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Map printed in Berlin in 1895, and distributed by the Pangermanist League, showing the frontiers of
Central Pan-Germany as they should be in 1950. It will be observed that the line of the projected frontier includes Italian (or Venetian) Friuli, which the Austro-Germans have recently taken, but stops
a little short of their present front, as shown by the line added to the map by the author. essential and indispensable part to play the formation of which is the first conin its execution.
dition of carrying out all the other Let us, first of all, prove, with the Pangermanist plans, is set forth in aid of a document of unquestionable detail in a pamphlet published at Berauthenticity twenty-two years old, that lin in 1895, with a colored map, under this was actually the plan of the Berlin the title, Greater Germany and Central Staff.
Europe about 1950. The extraordinary The Pan-Germanist plan of 1895, importance of this pamphlet is no which is that of Central Pan-Germany, longer open to question, for these three
reasons. First, from 1895 on it was 1895. In fact, on our map, Italian
Now, on November 22, Italian aviIn very truth, after an interval of a ators recorded the fact,' confirmed by score of years, coincidences so perfect German officer-prisoners, that extenas these between plans and their exe- sive fortifications had been constructcution cannot assuredly be fortuitous. ed by the Austro-Germans to form a The verification of what I say is sup- Hindenburg line ‘on the line of the plied by the map printed herewith, a Tagliamento,' that is to say, precisely
the frontier-line laid down in 1895. phlet of 1895, upon which I have had V Lastly, the Austro-Boche schemes of the colors represented by lines and annexation in this region have been have shown the German front as it plainly asserted. In the orders of the was at the end of 1917. Now, it will be day to his troops on November 4, the noticed that the German armies have Emperor of Austria described the instopped a little beyond the lines mark- vasion of Italian Friuli as the liberaing the future frontiers of Central tion of my territory on the Adriatic Pan-Germany, or in the positions that littoral,' a phrase which suggests exare necessary to make sure the crea- plicitly both the idea of premeditation tion of the satellite states of Pan- and the idea of conquest. Germany to the eastward. Thus, on Let us remark in passing that, as in the Eastern front, they have stopped the matter of Poland and indeed in all on lines laid down beforehand, even others, the Emperor of Austria coöpewhen they had before them no Russian rates docilely in the execution of the troops capable of opposing their fur- Pangermanist ideas of Berlin. Certain ther advance. Our map also enables us persons of the Entente believe that the to declare on the most irrefutable testi- government of Vienna is subjugated mony that the offensive against Italy by Berlin, whose tyrannous yoke it
that is to say, first of all, the seizure would be glad to shake off. Nothing of Italian Friuli, which was such a sur- of the sort is true. Even though the prise to the Allied Staffs — was pro- hegemony of Berlin may be offensive vided for most definitely in the plan of to Austrian self-esteem, the leaders in
Vienna and Budapest submit to it tral Pan-Germany would supply Gerreadily enough for this simple reason: many with the means of universal the dynasty of the Hapsburgs realizes domination, that the war was begun. perfectly well that its fate is bound up Under these conditions, then, it was with that of the Prussian autocracy, absolutely logical that the German and that it can save itself only by sav- Staff, before seeking to obtain a final ing the Hohenzollerns, that is to say, decision in the West should have deby strengthening the enormous exten- termined to create a Central Pansion of Prussian militarism. If this Germany, either at the expense of point of view had been grasped at the Russia, Serbia, and Roumania, or, by outset by the Entente, blunders re- dissembling its purpose, at the expense sulting in endless evil consequences
of Berlin's own allies, who, by the very could never have been committed. fact of this creation of Pan-Germany
Our pamphlet and map prove there- would automatically become more and fore that in the second phase of the more completely the vassals of Gerwar the German Staff subordinated many. everything to the determination to It is not true, therefore, as people create Central Pan-Germany first of still say incessantly among the Allies all. This determination is easily ex- because of their extraordinary and obplained when one is familiar with the stinate ignorance of the Pangermanist Pangermanist ideas and the conditions plan, that the Germans, for three years of their fulfillment. Brought abruptly past, have by their circular offensives face to face, after the battle of the simply been seizing territorial pledges; Marne, with a redoubtable coalition no – during the second phase of the which it had not foreseen, and which war the Germans have taken possesthreatened to take in the whole world, sion of the various fragments of territhe German Staff knew perfectly well tory essential to the formation of Centhat the military forces alone of Ger- tral Pan-Germany, not regarding them many and Austria-Hungary, in view as pledges, but as acquisitions long of the ineradicable hostility of the anticipated, or as destined to remain Slavs and Latins who form the major- forever in subjection to the will of ity of the population of the Empire of Berlin. the Hapsburgs, and because of the in- Of course, to refute my interpretasufficient food-supply of the Central tion of events, any one can say, ‘But Empires, could not resist the combined Verdun proves that the Germans forces of Russia, France, and Great wished to break through on the WestBritain. On the other hand, the ex- ern front early in 1916.' This objection haustive investigations pursued for has only an apparent or very imperfect more than twenty years in preparation force. In reality, the German offensive for putting into effect the Pangerman- against Verdun was of a twofold charist plan, had shown the German staff acter which is not yet understood by that a Central Pan-Germany actually the Allies, still because of their ignorconstituted, comprising, in addition to ance of the Pangermanist plan. In the the Central Empires, the Balkans and conception of the German staff the Turkey, would contain all the military Verdun operation had, not one, but and economic elements necessary to
two objectives - a maximum and a confront a formidable coalition.
