagonistic to Junkerdom have been mainly recruited from the working masses and a section of the commercial middle class. These influences will not be powerful enough, or coherent enough, to work an organic change to a constitutional régime until they are reinforced by the flower of the national intellect.


It is essential, however, in considering the prospect of political reform in Germany, or what are called the 'crises' of the past twelve months, to remember that what is at stake is the whole character of Germany after the war. This character will be determined by the peace, and if the military organization is strong enough to resist external pressure, it will be strong enough to resist any pressure likely to be exerted from the inside.

The attitude of the German press toward political developments since the appointment of the new Chancellor,

Count von Hertling, was widely interpreted in England as indicating a cleavage of opinion between the general public and the autocracy. But the German press is only partially trustworthy as a guide to the drift of political affairs in Germany. Hertling's appointment was another move in the offensive, directed from the political side. The German reply to President Wilson's and the Pope's notes, and the proposed Socialist conference at Stockholm, mark varying stages in this offensive. They all failed, for the simple reason that Germany could not state her terms definitely without exposing her bloodguiltiness and her aggressive designs.

The comments of the English press a few months ago on Michaelis's 'precarious position' and the 'distrust' of the Crown Prince and his clique, were quite immaterial to the main argument. Michaelis was nothing more or less than a stop-gap, accepted as a compromise by the Imperialists in the Reichstag, who succeeded in deposing the objectionable Bethmann-Hollweg. When Michaelis proved himself the third-rate politician which every one acquainted with the man and his career knew him to be, some of our English journalists already saw Kaiserism fighting in its last trench, and Germany abandoning her earlier dreams and schemes of world-power. The Chancellor 'crisis' was engineered solely because German statecraft was supremely concerned to make the most of the military situation, and Hertling was a far abler man than Michaelis to conduct the new 'offensive' against Germany's enemies. At home, the appointment was an honest effort to placate the extreme Imperialists without embittering the more moderate war party, but in no sense was it a yielding to popular clamor. On this ground the Reichstag welcomed him, but it was not responsible for the choice. VOL. 121-NO. 5

The appointment, it is true, was not decreed in the accustomed imperious manner of the Kaiser. Some sort of negotiation took place between the Chancellor elect and the parliamentary leaders. The Left clamored for the removal of Vice-Chancellor Helfferich, who had long been obnoxious to a section of the Reichstag. He was dismissed. Thereupon, with what would seem to the outsider a curious unanimity, the German press strove to give as much democratic color as possible to the incident, declaring that both Germany and Prussia were moving toward true constitutionalism. The Socialist and Liberal organs especially, in referring to the recent changes, said that Germany had already become a state ruled on parliamentary lines, and that the 'political revolution' which had taken place would increase her prestige with the nations of the world. If German Socialists and Liberals were really capable of such self-deception, it would not be surprising that the attitude of the Pangermanists toward them is what it is.

Nowadays comment on political movements and personages in Germany soon becomes out of date. The decisive factor in German politics today is simply the need of converting military successes into political assets. Hertling's whole speech in the Reichstag on January 24, 1918, proved this. The speech, throughout, showed that diplomatic astuteness for which he was noted as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Federal Council; but it showed also that he represents the German army quite as much as does Hindenburg or Ludendorff.

The disposition since the war to rest large hopes on every anticipated utterance of Berlin is in complete accord with the entire mental attitude of British Liberals to Germany and Germanism for at least a decade. Then, when

the concrete proposals are declared, they are found not to point to security, or to a league of nations, but to further strife and the continuance of all those conditions which would doom such a league, from its inception, to repose on a false idea and a false ideal.

