science, but supplementary to it, is careful to claim the knowing faculties for science, and to grant to religion insights and experiences, noble indeed, loftier in their range than those given by science, yet not strictly entitled to be designated as knowledge. He is right in the statement that fixity of conception is impossible to religion, for she deals with the Infinite. He is right in making a distinction between the faculties used in science and those used in religion. He is right in an assertion which he makes in an address on the "Scientific Use of the Imagination" that the "creative" faculties-by which he means the united action of the reason and the imagination-"lead us into a world not less real than that of the senses and of which the world of the senses is the suggestion, and to a great extent, the outcome." But is he quite justified in concealing in the adjective "creative" the fact that the intuitions of the reason lay hold of reality, and in giving to the word "know" its full significance in connection

with the report of the senses? Without the "creative" faculties "Newton never would have invented fluxions, nor Davy have decomposed the earths and alkalies, nor would Columbus have found another continent." He submerges the faith that is in science under the word "knowing" and the knowledge that is in religion under the word "creative."

Now knowledge is a very substantial word; it connotes something solid. One can build upon it, entrust his life to it, without hesitation. It is the sovereign, ultimate word in any department of thought. It is of such inestimable merit that it seems to me the scientists are trying to smuggle it into their camp under the cover of very arbitrary and plausible definitions, which they themselves make, and to leave religion something "just as good," but which does not carry with it the same confidence and power as the word "knowledge." So valuable is it that they wish the exclusive right to it.

As I have said, it is the scientists themselves who lay claim to the use of the

knowing faculties in their work. Certainly no group of experts in other fields, if asked to define the word "knowledge," would give it to science as a peculiar possession. And surely religion will never consent to have the word dwell permanently outside her domain. It has been hers from the beginning, and it is the only word that will accurately describe her experiences. One cannot imagine Jesus of Nazareth admitting: "I know Jerusalem and the mountains round about, for my eyes see them, but God and the eternal city of the spirit are the objects of faith. I know the things that are seen, but the things which are unseen I believe." He never would have assented to Tennyson's lines

"We have but faith, we may not know
For knowledge is of things we see."

On the contrary he would have affirmed that he knew God better than he knew the temple and the high priest. He would never for a moment have tolerated the idea that the senses bring us nearer Re

ality than does the vision of the pure heart. He considered knowledge to be the sovereign reward of fidelity, giving abundance to the life that now is and beatitude to that which is hereafter.

Neither can we imagine one of the glorious succession of apostles, prophets and saints who would think of consenting to the statement that they had more certainty of what their eyes saw and their hands handled than of a Reality reported in their spiritual experience.

The church thinks of herself as founded upon a rock and not upon the shifting sands of conjecture and hope. She believes that the evidence upon which one is willing to live and die can only be truly phrased in the strongest word of which our language is capable.

We claim that the difference between the results of scientific experimentation and religious experience is not the difference between knowledge and faith, but between two different kinds of knowledge, each resting on faith, each established on

experimentation after its own kind. Science uses the perceptive and the distinctively intellectual faculties in her operations; religion assumes that the heart has reasons as well as the intellect, that conscience is a doorway into reality, that the imagination and the will are also pathways to truth. Religion employs a larger portion of human nature in the discovery of truth than does science, and she believes that she touches a wider environment.

In order to make our discussion as clear as possible, let us start with a definition of certainty and knowledge. Certainty is an assured conviction that something is so and not otherwise. It is entirely subjective and may be an illusion. Knowledge is to have assurance upon proper evidence that one's mental apprehensions agree with reality. Subjectively there is certainty, objectively there is reality; the connecting link is proper evidence that the thought tallies with the thing.

The conviction we are seeking to establish is that religious experience creates a