minimum. If the maximum objective Indeed, it was because it had been could have been secured, that is to say, established before the war that Cen- if the morale of the French poilus could
have been destroyed by the length erable importance of the Balkan the and the savagery of the German offen- atre. If therefore the Eastern army of sive; if the Germans had succeeded in the Allies had received quickly the breaking through and taking Paris, powerful reinforcements which the France, struck to the heart, would un- leaders in Paris and London did not questionably have been put out of the give it, as the Bulgarians had not as
Verdun, therefore, may and yet the necessary matériel for fortifyshould be regarded as an attempt to ing themselves strongly, it is exceedbreak through and to resume the war- ingly probable that the Allies would fare of movement.
have been able to recover the Danube But what must be clearly understood front, that is, the strategic position is that, even if they had been certain which was the key of the whole war; at the outset that this maximum result for its possession alone, by putting into was absolutely impossible of attain- effect automatically the land blockade ment, still the Germans would have of Austria-Germany, and depriving her undertaken the Verdun operation; for of the men and supplies without which to them it had its full justification she could not go on fighting, would in view of the extreme importance of have assured the Entente a complete the minimum objective which it had victory, with efforts tenfold less vigin the conception of the Staff - an orous than those which have been comobjective which, as we shall see, was pulsorily decided upon, with the result in conformity with the general deci- that we know. sion at Berlin to constitute Central The German Staff, realizing fully Pan-Germany first of all, before real- that the lengthening of the war would ly thinking of annihilating France by a be of advantage only to that one of the genuine offensive.
two groups of belligerents which should This demonstration brings me to the be in possession of the Danube front, setting forth of a series of points of spied an immense peril in the camview which have never, to my know- paign carried on in France in favor of ledge, been suggested.
Saloniki. It determined therefore, at Not until the early days of 1916, did any cost, to prevent the Allies from Germany, as a sequel of the recent ascribing to their actions in the Bal. seizure of Serbia, come into direct kans the importance which would have geographical contact with Bulgaria made it possible to bring to naught all and Turkey. Berlin was still a long the Pangermanist plans. To divert the way from having organized the va- attention of the Allies from Salonikirious resources of those two countries Belgrade, a violent and persistent of
resources which were indispensable fensive against Verdun was the best to her to enable her to continue the expedient that could be imagined, given
the fact that the Pangermanist scheme Now, at that very time, certain per- was at that time wholly unknown to sons in France were making persistent the Allied leaders. efforts to have the French and Brit- In fact, the Verdun operation, by ish supply the expeditionary force at threatening the very heart of France, Saloniki with the powerful means of presented from the German standaction which it ought to have. These point this enormous psychological adefforts were on the point of success, for vantage, that it apparently justified a very large body of public opinion those of the French and British leaders, had become convinced of the consid- who at that time regarded the Saloniki
expedition with the opposite of sym- and political forces have been suffipathy. Indeed, early in 1916 they were ciently developed, the combined constill claiming that the Balkans could sequences of the length of the war and not have any decisive influence on the of the existence of Central Pan-Gerresult of the war, since they were sure, many, have manifested themselves in as they declared, that they could break accordance with the anticipations of through the Western front - which the German Staff. As Russia, under they called the most important one — the government of the Tsar, was not whenever and wherever they chose. put in a condition to sustain a long
Under these conditions it is easy to struggle either morally or materially, see why a part of the press also and - indeed, the Petrograd government hence of public opinion – was hostile
was never capable of doing so, and to the Saloniki expedition, in France, as she was, later, completely disorganbut especially in England, This being ized by the Maximalist traitors and so, a vigorous offensive against Verdun maniacs, she has foundered. As a concould not fail to strengthen these cur- sequence Roumania is reduced to imrents running counter to the Balkan potence. Thus, at the moment that I expedition by seeming to justify the am writing these words, only the Allied opposition that had been offered to it. army at Saloniki continues to emThus the minimum - but exceedingly barrass the German Staff. But that important — objective of the Verdun army not having been reinforced suffioperation consisted in preventing the ciently to form as dangerous a menace Allies from shifting the chief theatre as was necessary, the Staff has already, of the war to the Balkans in the begin- in effect, a sufficiently free hand in the ning of 1916. This minimum objective East to enter upon the third and last was completely attained.
phase of the war, that is to say, to conUnquestionably the Verdun opera- centrate on the Western front the tion was expensive to the Kaiser's whole of the disposable forces of Pantroops; but in reality those enormous Germany, — Germans,
Germans, Austro-Hunsacrifices had their justification, since garians, Bulgarians, and Turks, - in they resulted in enabling Berlin to order to make another trial of the war complete the formation of Central of movement likely to bring about the Pan-Germany, which alone could fur- final decision. nish the means of contending against At this moment the concentration is the world-wide coalition. It cannot be proceeding with all possible speed. But denied that Verdun, by reason of the we must thoroughly grasp the fact that Allies' ignorance of the Pangermanist in the German scheme the general ofplan, caused them to throw away their fensive in the West is regarded as a last chance of sending sufficient rein- very complex operation, necessitating forcements to the Balkan front before recourse to the strategy of the political the Austro-Germans and Bulgars had sciences, and hence of national psythe necessary time and matériel to chology, which lies at the root of all make it, humanly speaking, about as the German pacifist manæuvres. hard to break through as the Western front.
III. THE GERMAN PACIFIST MANEUVRES Third phase — from December, 1917
AND POLITICAL STRATEGY to - As Central Pan-Germany
has become an accomplished fact in In reality Germany has succeeded thirty-eight months, and as its military in creating Central Pan-Germany only