Any discussion of the prospect of a long or short reign for Hertling would yield little profit. All that one can say with certainty is that his appointment was popular with the Clericals, and, apparently, with a small section of the Left. A more interesting personality than either Bethmann-Hollweg or Michaelis, he has for years played an important part in Bavarian politics, and in the Federal Council he always displayed a keen flair for the motives of German foreign policy. He has also long been the unofficial mouthpiece of the Wilhelmstrasse with the Vatican. In many respects a typical member of the Centre, he is nevertheless Deutschnational, patriotic, and German, to the finger-tips, finding no difficulty in reconciling his Germanism with the just claims of his church. His attitude to the war and war-aims since August, 1914, has left nothing to be desired, even by the Pangermanists. In February, 1917, he said, 'We have gained all that we wanted, so from Germany's point of view there is no longer any reason to continue the struggle.' He went on to defend the submarine campaign, which was organized 'to bring the war to a close on the basis of the present war-map.' Responsible statesmen in Germany have given few plainer

indications of the motives underlying the policy that led up to the worldconflict.

I have often been asked if I thought there would ever be a revolution in Germany. My reply has consistently been, 'Only if the mass of the people find themselves face to face with military defeat and starvation.'

That time is not yet. It may well be that, before it is reached, militarism in Germany is destined to run its full course, and to supersede even such semblance of civilian authority as exists. For the pressure of democratic opinion, such as it is, will not influence the counsels of Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

I have never been one of those who hold that an overwhelming majority of the German people at any time sincerely believed that they were fighting a purely defensive war. But it is impossible to doubt that the German government would not now find that wholehearted support from the people which was accorded in the early stages of the war, or such unanimous approval of Hertling as the Allied governments can claim from their own people for their statement of war-aims. The German people have long desired peace, but the form of peace which has hitherto appealed to them is more or less associated with the ambitions and ideals of a militarist power. It will become less associated with those ideals in proportion as the militarists fail to 'deliver the goods.' Then the democratic ferment may begin to work effectively.



SUMMER resorts may not have been invented by women, but they would have short shrift in a womanless world. They are one of the more terrible products of civilization for which women are responsible. Suburbs are another. The average man hates half-and-half in all its forms; he wants either the city or the country; he is willing to be overcivilized during half the year if he may be under-civilized during the other half; for him it is either Broadway or the backwoods; and while, for prudential reasons, he may tolerate a suburban residence or even a summer resort, he can never be really happy in either.

My own taste does not run to resorts of any kind, but it runs least of all to seaside resorts. They are composed of sand, pavilions, hotels, and people, and I disapprove of all four, especially the people- not because I am undemocratic, but because I dislike to spend a summer watching people, whom I have seen all winter, amusing themselves in droves and herds, all doing the same things, wearing the same clothes, eating the same indigestibles. And there are too many of them. Sitting on a bench and watching them saunter by on the board-walk, most of them blistered and peeling, I want to push them off into the ocean. At such places there is usually an ocean, but it is a poor affair except at night or during a storm. At other times it is only so much water; nobody ever looks at it, though all keep up a pretence of loving it and liking to bathe in it.

Still, I do not mean to be too hard on the ocean. I like it better than I do the people, and, if I could look at it in peace, I might even grow to love it. I have watched it playing with the children, and for it to condescend as it does to fill the holes they dig and knock down their forts and gently lay scallopshells and razor-shells and sand-hoppers at their feet, is companionable, to say the least. What I object to is having it lay banana-skins and crackerboxes at my feet, and having its unplumbed salt estranging leagues of distance intercepted by rubber caps and bandana handkerchiefs.

When one turns landward, there are abominable formal beds of coleus and cannas in the foreground, and beyond, bath-houses and hotels and boardinghouses, of the jig-saw school of architecture, against a sky-line of chutes and Ferris-wheels and scenic railways, all simmering in the sun and exhaling an atmosphere of seaweed and clams, and humming with the drone of harmoniums and phonographs and the distant wail of merry-go-rounds.

That I view all with a jaundiced eye is not my fault. As a little boy I spent many summers in one of those curious places in which evangelical people used to gather once a year for a religious debauch. One could start going to church at six o'clock in the morning and continue singing and praying and listening to sermons until ten at night. When you were not attending a meeting in the temple or the tabernacle, you could enjoy yourself looking at a model of

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